Introduction
Founded in 1949, the Malaysian Chinese Association (MCA) was one of the founding members of Malaya, alongside the United Malays National Organisation (UMNO) and the Malaysian Indian Congress (MIC).
However, MCA has long been perceived as playing a subordinate role within Barisan Nasional (BN), particularly vis-à-vis UMNO, which has historically dominated the coalition among these three parties.
In the 15th general election (GE15) held in 2022, MCA secured only two parliamentary seats, while UMNO garnered 27 seats. This outcome contributed to the formation of the current “Unity Government” between BN and Pakatan Harapan (PH).
Despite being part of the ruling coalition, MCA was excluded from cabinet appointments. Meanwhile, UMNO and the Democratic Action Party (DAP), former rivals, had begun cooperating closely in electoral campaigns.
A notable instance occurred during last April’s Ayer Kuning by-election in Perak, whereby DAP deputy chairman Nga Kor Ming and UMNO campaigners jointly chanted “UMDAP Mantap” (UMNO-DAP Solid), symbolising their newfound collaboration.
These developments have triggered debates during MCA’s divisional-level annual general meetings, prompting the question of whether the party should remain within the BN coalition or chart a new pathway. This article analyses the factors affecting MCA in determining its decision to remain in or exit BN.
To Stay or Exit?
While there is a debate whether MCA should continue to stay within BN, it is interesting to note that there is no voice asking MCA to exit BN from Johor grassroots members. This fact is crucial, as Johor is the only state in Malaysia whose entire state executive council (EXCO) is formed by BN, whereas others are jointly governed by a
On the other hand, there is a growing chorus, particularly outside of Johor, urging MCA to reconsider its partnership with UMNO. There are several factors affecting MCA’s decision to stay or part ways with BN.
First and foremost, the seat allocation during elections.
The main concern revolves around whether MCA will be given slots to contest in the upcoming state elections (notably in Sabah, Johor and Malacca) and the 16th general election.
If BN and PH persist with an incumbency-based formula for seat distribution, MCA is likely to retain only its current two parliamentary seats in Ayer Hitam and Tanjung Piai – which are both located in Johor – and seven state assembly seats in Bekok (Johor), Yong Peng (Johor), Paloh (J
This constraint raises existential concerns among MCA members, as those from other states might not stand a chance to contest in the upcoming elections. Consequently, aspiring MCA politicians, if denied the opportunity to contest in the elections, may seek alternatives. This explains why a substantial number of former MCA leaders joined Parti Pribumi Bersatu Malaysia’s (Bersatu), which caters to Bumiputera voters.
Furthermore, if BN continues to enforce the rule that prohibits any component party from contesting a seat after two consecutive losses, i
Second, the historical relationship between UMNO and MCA.
MCA’s partnership with UMNO could be traced back to pre-independence Malaya when the leaders from both parties made contact in the Communities Liaison Committee and formed the Alliance Party, a precursor to BN.
MCA’s participation in electoral politics and independent movements in the mid-1950s had strengthened its popularity within the Chinese populace, which contributed to the victory of the Alliance Party.
However, over the decades, MCA has relied on UMNO’s campaign machinery and its extensive grassroots networks, particularly in Malay-majority mixed constituencies that are traditionally MCA’s main electoral base.
This historical interdependence continues to inform voices within the party advocating for the MCA to maintain its status quo.
Third, the marginalisation of MCA members from government posts.
During BN’s rule, MCA members were appointed to local governance roles, such as board of visitors at hospitals or district-level village heads. These posts, which were traditionally distributed among UMNO, MIC and MCA members, are now reportedly filled by DAP members under the current government arrangement, further fuelling dissatisfaction within the MCA grassroots.
In fact, there is not even a single MCA ca
Fourth, the perception of the Chinese community towards MCA.
Since the 2000s, MCA has been struggling to receive electoral support from Chinese voters. MCA was perceived as subservient to UMNO and ineffective in speaking up or safeguarding Chinese rights, especially in language and education.
If MCA continues to partner with UMNO, it would be hard for MCA to regain Chinese votes. The party’s repeated compromises on key issues have eroded public trust, while younger voters increasingly view MCA as outdated, lacking both autonomy and a strong and independent political identity.
Fifth, UMNO’s close relationship with DAP.
Recently, 30 DAP leaders made a historic visit to the UMNO headquarters for a briefing on technical and vocational education and training (TVET) hosted by Deputy Prime Minister and UMNO President Ahmad Zahid Hamidi.
However, this unprecedented stopover by DAP was perceived as not just another “official” visit; it bore clear political motives.
For DAP, the “ice-breaking visit” was seen to be a goodwill gesture to UMNO in preparation for the upcoming Sabah state elections. On the other hand, for UMNO’s leadership, the visit by DAP was a way to show to its grassroots supporters that DAP is a friendly partner and Malays should not be afraid to vote for DAP. This is also being perceived as UMNO sending a signal to MCA that it can be easily replaced by DAP and that any attempt at manoeuvring behind UMNO’s back will not be tolerated.
Last but not least, MCA needs to consider the possibility of exploring other collaborations.
If MCA decides to part ways with BN and to contest future elections independently, MCA might face a multi-cornered fight with BN/PH and Perikatan Nasional (PN). This is not viable for MCA politicians contesting in Malay-majority mixed seats, as they would lose critical support from BN-aligned voters.
Another alternative is to follow suit with Parti Gerakan Rakyat Malaysia (Gerakan) and join PN. However, given the pronounced ideological difference between MCA and the Pan-Malaysian Islamic Party (PAS), getting broad-based voter support from its own base presents significant challenges. The awkward position faced by Gerakan within PN serves as a cautionary tale for MCA.
Conclusion
Regardless of the factors, the party needs to carefully weigh its options in order to remain relevant in Malaysia’s evolving political landscape. The most important task is for MCA to rejuvenate its party leadership and ability to attract more credible and younger members.
MCA also needs to ensure its party machinery is strong enough to function independently and adapt quickly to changing political expectations and voter sentiments. As MCA marks its 76th anniversary this year, the decision to stay or exit is not only strategic, but also an existential one. In the shifting terrain of Malaysian politics, time is not on MCA’s side as public confidence continues to decline with each passing election cycle.
