Part of an ongoing article series on the impact of the Middle East conflict on Southeast Asia.
Overview
Three things drive Malaysia’s policies on the Middle East: trade and investment, the calibration of Malaysia’s position in Global South leadership, and support for the Palestinian cause.
This article will provide an overview of Malaysia’s relations with the Middle East, the ongoing war in the region as well as how it has impacted Malaysia.
Malaysia’s historical connections to the Middle East began with maritime trade and the transmission of Islamic faith and learning, which heralded people-to-people relations, especially with Egypt and Saudi Arabia.
Today, Malaysia’s foreign policy places much emphasis on the country being an open trading nation, with efforts to expand trade with Persian Gulf nations under way.
Diplomatically, Putrajaya is friendly with these Middle Eastern states, including Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Qatar and Iran. In 2023, Malaysia welcomed the Arab League’s readmission of Syria, reopened its embassy in Baghdad after a two-decade closure and established a defence attaché office for its diplomatic mission in Cairo.
Malaysia also enjoys cordial relations with both the Palestinian Authority (PA) and Hamas. It has refused to forge diplomatic relations with Israel and advocated for Palestinian self-determination.
Putrajaya’s concern, above all, is to halt bloodshed and support efforts to rebuild war-torn countries in the Middle East while advancing trade and investment initiatives with the region. Since 2007, the Malaysian Armed Forces (MAF) has deployed a battalion to United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL)’s peacekeeping mission in South Lebanon.
After withdrawing troops from the Riyadh coalition in Yemen in 2018, Malaysia retained her commitment to restoring peace in Yemen by participating in the United Nations Mission to Support the Hudaydah Agreement (UNMHA).
Despite supporting Arab governments’ reengagement with Bashar Al-Asad, Malaysia has not reopened its embassy in Damascus, instead emphasizing the need to rehabilitate life for Syrians.
The 7 October attack did not change Malaysia’s policies on the Middle East. Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim has been maintaining Putrajaya’s support for a ceasefire in Gaza and an end to Israeli occupation and Palestinian statehood in no uncertain terms.
Accepting Malaysia’s lack of clout over Israel and its most powerful ally, the United States, the prime minister has embarked on a course of unrelenting diplomatic advocacy for Palestine.
Putrajaya’s position in the periphery of Arab-Muslim political leadership somewhat limits its stances to responding, as opposed to making far-reaching unilateral decisions, in the context of geopolitical and military developments in the region.
Mindful of this reality, it is instrumental to outline the factors that facilitate either stabilization or conflict in the region, which consequently guide Malaysia’s stances.
Where goes the Palestinian cause?
Following Yahya Sinwar’s death in combat with the Israeli army in Rafah, Israel pledged to continue Israel Defense Forces’ (IDF) offensive in Gaza for years to come. Their aim since declaring war is to replace Hamas rule with a government that is more pliable to Israeli occupation of the Palestinian territories.
Without a doubt, Israel has managed to reduce the Al-Qassam Brigades’ (Hamas’ military wing) operational capabilities and decapitate both its parent organization as well as Hezbollah.
Nevertheless, it would be foolish to believe that these movements will not reorganize and rebuild capacity for as long as there is reason to resist: the Israeli occupation.
Responding to Yemen’s Houthis announcing the fifth phase of their resistance campaign in solidarity with Gaza, Sinwar had assured them that “the resistance is well and in good stead, and is prepared for a long war of attrition”, while acknowledging that the people of Gaza are “positioned between suffering, famine and pain from the Nazi genocide and valiant resistance that has been led by Al-Qassam Brigade.”
With or without Sinwar, armed resistance will persist in the occupied territories.
The West Bank is not faring much better. In March 2022, Israel launched the brutal Operation Break the Wave to crush rising armed resistance in the West Bank. A year later, Israeli systematic demolitions and settler violence caused the highest number of displaced Palestinians in a single year since the UN’s Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) began recording demolitions in 2009. Before 7 October 2023, Israeli forces and settlers killed 243 West Bank Palestinians; in the subsequent 12 months, 728 were killed, mostly by Israeli security forces.
At the United Nations General Assembly, Mahmoud Abbas demanded for Palestinian Authority (PA) control of all Palestinian territories including Gaza and the Rafah crossing. Abbas’s insistence on a PA rule points to a persistent challenge in overcoming the division between Fatah and Hamas, despite both parties having signed a National Unity treaty with 12 other Palestinian factions in Beijing in June 2024.
