The Last Supper in Indonesia’s Political Year

Two men talking at a voting station in Surabaya, Indonesia. Credit: Hobi Industri / Unsplash

Part of an ongoing article series on Indonesia’s regional elections 2024.

Introduction

Indonesia has had a busy political year with the presidential and legislative elections last February, as well as the upcoming regional head elections (Pemilihan Kepala Daerah – Pilkada) on 27 November 2024. The next round of voting will determine who gets to become governors, regents and mayors in all parts of Indonesia.

A key discourse in this Pilkada is whether Indonesians would vote for fresh faces or retain the ruling class in their respective regions, which have manifested in all sorts of political dynasties or oligarchs.

At the national level, former president Joko “Jokowi” Widodo is seen to be maintaining a degree of influence across the nation. President Prabowo Subianto was voted into office with Jokowi’s scion, Gibran Rakabuming Raka, in his ticket. Despite repeated denials by Jokowi, Gibran’s mere presence is a testament to his father’s enduring presence.

Jokowi’s influence may face some delicate opposition from his former platform, Partai Demokrasi Indonesia Perjuangan (PDI-P). The party has wrested the largest number of seats in the House of Representatives (DPR) in the past three legislative elections, though the number seems to be on a declining trend over the years.

Still, the PDI-P is the only force substantial enough to provide counter to Prabowo’s big tent coalition in the DPR. The question now is if the PDI-P would become an outright opposition or assume a more ambiguous stance like what it did under Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono’s administration. Regardless, in key and closely contested regions, the PDI-P can be seen as clearly challenging candidates affiliated with Jokowi.

The dynamics of Pilkada are also highly driven by the recent Constitutional Court’s (MK) ruling that lowers the threshold for parties to nominate candidates, allowing them to do so without forming a coalition.

Against this backdrop, this article attempts to offer the political mapping ahead of Pilkada in five key regions. West, East and Central Javas are selected as the top three most populated regions. North Sumatera is next, owing to its position as the most populated province outside of Java. Jakarta, while being the sixth most populated province nation-wide, is also chosen due to its special circumstances and unique political dynamics.

As will be shown below, these two aforementioned factors (Jokowi’s influence and MK’s ruling) have a big influence in the formation of political constellations that have determined the way each regional contest is playing out.

West Java: The Land of (Political) Giants

As the biggest province with the highest number of voters, West Java is currently dominated by Golongan Karya (Golkar) with 4.2 million votes, closely tailed by Gerakan Indonesia Raya (Gerindra) with 4.1 million votes and Partai Keadilan Sejahtera (PKS) with 3.5 million votes in the last legislative election.

For the upcoming Pilkada, Golkar and Gerindra joined forces – along with other parties including Partai Demokrat (the Democratic Party), Partai Amanat Nasional (PAN) and Partai Solidaritas Indonesia (PSI) – to nominate Dedi Mulyadi as a gubernatorial candidate. Dedi was Purwakarta regent for 10 years (2008-2018) and a Golkar lawmaker from 2019 to 2023, before hopping to Gerindra last year.

The PKS, on the other hand, established a coalition with Partai Nasional Demokrat (NasDem) and Partai Persatuan Pembangunan (PPP) to nominate Ahmad Syaikhu, who is running with Ilham Habibie as his deputy. Ilham is the son of the late president B.J. Habibie.

The other two gubernatorial candidates are Acep Adang Ruhiyat (supported by Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa [PKB]) and Jeje Wiradinata (backed by the PDI-P).

The latest poll indicated that Dedi is in the pole position (67.7%) to claim the gubernatorial post thanks to his popularity among voters. There is a wide gap between Dedi and other candidates, with Syaikhu-Ilham being the only other pair that have a two-digit electability score (10%) in the poll. All other candidates are even further behind.

East Java: A Contest Between Three Heroines

The incumbent East Java Governor Khofifah Indar Parawansa is favored to maintain her seats amidst the challenge by two other female candidates: Tri Risma Harini (a PDI-P politician, former Surabaya mayor and former minister of social affairs) and Luluk Hamidah (a PKB politician and former lawmaker).

Khofifah will be supported by 15 parties, parliament and non-parliament ones, that are dominantly part of Prabowo’s Koalisi Indonesia Maju (the Onward Indonesia Coalition – KIM). On the other hand, both the PDI-P and the PKB are confident to field their own respective candidates after securing the top two positions in Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Daerah (Regional Representative Council) following the last legislative election.

Recent polls show that Khofifah is in the pole position and has a huge opportunity to win in one round as she garnered 65.8% in electability score, leaving Risma (25.5%) and Luluk (1%) far behind.

Central Java: War of the Generals

Central Java has emerged as a battleground between Gen. (ret.) Andika Perkasa and Insp. Gen. (ret.) Ahmad Luthfi, with the two coming from the military and police backgrounds, respectively.

Like in the other two provinces, Central Java also demonstrates clearly how the PDI-P (which won 5 million votes in the region’s last legislative election) is challenging a big coalition (15 political parties, amounting to 13 million votes) that fields its own candidate.

In the last presidential election, despite Central Java being the party’s bastion, this did not stop non-PDI-P candidate (Prabowo) from winning the province’s total vote against the party’s own candidate Ganjar Pranowo. This was thanks to Jokowi’s influence overshadowing and undermining Ganjar’s political campaign.

There is a worry that a similar pattern will also repeat in the upcoming Pilkada.

After all, Central Java is also Jokowi’s basis: He had been a mayor of Surakarta before, a seat that was later occupied by Gibran for three years (2021-2024). Jokowi also performed strongly in this province during the 2014 and 2019 presidential elections, a further testament to his grasp over Central Java.

