Part of an ongoing article series on Indonesia’s regional elections 2024.
Introduction
Indonesia’s Pemilihan Kepala Daerah Serentak 2024 (2024 Simultaneous Regional Head Elections – Pilkada) was meant to be a demonstration of Indonesia’s decentralization and commitment to classic democratic values.
Pilkada was indeed touted as the crown jewel of the post-1998 reformation era, especially with regard to local governance, a pluralistic hierarchy of leadership and the representation of the various interests of Indonesia’s sprawling archipelago.
Yet, this past Pilkada has exposed a worrying decline of democratic norms. What was meant to be an instrument for the people to exercise their political rights ended up being an avenue for power accumulation, dynastic clientelism and oligarchic hegemony.
Power Accumulation
To demonstrate this, let us turn our attention to President Prabowo Subianto’s oversized coalition Koalisi Indonesia Maju (the Onward Indonesia Coalition – KIM).
KIM was formed during the 2024 presidential election from political parties supporting Prabowo’s bid to run for the presidential office. The coalition consists of Gerakan Indonesia Raya (Gerindra), Partai Amanat Nasional, Golongan Karya, Partai Demokrat and other parties that did not make it to the House of Representatives.
KIM further inflated and became KIM Plus when several more parties – including Partai Nasional Demokrat, Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa, Partai Keadilan Sejahtera and non-parliamentarian Partai Persatuan Pembangunan (PPP) – joined its rank for Pilkada.
Such an oversized coalition underscores ambition to implement political hegemony across Indonesia.
KIM Plus has a wider support base, politicizing local elections into nothing more than extensions of national politics. This centralization of power has rendered Indonesia’s political landscape more homogenized and centralized, thereby undermining the independence and plurality of local governing institutions.
Furthermore, it also threatens the diversity and creativity that have long been the hallmarks of Indonesia’s democratic and decentralized framework, as it marginalizes local voices and stifles innovation in governance.
In this year’s Pilkada, KIM Plus candidates won in 60% of the areas contested. This presents a concern, as regional elections, which were originally intended as a pathway for local self-determination, instead became an opportunity for political elites in Jakarta to entrench their power.
Allegations of active interference – “cawe-cawe” in former president Joko “Jokowi” Widodo’s parlance – began circulating in the days leading up to the elections. Reports collected until October 2024 show that gubernatorial candidates Ridwan Kamil-Suswono (Jakarta), Andra Soni-Dimyati (Banten) and Ahmad Luthfi-Taj Yasin (Central Java) were explicitly endorsed by both Jokowi and Prabowo.
A letter signed by Prabowo, for example, requesting Jakarta voters to support Ridwan Kamil, was published a few days before the election during masa tenang (cooling-off period), a time when campaigning is prohibited.
The move was later clarified by a Gerindra executive as a reasonable campaign strategy, despite major legal and ethical concerns involved. This is despite the Indonesian Election Law (UU No. 10/2016) prohibiting government personnel from campaigning while in office unless on official leave.
Such action, thus, blurs the lines between Prabowo the president and Prabowo the political actor. It violates the concept of neutrality and opens the door for further tampering in future elections.
The General Election Supervisory Agency (Badan Pengawas Pemilu – Bawaslu) has rejected claims of tampering due to a “lack of evidence”. Unfortunately, however, Bawaslu’s inaction has stoked popular mistrust.
Critics contend that Bawaslu’s position could result from political pressure, a lack of institutional autonomy or even an effort to keep appearances of stability against mounting public mistrust. This begs the question about the susceptibility of ostensibly objective bodies to outside influence, especially in a political environment progressively controlled by centralized power.
What made the process even less credible was the deep involvement of Jokowi in Pilkada. Though he is out of the office, Jokowi reportedly encouraged Prabowo to endorse candidates linked to his political dynasty, such as Luthfi-Yasin in Central Java.
The strategic alignment between Jokowi and Prabowo represents an alarming consolidation of power in the hands of Jakarta’s political elites, forming a political system that favors their interests and disregards the needs and aspirations of the regions.
Moreover, this dynamic undermines power decentralization that has allowed diverse regions to determine their development path, creating a homogenized political make-up in which power radiates out from the center (i.e. Jakarta).
The backstep to centralistic governance is particularly harmful to Indonesia’s democracy, given its experience with decentralization in post-reformasi era and given the country’s vast diversity.
