Articles

Introduction

It has been over a decade since former president Joko “Jokowi” Widodo launched his ambitious Global Maritime Fulcrum (GMF) strategy, aimed at promoting Indonesia’s maritime power and strategic identity.

However, the GMF seems to have lost its lustre today, despite the sea becoming a central space where security, trade, technology and power competition intersect.

As explored below, recent developments such as the unresolved tension over the South China Sea, progress over AUKUS and the Iran war have forced Indonesia into a strategically tricky place that might require the grand strategy’s return. This is despite Indonesia’s maritime agenda having undergone major changes since Jokowi first introduced it.

Against this backdrop, it is thus necessary to consider the revival of the GMF.

Two Administrations

The GMF was initially introduced at the East Asia Summit in 2014 as Indonesia’s ambition to become a maritime power situated between the Indian and Pacific Oceans.

Indeed, construction of ports, development of sea tolls and protection of marine resources were highly visible activities associated with the grand strategy in the beginning. The sight of former minister Susi Pudjiastuti blowing up poacher ships, for example, was a mainstay in national headlines back then.

However, the strategy has greater ambitions beyond these—its five pillars aim to strengthen Indonesia’s capability in maritime culture development, marine resource management, connectivity, maritime diplomacy and maritime defence.

Problems arose when jurisdiction overlaps between institutions occurred, resulting in weak sectoral coordination to realise this ambition. The government’s priorities also shifted in Jokowi’s second term. While activities under the strategy continued, such as port construction, the maritime domain was now considered as just another national development sector instead of a key national roadmap.

Though Indonesia’s broad maritime agenda has not been abandoned by the Prabowo administration, it has however been centred on the blue economy, economic self-sufficiency and the domestic utilisation of marine resources.

The Indonesia Blue Economy Roadmap places the blue economy within the national development agenda. The government has pursued initiatives to strengthen fisheries, maritime logistics, coastal communities and marine resource management. In 2025, it has also launched the Ocean Centre Indonesia to improve cross-sectoral coordination in the maritime sector.

While this shows that the administration pays attention to the maritime affairs, the emphasis has shifted further from a geopolitical vision to domestic interest. As new challenges and concerns emerged from the maritime domain, however, one only wonders if the government should have retained the GMF as the basis of its maritime policies.

Unresolved Tension in the South China Sea

The South China Sea continues to be a theatre for great power competition, with China’s Coast Guard concentrating its recent activities at Scarborough and Sabina Shoals. The activities of Chinese ships in the North Natuna Sea, which is part of Indonesia’s Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), have also ruffled some feathers in Jakarta.

Meanwhile, an emerging issue is the suspected usage of underwater drones by China to monitor Indonesian waters, highlighting the risk of underwater surveillance in Southeast Asia by the Middle Kingdom.

Countering such challenges requires Indonesia to achieve a higher degree of maritime domain awareness, which would enable the sovereign state to defend its territory from incursions and respond to maritime challenges through a greater ability to detect, identify and understand irregular activities across its maritime domain.

But the GMF should not be merely treated as Indonesia’s choice of strategy in responding to territorial dispute with China; it should, instead, be utilised as Indonesia’s foundation on which it can project and balance power over the South China Sea, especially in defence of its EEZ, trade routes and freedom of navigation.  

Concerns Relating to AUKUS

Latest developments regarding AUKUS signal an increased presence of highly capable foreign militaries on Indonesia’s doorstep.

For instance, member states reaffirmed that the formation of the Submarine Rotational Force-West (SRF-West) will commence in 2027. Starting from next year, the HMAS Stirling, a navy base in Western Australia, is planned to be the rotation site for one British submarine and up to four US nuclear-powered submarines.

Considering the proximity of HMAS Stirling to Indonesia’s territory, this means that more foreign submarines will be traversing the sea that separates Indonesia and Australia soon, an increase in the activities of advanced undersea platforms in Indonesia’s strategic neighbourhood.  

While this does not constitute a direct threat to Indonesia, it complicates the regional maritime environment and inflates the urgency to install underwater monitoring capabilities.

Submarines are not the only concern—AUKUS also aims at establishing cooperation in advanced technologies such as AI and autonomous systems. This is exemplified in Australia’s testing of the integration of unmanned underwater vehicles with British submarines as well as AI capabilities for anti-submarine warfare.

