Introduction
Even though Indonesia’s revised military law paves the way for active Tentara Nasional Indonesia (TNI) personnel to occupy certain civilian posts, the number and scope of these posts are limited. TNI has also lost some of the benefits it used to enjoy, as will be explored below.
In fact, concerns expressed by activist groups and students were partly accommodated by the House of Representatives (DPR) lawmakers, rendering the whole argument about the return of dwifungsi as somewhat inaccurate.
Initial Stages
Indeed, the revision process was fast-tracked by DPR’s Commission I (overseeing defence and security) and concluded in less than three weeks. In fact, the bill was last debated in DPR’s 2019-2024 period, though the process stalled and eventually failed.
The renewed interest in the process emerged when new lawmakers were sworn in last October. The discourse once again popped up in mid-February and was immediately included in DPR’s legislative plan, thanks to Deputy House Speaker Sufmi Dasco Ahmad’s machination, a Gerakan Indonesia Raya (Gerindra) politician.
The alarm went off when it was discovered that the revised bill was developed by the government instead of DPR lawmakers, contravening the proper lawmaking process.
Despite this, DPR invited relevant entities to convey their concerns with the bill. Dasco hosted a hearing session with Commission I lawmakers, activist groups and victims of past human rights abuse just hours before a plenary meeting with all DPR factions on 18 March 2025. That session was abrupt and believed to be a follow-up to his earlier meeting with activist groups a day before, in which he promised to accommodate their concerns.
Among the activists’ demands was a request to ensure that TNI personnel committing general crimes be tried in the public instead of the military court, which is closed to members of the public. However, this demand was not included in the revised law, as the section on the military court was outside the revision purview.
The revision process itself was led by Commission I’s Utut Adianto, a senior lawmaker from Partai Demokrasi Indonesia Perjuangan (PDI-P), who chaired the working group. His appointment initially raised hope of a fair and transparent process, as PDI-P is perceived to be outside President Prabowo Subianto’s large coalition. However, as time went on, the PDI-P fraction did not seem to harbour any strong rejection towards the revision; instead, their lawmakers played along and proceeded with the process.
On the other hand, Deputy State Secretary Minister Bambang Eko Suhariyanto and Deputy Defence Minister Donny Ermawan Taufanto (retired vice marshal and marshal from the Air Force, respectively) represented the government’s interest. Their appointment is peculiar yet interesting: the Air Force has been traditionally placed at the margin compared to the Army and the Navy, thanks to ex-president’s Soeharto’s preference as an Army general.
On top of these two is Defence Minister Sjafrie Sjamsoeddin, believed to be the orchestrator of the revision from the government side, who played a critical role behind the scenes. He was in charge of interpreting Prabowo’s interest and wishes on this matter, which was made apparent by his constant calls with his deputy during the revision process, according to a source.
Later, some activist groups, including KontraS, made headlines by breaking into the meeting room where the working group convened for a two-day consignment in Fairmont Hotel on 15 March 2025. This is despite the working group chairman never explicitly declaring the meeting was closed to the public.
Questions in the Revision Process
Objections to the revised law could be traced to the circulating narrative that Prabowo’s administration was planning to make a wholesale accommodation of TNI personnel in civilian posts.
As evidenced during the revision process, this plan, if it existed at all, did not even feature in the debate. The passed law, additionally, only adds several posts that can now be occupied by TNI personnel. These include positions in the fields of disaster relief, anti-terrorism, coast guard, border management and the Attorney General Office (AGO). Proposals to include posts in the maritime and fisheries portfolio were dropped towards the end of the process.
The lawmakers’ chief argument for this was that transboundary issues (e.g. human trafficking, arms trafficking and disturbance in Papua as well as the maritime domain) could only be effectively tackled by the inclusion of TNI personnel within civilian bodies.
These positions will add on to a number of other posts that retired and active personnel are already occupying, such as in political-security affairs, defence, the president’s office, and others.
Meanwhile, to assume the office of civilian posts mentioned above, active TNI personnel are required to resign from service to signify their shift to civilian governance. The ball is thus on the government’s court to ensure that this requirement is properly met. Failure to do so would only elevate the public’s criticism on the matter, which has scrutinised the appointment of Teddy Indra Wijaya as cabinet secretary and Novi Helmy as director of the State Logistics Agency.
On another note, the revised law will also allow TNI personnel to serve longer. The age limit was raised from 53 to 55 for non-commissioned officers and privates as well as from 58 to 62 for middle- and high-rank officers. Furthermore, four-star officers, such as commanders and chiefs of staff, will be allowed to serve until they reach the age of 65.
This new regulation may seem generous, but it is actually done to match the standards applied to other public servants, such as the police, in terms of retirement age.
Unfulfilled Aspirations
The revised law is not all sunshine and roses for TNI—it might actually be displeased with the alterations made to its relationship with the Ministry of Defence.
For example, the previous law regulated TNI to be under the coordination of the Ministry, but the revised one places TNI directly under it, which means closer control will be administered over TNI by the Ministry.
A source from the TNI Headquarters stated that TNI was not invited by the Ministry in formulating this clause and that it would spread discontent among the personnel to be over-dominated by the Ministry.
This new relationship could be viewed as an attempt an increase in civilian control over TNI, as long as the Ministry is still dominated by civilian bureaucrats and technocrats, particularly in its high-ranking offices.
Moreover, the revised law also sets the Ministry to authoritatively design policies on military equipment maintenance. In other words, it would create extra layers of bureaucratic process for TNI to autonomously undertake this process, which could worsen the technical mismatch often experienced by the TNI as the end user of that equipment, according to TNI’s consecutive reports to Commission I over the years.
Another source said that the DPR working group rejected the idea of conferring the Air Force with an investigative power like the one possessed by the police and AGO, owing to its serious implications to the country’s criminal law. This aspiration was borne from the fact that multiple airspace violations by foreign airplanes remain unpunished. Instead, the working group chairman asked the government to consult with other law enforcement bodies before deciding on this matter.
Conclusion
In contrast to the criticism lodged by activists and students, it can be surmised that DPR has undertaken the revision process fairly within reasonable limits, especially since some aspirations of the public were accommodated during the revision process.
The fear over the return of dwifungsi remains overblown at this stage, as TNI is now a direct subject under the civilian government through the Ministry of Defence.
The imperative now is to ensure that the legal basis provided by the revised law could enable DPR lawmakers to supervise the civilian government, especially in its relationship with TNI. This legislative task remains challenging due to a lack of meaningful opposition to provide checks and balances to the ruling coalition.
