Introduction
Though an expected consequence of the US’s hasty withdrawal, the swift return of the Taliban to Afghanistan’s power politics surprised the world. This development illustrates how the corrupt Afghan government has been practically hopeless and doomed to collapse with the withdrawal of the US troops. Although the US refuses to admit that its withdrawal is reminiscent of its military failure in Vietnam, the Afghan case re-educates top policy makers in Washington that external intervention through military occupation in a socio-culturally complex and politically corrupt nation damages its hegemonic position.
What concerns the international community about the Taliban’s return is its nexus with al-Qaeda (AQ). Notably, the September 11 attack, the first external attack on American soil, was directed al-Qaeda from its sanctuary in Afghanistan. This attack not only provided AQ with media spotlight on its uncompromising, violent struggle but also brought further attention to the Taliban. Consequently, Muslims became targeted due to the arising Islamophobia.
One may argue that the demise of Osama bin Laden could see the end of AQ’s violent struggle. However, this assumption is far from reality. AQ, through its regional cells, continues to be a formidable force by conducting small-scale attacks such as the attack UN peacekeepers in Mali. Therefore, the Taliban’s political return could be an indicator of AQ’s return to the global scene, the reinvigoration of terror cells and networks, and a morale booster to global religious violent extremists. Its return could also indicate the consolidation of violent extremist movements all over the world with serious global security ramifications. Though the Taliban is trying to project a new liberal image – promising social and political reforms, but analysts continue to cast doubts over its commitments given its past connections with AQ.
Second Front in Southeast Asia?
The connection between Afghanistan and Southeast Asia could also reignite a “second front” discourse in the region. Indonesia, Malaysia, and the Philippines were the strategic hubs of the AQ affiliate in the region- the Jemaah Islamiyah (JI). Prior to the US invasion, AQ militant camps in Afghanistan became the spiritual/ideological centre and training ground for JI members.
Nonetheless, the Southeast Asian threat environment has changed. Previously, Southeast Asian authorities had to contend with mitigating threats mainly from JI. However, this has changed with the presence of Daesh (Al-Dawlah Al-Islamiyah fi Al-Iraq wa Al-Sham) which saw the realignment of groups such as Abu Sayyaf (ASG) and Mujahidin Indonesia Timur (MIT). Both, AQ and Daesh, are different entities with contrasting ideological principles. Though both groups are Sunni Salafi striving to install an Islamic governance, AQ rejects Daesh’s takfiri arguments for its deviations from its interpretation of Islam. Additionally, AQ is focused on anti-Zionism and its mission against the US for its support to governments in Middle East. For Daesh, its ideology combines radical Salafism and Wahabism, offering its followers a narrowed understanding of Islam. Its strict adherence to the precepts of Prophet Muhammad’s life and legitimizing bloody sectarian killings on those they deemed to be apostates do not augur well for Islam’s image. Their incompatible goals and interpretations have led to numerous armed conflict between these groups.
Therefore, the possible threats of the Taliban’s political return to Malaysia’s security need to be contextualized with the current threat environment. AQ is currently benefiting from its affiliations with the Taliban. Afghanistan could once again serve as AQ’s safe haven for its militant training and planning for attacks. To reignite its Southeast Asian reach, AQ is also reconnecting with JI. Conversely, Daesh is gradually losing its grips in Syria and beginning to re-establish its base in Southeast Asia with the help of MIT and ASG. It is, thus, inevitable that both groups compete for supremacy over Southeast Asia.
Though Parti Islam SeMalaysia (PAS) was quick to congratulate the takeover, citing its confidence of Taliban’s new image, Malaysia is still assessing the situation and is, thus, implementing a cautious approach on recent developments in Afghanistan. The major concern among policy makers is its potential impact on Malaysia’s counterterrorism efforts and politico-security. At the operational level, the enforcement agencies continue to strengthen its counterterrorism strategies, such as by beefing-up intel gathering activities and border control, to restrict the movements of violent extremists into or out of Malaysia.
Malaysia, henceforth, needs to be cognizant that potential or future terror threats by regional affiliates of AQ and Daesh. Threats to Malaysia’s security would come in multiple forms. First is the recruitment process by these groups. Daesh’s social media accounts have proven to be a successful strategy in recruiting its followers compared to that of AQ’s old fashioned usrah method. However, this method could still be effective as there are still hardcore followers in Malaysia. Based on the author’s conversation with a senior officer of the Special Branch (SB) of the Royal Police of Malaysia (PDRM), at least five percent of those who were undergoing rehabilitation programs continued to subscribe to their violent worldviews. These hardcore followers were formerly AQ’s Malaysian leaders and have now joined Daesh to continue their political struggle. Unfortunately, they were also successful in influencing other inmates with Daesh’s propaganda. Consequently, these terrorist inmates are detained in isolation cells. Under Malaysia’s legislation, former AQ members like Yazid Sufaat, could not be detained indefinitely and have been freed. If left unmonitored, these hardcore individuals could return to their violent struggle.
Second is the strengthening of regional terror networking. Malaysia has so far been spared from direct or large-scale terrorist attacks compared to its neighbours like Indonesia and the Philippines. However, Malaysia has been accused of producing terrorists in the region like Hambali, Nasir Abbas, Dr Mahmud Ahmad, and Nordin Mat Top. Thus far, Malaysia’s resilience to terror attacks stems from its experience and expertise in managing potential terrorist attacks since the British colonialization of the country. Terror threats have been countered through several preventive laws, intel cooperation, and enforcements. Although all these hard approaches could not guarantee Malaysia to be from terrorism, it has at least mitigated possible major attacks. Under these new circumstances, Malaysia must also rely heavily on soft approaches.
As with previously, the current threats are complex and regionally connected. AQ and Daesh have set up their Southeast Asian bases in countries that are politically unstable, have weak law enforcements and have large followers to achieve their goals. Since the September 11 attack, Tawau and Semporna of Sabah, for instance, have been used as transit points by foreign terrorists to move between Sulawesi Island of Indonesia and Tawi-Tawi islands of the Philippines. Sabah’s eastern coast is the most convenient travel choice for terrorist groups to smuggle weapons and explosives due to open sea and porous border. Although the pandemic has hampered movements due to border closures and restrictions, these terror groups will continue to reconnect through underground networking on various social media platforms.
It is imperative for Malaysia, henceforth, to continue to work closely with neighbouring countries to prevent future terror attacks. Recent developments in Afghanistan cannot be taken lightly due to the simultaneous threats from groups affiliated with AQ and Daesh.
