Part of an ongoing article series on Indonesia’s regional elections 2024.
Introduction
This year’s presidential election in Indonesia was yet another eventful episode in the history of the nation’s democracy.
Chatters regarding Indonesia’s oligarchic instead of democratic nature, which emphasizes pragmatism over idealism, caught fire before and after the voting last February, thanks to various activities and developments deemed to have eroded Indonesia’s democracy.
These include the controversial nomination of Gibran Rakabuming Raka as vice president candidate and political parties’ many maneuvers to undermine the checks and balances system.
As explored by the other two articles in this series, patterns of power struggle that were in place during the presidential election seem to have repeated themselves during the campaign period of Pemilihan Kepala Daerah Serentak (the Simultaneous Regional Head Election – Pilkada).
Pilkada, which will be held this week, will determine the executive seats in 37 provinces, 415 regencies and 93 cities.
Chief of this power struggle is the tug-of-war between Partai Demokrasi Indonesia Perjuangan (PDI-P) and Prabowo Subianto’s oversized Koalisi Indonesia Maju (the Onward Indonesia Coalition – KIM). This is concerning, as political tussle at the highest level would only marginalize the best interests of hundreds of millions of Indonesians in all parts of the country.
It also explains the pessimism that some quarters harbor towards the way democracy is practiced in Indonesia.
Some of these contests, such as the gubernatorial elections in Jakarta, Central Java and North Sumatra, have emerged as significant battlegrounds with stakes that almost rival that of the presidential election itself, as explored by the other articles.
As will be discussed below, the pursuit of power and pragmatic politics in this Pilkada period further signal the notion of democratic decline in Indonesia, unfortunately.
The Curious Case of Jakarta’s Politics
The contest in Jakarta exemplifies this best. It was here where realpolitik manifested its face when Partai Keadilan Sejahtera (PKS) withdrew its support from potential candidate Anies Baswedan, despite having backed him for years.
The PKS later joined Prabowo’s KIM (which then became “KIM Plus” after the PKS and others came onboard) and supported Ridwan Kamil’s bid for Jakarta’s top job. The party then earned a spot in Ridwan’s ticket: Suswono, a PKS cadre, is running as his deputy candidate.
Even when accounting for the Constitutional Court’s (MK) supposedly game-changing ruling on party threshold to nominate candidates, it only shows the PKS’ strong desire for a seat in Jakarta’s executive role after having been in the opposition for 10 years.
Despite the supposed strength of KIM Plus, its stamina appears to be running out closer to the voting day. The PDI-P’s candidates, Pramono Anung-Rano Karno, are seasoned politicians with strong connections to senior figures in some of KIM Plus’ parties, such as Partai Nasional Demokrat (NasDem) and Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa (PKB). Some of these figures have outwardly declared their support for the pair.
This is also exacerbated by the blunders committed by both Ridwan Kamil and Suswono before they were even formally declared as candidates. As a result, the pair and the PKS are left to their own devices in the campaign period as financial backing from KIM Plus parties dwindles.
In a last-ditch effort to boost his credibility, Ridwan Kamil visited former President Joko “Jokowi” Widodo to seek his support. Jokowi, famous for his cawe-cawe (meddling) practice in the presidential election, has now declared for Ridwan-Suswono, giving a second wind to the pair’s sluggish campaign.
This only goes to show that questionable practices that were conducted during the presidential election have become an enduring trend, further raising concern about the state of Indonesia’s democracy.
When Pragmatism Hits the Ground
Grievances that transpire from power struggles in this year’s Pilkada are only symptoms of the ongoing concern over democratic decline in the country.
As an example, parties largely operate on a pragmatic level today, having shed off their ideological underpinnings sometime after reformasi. This effectively destroys any boundaries among parties, with the people unable to differentiate one from another.
If we pull this back further into history, one can argue that the US-assisted destruction of the Left in Indonesia and Soeharto’s suppression of political expression contributed towards the weakening of parties’ ideological foundations today.
This is not an excuse, however. In Indonesia’s case, excessive pragmatism is hindering Indonesia from truly becoming a democratic country.
Only two broad groupings of “ideology” exist in today’s political landscape: the Islamist and the nationalist. Notwithstanding that, practical politics today suggest that even the demarcation between these two is fading.
Programs and visions matter less when the majority vote based on charisma, popularity and physical appearance—hence why celebrities make successful politicians in Indonesia. As a consequence, party loyalty is weak, with the people voting for individuals and not what these individuals represent.
Pragmatic politics also bear consequences at the legislative level. With coalition(s) being formed on the basis of seat numbers and power accumulation, it is hard to imagine a stable relationship among the parties, let alone in their relationship with the executive level.
Either of the following scenarios may play out. On the one hand, parties might hinder executive administration attempts at seeking approvals from the House of Representatives (DPR) unless their interests are fulfilled and their power could consolidate further. This is plausibly the case on the matter of budget, for example.
