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New Threshold?

Indonesia’s Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat (House of Representatives – DPR) is currently mulling over a change to the 2017 parliamentary threshold, the percentage of national votes a political party must cross to enter the parliament.

The current threshold of 4% was declared invalid for the 2029 election in a 2023 ruling by Mahkamah Konstitusi (Constitutional Court – MK), triggering the ongoing legislative process to amend the law.

In its ruling, MK argued that the threshold was “reductive” in nature towards the constitutional rights of the people through “wasted votes” and mandated new legislation to address this issue.

Ironically, however, political parties in DPR are reportedly bent on increasing the threshold to 5%, which is likely to result in even more redundant votes for smaller parties.

Bigger parties are said to be trying to “gatekeep” the parliament from minor and emerging parties by stacking the odds against their election to the House.

This, among other things, illustrates how political parties in Indonesia can impede the rule of law – by contradicting the MK ruling – and to democracy—by treating the voters’ ballots in a cavalier manner.

If passed, a new higher threshold also has the potential to nip emerging parties in the bud.

Small and New Parties

Eight political parties did not make it into parliament in the 2024 election, and new ones are springing up. This year alone saw the declaration of Partai Gerakan Mandiri Bangsa (the Self-Reliant Nation Movement Party – Gema Bangsa), chaired by seasoned and yet largely unknown politician Ahmad Rofiq.

Ahmad started out his political career in 2006 as secretary general of the now-defunct Partai Matahari Bangsa (The Nation Sun Party). He then briefly joined and became the secretary general of the Nasional Demokrat (NasDem) between 2011 and 2013.

Before co-founding Gema Bangsa with Andogo Wiradi and Muhammad Sopiyan in January this year, he acted as secretary general of the Partai Persatuan Indonesia (Perindo) from 2015 to 2024.

Ahmad’s dynamic résumé tells us the classic story of a career politician from a non-privileged background trying to climb the greasy pole.

Elite Politics

Indonesia’s political parties are full of paradoxes. While claiming to represent the people’s aspirations, they remain one of the last bastions of quasi-feudalism, entrenched by the privileges of extraordinary wealth, proximity to power and dynastic ties.

Ahmad, unlike Megawati Sukarnoputri or Agus Harimurti Yudhoyono, does not belong to a political dynasty, much less a presidential lineage.

Although a wealthy entrepreneur, he is not in the league of “crazy rich” tycoons like his former bosses at Perindo, Hary Tanoesoedibyo, and at NasDem, Surya Paloh.

Neither is he close to or allied with the country’s power centre as Bahlil Lahadalia was when he was elected Golkar chairman in 2024.

Presumably, this motivated Ahmad to jump ship from both NasDem and Perindo. He could never have made it to the top in either party, since he was not part of the Tanoesoedibyo or the Paloh clan.

Price Tag

Time and again, I have heard disheartening accounts from earnest and hard-working political newcomers who contested parliamentary seats and failed in their attempts due to systematic discrimination against their lack of privileges.

In one instance, a first-time candidate under the banner of a new party went all out in advocating the interests of grassroots voters within his constituency in cases of land grabs and other legal matters. However, on the day of the voting, the same people he had assisted vigorously cast their votes for another candidate who had given them money.

This practice is known as serangan fajar or “dawn operation”, whereby candidates or their campaign teams will canvass for votes door-to-door in the early morning before voting booths open by handing out envelopes with money in them.

In an exit poll by Indikator Politik at the 2024 elections, voters were asked whether taking bribe money from candidates was acceptable. As many as 46.9% replied in the affirmative as opposed to 49.6% in the negative.

The practice has been normalised to the extent that the then presidential candidate Prabowo Subianto, at one of his political rallies in 2023, told the crowds that if they were offered money for their votes, they should take it but vote according to their conscience.

The same poll also asked voters whether they would vote for the candidates who bribed them ahead of the election. While 35.1% replied they would, 48.4% said they would still follow their heart.

The poll suggests that, at best, Indonesian voters are largely transactional and, at worst, venal in exercising their constitutional right to vote.

However, there is an underlying reason for such electoral misconduct.

Both political parties and DPR have consistently topped public polls over the years as some of the most untrustworthy institutions in Indonesia.

In a 2023 poll by Lingkaran Survei Indonesia (LSI), only 7% of the respondents had adequate trust in political parties. In a 2025 poll by Indikator Politik, 41% said they did not trust DPR to voice their aspirations.

The high degree of public distrust in political parties and DPR has in turn bred a pragmatic attitude at the grassroots level.

Many voters, rather than expecting parliamentarians to look after their interests when elected, settle for a one-off cash bribe to help politicians get into office.

At least, they will have got something out of the process, even at the price of legislative neglect for the next five years.

Middle Class

The 2024 poll by Indikator Politik also indicated that certain segments of the population – lower middle class, blue-collar workers and rural voters – were more susceptible to accepting cash for their votes.

The propensity of the most economically vulnerable classes to accept electoral bribery suggests that part of the solution to eliminating money politics is to uplift their economic status.

Yet, those hoping to see the transformation through an economic route as a given may be disappointed to learn that the middle class has been shrinking in the past few years.

A study released earlier this year claimed that between 2024 and 2026, 1.2 million people had lost their middle-class status due to economic pressure.    

This may not bode well for Indonesia’s democracy. Historically, the middle class grew in tandem with democracy.   

Still, simply growing the middle class alone may not be sufficient to offset the inherent problems between Indonesian voters and political parties.

A 2022 study by Litbang Kompas juxtaposing political preferences between the lower middle and upper middle classes did not find the latter to be more rational than the former when it came to political choices. The latter is also characterised by its ambivalence and apathy towards the political process.

But economics aside, no real change for the better will come forth so long as the parties themselves continue to resist internal reforms. A greater drive to make political parties adopt more merit-based systems will be a step in the right direction.

Only by shoring up meritocracy can a more level playing field be created for nascent parties. Only in a less quasi-feudal political atmosphere can the Ahmad Rofiqs of Indonesia thrive and be assessed by the electorate on their own merits rather than the size of their pockets or their illustrious lineage. 

The views expressed are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect those of STRAT.O.SPHERE CONSULTING PTE LTD. This article is published under a Creative Commons Licence.

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