Background
The return of Donald Trump to the White House may cause new tensions geopolitically, which will not spare Southeast Asia.
Indonesia has also been under the spotlight since Prabowo Subianto took over the reins as Indonesia’s president. As the biggest democracy in the region, the country aspires to become a significant power in Asia.
Nevertheless, it faces a complex, crucial challenge with regards to how and what strategy Prabowo’s foreign policy will adopt to navigate the competition between China and the United States.
Indeed, Prabowo may likely contrast former President Joko “Jokowi” Widodo’s more passive approach to foreign policy. Prabowo seems determined to consolidate Indonesia’s place on the global stage and solidify its role as an emerging power in the region.
Such a vision will encourage Prabowo to focus on national security, e.g., Indonesia’s role in the South China Sea as well as China’s activity vis-à-vis the Taiwan question.
Nevertheless, Indonesia’s economic dependence on China imposes crucial constraints that Prabowo will need help to manage.
Trump’s return means that the US administration may pursue policies that erode Prabowo’s ability to keep Indonesia neutral within the parameters of its bebas (free) and aktif (active) foreign policy. This may eventually press Prabowo to make that hard choice between closer alignment with the United States or China.
Dynamic Engagement
Prabowo’s foreign policy views have shown signs of dynamic engagement with the two superpowers. Prabowo visited China in the second week of November 2024, where he met with President Xi Jinping and signed MoUs on cooperation in multiple sectors, particularly infrastructure, trade, and energy.
A key takeaway of the visit was the promise of increased investment in the blue economy. The agreement will not only regulate the role of fishing vessels but also the production and sale of marine products. Perhaps more importantly, the visit concluded with a commitment by China to support Prabowo’s free meal program, a key point in his campaign.
These are positive signals denoting Indonesia’s intent to maintain good relations with China despite growing regional tensions.
His second strategic destination of balanced engagement was the United States. The trip was an opportunity to recalibrate Indonesia’s position with the United States and explore future possibilities for economic and security cooperation with Washington.
Indeed, the visit facilitated Indonesia’s attempt at diversifying its economic portfolio, potentially inviting US investors to participate in sectors such as semiconductors and technology. The response was also positive; President Biden declared the importance of Indonesia and establishing new collaborations.
Nevertheless, how Trump will engage with Indonesia is another question. Politically, Prabowo’s move to open a dialogue with both superpowers separately shows his attempt at keeping a more politically-friendly approach in exercising the bebas dan aktif foreign policy.
In larger context, Jakarta has given signals that it is also open to breaking free from the United States’ economic influence. Through his foreign minister, Prabowo has indicated Indonesia’s interest in becoming a member of BRICS, a move that signifies his willingness to be somewhat independent from the Western-centric global order.
Specifically, the outcomes of both trips indicate that Prabowo is sidestepping the pressure to closely align with either of the two, as well as assuming a nuanced neutrality to maximize Indonesia’s geopolitical flexibility.
Running Up That Hill
Indonesia has based its philosophy of non-alignment on a vision that mirrored the political conception of Mohammad Hatta. Historically, one can see how this vision manifested clearly during the presidency of Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, with his “one million friends and zero enemies” foreign policy.
However, maintaining neutrality will become more intricate today. That is because, after Trump’s victory, his administration may step up pressure on Southeast Asian nations to align with Washington’s China containment strategy, seeking not only greater economic cooperation but also military support.
From a geopolitical perspective, developments in the South China Sea increase the complexity of maintaining a neutral position. The geopolitical tension stems from China’s attempt to expand its military influence across the zone, which includes areas of territory disputed by other countries like the Philippines. Indonesia, which claims an exclusive economic zone in the South China Sea, is particularly vulnerable to Chinese incursions.
A recent furore erupted when Prabowo, during his visit to China, seemingly agreed to China’s interpretation of the nine-dash line, a move that landed him as a subject of criticism over alleged foreign policy inexperience. While this has continued to put certain quaters on edge, it has also been interpreted as a step to managing the tension with China.
For Prabowo, therefore, the challenge will be in finding a balance between national security and the economic benefits of partnering with Beijing.
Yet this will be an increasingly uphill task in the near future. Trump’s administration may compel Prabowo to put pressure on China, potentially jeopardizing Indonesia’s own relations with the Middle Kingdom.
On the other hand, Indonesia cannot do this easily; China is arguably Indonesia’s most essential economic partner. Indeed, it can also be argued that this dependence on China may have become a potential vulnerability for Indonesia.
The Taiwan Question
Another critical issue that needs further examination is Taiwan, with which Indonesia has recently increased diplomatic engagement. This move could exacerbate tensions between Washington and Beijing, with the former putting pressure on Jakarta to take a more pro-stability stance in the Taiwan Straits.
In addition, Taiwan is strategically important for Indonesia. It is also home to a large Indonesian community, the second largest destination after Malaysia for its migrant workers. Indonesians number around 300,000 in Taiwan today.
Interestingly, the last presidential election saw almost 70% of Indonesian workers vote for Prabowo, driven by promises of reforms that would increase their protection as migrant workers.
Moreover, Indonesia is also a gem from the perspective of Taiwan’s. Indonesia is of its target countries for the New Southbound Policy, which sees Indonesia playing a vital role.
While closer relationship between the two is much desired by both sides, it might invite consternation from Beijing.
It remains to be seen if the Taiwan question could destabilize Indonesia’s relationship with China. One thing is certain: Prabowo needs to navigate this potential landmine tactfully.
Conclusion
Probowo has seen the rise of polarization in the international context and how foreign policy decisions could directly affect internal stability. He also understands that his political legitimacy is rooted in economic stability and the perception that Indonesia can prosper without outside interference.
A too-direct alliance with one of the two superpowers could disrupt the balance in Indonesia’s policy of non-interference. However, more studies should be undertaken to investigate how the public would perceive such a move by Prabowo’s administration. Finally, Trump’s return to the White House could also force Prabowo to make decisions that are unpopular with Indonesians. Yet, if the strategy is based on political autonomy and directed towards all without enemies, Indonesia could emerge as a new international player with Prabowo as a critical regional leader.
