Introduction
In recent weeks, Indonesia has seen the emergence of a narrative on the rise of Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (HTI) after its legal entity was revoked by the government in 2017. This began when a solidarity action against Palestine was held in various Indonesian cities on 2 February 2025.
Although the group that staged this action did not carry HTI’s name, the group’s employment of HTI’s characteristic black and white flag, as well as espousal of such jargons as caliphate and jihad, clearly show HTI’s remnant being the driving force behind this action.
Consequently, mainstream media highlighted the issue of HTI again, focusing on its ideological threats, political motives and transnational character.
Since shortly before its disbandment in 2017, the government has generally portrayed HTI as a threat to the state and nation, one that carries a subversive ideology.
This is a shift from the government’s stance when HTI came about in early 2000s. Some HTI figures even also became board members of the Indonesian Ulema Council. Clearly, resistance was in short supply back then, if any at all.
So, what happened in 2017, the year HTI was banned?
To recap, various academics have explained this harsh policy against HTI as a form of revenge for the group’s involvement in the anti-Basuki Tjahaja Purnama (Ahok) movement during his blasphemy case. Such a fate befell not only HTI, but also Front Pembela Islam (Islam Defenders Front), which former leader has shown signs of stirring as well.
Narrative of Hostility
Despite the regime change, there remains the narrative that portrays HTI as a radical, anti-Pancasila and pro-caliphate group, including in the mainstream media.
This is more or less the same as the narrative used to describe the movement in various countries such as those in Europe, the Middle East, the United States and Australia. This narrative has been utilised as a legitimising factor to dissolve or ban this movement around the world.
However, such narrative also ignores the movement’s resilience, evidenced by its enduring remnants and covert activities to advance its agenda of caliphate and oppose the existing system, albeit without using its official name.
Several factors explain this resilience against authoritarian and repressive political environment.
The first is internal factors. HTI is able to build its cadres by inculcating robust ideological roots juxtaposed against the problems of the ummah and the urgency to establish caliphate as a remedy. This ideological galvanisation strengthens the bonds between members as well as allows them to operate easily under various banners and conditions.
HTI’s resilience is even more remarkable considering its relatively small number of members, compared to mass organisations such as Nahdlatul Ulama and Muhammadiyah. The members’ militancy has enabled this movement to influence the public narrative at the national level. Various mobilisations have been carried out to respond to an issue, at both national and international stages, through online media or various actions and forums – the aforementioned pro-Palestine action was just one example.
The second is structural factor. This includes global and national political conditions in Indonesia.
In the global context, Hizbut Tahrir and other Islamic movements have advocated various issues affecting the global Muslim population, including poverty, foreign intervention, the Zionist occupation of Palestine, and the impact of global capitalism on Muslims.
In the local context, HTI occupies a comfortable seat in the middle of the Indonesian public by highlighting public concerns such as corruption or abuse of power, economic disparities, and various government policies that are not pro-people.
Even though its messages carry the same DNA as those espoused by other social movements criticising the government, HTI packages all of its criticism of the government under an Islamic framework to make its discourse more accessible to the Indonesian Muslims.
The third is communication acumen. HTI is also able to attract the public because of its expertise in utilising social media through various platforms. It increases its appeal with attractive packaging that suits the needs of the public today, including the youth.
This is what mainstream Islamic groups in Indonesia do not have, which largely still dwell on traditional ways of undertaking da’wah. In addition, these groups mainly focus on social issues such as education, health or religion. Rarely do they incorporate national political issues in their campaigns.
The same applies to both nationalist and religious political parties, whose political functions are not optimised to represent the voice of the Indonesian public. In fact, these parties appear usually only engage the voters in political contestations, during which they churn out promises that would eventually disappoint their own voters.
This is a niche that HTI – a banned organisation – is able to exploit, a void that mass organisations and political parties fail to close or even help to create.
All of these factors explain the movement’s resilience despite all the negative narratives that circulate about it.
In addition, efforts to stigmatise HTI – as carried out by the state of Nahdlatul Ulama activists – seem to bear little impact. Narratives attacking the idea of caliphate may not be effective especially when there is a recent shift to acknowledge that caliphate is a legitimate political system in a Muslim society. This idea gained traction when the Indonesian Ulema Council issued a fatwa in 2021 stating that the caliphate is part of Islamic teachings that should not be negatively stigmatised.
The Need for a New Approach
In the global Islamic politics, a state’s response to Islamic political movements commonly uses two approaches: confrontation and accommodation.
The first approach views Islamic political movements as an enemy – consequently, the only way to deal with them is to eradicate them.
The second approach tries to embrace these Islamic groups and invite them formally into the state apparatus. However, this second approach is criticised as merely a tool to tame Islamic political movements, forcing them to compromise with secular-liberal ideology and ultimately aiming to eradicate their ideology, not unlike the first strategy.
There is, however, an alternative option labeled the new convergence approach that acknowledges the existence of various Islamic political movements with all of their different ideologies. The new convergence approach argues that instead of seeing the political Islam as a threat, this ideology should be seen as a critique of the liberal ideology, especially owing to the many problems that governments functioning under liberal tenets are facing. It suggests that solutions offered by the Islamic framework should be considered by these governments.
There are examples for this: Some welfare states in Europe have incorporated aspects of leftist ideology in an attempt to manage groups affiliated with this.
In the context of HTI, the government adopted the accommodative approach from 2001 to 2017, though this was later reversed as the government pursues a policy of dissolution and stigmatisation.
To be fair, it is understandable that HTI’s call for caliphate could be detrimental to Indonesia’s democratic system and the nationalism of its people. Thus, when triggered by HTI’s involvement in the anti-Ahok movement, the government opted for the confrontational approach in its handling of the movement.
This, however, has not stopped HTI’s activities. Its da’wah and political engagements has continued to grow and spread in various levels of the society even as Indonesia’s political and economic conditions deteriorate. Worse, the repressive policy contributed to the decline of the quality of Indonesian democracy, which of course is more detrimental to Indonesia’s image globally.
As an alternative, the government may consider the new convergence approach in managing HTI, perceiving its messages as both a challenge and an opportunity to address the current condition in Indonesia. The process of acceptance and rejection of HTI’s ideas depends on the dialectic that occurs in society and the government’s response to these ideas.
Such an approach has a precedent in Indonesia’s political history, such as the of the formation of the Indonesian state and the adoption of Pancasila as the basis of the state. These two were the outcome of a cross-ideological compromise and negotiation between the Islamic and nationalist groups. Furthermore, various policies and regulations in Indonesia have also adopted aspects of the Islamic economy including Islamic banking, waqf and sharia pawnshop.
Therefore, there is nothing inherently wrong with accepting parts of demands by groups such as HTI. Equally, there is also nothing wrong with including ex-HTI figures in policy discussion as well, especially if the aim is to vanquish deep-seated problems such as corruption.
Conclusion
In managing HTI, the government needs to reconsider continuing its repressive policy by focusing on solving the structural problems that occur in Indonesia to increase the public trust. On the other hand, HTI’s ideological narratives need to be responded to with counter-narratives that aim to resolve Indonesia’s problem realistically.
If the government continues its approach in securitising HTI, more people will only flock to this movement. Therefore, the government needs to reconsider the approach taken to face the ideological challenges of HTI more carefully for the benefit of the Indonesian political future.