It is unlikely for the PA to gain political support and ascendancy in Gaza. A September 2024 poll reveals that while the majority of Gazans no longer believe that Hamas will win the war, Palestinians still overwhelmingly demand for Abbas’ resignation. Support for the two-state solution has risen in both territories. Most importantly, Israel does not want a Palestinian state.
Diplomatic efforts
Arab leaders are running on low patience and limited by their resolve to refrain from responding militarily. The vexation is shared equally by those who have relations with Israel – Egypt, Jordan, the UAE, Bahrain and Morocco – and those who do not.
Jordanian Minister of Foreign and Expatriate Affairs, Ayman Al-Safadi, delivered a trenchant summary of the Arab-Islamic Ministerial Committee’s readiness to guarantee Israel’s security upon fulfilling the condition of Palestinian statehood, followed by an indictment of Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s determination to wage war.
Remarkably, nothing Al-Safadi stated was news – these terms for peace were committed to in the Saudi-led 2002 Arab Peace Initiative – but it was a rare instance of public takedown by a frustrated diplomat.
For Saudi Arabia and countries that do not have relations with Israel, normalization is dangled as the prize for an end to the war, occupation and for the establishment of a Palestinian state. Alas, this is not a big enough incentive for Israel to call for a ceasefire—not when it has been waiting for a chance to conduct an intensive dismantling of Hamas and Hezbollah.
Amidst a calculated exchange of fire with Israel, Iran has been conducting a flurry of diplomacy with Arab neighbors. The Iranian Foreign Minister, Seyed Abbas Araghchi, met with Saudi Crown Prince Mohammad Bin Salman and Egyptian President Abdel Fattah El-Sisi.
He also visited Jordan, Lebanon, Türkiye, Iraq, Qatar and Oman in a tour that signals active engagement with neighboring countries to secure regional support against Israel, which is bent on destroying Iran’s military and nuclear capabilities.
On top of that, citing the absence of a reason to talk to Washington unless the current crisis is resolved, Tehran has halted indirect communication with the United States via Oman.
How has Malaysia been impacted so far?
To date, the Houthi attacks on ships in the Red Sea have a limited impact on Malaysian trade. Container rates have increased and there have been shipment delays, but intra-ASEAN and China trade – which take the top two spots above Southeast Asia-European Union trade – have kept Malaysia buoyed from the primary effects of shipping disruptions in the Red Sea.
As for developments in the wider region, Malaysia refuses to recognize unilateral US sanctions on Iran but is by no means insulated from its implications.
In 2019, Malaysia was pressured to close bank accounts belonging to Iranians, causing their number to drop from 200,000 to fewer than 10,000 in Malaysia. This is a real barrier to encouraging Iranian business in and visits to Malaysia, and realistically one that cannot be fixed by diplomatic persuasion.
Meanwhile, Malaysia has always been wary of Shia influence domestically, but there is no real political threat as Sunni Islam is still very much dominant.
Unlike Iraq, Syria and Lebanon, Malaysia – incontrovertibly anti-Shia in its institutions and laws – does not face the problem of militant Shiites, so Putrajaya can afford to compartmentalize the sectarian issue in their bilateral relations with Tehran.
Again, Malaysia has the luxury of distance – geographically and culturally. Put simply, Iran’s hard power and Shiite influence has no currency in this Southeast Asian nation. As long as Malaysia navigates this issue tactfully, it should be able to pursue wider relations with Iran in the future if it so wishes.
In South Lebanon, after a year of anticipating the expansion of Israeli military offensive into Lebanon, the MAF are prepared for any eventualities, including the last resort of unilaterally withdrawing its troops from the mission and evacuating from the country, which will be very costly. Ultimately, Malaysia is expected to follow UNIFIL’s decisions.
Tracking the flow of aid to Gaza and Palestinian refugees
One of the most tangible ways for a private citizen in Malaysia to help victims of war is by donating money and goods.
The government and various NGOs have mobilized fundraisers for Middle Eastern refugees for decades. Following Israel’s military offensive on Gaza, the government launched the Humanitarian Trust Fund for the People of Palestine (AAKRP) in the amount of RM10 million. The sum was channeled to the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) on 17 November 2023. In August this year, Malaysia contributed a further RM10 million to the agency.
