Prelude
In the 15th General Election (GE15) in 2022, we witnessed a 75.6% unprecedented turnout from Malaysian youths, driven by the lowering of the voting age to 18 years old via the UNDI18 legislation that added 5.8 million new voters to the electoral roll.
This surge translated into protest votes, with 37% of under-30s voting for Perikatan Nasional (PN). Critics, particularly Pakatan Harapan (PH), were quick to decry this as a “green wave”, claiming that Malay-Muslim youths were intent on Islamising the country.
However, subsequent studies that attempted to understand beyond the fearmongering found a constituency frustrated with the political status quo and deep concerns about their socioeconomic futures.
Have political parties learnt from the GE15 experience since, and will they take youth concerns seriously? Some, like PN, took note and have recalibrated—but will youths respond, and under what terms?
Understanding the Youth Electorate
When it comes to understanding the youth constituency, it is worth considering a few factors.
The first being the urban-rural split, the professional or working class, and those from the “Malay heartlands” of the northern and east coasts, or those from urbanised west coast regions such as the Klang Valley, Pulau Pinang (island-side), and Johor Bahru.
What is becoming increasingly pronounced – something explored in the IMAN Research report, Orang Kita: Malay Youth Politics of Acknowledgement and Resentment – is that these lines are often drawn along class and regional lines.
In the last elections, 35% of youth voted for PH, while 37% voted for PN. Many had moved away from Barisan Nasional (BN), which earned 23% of the vote, reflecting a desire for a different form of governance. During fieldwork, it was discovered that youth across the board share the same concerns of rising cost of living, stagnant wages and job insecurities. The university degree they have worked hard for is becoming increasingly irrelevant in a rapidly shifting economic landscape dominated by Artificial Intelligence (AI).
These are also youth who understand the value of democracy as collective action and democratic decision-making but have deep distrust in elite politics. For Malay youths, particularly, there is a growing expectation of religion and identity with governance—not as a form of Islamisation, but the integration of Islamic values into public life.
The nuance here, often missed by a lot of Malaysians, is crucial, as it signals the desire for a better sociopolitical landscape guided by Islamic values, instead of the validation of Islamists or religious institutions.
Finally, this is a digital-native generation. These are individuals who primarily rely on social media platforms like TikTok and Instagram for news and information but also use news portals for fact-checking and validation.
Online participation among the youth is high (at 99%), but in IMAN Research’s fieldwork, offline democratic participation appears to be paradoxically shallow.
Against this backdrop, how are political parties engaging youths then?
Engaging the Youth
Political parties across the board offer structured entry—some through community presence, some through active recruitment and others through familial ties. However, the roles for youths offered in these parties, even youth party wings, are often symbolic and tokenistic.
Some youth engaged in the study are cynical of other youths who willingly join political parties, calling these politically involved youths “macai” (lackeys). One finds these represented most in online comment sections, where “walanons” or “walauns” of either side publicly defend their political parties and figures.
During the BN days, they were called cybertroopers, and it was often implied they were paid. It is uncertain whether the macai of this political era are hired help or if – in this polarised landscape – they genuinely believe in their online crusade.
Within these parties, mentorship networks are rare, and political ascension is highly dependent on patronage. For example, a known practice in certain local councils in Selangor is the appointment of politically affiliated youths.
In these instances, the ideal ascension follows the path of councillor to elected representative as ahli dewan undangan negri (ADUN – state assembly representative) and, if the cards are played well, member of parliament. Though rare, certa
Certainly, political parties understand the need to appeal to youth voters. In GE15, many were quick to claim that they were fielding “young candidates”.
Partai Islam Se-Malaysia (PAS), recognising the changing tides, fielded white-collar professionals as candidates to shift away from its imageas a“lebai” (local religious figure) and to demonstrate that it was committed to governance through technocratic means.
The popularity of Dr Samsuri Mokhtar, the Terengganu chief minister, among Terengganu youths is indicative of the party’s shift towards political representatives who understand the technical needs of governance while also being religious.
However, was the fielding of fresh blood genuine? Discussions with politically involved youths suggest that this was mostly tokenistic; youth candidates were often fielded in “black areas” where the party had made a calculated loss. These candidates often had to go above and beyond to prove themselves or were given limited resources to work with.
Even in the last election, the manifestos of different political coalitions are indicative of how important the youth vote was to them. Both PN and BN appeared to care for youth repr
As far as digital strategy goes, PN emerged highly popular among the youth, especially on TikTok—a platform known to be inhabited by under-20s. During the election, while PN supporters were known to engage in hate speech and fear-mongering, PN’s digital campaigning also had an undeniable quality of resonating with the youth through memes and trends.
PN also focused on messaging that prioritises anti-corruption and clean governance, appealing to youths who were sick of political elite corruption. PH and BN’s messaging, which focused on reforms and stability, seemed to miss the mark with youths who were frustrated, having come out of a pandemic that disrupted their social and economic lives.
Hence, while youth engagement and representation were largely tokenistic, there appeared to be more genuine effort from PN to include youth as stakeholders, at least in the last election.
