Introduction
China’s maritime coercion directed against the Philippines reached a peak in 2024, with ships and boats from China harassing Philippine civilian vessels between July and September 2024.
Such reports of aggressive and dangerous conduct on China’s side have been increasing at an alarming rate. Since February 2023, the Philippines has accused China of unsafe behavior on at least 12 occasions, often within its exclusive economic zone (EEZ).
To illustrate this, there were two separate “ramming” incidents that had taken place between the ships of the Chinese and Philippine coast guards. One of such incidents caused severe damage to the hull of one of the latter’s vessels in waters near Sabina Atoll, well within the Philippines’ EEZ.
A spokesperson of the Philippine National Maritime Council stated that China’s illegal actions do not contribute to confidence-building measures that are necessary to achieve mutual respect and preserve a rules-based international order.
Despite both sides agreeing in July 2024 to avoid confrontations during resupply missions to Philippine troops at a disputed shoal, recent events have called into question China’s sincerity. A month later, two Chinese planes released flares in the path of a Philippine military aircraft over the Scarborough Shoal, thus contradicting the agreement.
Geopolitical Concerns and Chinese Maritime Aggression
Southeast Asia is beset by a host of maritime security threats, including illegal, unreported and unregulated (IUU) fishing, piracy, sea robbery, illegal trafficking in arms, people, and drugs, as well as environmental crimes.
Institutions responding to these issues have proliferated, both inside and outside the purview of ASEAN. Indeed, the region is considered the “center of intensifying geopolitical competition with multiple potential flashpoints.”
Within Southeast Asia, the Philippines is a major maritime trading hub. Its territorial waters abound with enormous natural resources, beautiful beaches, minerals and hydrocarbon deposits. The protection of merchant, fishing and tourism vessels has thus created the need for constant monitoring of the maritime area.
Given the tremendous maritime traffic, the Philippine Navy and the Philippine Coast Guard are tasked with dealing with IUU fishing, piracy, armed robbery, the trafficking of drugs and people, as well as the transport of illegal goods by sea.
With such hefty tasks at hand, the intrusion of Chinese vessels has thus added another problem to the mix.
However, it is a mistake to perceive this problem solely from the Philippines’ perspective, as China’s maritime activities can never be extricated from its broader strategic competition with the United States in the Indo-Pacific region.
On the United States’ part, it has political and moral obligations to maintain its position in areas threatened by Chinese incursions, including in the South China Sea, the East China Sea and the Yellow Sea.
Among others, these include: 1) keeping the regional balance of power favorable to the United States and its allies; 2) safeguarding US-led security architecture in the Western Pacific, and; 3) upholding its commitments to Japan and the Philippines.
The United States has undertaken various actions to attain these goals, which comprise activities such as: 1) transferring military personnel, equipment and supplies to bases at sites occupied in the South China Sea, and; 2) upholding the July 2016 tribunal award in the South China Sea arbitration case of the Philippines and China.
The Academic Perspective
It should be noted that China’s maritime strategy is derived from serious academic works on naval study and the alignment of military doctrine with national defense modernization, as written by Lidong Wang in “Theory of National Maritime Interest.”
These studies are done by the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Academy of Military Science and the PLA National Defense University, which focus on the use of armed force, tactics, and military theories.
Many sea power theorists center their assessments on China’s continental power and its rising international status. Interestingly, some, like James Holmes and Toshi Yoshihara, found the commonalities between China’s strategy in the South China Sea and the United States’ in the Caribbean Sea.
These studies offer adequate knowledge regarding China’s increasing naval capability as well as the implications of China as a sea power—China’s intrusion into the Philippines’ waters being one manifestation of such.
Accordingly, a narrative has emerged into how the state should pursue its maritime policies. Such studies suggest the expansion of naval influence, the acquisition of deterrent sea power and the focus on the protection of sea lines of communication, according to Wenmu Zhang in Discussion of China’s Sea Power.
As shown, extensive research has been pursued pertaining to Chinese maritime power development.
In 2009, Chinese academics such as Wu Shicun, Xu Liping, Zhang Jie and Zhong Feiteng promoted their ideas on China’s international roles, diplomatic relations with the United States and China’s prominence in Southeast Asia. Their research centered on raising possible policy approaches to resolve debates and foster collaboration in the region.
Other studies also cover non-dispute-related maritime issues. Scholars of these areas posit that the information environment is strategic to China’s energy and logistic supply. Examples include studies on the “Malacca Dilemma” and the “String of Pearls,” which are associated with China’s energy imports and sea control.