It means that the focus of maritime warfare has shifted away from warships to technologically advanced underwater vehicles. However, for countries whose tech capabilities fall short, this only means heightened security concerns emanating from the technological gap.

In this context, the GMF provides a framework through which Indonesia can respond to these developments without necessarily entering an arms race with AUKUS members.

Its maritime defence pillar can support the strengthening of Indonesia’s maritime surveillance, naval readiness and underwater situational awareness. Meanwhile, its maritime diplomacy pillar offers a basis for Indonesia to engage Australia and other regional actors in promoting an inclusive regional security architecture.

Lessons from the Iran War

The Strait of Hormuz crisis shows how vulnerable global trade is to disruptions at maritime chokepoints. Months of tension have disrupted global shipping traffic, raising concerns over energy security in countries like Indonesia and Malaysia. With the conflict nowhere near its terminal point, the anxiety over supply chain disruption is expected to persist for an inconsiderable amount of time.

If Indonesia were to revive the GMF, it should incorporate lessons learned from the conflict, particularly those pertaining to massive disruption to sea lines of communication (SLOC) and supply chain as part of national security.

For Indonesia, this highlights the importance of treating the SLOC as part of national security rather than solely as a matter of commercial shipping. It also underscores the need to strengthen maritime domain awareness, improve coordination among maritime institutions, diversify energy and trade routes where possible, and develop contingency mechanisms for disruptions to critical maritime chokepoints.

A revived GMF should not only focus on connectivity and maritime economic development but also on the resilience of the maritime networks that sustain Indonesia’s economy and energy supply. Strengthening maritime surveillance, protecting critical sea lanes, developing alternative logistics and energy routes, and improving coordination between civilian as well as security institutions would allow Indonesia to better anticipate and manage disruptions originating beyond its immediate territorial waters.

Reviving the GMF

With these three challenges in the background, it is high time that Indonesia consider a revival of the GMF to accelerate its strategic responses to them. To get to that point, perhaps policymakers could consider proposals laid out below.

First, Indonesia should prioritise maritime domain awareness over an expensive expansion of naval platforms. Given highly expensive national programmes, Indonesia is unlikely to sustain a broad maritime build-up anyway. 

The more realistic approach is to integrate existing satellites, drones, sensors and maritime agencies to improve Indonesia’s ability to monitor its waters. This would allow limited resources to be directed towards improving information-sharing and institutional coordination rather than simply acquiring more platforms.

Secondly, increasing maritime defence capability. The modernisation of the Indonesian navy should not be solely concentrated on raising the quantity of vessels but also increasing underwater capabilities.

Furthermore, fostering closer interagency cooperation, such as between Badan Keamanan Laut (Maritime Security Agency – Bakamla) and the navy, is absolutely necessary.

Thirdly, building maritime industrial capability. Continued dependence on foreign states and bodies for maritime technology provision could limit Indonesia’s ambition. As such, the GMF should support a gradual strengthening of Indonesia’s maritime industrial base.

Rather than attempting to match the technological capabilities or defence spending of major powers, Indonesia could concentrate on areas with wider economic and security benefits, particularly shipbuilding, maintenance, surveillance systems, and unmanned technologies. This would make maritime investment more compatible with the government’s broader emphasis on industrialisation and strategic autonomy.

The challenge, however, is maintaining this agenda consistently despite limited fiscal capacity and competing development priorities.

Conclusion

Indonesia’s paradox now is that while the sea has become important in world politics, Indonesia has become increasingly dim in its narrative about the sea.

In the north, the South China Sea shows increased competition and the use of grey-zone instruments. In the south, AUKUS is driving the transformation of Australia’s underwater capabilities and military technology. Outside the region, the Iran war shows how a single chokepoint can disrupt global energy and trade.

The three problems show that the sea is no longer just a geographical feature but a strategic infrastructure of national power.

Therefore, the GMF should be revived to help Indonesia build maritime strategic autonomy to secure its territory, protect trade routes, build the maritime industry, master technology and use its geographical position as an instrument of diplomacy. 

The views expressed are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect those of STRAT.O.SPHERE CONSULTING PTE LTD. This article is published under a Creative Commons Licence.

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