Part of an ongoing article series on the impact of the Middle East conflict on Southeast Asia.
Introduction
Israel continues to face pressure to cease its attacks after a year of aggression in Gaza. Commemorating a full year of Israel’s war, various pro-Gaza solidarity actions were carried out worldwide, including in Europe, Japan, South Africa, the United States and Indonesia.
In the United States, for example, several protests were carried out in some states, including New York and Washington. There, the pro-Gaza support has been quite consistent, despite resistance from pro-Israel groups.
In contrast, in Indonesia, the commemoration only saw protests in two spots: one in front of the United States embassy in Jakarta and another in Surabaya. These protests paled in comparison to nation-wide solidarity actions seen when the war first erupted in October 2023.
The public’s response in America is understandable because of the country’s direct ties to Israel. Universities became hotspots for protests, considering many US universities have invested in companies linked to Israel or benefitting from Israel.
The backlash in the United States is not just a form of solidarity for the Palestinians but also a direct political pressure on the US and Israeli governments.
Protest as a Political Tool
Throughout 2024, public protests in defense of Gaza in the United States have succeeded in pressuring the Biden administration to be proactive in facilitating peace process and sending aid to Gaza.
In one instance of a public victory, the protests in South Africa were successful in motivating its government to bring a case against Israel to the International Court of Justice, on account of genocide.
Since the Israeli aggression in October last year, Indonesians have also supported Gaza in a variety of ways, including through street protests and social media posts. The Indonesian public also calls for boycotts of products that have ties to Israel.
On social media, activists launched the julid fi sabilillah movement on the X platform to challenge narratives that justify Israel’s attack on Palestine from Israeli military, policymaker and pro-Israel social media activists. Supporters of the movement are seen terrorizing Israeli soldiers through online attacks and condemnation.
Pro-Gaza Support is Waning in Indonesia
By right, Indonesia should be at the forefront of supporting Palestine, given its status as the country with the largest Muslim population in the world. Furthermore, Indonesia remains a democratic nation, despite a dramatic decline in its quality in recently.
Therefore, Indonesians, in theory, have an almost unbridled freedom to voice out their support towards Palestine, one that is fuelled by the emotive factors of Muslim solidarity and disdain against all forms of colonialism.
Meanwhile, the Indonesian government’s pro-Palestine stance guarantees the space for the public to assert political pressure or undertake humanitarian actions without fear of repercussions.
This stands in contrast to the experiences of Muslims in Arab or Western countries where expressing support or participating in pro-Gaza demonstrations can lead to confrontations with security forces or other forms of intimidation.
Despite this, what we are seeing on the ground today is the waning of this pro-Gaza spirit that has inflamed the Indonesian society until just a while ago. Several factors may influence this issue:
First, unlike the United States, Indonesia does not have diplomatic relations with Israel, so there is no reason to demand the Indonesian government take certain steps. Furthermore, for a long time, Indonesia has been active and vocal in fighting for the Palestinian issue politically and through delivery in humanitarian aid. The bombed-out Indonesian Hospital in Gaza is one such manifestation.
The public is most likely to urge the Indonesian government to boycott products linked to Israel in Indonesia, yet this action remains unfulfilled. Despite some chatters online, there has been no concrete, organized action that demands the Indonesian government to cease its cooperation with companies that have Israeli affiliations. For now, the public is simply calling for a boycott or a call to not buy these products.
In addition, the rather covert trade relations between Indonesia and Israel could become an issue raised by the public to demand transparency from the government and potentially serve as a leverage tool against Israel. However, this issue, for some reasons, has not become a major point in pro-Gaza discourse in the country.
Second, Islamic groups have championed most of the discussions and actions in response to the Palestinian issue, thus limiting its scope. This stands in stark contrast to other national political issues, where diverse societal elements and students from various Indonesian campuses participate simultaneously.
These include the national protests against the revision of the Corruption Eradication Commission law (KPK) in 2019, the Omnibus Law in 2020 and the regional election law (Pilkada) in 2024.
In contrast, when it comes to the Palestinian issue, there is no national solidarity movement that cuts across identities and elements, except by Islamic groups per se.
