Introduction
Prime Minister Anwar is now halfway past his premiership and has served longer as prime minister than his three immediate predecessors. In June 2025, the Merdeka Center released data regarding his approval rating, which stood at 55%; this is a mere 1% increase from his rating in November 2024 (Table 1).
This article aims to discuss a contradiction: while Anwar is facing numerous struggles at home (reflecting his mediocre approval rating), he remains popular abroad, presenting himself as a vocal Malaysian leader and the current holder of ASEAN chair.
Anwar’s Diplomatic Spotlight
When Thailand and Cambodia clashed and exchanged artillery fire, Malaysia grabbed the opportunity to step in as a mediator. Anwar positioned himself as a regional peacemaker, projecting an image of statesman and international leader.
The Thai-Cambodia dispute provided a chance for Anwar to showcase himself as a skilful diplomat who also managed to balance the vested interests in the conflict—the United States’ and China’s. In fact, Anwar mentioned that he had received a compliment from President Donald Trump who described it as a “fantastic job”.
Ironically, the government’s “success”
On top of that, Anwar’s engagement with world leaders has enhanced Malaysia’s international profile. Hosting China’s President Xi Jinping in April 2025 gave him a diplomatic spotlight. As ASEAN chair, Anwar is the first Malaysian leader to be invited to the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) Summit, and he would deliver his inaugural remark at the SCO Plus Summit in Tianjin University, China.
Moreover, Trump may attend the ASEAN Summit in October this year. This seems to suggest that despite the tariff-related tension, Anwar has managed to maintain the bilateral relations with the United States on an even keel.
Moreover, Anwar has p
His rhetoric has been framed as a political necessity and reinforced his image as a defender of the oppressed.
However, this stance is now being tested by the controversial nomination of a pro-Israel US envoy to Malaysia. The move has triggered backlash, with critics accusing the government of hypocrisy and enquiring whether the incoming envoy’s stand will match the US’ foreign policy decisions.
Anwar’s Domestic Struggles
Nevertheless, beneath the polished optics of his diplomatic engagements, things at home were still far less reassuring.
On 26 July 2026, a protest spearheaded by the Malay-dominated Perikatan Nasional (PN) called for Anwar to step down. This signifies that troubling issues at home may pose a threat to Anwar’s position as prime minister.
First, the economic discontent among the people. The expansion of the Sales and Service Tax (SST) from 1 July has directly impacted the prices of essential household items and services, squeezing the rakyat further.
Furthermore, the rationalisation of RON95 petrol subsidies and rising electricity bills, which are set to be implemented by the end of this year, has sparked public furore.
Growing concerns over the rising cost of living and inflation, compounded by wage stagnation, are especially troubling for M40 and B40 groups. If the economic concerns are not properly addressed, this would leave the M40 and B40 behind and might incentivise them to vote against Anwar’s Pakatan Harapan (PH).
Second, the slow rollout of reforms. The institutional reforms, particularly in the areas of the judiciary, anti-corruption and the separation of powers, are progressing slower than promised.
The recent judicial void in Malaysia, as its chief justice retired without a successor, has raised many questions and concerns about judicial independence and the prime minister’s power and role in the appointment of judges.
On top of that, Anwar has publicly stated that political appointments made by the government to individuals should be allowed. This has been fully condemned by the civil society organisations, as such appointment as a reward for loyalty is the foundation of cronyism.
These episodes had contributed to the mistrust and a decline in credibility among civil society voters who were once strong supporters of Anwar’s Reformasi agenda.
Third, Anwar is also facing headwinds from within his own party as well as the Unity Government. Former deputy president Rafizi Ramli’s failure to retain his post in the recently concluded Parti Keadilan Rakyat (PKR) election led to his resignation as economy minister.
Following this, he has started his own podcast—Yang Berhenti Menteri (YBM, The Minister Who Quits), with a debut episode of 122k views. Rafizi’s decline of the offer to be the second PKR deputy president and to remain as an ordinary party member may deepen divisions within PKR.
Furthermore, the case of Rafizi’s 12-year-old son being attacked in a mall shocked the country because politically linked physical attacks, especially targeting children, are exceptionally rare. The timing of this attack is suspect, with Rafizi himself stating that it is a warning against him to refrain from being outspoken on certain issues.
Fourth, the relationship between PH and Barisan Nasional (BN). Although PH and BN have cooperated in previous state and by-elections, the extent to which this collaboration can be sustainable and replicated is unknown despite the proven vote transferability between these two coalitions.
The testing grounds will be the upcoming Sabah, Malacca and Johor state elections as the two negotiate on the allocation of contesting seats.
In addition, the recent move of Minister of Trade and Industry Tengku Zafrul Aziz from the United Malays National Organisation (UMNO) to PKR has intensified internal dissatisfaction within UMNO, with growing sentiment that his portfolio must remain under UMNO’s purview.
Last but not least, the underperforming cabinet. Anwar’s cabinet appears to rely excessively on the prime minister to respond to every single national issue. From the recent death case of a school bullying victim to the controversy surrounding the display of an upside-down Malaysian flag, ministers have been conspicuously absent from facing the public or taking the lead in public communication.
Instead, all these issues are consistently deferred to Anwar, creating the perception that governance is being conducted as a one-man performance rather than through collective cabinet responsibility.
Conclusion: Balancing Act
Anwar’s mid-term performance reveals a premiership caught between two arenas.
Abroad, he has successfully carved out a role for Malaysia as a respected regional leader, peacemaker, trade negotiator and moral voice for the Global South. Nevertheless, domestically, his administration is weighed down by economic discontent, policy incoherence, slow reforms, internal party divisions and an underperforming cabinet.
The lesson is that international status cannot replace domestic legitimacy. Global recognition may temporarily shield Anwar from critics, but without addressing the local bread-and-butter issues and restoring faith in his reformist credentials, his administration risks losing his own long-time supporters.
If the prime minister could translate international goodwill into domestic gains, such as channelling new trade deals into jobs or maximising his global reputation to drive investment and institutional reform, he will be able to reconcile these two arenas. If not, his premiership would be remembered as one where Malaysia’s image shines abroad, but the government’s credibility falters as home. In conclusion, Anwar needs to devote more attention to addressing pressing domestic challenges than focusing predominantly on courting potential foreign investment deals if he intends to remain as prime minister.
