Articles

• TAGS:
• Malaysia
• Youth

Introduction

Malaysia’s politics is often seen as complex, but two features stand out: race and religion. These are not just social identities; they are embedded in how politics is organised and experienced.

From elections to public policy, these features continue to shape how power is understood and distributed.

For many Malaysians, engaging with politics means not only navigating through politicians and institutions but also the histories and sensitivities of different communities.

Among Malaysian Chinese* youth, this understanding is shaped by a longer historical trajectory such as minority positioning, stories of migration and moments of tension like the 13 May incident.

Even when these histories are not fully understood in detail, they are passed down in quieter ways, including through family caution, community narratives and as implicit awareness of vulnerability. Unfortunately, this means the Malaysian Chinese youth must navigate a system where ethnic identity often carries political meaning.

At the same time, education pathways, media consumption and political competition remain largely organised along communal lines. As a result, political understanding often begins not with policy or institutions, but with identity and group positioning.

In this context, Malaysia’s political culture is commonly understood as ethnic-based politics out of preference, parochialism, cultural conservatism or an unwillingness to engage with a multiracial political reality.

But what if ethnic politics was never a choice for the youths?

This article draws on the ongoing study by IMAN Research entitled “Kami Orang Sini Juga: Malaysian Chinese Youths” as part of its larger nation-building project. It aims to understand the sociopolitical aspirations of Malaysian Chinese youth, how they perceive belonging and national identity, and where current policymaking and public discourse fall short in addressing their lived realities.

The research team travelled across Peninsular Malaysia to engage over 100 Malaysian Chinese youths aged 18-35 from diverse socioeconomic, occupational and ideological backgrounds. These conversations offered a grounded and often eye-opening perspective on how individuals directly or indirectly participate in democratic life, whether through their professions, personal interests or community work.

Our preliminary findings show that Malaysian Chinese youth are not politically shallow; they are politically conditioned. What appears to be an ethnic fixation is, in many cases, a learned belief about how politics must operate to survive.

Challenging that belief requires more than urging them to be “braver” or “more progressive”—it requires redesigning the political environment that initially taught them caution. To achieve different political outcomes, there is an imperative to acknowledge how existing beliefs were shaped in the first place, which this piece aims to explore partially.

Our observation so far indicates that the status quo is not a voluntary attachment to ethnic politics but the outcome of a belief system that has been carefully and consistently constructed since everyone’s childhood.

Why does this difference matter? One implies moral responsibility, while the other points to structural conditioning.

Beliefs Are Taught, Structures Are Not

Our findings thus far indicate that Malaysian Chinese youth do not “choose” ethnic-based politics—they are born into it.

When interviewees were asked about their identity, all prioritised “Malaysian” in their answers (be it “Malaysian” or “Malaysian Chinese”) instead of “Chinese”. The sense of belonging and pride was immediate across their answers, as exemplified by one respondent: “Of course Malaysian, I was born here and have my IC (identity card) here [sic].”

While the Malaysian Chinese community is often labelled as “pragmatic”, i.e. prioritising benefits over values, there is an urgency to viewMalaysian Chinese youth as a distinct entity. This is because for many of these youths, this is the only political logic they have ever been exposed to and recognise as legitimate.

From an early age, the political understanding of Malaysian Chinese youth is shaped less by formal civic education and more by informal socialisation—through family narratives, media and party-linked discourses.

At home, politics often appears in passing remarks rather than structured discussion: reminders that “Chinese are a minority”, that certain issues are “sensitive”, or that one should be careful about what is said in public. These are not taught as political ideas, but they quietly shape what feels safe, possible or realistic.

Media exposure reinforces this. Many youths rely on Chinese-language news or social media, where political developments are often framed in terms of communal impact – who is affected, who is protected – rather than how institutions function or decisions are made.

At the same time, political messaging encountered during elections or online tends to reduce politics to familiar themes of protection and representation. Over time, these repeated signals shape how young people make sense of politics, often before they have had the chance to learn how the system works in a more structured way.

Together, these everyday experiences do not just inform political views—they set the boundaries of how politics is understood in the first place.

As a result, this makes the question of formal civic education relevant. In principle, schools are one of the few spaces where young people can be introduced to how political institutions function beyond everyday narratives. However, many of our interviewees do not recall meaningful exposure to Pendidikan Sivik dan Kewarganegaraan (PSK).

While PSK was introduced in 2003 and later absorbed into other subjects, several respondents shared that such classes were often treated as secondary or replaced by other “more important” subjects such as Mandarin or Mathematics.