Youth in Civil Society
Leading up to and after the implementation of the UNDI18 bill, an emerging trend of youth being involved in sociopolitical causes became more apparent.
UNDI18, the organisation, came to the forefront of this movement, headlining and supporting campaigns and youth-led movements across a range of issues, including women’s parliamentary representation and climate change.
Online, especially on Instagram after GE14, youth-led advocacy accounts emerged in the form of infographics and bite-sized content. This content was either hyper-focused on specific issues or more broadly provided updates in the political landscape.
What became apparent during this period was the tendency for youth to focus and engage on specific issues or rally around flashpoints.
In discussions with civil society actors – both senior and young – the traditional form of civil society engagement, where one formally joins an organisation with a hierarchical structure and a broad coverage of issues within a sector, was no longer appealing.
Where identities and associations in the 21st century become increasingly fluid due to socioeconomic restructuring, so do the youth of this generation and how they choose to associate with issues that they care about—as mediated through the online space. Online, the advocacy of these issues materialises in the form of memes, online campaigns or “explainer” videos. However, this is where youth now also face frustrations with the government.
The government’s broad and vague policy on discourse surrounding 3R (race, religion and royalty) has also led to youth reporting that their accounts have been banned or have content removed, despite only critiquing government policies and not touching on sensitive subjects.
Even if expression here is not concerned with politics or civil society, youth, particularly from the northern and east coast regions, shared how they feel increasingly alienated in the community. Much of this has to do with decreased government support for grassroots youth movements, as well as gatekeeping by PN state governments as to what sort of events are allowed in community spaces.
As public spaces shrink, youth are left with the online space, where sensitive topics are often defined loosely. This increasingly tightening space of expression also adds to their frustrations.
Barriers and Challenges to Youth Participation
When discussing freedom of expression, many laws that the PH government had once promised to abolish appear to remain, bringing into question the commitment to reform—a common criticism with this government.
The laws that affect youths in this matter are: 1) the Universities and Universities Colleges Act 1971 (AUKU) that governs youth autonomy in tertiary education institutions; 2) the Sedition Act 1948 that
Systemically, however, the youths engaged in IMAN Research’s study shared frustrations with the lack of civic and voter education by the government, both after UNDI18 implementation and even until today.
In the lead-up to GE15, political activist Fahmi Reza ran Kelas Demokrasi, informal voter education sessions both online and in person, with some of the sessions barred by university campuses. However, this effort was largely missing from political par
The youths engaged in the study expressed a desire for civic education and media literacy to be included in the secondary school syllabus. The latter is key in educating youth in navigating an online media space that is becoming increasingly complex with editorial biases, misinformation and AI use.
Implications for Malaysia’s Democracy
What does all this mean for the youth?
The unfortunate truth is that youth are still treated as vote banks and not genuine stakeholders in the country’s direction. Consultative sessions or engagement are either funnelled to a select group of politically involved youths or not done in a manner where the youth are “met at their level”.
This is particularly important, as most political operatives interviewed appear to express frustration with youth not attending town halls, engagement sessions or only preferring to engage on social media.
What seems to be missing here are efforts from these parties to engage with youth where they are and where it matters, but this could be achieved in multiple ways and does not need to be political.
As an example, PAS has Unit Amal, a youth volunteering community focused on uplifting and aiding their local communities. The group has been notably mobilised during disasters to collect donations and go on the ground to offer aid and assistance to victims.
One common theme often heard is the youth’s desire to contribute to their communities. There are opportunities to build structured pathways for youth engagement and leadership, whether via local council elections, civic engagement or community movements—these are infrastructures that can turn performative action into meaningful representation.
Not doing so risks the youth’s long-term disengagement from democratic and political processes. After all, why would they want to participate in a system that does not engage them seriously as stakeholders?
How Malaysia treats its youth will signal the health of its democracy: whether symbolic tokenism leads to stagnation or, more optimistically, real agency could recalibrate politics and democracy.
Conclusion
While it is tempting for political parties to care about youth due to their electoral numbers and “kingmaker” position, the youth need to be regarded as the moral barometers of Malaysia’s democratic future.
Speaking to the youth and studying the infrastructures that affect them democratically, politically and socially, Malaysian youths, even those in the northern and east coast regions, have high hopes for the country. This is an electorate that wants to be involved not only in their communities but also as architects of Malaysia’s democratic renewal.
The UNDI18 bill offered them a possibility, but the lack of care political parties show towards further broadening the space for youth involvement is not only disappointing but also signals to them how little they matter in Malaysia’s future; that elderly politicians are always deciding for them, rather than being co-authors in the process.
As GE16 approaches (expected in late 2026 or early to mid-2027), the preparation of political parties and the government from now on will determine whether Malaysian democracy can evolve to include youth meaningfully or if the next generation will inherit fracture and cynicism.
In this, the youth at least know how to exercise their autonomy. As one youth shared, “As the rakyat, we have rights…. [Democracy] allows us to try other political options. Because if there’s no change [with this government], we can [vote] to see change [with another].” In effect, the youth know that they have multiple electoral cycles to test the limits of the system until it brings them the results they want. This is something political parties should take heed of.