However, transparency is an issue that needs to be underscored, considering the Israeli blockade of Gaza and Egypt’s control over the Rafah crossing have prevented aid delivery.
The Norwegian Refugee Council recently reported that 83% of food aid does not make it into Gaza. A dismal average of 69 aid trucks per day were allowed to enter Gaza in August 2024, compared to 500 per working day in 2023, which was already inadequate to meet the needs of Gaza residents.
The Malaysian government’s coordinated coalition of charities for Palestine, Ops Ihsan, has delivered three loads of aid cargo to El-Arish, Egypt by December 2023. This initiative has also kept up the delivery of food packs into Gaza while looking into the option of shipping aid from Port Klang to Egypt. The Foreign Ministry has kept the Parliament informed about the progress of these donations.
But how much of the goods sent actually reached the besieged residents of Gaza? Besides, how much have reached those who have managed to escape to Egypt but are struggling to pay for housing, food, medical treatment and education as refugees?
At the moment, initiatives and civil society are filling in the vacuum left by the Egyptian government, which does not recognize displaced Palestinians in Egypt as refugees in a bid to preserve Palestinian presence in and hold over occupied land.
Meanwhile, research on establishing a Charities Commission for Malaysia was recently presented to the Prime Minister’s Department (Law and Institutional Reform), following the cabinet’s decision to study regulation of the charities sector.
This initiative was born out of a concern of misuse of public and private funds as well as money laundering through charity work. Beyond this, however, the successful set up and enforcement of the Charities Commission should assist charities in tracking the flow of aid and informing the public about donation delivery mechanisms.
Having this additional instrument of oversight would also provide hard data that can better inform Malaysia’s diplomatic efforts to push for ending the obstruction of aid into Gaza, particularly considering Egypt and Israel’s blame-trading on this matter.
Nevertheless, this initiative has a long way to go still; the government would do well to supply timely updates on the progress of donation drives under its patronage.
Conclusion
Prior to 7 October 2023, the Middle Eastern states were tentatively but determinedly rebuilding political stability and regional diplomacy after more than a decade of the Arab Spring uprisings and the rifts between Riyadh, Cairo, Doha, and Tehran.
The war that Hamas invited on that day only served to highlight the deep cracks in the region that was not filled by the UAE and Bahrain’s bold sidestepping of the long-held Arab paradigm of no peace with Tel Aviv until Palestine is sovereign and free.
Hamas’ incursion into Israeli territory also prompted a new stage in Palestinian resistance against Israel, who, by the looks of it, is determined to take advantage of this moment to militarily incapacitate its nemeses at any cost, for as long as the international community will allow it to.
To rehash, Malaysia’s top concerns are threefold: addressing the Palestinian humanitarian catastrophe, pushing for Palestine’s liberation from Israel and bringing Israel to justice.
As it currently stands, however, Putrajaya can claim no sway over Tel Aviv or Washington nor the political and geographic influence of Arab rulers over Palestine.
Recognizing the failure of the post-World War II international order to ensure the rights of sovereign states and protect the dispossessed, Malaysia has turned its focus towards strengthening the South-South cooperation.
Distance has spared Malaysia from the brunt of the Middle Eastern refugee crisis that has been exacerbated by Israel’s offensive in Gaza and Lebanon. Even so, Malaysians have long been supporters of the Palestinian cause and are not strangers to donation drives for the displaced in the Middle East over the past decade.
Besides exercising its diplomatic capital in regional and multilateral forums, Malaysia must play to its strengths by optimizing its humanitarian efforts, supporting Palestinian agency, and contributing legal expertise as well as testimony towards the International Court of Justice’s cases against Israel’s war crimes.
At this juncture, international humanitarian efforts cannot outpace the rising casualties of Israel’s lethal rampage, while diplomatic efforts have repeatedly failed to pressure Israel into a ceasefire, let alone withdraw from the territories it has invaded. What remains for a middle power like Malaysia is to maximize sustainable aid for the victims of war, who will need assistance for every aspect of life for years, realistically decades, until they can return to their homes or gain permanent residence in another country, or until Israel ends its occupation and Palestine is finally free.