Efforts to Safeguard Territorial Integrity
The Philippines has undertaken steps to safeguard its territorial integrity by emphasizing the importance of international law and through engagement with ASEAN.
While leveraging on international law is important, the Philippines still needs to continuously highlight in international forums about China’s violations of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), especially considering both the Philippines and China are parties to UNCLOS.
For example, the Philippines needs to highlight the outcome of the 2016 South China Sea Arbitration that found China’s claim as incompatible. The arbitration resulted in several key decision points.
Firstly, China’s claims to historic rights and resources have no legal basis. Secondly, none of China’s claimed land features in the Spratly Islands are islands capable of generating a 200-nm EEZ. Thirdly, China violated the Philippines’ sovereign rights on several layers: 1) interfering with the latter’s oil exploration activities; 2) prohibiting its fishing vessels from operating; 3) failing to prevent Chinese fishing vessels from operating and; 4) conducting land reclamation in areas where the Philippines enjoys sovereign rights to explore for and exploit natural resources. Lastly, China violated its marine environmental protection obligations under UNCLOS by causing “severe harm to the coral reef environment” with its land reclamation activities and harvesting of endangered species.
Despite this, China has lodged its non-participation and non-acceptance of this ruling.
The impact of the 2016 arbitral ruling is threefold. First, the arbitration denies the effectivity of China’s maritime security strategy in the South China Sea. Second, it denies China’s historic rights claim. Third, it gives independent states recourse to the merits of UNCLOS in the face of China’s sea power in the South China Sea.
In other words, it has reinforced the Philippines’ contention that the actions of China in the South China Sea are “Illegal, Coercive, Aggressive and Deceptive.”
As a strategy to promote this ruling, President Ferdinand Marcos signed Executive Order 57 on 25 March 2024, to deal with issues that impact the country’s national security, sovereignty, sovereign rights and maritime jurisdiction over its extensive maritime zones. The Philippines continues to present the merits of the 2016 Arbitral Ruling in all public forums and implement exhaustive efforts to maintain its full adherence to the rule of law.
Efforts to Counter Maritime Aggression
The Philippines’ strategic alignment with the United States, Japan and Australia is a clear response to China’s intrusion. Under the auspices of the US Indo-Pacific Strategy, the Philippines can coalesce international support to maintain its position vis-à-vis China’s activities in the South China Sea.
There is strength in number. The leaders of the United States, Japan, India and Australia have collectively declared their concern about the situation in the East and South China Seas, the “coercive and intimidating maneuvres” by China in the latter.
Even with such support in place, the Philippines must adopt a two-fold strategy to deal with China’s recurring activities within its EEZ.
The first strategy is to allow the United States and other foreign vessels to join the regular resupply mission to the BRP Sierra Madre, a tank-landing vessel under the Philippine Navy. If the Philippines’ resupply vessels are accompanied by foreign vessels, this may deter the Chinese maritime militia from carrying out its ramming techniques. Thus, the resupply missions can be peaceful and may be completed without any incident.
The second strategy is to allow active-duty Filipino Americans in the United States’ armed forces to join the resupply mission on board Philippine vessels.
The Philippines is one of several countries that recognize dual citizenship, with more than 15,000 Filipino Americans actively serving in the United States Navy, some of whom have achieved ranks of leadership at all levels.
Many Filipino American officers are known as “mustangs,” naval service members who have worked through their career path from the bottom to the top. This is an honor that is difficult to attain and those mustangs are valuable repositories of knowledge as well as experience wherever they go.
The Philippines may put a request to the United States to allow Filipino-American naval officers to participate in regular resupply missions to the BRP Sierra Madre and in the patrolling of territorial waters in the South China Sea. The presence of Filipino Americans inside the Philippine vessels would help boost confidence among the Philippine Coast Guard and the Philippine Navy officers.
Conclusion
Chinese aggression within the Philippines’ EEZ has increased dramatically in the second half of this year. These actions have resulted in increased tensions between the two, thus threatening regional stability. Furthermore, despite a joint China-Philippine arrangement, which focuses on refraining from aggression during resupply missions to BRP Sierra Madre, China has not adhered to its commitments. This has called into question the viability of any diplomatic agreements with China.
The time has come for the Philippines to adopt more creative ways to deter China. The two-pronged strategy of including American vessels and Filipino American naval officers for regular resupply missions may offer a boost to maritime stability.
Filipino officials need to go beyond just diplomatic efforts to address the tensions in the South China Sea. These two creative solutions, which constitute peaceful strategies, may lead to better maritime security and regional stability in the long term.
