Is Indonesia’s Military Leaving the Barracks?

Discourses about the Indonesian military’s potential bigger role in the civilian space have been around for years. Credit: Akurat.co/Endra Prakoso

Introduction

Indonesia’s political landscape is experiencing a significant shift that subtly leans towards increased military engagement in civilian affairs.

Following Prabowo Subianto’s election as president, Tentara Nasional Indonesia (TNI) has become a more visible and constant presence in a multitude of areas, including economic development and political process.

TNI’s role under the current government has expanded beyond traditional defence duties and into civilian matters, as will be explored below.

Although such may also be interpreted as TNI’s support for the government’s affairs, its consequences are significant. This is because such activity transcends TNI’s conventional role as the security provider and affords it an opportunity to participate in the state’s governing process.

This is not new. The military was a primary force in Indonesia’s politics during former president Suharto’s New Order regime, during which it incorporated the concept of dwifungsi (dual role)in security and governance. Reformasi, however, facilitated the segregation of the military from civilian government, a process that is often colloquially referred to as “going back to the barracks”.

However, developments in recent years suggest that the military is returning to political centre stage.

TNI’s Growing Prominence: From Jokowi to Prabowo

Prabowo’s military background and connection profoundly define his identity as a political actor. It plays a big role in how Prabowo’s administration is using his military background to strengthen TNI’s role in Indonesia’s political and social landscapes. Following former president Joko “Jokowi” Widodo’s co-optation of Prabowo as defence minister in 2019, this became even clearer.

During Jokowi’s administration, military personnel were assigned to various civilian administrative roles and non-traditional activities, including disaster relief, infrastructure development, and social programmes. Jokowi highlighted that, notwithstanding the expanded responsibilities, the military’s primary role remained on counter-terrorism, maritime security and national development.

Concurrently, Kepolisian Negara Republik Indonesia (Polri) emerged as the main security entity, capitalising on robust political affiliations. During this period, Polri frequently aligned itself with political figures and entities, at times becoming embroiled in political disputes to suppress opposition or dissent.

For instance, even after leaving office, Jokowi allegedly instructed Polri’s inspector general to lobby the senior officials of Partai Demokrasi Indonesia Perjuangan to keep him and his family within the party. Compared to Polri, TNI exhibited a notably restrained presence in the political sphere, keeping itself mostly in the background, though occasionally emerging above the surface.

This arrangement is shifting under Prabowo’s leadership. TNI appears to have a more prominent role in certain areas, including food security and regional elections.

The establishment of agricultural battalions exemplifies this, with 100 new military units being formed to manage national food security initiatives.

This activity, which was spearheaded by Prabowo during his tenure as Minister of Defence, assigns the military with the responsibility to develop agricultural initiatives, such as the food estate scheme in Central Kalimantan that became contentious.

Regardless, this indicates a considerable expansion of TNI’s role in the areas of economics and development.

Another example is TNI’s participation in the logistics of the recent regional head elections. All three of TNI’s forces deployed their personnel and assets – such as aircraft carriers, helicopters and warships – to distribute election materials like ballots and boxes.

The initiative to integrate troops into regional government activities demonstrates the growing relationship between military forces and civilian governance. These measures indicate TNI’s expanded role in state-building efforts, wherein the armed forces participate in the nation’s economic and political processes while simultaneously safeguarding the state.

Public Perception: Indifference, Confidence or Acceptance?

A significant part of TNI’s seeming resurgence is the lack of considerable popular opposition. In contrast to the events during reformasi, where the people united to oust Suharto and consequently pushed the military away from the political scene, the present shift appears to have largely escaped significant examination or scrutiny.

Despite some instances of dissent, the general populace seems largely indifferent or, in certain instances, are endorsing the military’s expanding influence.

A variety of factors contribute to this societal attitude. Firstly, Indonesia’s historical backdrop influences the people’s perception of TNI, often laced with a romanticised sense of respect and yearning for them to be put in charge.

In contrast, the police have not played a significant role in the national heroic narratives and are oftentimes embroiled in cases of corruption or power abuse. Clashes between the police and the public are also quite frequent.

