The Intersection between Terrorism and Politics
Terrorist narrative and propaganda, particularly that of jihadi groups, are not just tools for spreading ideology. They are sophisticated political disinformation machineries designed to distort reality, manipulate perceptions and incite violence.
These extremist messages have found fertile ground in Indonesia, where latest major events, such as the 2019 presidential elections and the Covid-19 pandemic, have facilitated the surge of fake news, national polarization and an increasing distrust in the government.
Generally, disinformation is understood as false information deliberately and often covertly spread (such as by planting rumors) to influence public opinion or obscure facts.
However, Thomas Rid argued in his book Active Measures that disinformation is not necessarily all lies; it can be accurate information presented in a harmful way. Typically, it mixes about 80% of facts and 20% of falsehood to deceive the audience. Think about messages that aim to misrepresent the truth by planting hoaxes in them.
In the political context, examples include the false claim about the origins of AIDS, the Pizzagate conspiracy during the 2016 US election and the allegations of Jokowi’s Chinese heritage during Indonesia’s 2019 presidential election. All these cases share the trait of blending truth and lies.
Interestingly, these traits are also present in jihadi terrorist narratives. Per Rid’s definition, these narratives blend authentic references from the holy texts with twisted interpretations to support their agenda.
Findings from my personal conversations with reformed terrorists align with this. The extremists combine the holy scriptures and the perceived global oppression of Muslims to attract followers.
Terrorist groups like Daesh are masters of this art. They can quickly spread their disinformation globally using social media platforms’ wide reach and anonymity, which algorithms study user preferences and amplify these messages by providing similar content. This digital shift has increased the impact of their propaganda, making it harder to control.
For instance, it was found that YouTube’s algorithms do recommend extremist content to users who actively search for it. This is occurring on other video-sharing platforms as well, such as what happened to migrant worker Ika Puspitasari who was hooked on extremist content after seeing it on Facebook.
The employment of bots and buzzers in disinformation campaigns has only complicated the matter, as these things foster confusion, erode trust in government and media, and contribute to societal polarization in the long run. This trend was very popular during the US and Indonesian elections, signifying the close association between methods of disinformation campaign and politics.
Terrorist groups such as Daesh, Jemaah Ansharut Daulah (JAD) or the recently disbanded Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) fit the same mold. Their ultimate goal is to establish a caliphate in Iraq, Syria or Indonesia, overturning the status quo and replacing existing governments with their own rule, thus revealing their political ambitions despite their proclaimed religious objectives. Interestingly, they have also employed bots to magnify their disinformation campaign.
Having considered these points, the similarities in the processes of both terrorist groups and political actors cannot be overlooked. Through their pursuit of power and ability to govern, terrorist groups’ agendas are political in nature. Besides, they also use disinformation tactics similar to those employed by legitimate political players, such as the use of bots and blurring the lines between facts and lies in their messages.
It is easier to detect hoaxes, fake news and the likes when several factors are present, such as high literacy, strong education, solid trust in government, high social capital as well as fair and just political process. In such conditions, terrorist narratives and disinformation may not take root in the society.
But what happens if these conditions are not met?
Is Indonesia Vulnerable?
The unfortunate news is that the political landscape of the world’s largest Muslim-majority country, especially since the contentious 2019 presidential election and the Covid-19 pandemic, has become more vulnerable to disinformation.
This has created perfect opportunities for jihadi groups to exploit tensions and erode trust in the government.
High internet penetration and social media usage in Indonesia are not matched by high media literacy and education, making the majority of the population sitting ducks for disinformation campaigns.
Low trust in the government and its institutions, coupled with polarization and identity politics, has made it harder for the government to combat disinformation, as the government does not enjoy high trust from the governed.
This condition is suitable for terrorist groups to spread their hate-filled disinformation against the government as part of their radicalization efforts. Once radicalized, individuals find it difficult to change their minds, even when presented with facts and logic by the government.
Lee McIntyre, in his book On Disinformation, argues that many disinformation believers or deniers – those who deny facts even when shown clear evidence – are driven by values and identity, not just facts. Their beliefs are part of who they are, so presenting them with counterfactuals may be perceived as an attack on their identity.
Worse, disinformation facilitates an “us vs. them” mentality and pushes individuals to view those who disagree with them as enemies. This mentality is written all over the takfiri ideology, which views the government and its institutions as enemies. As a result, many members of JI and JAD who were arrested refused to participate in the authority’s deradicalization program, thus undermining its effectiveness.
This is reflected in the government’s struggle to earn public trust. Key government institutions – including the House of Representatives (DPR), the Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK), and the National Police (Polri) – were among the least trusted institutions last year.
High profile cases of corruption and power abuse in the past two years alone have damaged Polri’s reputation, which will need some time to be rehabilitated. Furthermore, recent wrong turns by the government also play a factor. For example, the cybersecurity disaster affecting the country’s Temporary National Data Center casts doubt over the government’s competency to protect the nation’s interests.
If similar misfires persist, public trust in the government will likely decline further. This could render people more vulnerable to terrorist groups, which propagate the beliefs that the government has transgressed (taghut) and that no positive outcome can emerge from a government led by infidels.
This is clear from both past and recent arrests made by Densus 88. The 2022 Astana Anyar suicide bomber, a terrorist recidivist, harbored hatred towards the police and the government. More recently, a 19-year-old in Malang was arrested for planning to bomb religious houses after being influenced by similar Daesh propaganda.
Thus, anti-government campaigns may easily find an audience in a society that has growing discontent with the government. This is a major risk that the authorities must attend to.
Way Forward
The World Economic Forum has ranked disinformation as the most significant global risk for the next two years and the fifth greatest over the next decade. Therefore, addressing this issue is crucial, especially in the context of Indonesia, where political instability might enable terrorist groups to spread their wing.
Will McAvoy of The Newsroom: “The first step in solving the problem is admitting that there is one.”
The Indonesian government should not turn a blind eye or be in denial about the disinformation issue, as terrorist groups can easily exploit it. Furthermore, it is imperative for the authorities to acknowledge and immediately ameliorate the mistakes that they have committed, as ignorance and dismissiveness would only hamper the government’s effort to rebuild public trust.
There is no silver bullet for this. Due to the political nature of the disinformation used by terrorist groups, continuous efforts to educate the public and raise awareness about its dangers and the political elements within their propaganda are necessary.
Other steps, such as fact-checking initiatives, are important, but public campaigns and face-to-face conversations with those who sympathize with radical ideology can also be effective, especially when involving “credible voices” like reformed terrorists and Daesh returnees.
Moreover, coordinated efforts between governmental and non-governmental entities must also be improved. This is especially true for agencies like the National Counter Terrorism Agency (BNPT) and Densus 88 of Polri, as they are the primary authorities the public relies on for matters related to counterterrorism and counter violent extremism. Displaying competence and reliability would help boost public trust.
Furthermore, improving media and digital literacy, along with education, are essential for long-term solutions. This is especially important given the rise of AI, deep fakes and generative AI, which make it even more difficult to differentiate between fake and real information. As a final thought, tackling this issue requires a comprehensive strategic communication approach involving all stakeholders, including the government, media, religious organizations, civil society groups, youth organizations and technology companies.
