Articles

BN and PN swept 24 of 28 seats in Melaka, exposing deep fault lines inside Anwar Ibrahim’s federal unity government ahead of GE16. Credit: Unsplash/Vale G

Frenemies in Power

20 November 2026/6 Minutes of Reading

Introduction

 

The 16th Melaka state election, held on 14 November 2026, has concluded with another setback for Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim’s Pakatan Harapan (PH).

 

As widely anticipated, the electoral pact between Barisan Nasional (BN) and Perikatan Nasional (PN) delivered a landslide victory. Together, the two coalitions secured 24 of the 28 state assembly seats, giving them a comfortable two-thirds majority. BN won 21 seats, while PN captured three.

 

Meanwhile, PH won only four seats, one fewer than in the 2021 election. Parti Pribumi Bersatu Malaysia (Bersatu) and Parti Bersama Malaysia (Bersama) failed to win any seats despite contesting seven and 16 constituencies, respectively (see Table 1).

 

The result continues the pattern seen in Johor and Negeri Sembilan earlier this year, where BN and PN made significant electoral gains while PH struggled to retain support.

 

However, Melaka is important for reasons beyond the number of seats won. It provides another test for the emerging BN-PN political cooperation, exposes PH’s predicament to regain Malay support and raises further questions about the future of Anwar’s federal unity government.

 

Table 1: 2026 Melaka State Election Results

Source: Election Commission of Malaysia

 

The BN-PN Understanding: More Than an Electoral Arrangement?

 

One of the most significant outcomes of the Melaka election is the apparent effectiveness of the electoral understanding between BN and PN.

 

The two coalitions, which contested separately in 2021, have increasingly found common ground in their opposition to PH at the state level. Their cooperation in Johor and Negeri Sembilan has now been extended to Melaka, where they avoided contesting against each other and presented a common electoral front.

 

This arrangement has two important advantages.

 

Firstly, it reduces the fragmentation of the Malay vote. In previous elections, competition among the United Malays National Organisation (UMNO), Parti Islam Se-Malaysia (PAS) and Bersatu often divided Malay voters among rival coalitions, allowing PH to remain competitive in some constituencies.

 

By avoiding direct competition, BN and PN reduced the possibility of splitting their overlapping electoral support, particularly among Malay voters, and improved their prospects against PH candidates.

 

Secondly, the arrangement carries a broader political message of “Muafakat Melayu-Muslim” (Malay-Muslim unity). UMNO and PAS have traditionally competed for influence among Malay voters, and their willingness to cooperate suggests that their leaders increasingly see political accommodation as preferable to continued rivalry, at least in selected electoral contests.

 

The results in Melaka demonstrate the electoral value of such cooperation. BN retained its 21 seats, while PN increased its representation from two seats in 2021 to three.

 

More importantly, PN captured Bukit Katil from PH, defeating former Melaka chief minister Adly Zahari. The loss of a prominent Amanah leader carries significance beyond a single constituency.

 

The arrangement also raises questions about the changing position of BN in Malaysia’s coalition politics.

 

At the federal level, BN remains a partner in Anwar’s unity government. Yet, at the state level, it has increasingly cooperated with PN to defeat PH candidates. This creates an unusual situation in which parties working together in the federal government are direct electoral opponents elsewhere.

 

For UMNO, cooperation with PAS offers an opportunity to strengthen its Malay electoral base. For PAS, working with UMNO provides access to an established political organisation and its grassroots machinery in states where PAS has traditionally been less influential.

 

Nevertheless, electoral cooperation does not necessarily mean a permanent political alliance. Differences over leadership, seat distribution, policies and future composition of the federal government remain unresolved.

 

PH’s Failed Attempt to Regain Malay Support

 

For PH, the Melaka result raises another question: how could the coalition regain Malay support while retaining its traditional non-Malay base?

 

In an attempt to challenge the growing BN-PN cooperation, PH entered into a limited electoral understanding with Bersatu, its former political ally. The arrangement was politically significant, given Bersatu’s involvement in the 2020 Sheraton Move that brought down the first PH federal government.

 

PH hoped that cooperation with the Malay-based party would broaden its electoral appeal. However, unlike the relatively coordinated BN-PN arrangement, PH and Bersatu continued to contest against each other in some constituencies, highlighting the limitations of their cooperation.

 

Still, the arrangement produced little visible electoral benefit. Bersatu lost all seven seats it contested, while PH secured only four, with neither PKR nor Amanah winning a seat.