This matters because the role of civic education in shaping how youths understand political institutions appears uneven. In the absence of a strong and consistent institutional grounding, many young people come to rely more heavily on informal sources to make sense of politics.

There is a recurring pattern in our findings that aligns with this observation. Many can articulate strong views about which parties “defend Chinese rights”, yet struggle to explain how parliamentary processes work, how fiscal policies are decided or how institutional reform occurs. 

In addition, some interviewees also shared that they do not know where to get structural political knowledge and neutral or non-biased information, reflecting not disinterest but a genuine desire to learn with uncertainty about where to start.

Such a situation emerges from belief formation that prioritises identity cues over structural understanding.

Collective Memories Without History

Some may argue that these are all due to historical and generational trauma. After all, nations can be understood as socially constructed, imagined communities whose cohesion and sense of purpose are maintained through shared collective memory. This is why political leaders often leverage collective memory as a tool for nation-building.

Indeed, our interviewees mentioned historical events as key moments in their construction of the Malaysian Chinese identity. These include family migration from mainland China, the 13 May racial riot, Ops Lalang and the Bersih movement.

However, when probed further, no one can explain what exactly happened during these events.

Such a trend could indicate that what has been transmitted through the generations is not historical knowledge or trauma, but affective orientations: fear, caution and an implicit understanding of ethnic vulnerability. In the absence of institutional or civic narratives, political socialisation occurs primarily through silence, anecdote, and moral warning.

From a first principles perspective, this is predictable. At the most basic level, young people form their political understanding through early signals about risk, safety and legitimacy. When politics is consistently framed as ethnic, zero-sum and structurally unequal – along with the absence of civic education – individuals rationally learn to prioritise group protection over institutional ideals.

In an environment like this, many young people learn to see politics through ethnicity simply because that is what they are most exposed to. It is less a conscious decision than a way of making sense of how things seem to work. In such a context, asking them to think beyond race or focus only on policies is not always realistic.

The beliefs we learn when we are young – especially those tied to safety, identity and what makes us feel secure – tend to stay with us. Over time, they shape how we see politics, making some ways of thinking feel more natural than others.

A similar message often comes through across family conversations, media and everyday discussion; that politics is closely linked to protecting the interests of one’s community in a system that does not always feel equal. Rarely is it presented as an ideology; instead, it is framed more as a way of understanding reality, “how things really work”.

This has manifested in such discourses that are normally found among the Malaysian Chinese community:

“You must understand politics, because [the] Chinese are a minority.”

“If we don’t look after our own, no one will.”

“This is how the system works – don’t be naive.”

Over time, such dynamics shape how politics is understood. Issues are not only judged by policy or performance but also by how they affect one’s community. Political actors are seen not just for what they do but for whom they represent.

In such an environment, thinking beyond ethnicity is not always seen as more informed or forward-looking. At times, it may even feel unrealistic or disconnected from how people believe the system actually works.

Political Efficiency, Democratic Cost

Political parties, institutions and media ecosystems have actively reinforced ethnic reasoning because it is electorally efficient. Ethnic narratives simplify complexity, reduce politics to loyalty tests and mobilise fear faster than policy debate. For parties operating in a competitive, fragmented environment, ethnic framing offers predictability.

For instance, during GE15, campaign messaging across different parties frequently centred on warnings that specific communities risked “losing political power” or “being sidelined” if the opposing coalition prevailed. Such framing often overshadowed substantive policy discussions on governance or economic reform, as appeals to communal security proved more immediate and resonant with voters.

Education policy has compounded this problem. Civic education in Malaysia remains shallow, procedural and largely depoliticised. While civic education was introduced through PSK, its implementation has been uneven and often treated as secondary within the broader curriculum, not to mention the low sentiment expressed towards it as explored above.

In practice, many students encounter civic concepts in a fragmented and often superficial way, with limited opportunities to engage critically with how political institutions actually function. As a result, many youths do not understand the separation of powers, the structure of government and, of course, the responsibilities and powers assigned to each branch, as we discovered in our research.

At the same time, linguistic segmentation of media consumption in Malaysia means many Chinese youths are exposed primarily to Chinese-language political commentary, which often emphasises communal stakes, elite conflicts and moralised narratives rather than institutional analysis. The result is a closed feedback loop: ethnic framing produces ethnic responses, which then justify further ethnic framing.