Indonesia’s lack of diversity in pro-Gaza action might stem from the perception that the Palestine issue is a religious conflict between Muslims and Jews. The majority of Indonesians, for example, continue to perceive the Palestinian-Israeli issue as a conflict between Islam and Judaism.
Such is not a standout in the region – earlier in this article series, it was put forward that Catholics in the Philippines believe that Israel is the “promised land”, denoting the religious value ascribed to the whole dynamics.
Regardless, the Islam-heavy narrative the conflict in the Palestinian issue is likely to demotivate non-religious movements – including nationalist groups and other critical movements in Indonesia – from mobilizing solidarity actions for Palestine.
This distinguishes Indonesia from the United States and European protests, where pro-Palestinian movements were led by non-religious groups, with participants fluidly coming from all walks of life.
Third,Muslim groups NU and Muhammadiyah actually possess the potential to mobilize these significant actions, given their extensive network of organizations, schools, Islamic boarding schools, universities and millions of members across Indonesia.
However, NU and Muhammadiyah do not have a tradition of carrying out movements by taking to the streets to express their aspirations. These two groups are mostly involved in humanitarian actions, especially fundraising, in response to the Palestinian issue.
Indeed, NU and Muhammadiyah activists were involved in protests in 2016 regarding the issue of religious blasphemy, but this action was led by a coalition of activists and Islamist movements, including the Islamic Defender Front (FPI) and Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia. In this protest, NU and Muhammadiyah did not establish a formal alliance with the Islamist groups, nor did they lead the movement in any way.
The credibility of NU has also been somewhat blemished by the visit of five NU academics and activists to Israel. The visit was facilitated by Itrek, an American Jewish NGO, and their meeting with the Israeli president in July 2024 sparked controversy as well as criticism toward NU’s stance on Palestine.
Subsequent pressures forced NU to clarify its stance on Palestine, emphasizing that they were unaware of the situation and planned to impose sanctions on these individuals.
It also does not help that engaging with NU’s members and figures has become Israel’s tactic for normalizing relations with Indonesia. Some of its figures, including the current chairman, Yahya Cholil Staquf, have visited Israel before.
This “normalization” program also targets young people, including NU academics, for visits to Israel. Israeli networks of NGOs, such as the American Jewish Committee (AJC) and the Australian Israel Jewish Affairs Council (AIJAC), have facilitated such programs.
If NU elites or activists continue to be involved in this program, it is possible that NU’s attitude towards Israel could be softer in the future and thus influence a potential shift in the Israeli-Palestinian narrative in Indonesia.
What makes NU susceptible to being drawn into Israel’s political strategy is its inclusive and pragmatic political stance, both in domestic politics and in its relations with other countries.
NU’s pragmatism in international relations is evident, for instance, in its decision to maintain good relations with China despite widespread criticism of China’s treatment of Xinjiang. This close relationship has led to NU receiving significant assistance from China, particularly for social and educational activities.
It should not be a surprise that NU circles have also become targets of Israel’s, as it is likely that Israel has taken note of NU’s political track record, both locally and internationally.
In contrast, Muhammadiyah tends to distance itself from those in power, with its leaders often voicing criticism of the ruling regime in Indonesia. As for Israel, there is no record of Israel making concerted efforts to approach this organization intensively.
Conclusion
The global actions carried out in various countries have successfully pressured governments to urge Israel to halt its brutal attacks on Palestine. The stances of various nations, including during UN sessions, show that these leaders are listening to the aspirations of their people, which are continuously voiced through actions on different platforms.
If this cross-national solidarity is not consistently expressed, it is possible that the responses of these leaders would be different regarding this issue.
The actions taken by activists in the United States have managed to inspire university students in various parts of the world, such as in Europe and Australia, to launch similar pro-Gaza actions. These activities should not only be seen as pressure on governments to change their policies but also as part of raising global awareness about the ongoing issue.
Indonesian citizens, including students, have even greater opportunities to engage in such actions, given the political conditions, the large population – many of whom are Muslim – and the Indonesian government’s stance on Palestine. However, this potential has yet to be fully maximized, with support towards Gaza seemingly waning a year after the start of the war. This should serve as a reflection for all groups in Indonesia, whether Muslim groups, nationalists, students, or other movements, to actively engage in voicing the issue of Palestine. When opinions are strongly and massively expressed, they will be appreciated and followed by other publics across the globe.