 

These results suggest that PH’s difficulties cannot be resolved simply through electoral arrangements with another Malay-based party. They also point out that rebuilding Malay support requires a more convincing political narrative and stronger grassroots engagement.

 

At the same time, the outcome highlights PH’s continued dependence on the Democratic Action Party (DAP) in Melaka.

 

DAP retained four of its established constituencies, but its success was insufficient to compensate for the losses suffered by the coalition’s other components.

 

The repeated failure of PKR and Amanah to secure seats in recent state elections raises questions about their ability to appeal to voters beyond PH’s established strongholds.

 

There is also a wider problem. PH has increasingly relied on electoral cooperation alongside opposition to rival political figures to mobilise support. Yet, nearly four years after Anwar became prime minister, voters also have expectations regarding living costs, institutional reforms, employment opportunities and government performance.

 

It is time for PH to rebuild the voters’ confidence and present a political agenda that connects with the concerns of ordinary Malaysians.

 

Political Liability

 

Another issue that attracted considerable attention during the campaign was the royal pardon allowing former prime minister Najib Razak to serve the remainder of his sentence under house arrest.

 

DAP Secretary-General Anthony Loke resigned as transport minister in protest against the decision. His resignation reflected the party’s attempt to uphold its position on accountability while responding to public dissatisfaction over Najib’s treatment.

 

However, the controversy also exposed the political sensitivities surrounding Malaysia’s constitutional monarchy, and UMNO leaders criticised his action and questioned whether it amounted to challenging the royal institution.

 

It has placed PH, particularly DAP, in a difficult political situation. On the one hand, DAP faced pressure from supporters who expected the party to remain firm on corruption and institutional reform. On the other hand, strong opposition to the decision risked being interpreted by some Malay voters as disrespect towards the royal institution.

 

For Anwar, the situation was equally uncomfortable. Najib’s UMNO remains an important partner in the federal government, while DAP is one of PH’s principal components.

 

Their conflicting positions highlighted the difficulties of maintaining a coalition whose members hold different political priorities.

 

Nevertheless, it would be premature to conclude that the Najib controversy determined the Melaka election. What the issue demonstrates more clearly is the increasingly difficult position facing PH, defending its reform credentials while managing the competing interests and sensitivities of its political partners.

 

What Lies Ahead

 

The Melaka election result is likely to intensify speculation over the timing of the 16th General Election (GE16) and the future configuration of Malaysia’s political alliances.

 

For Anwar and PH, the setback adds to the challenges reflected in the Johor and Negeri Sembilan elections. While state elections do not necessarily predict federal outcomes, these results suggest that PH faces difficulties in rebuilding electoral confidence.

 

Calling an early general election under such circumstances would carry considerable risks for the prime minister, though GE16 will be shaped by broader considerations, including economic conditions, government performance, leadership and the political alliances that eventually emerge.

 

More importantly, the BN-PN pact in Melaka raises questions about the sustainability of its partnership with PH at the federal level. Within UMNO, the electoral benefits of cooperation with PAS could strengthen pressure to reconsider its political direction.

 

A formal BN-PN alliance would require difficult negotiations over leadership, parliamentary seats and relations with non-Malay voters.

 

For PH, the challenge is twofold: rebuilding public confidence while maintaining cohesion within an increasingly complicated unity government. Ultimately, GE16 will test not only the electoral strength of competing coalitions but also their ability to forge credible and sustainable political partnerships.

 

Conclusion

 

The Melaka election offers important insights into Malaysia’s changing political landscape.

 

For BN and PN, the outcome demonstrates the electoral advantages of cooperation, particularly in reducing competition for Malay support. For PH, it exposes the limitations of tactical political arrangements without corresponding improvements in voter confidence and government performance.

 

Yet, Melaka should not be regarded as a definitive turning point. Rather, it reflects the increasingly fluid landscape of Malaysia’s coalition politics, where electoral cooperation does not necessarily translate into lasting political partnerships.

 

Melaka has demonstrated that BN and PN can cooperate to win an election. Whether they can cooperate to govern Malaysia remains a much bigger question.

 

The views expressed are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect those of STRAT.O.SPHERE CONSULTING PTE LTD. This article is published under a Creative Commons Licence.

 

Republications minimally require: 1) credit authors and their institutions, and; 2) credit to STRAT.O.SPHERE CONSULTING PTE LTD and include a link back to either our home page or the article’s URL.