For the upcoming Pilkada, Andika is paired with Hendrar Prihadi, former mayor of Semarang (Central Java’s capital). Meanwhile, Luthfi runs with Taj Yasin Maimoen as his deputy, the son of popular cleric Maimoen Zubair and Ganjar’s deputy governor of Central Java from 2018 to 2023. In the previous Pilkada, Ganjar-Yasin won 3.8 million votes.

The majority of polls in September put Luthfi in the pole position, while another conducted in October put Andika slightly ahead of Luthfi (a gap of 2%). Nevertheless, the latter poll also indicated that the number of swing voters is still huge (80%), which means the election will be closely contested.

Moreover, a recent video on Prabowo promoting Luthfi-Yasin also added controversy to the mix, indicating that Prabowo’s voice matters and that he is not above influencing the political contest, especially one that will be fiercely fought. It also indicates Jokowi’s rather heavy-handed measure to deny the PDI-P a win in its own bastion.

North Sumatra: The Son-in-law vs. the Incumbent

The gubernatorial contest in North Sumatera will feature two pairs: Bobby Nasution-Surya and Edy Rahmayadi-Hasan Basri Sagala. Bobbby is Jokowi’s son-in-law, while Edy is the incumbent.

Bobby-Surya is supported by seven political parties, including Golkar, Gerindra, NasDem, the PAN, Demokrat, the PKS and Partai Bulan Bintang (PBB). Bobby is currently serving as the mayor of Medan (North Sumatera’s capital) for the 2021-2024 period.

The second pair, Edy-Hasan, is backed by six political parties, including the PDI-P, Partai Hati Nurani Rakyat (Hanura), Partai Buruh (the Labour Party) as well as non-parliamentarian Partai Kebangkitan Nusantara (PKN), Partai Gelombang Rakyat Indonesia (Gelora) and Partai Ummat (Ummah Party). Edy only entered the politics of North Sumatra in 2018 – previously, he served as the Commander of Army Strategic Command.

The PDI-P backed Bobby’s mayoral bid in 2021 when Jokowi and the party were still in-sync. Nevertheless, as this relationship deteriorates, the PDI-P now implements the “no-Jokowi” strategy in numerous contests, including in North Sumatera. The party is now backing Edy.

In a twist, Gerindra, which backed Edy’s gubernatorial bid previously, has now switched sides and supported Bobby.

Jakarta: The Absence of a Favourite

Former governor Anies Baswedan was leading the polls prior to the registration deadline for gubernatorial candidates. As a figure of resistance to Prabowo’s administration, Anies was regarded as a serious contender in Jakarta’s gubernatorial election. He was also closely associated with the PKS, which won the highest vote in the province’s legislative election.

These did not save him, however, as the PKS withdrew support and joined Prabowo’s camp.

Nonetheless, the PDI-P showed signs that it was ready to back Anies’ candidacy. This did not materialize either, with the PDI-P switching support to Pramono Anung in the last minute. Pramono is Megawati’s right-hand man and he is paired with popular actor Rano Karno, who also served as the governor of Banten from 2015 to 2017.

Furthermore, Pramono was a cabinet secretary in Jokowi’s administration and was among the hundreds of figures who showed up at Prabowo’s home while the president-elect was finalizing his list of ministers, deputy ministers and heads of state institutions. While some assumed that Pramono’s visit signaled Prabowo’s support for his gubernatorial campaign, Pramono has dismissed the rumors.

Meanwhile, KIM parties have nominated Ridwan Kamil, a Golkar politician and highly popular former West Java governor (2018-2023) as their candidate. Although Prabowo’s supporters have rallied behind Ridwan and his running mate, PKS executive Suswono, there is no urgency for Prabowo to support a specific candidate in this contest.

This is because Prabowo will gain regardless of who wins. Even if Pramono-Rano win Jakarta’s top job, Pramono could serve as a strategic bridge between Prabowo and the PDI-P chairwoman Megawati, who has kept the party’s stance towards Prabowo’s administration ambiguous.

Different pollsters have expressed differing opinions on electability. The latest poll by the LSI showed Pramono ahead of Ridwan with a notable margin (around 4%). The third and independent pair of candidates, Dharma Pongrekun-Kun Wardana, trailed far behind with only 6.6% of support.

Even though Jakarta will cease to be the capital of Indonesia soon, the office of its governor is still one of the most important and sought-after ones in the upcoming Pilkada. Jakarta may remain as Indonesia’s hub for business, finance and trade, but its future governor will be tasked with navigating the city in its post-capital years.

Conclusion

Pilkada is significant as future development of the regions will be determined by the victors. More importantly, Pilkada in the most populated areas has the potential to influence national political dynamics, while also determining the future of tens, if not hundreds, of millions of lives.

For example, the outcome of Pilkada in West, East and Central Javas will shape the candidates’ future political trajectories, regardless of whether they win or lose. Party constellation has also changed thanks to the two factors mentioned above – it will be interesting to observe how the inter-party dynamics will change in the future as well.

Furthermore,  the Jokowi-PDI-P schism remains as intense and as visible in Pilkada contests in various regions. At the same time, we should not discount the interest of individual candidates to advance their own goals and perhaps a desire to be free from this fettering political dynamic. Pilkada is the last piece of puzzle in this long political year. Prabowo has won and assembled his lieutenants–the outcomes of Pilkada in various regions will complete the picture of Indonesia’s political trajectory at least in the next five years.


The views expressed are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect those of STRAT.O.SPHERE CONSULTING PTE LTD.

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