When a regional giant modernises its military without an updated doctrine, its neighbours calculate for the worst-case scenario. Credit: Unsplash/Bisma Mahendra
Indonesia Must Produce a New Defence White Paper
10 July 2026/5 Minutes of Reading
Modernise
Indonesia is undertaking the largest military modernisation programme in its history since Reformasi.
In recent years, the country has obtained 42 units of Rafale jets from France, explored defence technology partnerships with Turkey and acquired the Italian aircraft carrier Giuseppe Garibaldi, highlighting its strategic ambition.
The modernisation programme has been a long time coming, considering Indonesia’s ageing military assets and technologies. As an archipelagic country with the fourth longest coastline in the world, Indonesia demands a strong foundation in defence, especially to maintain territorial sovereignty and strategic trade routes.
But this significant development is not coupled with an update to its Defence White Paper that was last published in 2015, risking the emergence of an information vacuum that could spook its neighbours. Already, countries in the region have begun to worry if Indonesia is shifting its posture from defensive to offensive under the leadership of President Prabowo Subianto.
Anxiety
For instance, the gradual acquisition of the Rafale units since 2022 has put Indonesia in the exclusive group of 4.5th-generation fighter jet operators.
Meanwhile, cooperation with Turkey in the development of Harimau tanks, drones, KHAN missiles and the purchase of KAAN jets further cement the perception of Indonesia’s increasing militarisation. Turkey’s intermediate-range ballistic misses and autonomous weapon system have been used in active conflicts before, including in Libya, Ukraine, and Nagorno-Karabakh.
Such developments have pushed military planners in Singapore and Malaysia to ponder whether Indonesia is preparing for a potential escalation in the South China Sea or aiming to project power over the Strait of Malacca. Considering the sensitivity of this chokehold in global trade, coupled with lessons from the Iran war and the blockade of the Strait of Hormuz, these are all valid concerns.
Indonesia’s past aggression during Konfrontasi is the undercurrent beneath this anxiety; the prospect of Indonesia growing its repertoire of weapons, assets and equipment has only inflamed this sense of unease.
Furthermore, Australia has long viewed Indonesia as a key variable in the calculation of its regional security. In its military doctrine, the latter’s capability to operate aircraft carriers (e.g. Giuseppe Garibaldi), even on a small scale, will fundamentally change the power constellation in the Indo-Pacific, Australia’s own backyard.
Besides, Australia also considers its northern approaches a strategic vulnerability and a potential region where other forces might attempt to project their power. Thus, Indonesia’s increased military capability could elevate the level of vigilance on the part of Australian defence strategists.
Lack of Transparency
Against this backdrop, the absence of an official document describing Indonesia’s military posture (e.g. limited defence vs power projection) reinforces the perception of the country’s strategic ambiguity.
Without an explicit and credible declaration of doctrine, neighbouring countries have no rational basis for assuming Indonesia’s continued defensive posture, thus altering the calculation for the balance of power in the region.
In the security dilemma perspective, what makes this modernisation particularly sensitive is its structural position.
Indonesia is the largest country in ASEAN in terms of population, region and economic potential, but it has historically refrained from expansive power projections, barring a few instances (i.e. Konfrontasi and Operation Lotus). A change in Indonesia’s posture will bear systemic implications for the distribution of regional power.
For instance, Singapore will naturally consider if Indonesia aims to assert control over the Strait of Malacca; the Malaysia-Indonesia tension over Ambalat will rise once more and; Australia already deems Jakarta’s actions as “unpredictable”.
White Paper
An update to Indonesia’s Defence White Paper will thus ameliorate some, if not all, of these attendant uncertainties. As the most important instrument in the security policy architecture of a democratic state, it elucidates a state’s threat perception, defence policy directions and the doctrine of use of force.
Earlier editions of the White Paper were published in 2003, 2008 and 2015, emphasising the need to modernise Indonesia’s defence equipment, the country’s defensive posture, its embrace of non-aggressive principles, and also its commitment to ASEAN as a peaceful region.
Moreover, the documents also served as a bridge between the military’s strategic needs and the principle of public accountability in the post-Reformasi democratic system. They were reflective of Indonesia’s strategic transparency at the time amid the country’s pursuit of becoming the world’s maritime axis.
However, the document has yet to be updated to reflect the changing geostrategic considerations and Indonesia’s latest measures in amplifying its defence capabilities. It has been 11 years since the last edition, creating a vacuum in Indonesia’s defence transparency landscape.
What has changed is not only the absence of documents, but also the loss of the “official language of the state” that explains how Indonesia views threats and responds to them. In the absence of such an updated document, the external interpretation of Indonesia’s military modernisation has shifted from doctrine-based to capability-based.
As a result, the message that Indonesia is sending is unclear. When the White Paper was still produced and updated, Indonesia actively framed its defence narrative in official documents that could be accessed by the domestic and international public. Today, these narratives are spread in the form of institutional statements, partial policies, speeches or unintegrated diplomatic communication.
There is, thus, a perceived disconnect between increased military capabilities and the doctrine that governs Indonesia’s military affairs. From a regional security perspective, this gap could trigger misperceptions, even if Indonesia’s intentions remain defensive.
Recommendations
Nonetheless, it is important to underscore that aiming for defence transparency is not tantamount to stripping military capabilities. There is a difference between strategic transparency and operational secrecy.
As the first level of official declaration of military paradigm, the White Paper only elaborates on the country’s military directions, not tactical details. Thus, in Indonesia’s context, an update to this document will not weaken Indonesia’s defence capability but strengthen its domestic legitimacy and regional stability.
Several steps should be considered if Indonesia were to move forward with this suggestion.
Firstly, Indonesia must aim for a comprehensive, not partial, update to the White Paper. The new document must explain the objectives of recent military modernisation, reflect strategic developments in the Indo-Pacific, acknowledge latest technological advancements and state Indonesia’s current defence priorities.
Secondly, such an updated paper must affirm a defensive posture. It is imperative to declare that the increase in its capabilities is not aimed at a form of aggression but for the defence of the region, especially in the context of a large archipelagic state.
Thirdly, the government must consistently improve and strengthen communication in regional forums regarding its military doctrine. Mechanisms such as the ASEAN Defence Ministers’ Meeting (ADMM) must be leveraged to clarify Indonesia’s position and build trust.
Fourthly, and linked to the above, the government must stress the national defence narrative. Defence policy communication needs to be more integrated across different bodies and actors so as not to cause fragmented interpretations at the regional level.
Conclusion
Therefore, Indonesia’s main challenge lies not in the decision to strengthen its defence capabilities but in ensuring that these increased capabilities can be properly understood by the domestic public and countries in the region.
The absence of an update to the Defence White Paper since 2015 has created a vacuum in Indonesia’s defence transparency architecture. In the context of the Indo-Pacific – with its ever-shifting balance of power and atmosphere of uncertainty – this vacuum is a strategic issue that needs to be addressed urgently.
On Indonesia’s part, military modernisation is a legitimate and necessary step in addressing changes in the global strategic environment. However, without an updated policy framework and clear strategic communication, this modernisation has the potential to create uncertainty in the region.
An updated Defence White Paper is therefore essential to restore strategic clarity in Indonesia’s defence policy. It is an important instrument to ensure that Indonesia’s military modernisation is properly understood as a contribution to regional stability, not as a new source of uncertainty.


