Introduction
Indonesia was rocked with a constitutional crisis recently following the House of Representatives’ (DPR) attempt to revise Law No. 10 of 2016 concerning regional elections (Pilkada). This attempt came the day after the Constitutional Court (MK) altered the conditions for candidacy in Pilkada with decisions No. 60/PUU-XXII/2024 and No. 70/PPU-XXII/2024.
On 21 August 2024, DPR swiftly convened a meeting of the legislative body (Baleg) with the aim of reversing MK’s decision, thus triggering a wave of national outrage.
A total of eight factions approved the discussions’ outcomes on the Fourth Amendment to the Pilkada law. These include Gerakan Indonesia Raya (Gerindra), Golongan Karya (Golkar), Partai Amanat Nasional (PAN), Demokrat, Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa (PKB), Partai Keadilan Sejahtera (PKS) and Partai Persatuan Pembangunan (PPP), all members of Koalisi Indonesia Maju Plus (Advanced Indonesia Coalition – KIM) supporting Prabowo Subianto and President Joko “Jokowi” Widodo.
This latest episode highlights the most recent attempt at undermining Indonesia’s democracy, but also how rules and regulations can be easily challenged by the political interests of undemocratic forces in the country.
However, widespread demonstrations, coupled with media protests and unexpected pushbacks from the country’s elite, forced DPR to backtrack. DPR has now announced that it will respect the decision of the MK.
A Constitutional Crisis?
To reiterate, the crisis was triggered when DPR attempted to repudiate MK’s ruling on Pilkada law. The brouhaha occurred after MK modified the threshold for parties to nominate political candidates in Pilkada, overturning the thresholds stipulated by the Pilkada law with the two decisions identified above.
MK’s ruling lowers the threshold for political parties and coalitions to nominate regional heads even without seats in the DPRD, provided they meet the percentage requirements based on the final voter list (DPT). Parties with less than 20% seats at the Regional People’s Representative Council (DPRD) or 25% of valid votes can now field their own candidates, according to MK’s decision.
However, DPR Baleg’s ruling retained the threshold of 20% of DPRD seats or 25% of valid votes for parties with seats in the DPRD, disregarding MK’s decision.
The second critical point concerns the minimum age limit for governor candidates. The Pilkada law sets the minimum age of 30 for governors and 25 for mayors/regents. MK’s decision No. 70/PPU-XXII/2024 confirms these limits, but DPR Baleg stipulated that these ages refer to the time of official inauguration of elected officials.
DPR curiously aligned its ruling with a previous decision by the Supreme Court (MA) rather than adhering to MK’s decisions.
The Fundamental Problem
One of MK’s main tasks is to ensure that all laws and rulings respect the 1945 Constitution. Therefore, MK’s decisions are final and binding on all institutions, including DPR. Ignoring an MK decision means violating the Constitution.
However, DPR attempted to circumvent this situation by appealing to MA, a move that remains unconstitutional as only the MK has the final authority on constitutional matters. Consequently, all reforms or laws that do not respect MK’s decisions must be considered unconstitutional.
DPR’s attempt to reverse MK’s ruling has triggered a slew of protests, evoking memories of 1998. Major demonstrations took place in Jakarta, Yogyakarta, Makassar, Semarang, and Bandung, where protestors often clashed with law enforcement.
Jokowi also curiously defended DPR’s decision as part of the electoral process, but Partai Demokrasi Indonesia Perjuangan (PDI-P) and the Labour Party mobilized against him, accusing Jokowi and Prabowo of acting solely to maintain and expand the status quo in the country.
These contradictions came at a critical time when the nation’s attention has been fixed on the upcoming Pilkada, with particular attention on Jakarta, where the governorship has been vacant since Anies Baswedan’s resignation in 2023 following his presidential candidacy.
Decision No. 60 gives PDI-P the opportunity to nominate its own candidate, a significant factor given the PDI-P’s defeat in the national elections, opening the possibility of an eventual coalition with the Labour Party.
At the same time, MK’s decision No. 70 placed definitive limits on the possibility for Jokowi’s youngest son, Kaesang Pangarep, to participate in regional elections because, at the time of candidate registration, he was not yet 30 years old.
