Introduction
Indonesia successfully curbed terrorist attacks throughout 2023 and 2024, as evidenced by zero recorded attacks.
Enhanced counterterrorism (CT) capabilities and legal frameworks led to this remarkable achievement. Following a series of terrorist attacks in East Java in 2018, the revised Law No 5/2018 on terrorism has empowered security apparatuses to conduct pre-emptive arrests against terrorist suspects.
Nevertheless, the absence of any incident has created a “false assumption” that Indonesia has completely curtailed terrorist threats. Such a perception affects the available funding for CT and preventing and countering violent extremism (P/CVE) efforts in the country.
“Zero attack” does not mean that terrorist threats have been eliminated in the country. The police arrested 147 and 55 terrorist suspects in 2023 and 2024, respectively. These figures alone show that extremist beliefs still exist among certain quarters in the country, inspiring some individuals to commit violence.
This article will delve into the enduring threat of terrorism despite the reduction of funding for CT and P/CVE efforts in Indonesia due to shifting priorities at the domestic and international levels.
Unfading Threats
The case studies below demonstrate why Indonesia is yet to be free from the terrorism threat.
In July 2024, HOK, a 19-year-old man, was arrested by the police for his alleged terror plot against two religious sites in Malang, East Java. He was allegedly linked to the Daulah Islamiyah network.
HOK was first exposed to radical ideologies through Telegram in November 2023. In the span of six to seven months since his first exposure, he had plotted an attack that he financed using allowance from his parents without their knowledge.
Two other Daulah Islamiyah supporters were arrested in West Jakarta just days after HOK’s arrest, although they seem to have no connection to HOK himself. Just like HOK, however, they were also exposed to radical ideologies through social media and the Internet, and they have also assembled explosives to launch their own attack.
These examples show that social media remains a critical radicalisation tool in Indonesia. In the first 10 months of 2024 alone, the National Counterterrorism Agency (BNPT) recorded 2,264 social media accounts spreading terrorist propaganda. Facebook recorded the highest number with 1,013 accounts, followed by WhatsApp with 571 accounts.
The police’s special counterterrorism unit, Detachment 88, has also continued detecting social media propaganda encouraging aspiring jihadis to emigrate to Syria following the fall of Bashar al-Assad’s regime. In a similar vein, BNPT has observed narratives asserting that the victory of Hayyat Tahrir Al-Sham (HTS) in Syria was the victory of the caliphate against Western capitalism and that people should go to Syria for the struggle of Muslims.
Evidently, the dynamics of Syria and Daesh continue to influence online radicalisation narratives in Indonesia.
Apart from this, offline radicalisation also continues.
In September 2024, the police arrested two suspects in Bima, West Nusa Tenggara, who are affiliated with Jemaah Ansharut Daulah (JAD), the umbrella organisation of IS-affiliated individuals. According to the police’s claim, one has delivered radical religious sermons while the other conducted paramilitary training for aspiring jihadists.
Meanwhile, in June 2025, the police arrested another suspect in Bima affiliated with Jamaah Ansharu Syariah (JAS); the individual has posted terrorist activities on his social media.
Bima is infamous as a hotbed of terrorist networks, which means that the radicalisation process there occurs in a social environment where many people support radical ideologies. Breaking the chain of extremism in this area will remain a challenge.
The above cases prove why terrorism has not faded as a security concern in Indonesia, even if the intensity of the threat may have decreased in the past few years.
Daesh-affiliated groups may have been weakened, while Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) has disbanded. However, the future remains uncertain. The changing domestic and global political situations would determine the way terrorism manif
Prabowo and His Shifting Priorities
Despite this, CT does not seem to be a priority security issue for President Prabowo Subianto. It is not mentioned at all in Prabowo’s manifesto, Asta Cita, which is in all fairness unsurprising considering his focus on the traditional defence procurement agenda during his previous stint as defence minister.
However, Prabowo’s lack of interest could also be partly explained by the already declining trend of terrorist attacks while he was serving as minister thanks to the revised terrorism law.