Despite this, we must caution against assuming that Malaysian Chinese youth are conditioned to “choose” ethnic-based options, which also presupposes the existence of viable alternatives that are equally visible, credible and safe.

Our research suggests that for many youths, such alternatives are never meaningfully presented. Almost all interviewees reported that they do not find any political parties or politicians representing their interests—contrary to the assumption above that they “choose” ethnic-based politics.

Within this cultural and historical context, Malaysian Chinese politicians are often expected to be the saviours of the community, to speak against ethnically framed issues and to defend the community against those who harm its interests.

But who determines the interests of this community?

Ethnically Stuck

Most of our respondents told us they are not fond of racism and have never faced any inter-ethnic tensions in real life, despite popular discourses on social media platforms indicating that such tension is prevalent.

In the absence of direct conflict, many youths come to understand ethnic tensions primarily through mediated narratives, be it online circulation or political messaging framing. This begs the question whether these discourses are primarily mobilised by political elites to advance their personal political interests.

At the same time, our interviews reveal a range of views that do not align neatly with traditional communal positions. One respondent shared that “I actually hope vernacular schools are abolished, so that we (different ethnic groups) are able to understand each other more and mix well together.”

Amidst the course of the Unified Examination Certificate (UEC) rectification, another stated that it should not be remedied under the current circumstances unless they reach the requirements for Malay and History subjects. 

On the other hand, most respondents do not take a stance on these issues, saying they only caught news of them from headlines and do not really understand them.

Again, the distinct needs of different generations within the Malaysian Chinese community are highlighted. While older Malaysian Chinese discourse has often centred on institutional protection – such as upholding vernacular education or advocating for UEC recognition – many younger respondents appear more open to alternative arrangements, even if they do not always feel equipped to engage these issues in depth.

In this context, equating the positions of political elites with the views of the broader Malaysian Chinese community risks oversimplifying a more complex and evolving landscape. It may overlook internal diversity and the differing concerns across generations.

There is a cost to being politically and ethnically “stuck”, as ethnic-based politics limits strategic imagination. It narrows the range of acceptable demands and discourages coalition-building except as short-term tactics.

The danger is that over time it could train youth to think defensively rather than creatively about power. More importantly, it could lead to political dependence; when representation is framed exclusively through ethnic parties or elites, youth are positioned as clients rather than stakeholders. They learn to wait for protection rather than demand reform.

From a governance perspective, this is inefficient; from a democratic perspective, it dampens Malaysia’s momentum for reform and democratisation.

Redesign the Structure, Do Not Blame Each Other

Unfortunately, many Malaysian Chinese youths grew up without sufficient civic education and meaningful exposure to institutional politics, often simply bombarded by political scandals highlighted by the media, like the 1MDB case.

With the absence of alternative political reference points, Malaysian Chinese youth are at risk of being pushed towards becoming apolitical or ethnically biased. Unfortunately, this left them with a sense of helplessness or a distant feeling from what is supposed to empower them.

Malaysian governments have not been entirely indifferent to the problem of ethnic-based politics. Various initiatives – including national unity frameworks such as Rukun Negara, Bangsa Malaysia, 1Malaysia and Malaysia Madani – explicitly frame political thinking to move beyond communal lines, which some of the interviewees themselves were able to recall. Apart from that,PSKhas now been incorporated into the language and History curriculum.

Yet these efforts have largely operated at the level of messaging and exposure, while the broader environment of electoral competition and media narratives continues to be organised along communal lines.

As a result, young people might continue receiving mixed signals: unity is encouraged in principle, but ethnicity continues to structure how politics works in practice. The conditions in which young people learn about politics in everyday life, thus, have not substantially changed.

If Malaysian Chinese youth are to move beyond ethnic-based politics, the solution is to inculcate political maturity that blooms from policy competence, civic education and positive public discourse. It cannot emerge from moral persuasion or shaming narratives that demand youth to “think beyond race” while at the same time surround them with race-based incentives.

Ethnic-based politics persists not because youth believe in it, but because the system continues to make it the most sensible way to navigate power. That said, expecting spontaneous ideological transformation from the ground up is unrealistic, as they are the one benefitting from this narrative.

*The phrase “Malaysian Chinese” follows the formatting requested by IMAN Research.

This article is published under a Creative Commons Licence. Republications minimally require 1) credit authors and their institutions, and 2) credit to STRAT.O.SPHERE CONSULTING PTE LTD  and include a link back to either our home page or the article URL.

• TAGS:
• Malaysia
• Youth