Critics also say Jokowi mobilized his machines to allow Kaesang’s nomination so that he could continue exerting influence even after stepping down from his presidential post later this year.
By attempting to circumvent this decision, DPR shows its readiness to facilitate such questionable design, instead of providing checks and balances to the activities of the presidential office.
The Context
These developments cannot be extricated from trends of democratic decline and power struggle that have been happening in Indonesia for quite some time.
The recent general election saw significant developments taking place, including: 1) Jokowi’s shift away from PDI-P; 2) the revision of the election law that lowered the minimum candidacy age to facilitate Gibran Rakabuming Raka’s nomination as vice president and; 3) Prabowo Subianto’s victory in the elections.
The problem is, the effort to facilitate Kaesang’s nomination is indicative of an ongoing trend instead of a singular phenomenon. MK previously lowered the minimum age for candidates running for vice presidential post, a highly controversial move that paved the way for Jokowi’s eldest son Gibran to run.
The ruling was mired in ethical questions, not least because Jokowi’s new brother-in-law Anwar Usman was chief justice in MK, therefore undermining MK’s image and credibility as a product of democratization in the country. Anwar was later embroiled in ethical questioning and demoted from his chief justice post.
Furthermore, it instigated the trend to view Jokowi as intending to create his own political dynasty, despite past vows not to go down this road, primarily as a means to cement his political legacy.
To complicate matters, his pursuit of this is also backed by a large parliamentary coalition aligned with both the outgoing president and the president-elect, Prabowo Subianto. Jokowi, additionally, has shown he is not above punishing those that do not support his vision and vice versa. This is on full display during the umpteenth cabinet reshuffle that took place just recently.
Jokowi phased away cabinet ministers affiliated with the PDI-P with new figures connected to Prabowo, a move more strategic than political aimed at facilitating the next president.
Among these are Rosan Roesiani, chairman of Prabowo and Gibran’s national campaign team (tim sukses), as Minister of Investment, and Agus Harimurti Yudhoyono, leader of Demokrat, as Minister of the National Land Agency.
The Unfinished Democratic Process
The constitutional crisis is the latest episode in a series of tensions rooted in the complex post-Suharto democratic transition. After the fall of Suharto’s authoritarian regime in 1998, Indonesia embarked on a democratization process that has never truly been completed.
The country’s political dynasties, oligarchs and other actors with undemocratic designs hindered the process, which was also affected by factors such as ethnic and religious conflicts, the slow evolution of the rule of law, systemic corruption and the influence of the military in the country.
This conflict is not merely a matter of institutional disagreement but touches on the very core of democracy: the separation of powers. MK was conceived as the ultimate guardian of the 1945 Constitution’s values, an independent institution tasked with protecting citizens’ rights and ensuring the government operates within constitutional limits.
If DPR continues to challenge MK’s decisions, there is a risk of further constitutional crisis that could severely undermine judicial authority, leading to a weakening of the system of checks and balances fundamental to any functioning democracy.
This situation could lead to a concentration of power in the hands of the executive or parliament, increasing the risk of power abuse and corruption—a trend already well underway in Indonesia, particularly during Jokowi’s period.
In a broader context, the erosion of the MK’s independence could foster a shift towards an authoritarian or illiberal regime, where civil and political liberties would be progressively curtailed.
Conclusion
Indeed, the recent events reflect deeper issues within the country’s democratic framework. The controversy between DPR and MK over the Pilkada law underscores a growing trend of political maneuvering that threatens the balance of power and the integrity of democratic institutions.
Nevertheless, the swift reaction from civil society demonstrates the resilience of democratic forces in Indonesia, though the underlying tensions – rooted in the unfinished democratization process post-Suharto – remain unresolved.
Left unchecked, these power tussles and attempts to undermine constitutional authority could lead to a dangerous erosion of democratic norms, pushing Indonesia towards a more authoritarian and illiberal political environment.
The stakes are high, as the future of Indonesia’s democracy hangs in the balance, with potential long-term consequences for the country’s rule of law and civil liberties.