Indonesia is a pluralistic country with differences in geography, culture, economy and regional needs. This diversity helps democracy thrive, fostering a marketplace of ideas and competition, as well as ensuring that policies are tailored to the needs of local communities. Moreover, regional autonomy has allowed local leaders to create solutions tailored to their goals.
Such a political space could potentially diminish after this Pilkada, as its results (i.e. KIM Plus’ victory in 60% of areas contested) could pave the way for a forced uniformity for the regions. The regions’ unique aspirations may be drowned out by the political interests of the Jakarta elites, who may seek to profit from their power accumulation or win future political contestations.
Tampering
Another popular narrative in this Pilkada is the misuse of government funds, colloquially known as politik gentong babi (pork-barrel politics).
It has been demonstrated that local leaders were mobilized to win votes for the contestants, such as what happened in Central Java. For instance, 90 village heads were gathered in a fancy hotel in Semarang, where they were reportedly lobbied to support certain candidates for the gubernatorial election.
Moreover, the Village Fund has been “weaponized” to compel village heads to obtain votes for certain candidates in exchange for its continued flow of funds, such as what happened in South Halmahera.
This is why oversized, concentrated powers such as KIM Plus could undermine democracy, as such coalitions could easily utilize state funds and resources to achieve political targets.
Social assistance programs were exploited too. In North Sumatra, where Jokowi’s son-in-law Bobby Nasution ran for governor (and won), some alleged politicization of social assistance that help him win. Similarly, in Surakarta, the KIM-supported Respati Ardi-Astrid Widayani pair allegedly distributed basic food aid during the pre-election lull.
Although Bawaslu has declared that no violation was committed in these instances, the indication of the candidates’ blatant exploitation of the social welfare programs cannot be ignored. By weaponizing public resources for political campaigns, the political elites have reduced Pilkada to contests for wealth and power, rather than a legitimate avenue for the region’s self-determination process.
Dynasties in the Region and Jakarta’s Exceptionalism
To make matters worse, dynasty politics has further entrenched oligarchic networks in Indonesia’s democracy. In this year’s Pilkada, more than 605 candidates were linked to political dynasties, double the figures from the previous two Pilkada cycles.
Those involved in dynasty politics today are local franchisees of national coalitions that exchange loyalty for access to power. This trend, as well as the acceptance of Jakarta’s political elites towards such practice, turns Pilkada into a mere appendage of the power struggle in the center which ultimately erases local autonomy. The Bobby Nasution-Surya and Respati-Astrid pairs are some such examples.
Yet, the outcome in Jakarta presents an entirely different dynamic. The Pramono Anung-Rano Karno pair, who were backed by Partai Demokrasi Indonesia Perjuangan, managed to clinch a win against KIM Plus’ candidates Ridwan Kamil-Suswono.
Their successful campaign cleverly leaned on Rano’s cultural resonance as well as alliances with former governors Anies Baswedan and Basuki Tjahaja Purnama, which helped bridge ideological divides.
Still, Jakarta’s exceptionalism only highlights a basic truth: That Pilkada has lost its identity as a platform for grassroots politics and become an opportunity for a power grab by Jakarta’s elites.
The similarities between this year’s Pilkada and the last two presidential elections are concerning. Both relied on the misappropriation of public resources (some cases are still alleged), intervention by the sitting president and mobilization of institutions to deliver the desired political outcome.
Such strategies undermine public confidence in democratic institutions and are reminiscent of the New Order’s heavy-handed measures to maintain power. Despite the post-reformasi aspiration for democracy, Indonesia’s state today has increasingly become homogenous and centralized, while authoritarian practices are becoming more common. The absence of a pluralist system that respects differences and regional autonomy diminishes dissenting voices and alternative ideas.
Conclusion
The results of the 2024 Pilkada are nowhere near rosy for Indonesia’s democracy. With KIM Plus-backed candidates winning in 60% of the contested area, a centralized form of governance appears to be coming back to Indonesia’s political setting.
Once a trademark of the reformasi era, Pilkada has now become an avenue for political elites to consolidate their power, as the governance practices become more homogenous and centralized, thus marginalizing innovation and regional needs.
The developments surrounding Pilkada have thus threatened Indonesia’s democratic future, dampening the expectation for further democratic consolidation in the next five years. Without alternative angles and adequate representation, Indonesia is bound to have an outdated and disconnected governing system that will not serve its people.