A portion of the population, including those residing in the regions, continue to view TNI as a crucial, stabilising entity that provides security and order in a nation troubled by regional disparities, economic inequalities and unceasing political turmoil.

Secondly, Prabowo’s portrayal of himself as a decisive and dynamic leader may have distracted the public from the fact that TNI is slowly returning to the centre stage. There is also a potential that the public will dismiss this concern as long as Prabowo remains in the driving seat, becoming a somewhat balancing force against TNI’s expanded role.

Unlike Jokowi’s bureaucratic and technocratic approach, Prabowo projects a straightforward, assertive yet populist image, appealing to a population that heretofore felt disconnected from the political process. His approach resonates with those who see him as a leader, someone who acknowledges their challenges and is actively addressing them.

However, it would be erroneous to think that the people’s lack of rejection towards TNI’s return indicates a complete endorsement of the military’s expanding authority.

Some quarters of the population might not grasp the direct and indirect consequences of TNI’s increasing presence. Besides, they may also consider it as an unavoidable compromise in a country grappling with economic and security issues.

Regardless, the absence of strong public debate and critical discourse surrounding these developments is concerning, indicating that the nation is slowly becoming desensitised to the military’s participation in governance.

A New Dwifungsi?

This shift necessitates a review of the status of democracy in Indonesia. Local NGOs and international human rights organisations alike have consistently warned of the danger of diminishing democratic space in the country.

To be fair, this shift does not directly signify a decline in democracy in Indonesia. Nonetheless, it indicates a transition to an era where coercive power may feature more prominently in day-to-day business, owing to the military’s presence being interwoven with the governance structure.

The military’s growing presence in critical dimensions such as food security, regional politics and electoral processes indicates that it is ready to be involved in sectors outside its traditional mandate.

This blurring line between the military and civilian spaces is not necessarily a throwback to Suharto’s dwifungsi in the New Order era, but something that is uniquely Prabowo’s in nature. Besides, we are still only in the beginning of Prabowo’s administration – how this dynamic would change or develop in the future remains to be seen.

Some portents are suggestive of how this would unfurl, however. Firstly, Prabowo’s Red and White cabinet features the largest numbers of TNI and Polri retirees in the nation’s history. Secondly – and this is more symbolic than substantial – Prabowo sent almost all his cabinet members to a three-day boot camp at the military academy in Magelang after the inauguration, where they were draped in military garbs and taught discipline courses.

Unlike the New Order era, which explicitly integrated the military with civilian politics, Prabowo’s strategy thus far indicates a more nuanced approach, wherein TNI plays a crucial role in several pockets of government affairs.

All these suggest TNI’s relative progress back into the centre stage, blurring the line between military and civilian affairs.

Conclusion

This development requires considerable attention. The increasing military engagement in food security and regional elections also indicates the shrinking role of civilian authority in these areas. If this trend continues and expands to other domains, it might jeopardise fundamental democratic principles like accountability, checks and balances, and civilian oversight.

The public’s indifference – or implicit endorsement – of this shift intensifies the problem. As indicated above, a number of Indonesians view the military as a stabilising force. Yet, further studies should be conducted to investigate what this means to their perception of democracy in Indonesia. The nation finds itself at a pivotal moment, necessitating careful examination by both the populace and the global community regarding the possible lasting effects of TNI leaving the barracks. Without careful vigilance, Indonesia could veer toward a path that undermines its democratic ideals, all under the guise of stability and security.


The views expressed are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect those of STRAT.O.SPHERE CONSULTING PTE LTD.

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Authors

  • Virdika Rizky Utama is a political researcher at PARA Syndicate in Jakarta and presently holds the position of International Relations lecturer at President University, Indonesia. He possesses a Master of Arts in Political Science from Shanghai Jiao Tong University (SJTU) in China. Furthermore, he is acknowledged as a Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) observer and has written two books regarding Gus Dur. His most distinguished work is Menjerat Gus Dur (NUMedia, 2019), and his most recent publication is a novel entitled Call Me Mutia, a novel (Islamidotco, 2023).

  • Anum Intan Maulidi is Junior Supervisor at the Ministry of Finance, Indonesia.