Meanwhile, as Indonesia failed to meet its Minimum Essential Force (MEF) agenda by 2024, Prabowo is compelled to carry forward his ambitious procurement agenda as president, thereby focusing on traditional security. Additionally, Prabowo also prioritises the establishment of 100 Territorial Development Battalions, which are expected to assist the government in the food estate programme, a central policy in Prabowo’s dream of food security.
Prabowo’s budget cuts affect the CT landscape too, even if they were only aimed at minimising business trips and procurement of office supplies. BNPT is severely affected by this, having suffered roughly a 24.49% cut to its budget. As many of its deradicalisation and counter-radicalisation programmes require Jakarta-based officers to travel to the regions, the effectiveness of its programmes would be notably impacted.
Despite this, the Audit Board of Indonesia (BPK) has flagged a few problems with BNPT’s budget absorption. According to BPK, in 2024, BNPT only utilised roughly 55% of the amount allocated by the government. This is due to the presence of foreign funding, which BNPT has also received over the years due to the international nature of its CT efforts. On the flip side, BNPT’s failure to absorb its budget from the government became a justification for the latter to cut out a portion of its budget.
The Fall of USAID
When the security of the world was rocked by such threats as those imposed by Daesh and its affiliates, many countries witnessed the so-called P/CVE-sation wave whereby a huge flow of foreign funding was dispensed to civil society organisations (CSOs) that focus on P/CVE. In fact, the rapid growth of P/CVE CSOs in Indonesia could be attributed to the availability of support from foreign funders.
But can Indonesia rely on foreign funding?
We are now living in a different time. As the number of terrorist attacks decline and terrorist networks are enfeebled, P/CVE may no longer be a priority for international funders. Consequently, existing projects may be affected, and it would be difficult to ensure the sustainability of P/CVE programmes.
Heavy reliance on foreign funding is unsustainable, as its continuity is dependent on the domestic politics of the country from where the funding comes. No example is more accurate than the United States, which provides the prime example as to why Indonesia should not rely on foreign funding.
Following Trump’s executive order to freeze the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), the future of USAID-funded programmes in Indonesia is bleak.
USAID has been one of the main funders of Indonesia’s CT and P/CVE programmes. Agencies such as BNPT have been working closely with USAID in engaging CSOs and deploying programmes, while USAID eventually became a main source of funding for a number of P/CVE-oriented CSOs in the country.
For example, from 2018 to 2024, the USAID-Harmoni project channelled funds to various CSOs to conduct trainings and programmes aimed at enhancing Indonesia’s resilience to intolerance and violent extremism. Despite the importance of such engagements, the project was not renewed after Trump dropped the axe on USAID.
Developments such as these compel Indonesia to find alternative funding that can support its CT and P/CVE programmes. Some available options outside USAID include the Australia Indonesia Partnership for Justice (AIPJ) and the Global Community Engagement and Resilience Fund (GCERF). However, options such as these are fairly limited.
Worse, CSOs are forced to look for alternative projects outside the domain of P/CVE to ensure survival. While limitation to foreign funding is an issue, the improved terrorism landscape in Indonesia could also pose existential questions regarding the continued utility of such CSOs.
Despite this narrowing space, CSOs may explore alternative funding from private companies and state-owned enterprises (SOEs) through their Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) scheme.
Companies disbursing funds for P/CVE-related projects is nothing new; BNPT and Detachment 88 have been working closely with various companies to support former terrorists and the survivors of terrorist attacks. For instance, Detachment 88 has worked closely with PT Sang Hyang Seri – an SOE in the agricultural sector – in providing agricultural training to former terrorist inmates.
CSOs could take an inspiration from this, developing programmes that could benefit both the funder and target audience alike.
Conclusion
The terrorism threat may be declining in Indonesia, but it is fallacious to assume that terrorism has been fully eradicated from the country. Radicalisation continues to occur in the digital space. At the same time, extremists carry on with recruitment and propaganda dissemination in their
