Introduction
At the heart of Thailand and Cambodia’s stormy bilateral relations lies their border conflict that has gone through periodic flare-ups, but none as severe as 2025’s clashes.
The conflict’s root causes are now intertwined with modern forces of globalisation, such as transnational crime and information warfare, offering grave lessons in modern governance and addressing security threats that transcend borders.
Meanwhile, elite capture of domestic and foreign politics, major power involvement, and regional inertia on conflict management contribute to the conflict’s protracted nature, ensuring no easy solution for peace.
Background
Colonial-era boundary treaties between Siam (Thailand before 1933) and French Indochina placed various Khmer-style temples in ambiguously demarcated zones. With the exception of the Preah Vihear Temple, which the International Court of Justice (ICJ) ruled as belonging to Cambodia in 1962, the area around three other temples remains hotly contested, with little to no progress on border demarcation.
Between May and July 2025, severe fighting broke out along several border provinces in Cambodia and Thailand.
A fragile ceasefire was reached on 28 July, overseen by Malaysia, then chair of ASEAN, the United States and China. On the sidelines of the 47th ASEAN Summit in Kuala Lumpur, Thailand and Cambodia signed the Kuala Lumpur Peace Accords, witnessed by Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim and President Donald Trump.
After weeks of renewed fighting in December 2025, another ceasefire was reached on 27 December.
To complicate the already volatile border environment, Chinese-run transnational criminal networks housing thousands of trafficked workers are operating cyber-scam compounds along the Cambodian border.
Stoking the Flames of War
While both sides blame the other for starting the hostilities, what is clear is that the lopsided domestic power balance enables the political and military elites in Thailand and Cambodia to needlessly prolong the conflict. This is done by shaping domestic and foreign policies based on ultra-nationalist sentiment, as well as exploiting information asymmetries of both local and international
Military information operations on both sides have each vilified the other and downplayed the significance of the temples as shared cultural symbols. Such operations have exponentially scaled up, exacerbated by the proliferation of fake news.
Former Cambodian strongman Hun Sen remains the most powerful actor in the country, despite his son serving as the current prime minister. He has been dictating all military decisions surrounding the conflict.
Although Cambodia is the militarily weaker nation, Hun Sen seems confident in waging war by utilising his authoritarian grip on power and deep knowledge and relationships with Thai politicians to destabilise Thai politics.
The country’s information vacuum – stemming from the stifling of government criticism and dissenting views of the war as well as scant information about the Cambodian military – has allowed Cambodian elites to perpetuate a narrative of victimhood.
On the other hand, the powerful Thai military has gained public trust and enjoyed a resurgence in popularity over its handling of the border conflict, with a view to shoring up support for pro-military parties in the next general election in February 2026. It has deliberately projected its image as a unified, disciplined unit and protector of national security, especially after pledging to regain the disputed temples.
Despite this, technical issues of border demarcation continue to be shrouded in secrecy, with the Thai military refusing to publicly disclose the results of its own border surveys.
Multidimensional Conflict
The conflict has become entangled with scam operations that operate openly on the Cambodian side, demonstrating the extent of corruption and complicity with organised crime inside the Cambodian government.
The global spotlight is now firmly on the border scam economy that likely provides illicit income for Cambodian elites, generating revenue equivalent to half of Cambodia’s GDP.
For much of 2025, the Thai government has largely been foot-dragging to tackle scam operations. Only recently have they begun seizing assets and expanding the investigation of Cambodian-Chinese criminal networks after being pressured by major power scrutiny. Thai air strikes now specifically target scam compounds housing Cambodian military assets.
As investigative reports increasingly point to an alleged connection between scam operators and high-level Thai elites, the tactic to cut off the Cambodian government’s alleged source of revenue has hit a wall of reticence by the current administration. This raises questions about possible vested cross-border business interests between the two countries’ elites.
Are Major Powers Helping or Hurting?
Prolonged b
As the world grapples with Trump’s erratic behaviour, the United States’ involvement is perceived as performative, with no sincere desire to resolve the conflict but to push for its economic interests in the form of high tariffs, which the Thai side has rejected.
The United States has not taken the opportunity to shore up its alliance with Thailand, its major non-NATO ally. Instead, it has been hedging its bets in the conflict by downplaying the grievances of Thailand and the thawing US-Cambodia ties after the peace accords by lifting an arms embargo and pledging to restart joint military trainings.
Nonetheless, the judge is still out on whether Cambodia can genuinely become the United States’ strategic partner, as it traditionally has close security ties with China.
Meanwhile, Cambodian Prime Minister Hun Manet has played up his shared authoritarian affinities with Trump – as well as the latter’s personal interest in peacemaking – by nominating him for the Nobel Peace Prize after the peace accords were signed.
Hun Manet’s friendship with fellow graduates from his alma mater, the United States’ West Point Academy, also raises questions about the neutrality of US policy decision-makers towards the conflict.
In contrast to the United States’ high-stakes diplomatic pressure, the Chinese have preferred low-profile, non-coercive diplomacy to mediate the conflict. But there is scepticism over China’s declaration of having no vested interest in the conflict, given its significant political, economic and defence ties with both countries as well as its desire to counter the United States’ overtures to its key partners in the region.
China already has a poor track record in conflict management in Southeast
ASEAN’s Role
ASEAN’s lack of binding frameworks and structured conflict management has prompted member states to rely on personal rapport and informal discussions over institutionalised mechanisms. But leaning on current mechanisms and personalities, such as Track 1.5 diplomacy, has failed to resolve regional conflicts.
Before last year’s clashes, the calculated military build-up in both countries was clear, but ASEAN did little to address heightening tensions.
The current ASEAN Secretary-General Kao Kim Hourn, a Cambodian, is not trusted to mediate the current conflict, as was the case with the former secretary-general, Surin Pitsuwan, a Thai, during clashes in 2008.
Malaysia’s Anwar has proactively mediated in the conflict by facilitating various ceasefire meetings and coordinating the work of the ASEAN Observer Team (AOT) that has provided a neutral source of facts from the ground. Nevertheless, his time for peacemaking has run out, as Malaysia’s chairmanship ended late last year.
ASEAN’s conflict management modus operandi cannot be reformed overnight. But stepping up peer pressure to bolster adherence to regional and UN mechanisms on early-warning systems, confidence-building measures, and weapons non-proliferation will go a long way to prevent escalations and encourage dialogue.
The region should coordinate with external partners to pressure both countries to clamp down on transnational crime that plays both a direct and supporting role in sustaining the conflict. Ramping up efforts to tackle illicit money flows in Thailand, the main destination for laundered scam profits from Cambodia, would be a good start.
Silencing the Guns
The border conflict has dragged on due to both sides’ belligerent, authoritarian tendencies and toxic ultra-nationalism, alongside the dubious attempts at mediation by external players.
There is little political will on both sides to de-escalate the situation, as pro-military parties attempt to win over hearts and minds of the public for Thailand’s general election in February 2026, while Cambodia’s Hun regime appears more entrenched in power than ever.
Although Thailand has the military advantage, the Thai side is mindful of Cambodian retaliation as well as backlash from the international community if military operations are stepped up. Thus, a stalemate is the current medium- to long-term scenario, especially if both sides do not sincerely return to mechanisms such as the Joint Boundary Commission, the main bilateral mechanism for negotiations on border demarcation.
To ensure neutrality and impartiality of mediation, returning to ASEAN-led mediation is the most constructive path forward as well as boosting the capacity of the AOT. The Philippines, as the current ASEAN chair, is expected to bring its conflict management skills from domestic experiences to the role of mediator.