On the other hand, some programs might, in spite of potential benefit or drawback to the public, be more likely to receive the greenlight or be swept under the rug, whichever suits the parties’ interest at any given day.
This is surely not something new, as such has been the standard practice at the DPR throughout Jokowi’s tenure, wherein parties within his coalition rushed various laws without proper public consultation and due process. These include the speedy passing of the laws related to the Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK) and the new capital city, Nusantara, to name just a couple.
What is especially worrisome in this regard is that there is little to no room for policy consistency, and undertakings at large scales may come to an abrupt end if the parties lose their grasp over profitable portfolios and projects.
Weakening Pillars of Democracy
Political parties, in the words of one of the nation’s constitutional jurists, are a pillar of democracy. While due criticisms have been launched against the efficacy of this institution across parts of the world, representation through parties still proves to have considerable advantages if done right.
Alas, the phenomenon seen in Indonesia today is hard to categorize into any type of architecture. There is evidence to argue, for instance, that what is being displayed is a pluralist democracy where the interests being lobbied and subsequently advocated are those of corporations’, such as coal mining tycoons.
One can frankly argue that oligarchic influence has grown ever more pronounced through financial support for rallies, which are often welcomed by parties.
Cadreship, a feature of Indonesian politics that was particularly prominent throughout its early decades, has lost its meaning in time. It is doubtful that political parties today will take in people who believe in their “ideology” and nurture them to become champions of their cause.
Individuals must pay a “dowry” to be even included in their party’s list for legislative elections, further accentuating the diminishing value of cadreship. It becomes increasingly alarming as parties, in this age of pragmatic politics, no longer deem it important to recruit and properly foster (young) people with high potential.
Instead, parties have the convenient option of taking in or nominating individuals with a large following, influence or deep pockets, such as former ministers, army, or police generals. Indeed, Pilkada contestations in provinces like Jakarta and Central Java exemplify this.
This systematically sidelines those with vehement aspirations in favor of others with the ability to win elections or bring in capital. The repercussions of this practice will be felt long term beyond just Pilkada, as cohorts of political talents will be lost to short-term gains and young people increasingly turn away from politics.
Administrations at the regional level suffer as well, with governors, regents, and mayors being hampered from implementing policies that befit local context and needs due to potential intervention from the central government. Anies’ struggle to implement policies in Jakarta during the Covid-19 pandemic is a good example of this.
The DPR lawmakers may only pass laws or regulations that benefit the central government yet derail the programs and projects that regional leaders attempt to implement.
To be fair, regional lawmakers that are under the influence of the central government may pave the way for programmatic alignment. However, it can also be interpreted as the backstep towards recentralization that defeats the whole purpose of autonomy in the first place.
This is a worrisome trajectory, primarily noting how the Jokowi administration had curtailed autonomy across regions to further his agenda. This is best displayed by the passing of the 2020 Job Creation Law and the Second Amendment to the Law on Special Autonomy for the Papuan Province – not least thanks to his own oversized supporting coalition in the DPR.
Indeed, this discussion stresses how power struggle and the quest for power accumulation have only eroded Indonesia’s democratic vision.
Rewiring the System
Ideally, Indonesia’s practice of pragmatic politics at the national and regional levels needs to be revisited and reconsidered as it comes at the expense of the democratic tenets that the country has tried to uphold in the past 25 years or so.
There is a need for a return of ideology, values and virtues, if it is at all possible, while meritocracy should be pushed forward. These are just hypothetical, however, which are unfortunately not pragmatic in the first place. Yet it should not deter us from considering the damage that pragmatic politics has done to our nation and people.
Below are some steps in the author’s wish list.
The central government should break from the past tradition of undertaking practices that erode democratic principles and resume the democratic consolidation process. Ultimately, this is a test for Prabowo’s commitment towards democracy. Recent developments, however, suggest that it is still hard for the new administration to uphold this commitment, with the practice of cawe-cawe (meddling) making a return to this Pilkada.
Mechanistic foundations like the enhancement of political accountability through vertical as well as horizontal checks and balances should be strengthened. Practices in the past few years indicate that there is an active effort to overstep the checks and balances system. These include the weakening of KPK and the attempt to circumvent MK’s ruling on Pilkada law.
Such practices need to stop, while civic education that serves the best interest of the rakyat, instead of the prevailing regime, should be promoted.
Politicians must also be encouraged to undertake more programmatic and policy-based campaigning – Anies has conducted this before, though with disconcerting results.
Beyond that, political parties must also revitalize their purpose as the representatives of the people, not just some powerful individuals or those with deep pockets. Parties need to realize that building a sustainable pipeline of cadres that truly invest in a vision and uphold noble principles is key to the development of the country and welfare of the people.
