Introduction
The election of Prabowo Subianto as Indonesia’s president seemed to signal a new era of a more active Indonesian foreign policy, at least initially.
Previously, former president Joko “Jokowi” Widodo preferred a more practical approach, treating foreign policy as a support for national development throughout his 10-year rule. Consequently, Indonesia earned the reputation of prioritising national interest over playing a significant role in global diplomacy.
Jokowi himself showed a lack of interest in the area, viewing foreign policy simply as an avenue to earn economic advantages. As he himself remarked, “What’s the point of having many friends if we only get the disadvantages? Many friends should bring many benefits.”
Prabowo, in contrast, has every intention to leave a personal mark on Indonesia’s foreign policy and to play a significant role in global diplomacy, especially as a global power broker. Throughout his campaign for presidency, he stressed the need for Indonesia to become the leader of the Global South.
Even before he was inaugurated, he already had a whirlwind global tour by visiting China, Japan, Malaysia, the Middle East, Singapore, France, Russia, Serbia, Turkey, Australia, Brunei, Laos and Thailand, all in the span of April to September 2024. He was only inaugurated in October 2024.
After he was sworn in, he went on to visit China again, followed by trips to the United States, Peru, Brazil, the United Kingdom, the United Arab Emirates and finally Egypt, all before the end of 2024.
Beneath the dizzying foreign visits, however, there are two major problems in Prabowo’s foreign policy.
The first is the lack of strategic purpose, which analysts have sarcastically labelled as a directionless approach to diplomacy, even akin to sleepwalking, and motivated by personal ambition.
The second is its apparent neglect of ASEAN itself that, in the end, may be detrimental to Prabowo’s own ambition to become the leader of the Global South.
The (Controversial) Foreign Policy President
The concept of a “foreign policy president” is not new. Former president Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (SBY) was also known for his interest in foreign policy, such that he strengthened the foreign affairs unit in the State Palace into “the Presidential Staff for Foreign Affairs”, led by highly competent diplomat Dino Patti Djalal.
It was even observed that this office bypassed and usu
Prabowo, however, appointed Sugiono – a trusted, loyal career politician from his own party – to serve as his foreign minister. Sugiono notably has no foreign policy background aside from being the vice chairman for the Defence, Foreign and Information Affairs Commission of the Indonesian House of Representatives (DPR).
Sugiono’s appointment indicated that Prabowo desires to assert himself as the authoritative voice in Indonesia’s foreign policymaking, thus bypassing or entirely ignoring bureaucrats in the Foreign Ministry.
Prabowo’s preference to bypass bureaucracy was evident in his first three momentous foreign policy decisions in the beginning of his administration.
First, on 9 November 2024, he signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) with China, which acknowledges that Indonesia has an overlapping claim with China over the South China Sea. The MoU also states an agreement by both to jointly develop the disputed area.
Tempo, a respected Indonesian news magazine, report
Not surprisingly, this decision proved to be controversial and caused an uproar, forcing the Foreign Ministry to issue a clarification that Indonesia has not recognised China’s claim in the South China Sea.
In a stroke of a pen, by ignoring the bureaucrats, Prabowo managed to undermine Indonesia’s decades of foreign policy position in pursuit of economic benefits, an action that may come at the expense of ASEAN, an important cornerstone in Indonesia’s foreign policy.
ASEAN Abandoned?
The second momentous foreign policy decision was Foreign Minister Sugiono’s decision to skip the Informal ASEAN Foreign Minister’s Meeting that took place in Bangkok on 20 December 2024 in order to accompany Prabowo on his state visit to Egypt. This prompted the local English-language newspaper The Jakarta Post to ask whether Indonesia was abandoning ASEAN.
Granted, Prabowo did attend the ASEAN Summit in Kuala Lumpur on 26 May 2025, where he declared ASEAN as one of the most successful organisations in the world and stressed the need to safeguard its centrality and cohesiveness.
His actions, however, did not support his statements.
Sugiono’s absence from such a crucial meeting, coupled with the aforementioned joint statement that undermined ASEAN’s common position in the Code of Conduct negotiation with China, sends strong signals that Prabowo is not taking ASEAN seriously.
But this is not something that should be considered as a surprising revelation.
ASEAN was not even featured prominently and positively during the presidential candidate debate on 7 January 2024, with Prabowo conspicuously not mentioning ASEAN at all. Ganjar Pranowo, another candidate, did stress the need for ASEAN to be fixed due to its sluggishness.
The question, of course, is whether Prabowo, who ended up winnin
It is not surprising that many would question the value of ASEAN, considering its reputation as just a talk shop and its sluggishness in its decision-making process. One analyst bluntly calls it boring.
It cannot be ignored that ASEAN still serves an important function in Southeast Asia, notably in aligning the national priorities of its member states so that they share a common interest on a particular issue. This, however, requires a heavy lifting from whoever wants to advance their agenda.
As the largest country in Southeast Asia with an established legacy of leadership, Indonesia has the unique position of becoming a natural leader of ASEAN, especially with everyone in ASEAN implicitly acknowledging that the grouping simply could not function without Indonesia’s participation.
Essentially, Indonesia could influence ASEAN by simply being present in its events and functions. Even during years of Jokowi’s administration, despite his indifference, he still let Retno Marsudi, then foreign minister, maintain Indonesia’s active participation in ASEAN. She managed to strengthen Indonesia’s position and advance Indonesia’s agenda,
Granted that these two were driven more by a lack of alternatives than a coherent national strategy. Still, they served Indonesia’s interest, notably to unite Southeast Asian nations in order to prevent the region – and especially itself – from being dragged into a conflict that it does not want due to the growing tension between the United States and China.
Therefore, regardless of Prabowo’s declaration, his actions speak louder than his words. By not spending necessary time and political capital in ASEAN, Prabowo ends up neglecting Indonesia’s leadership, allowing other countries in Southeast Asia to take over the mantle and push their own agenda.
Without Indonesia’s leadership, ASEAN risks becoming irrelevant, pushing member states to seek support and network outside the region, thus undermining Indonesia’s own power and leadership in the region.
A Piece of BRICS
Prabowo’s third momentous foreign policy decision was his decision for Indonesia to join BRICS.
For many years, BRICS – a loose bloc of states then comprising Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa, whose goal was to build an alternative multilateral institution that was not dominated by Western nations – had been extending its membership invitation to Indonesia.
The invitation was initially refused during the Jokowi administration due to the fact that there was no clear benefit in joining BRICS economically, while the political cost due to the backlash from the West was quite certain.
Not long after Prabowo’s inauguration, however, the invitation was accepted, with Prabowo sending Sugiono to attend the BRICS Summit in Kazan, Russia, on 24 October 2024. Sugiono later justified the decision to join BRICS as a manifestation of Indonesia’s independent and active foreign policy as well as motivated by potential economic benefits.
From an economic perspective, this decision is actually questionable.
It is a fact that BRICS is a group of states with economic problems. Russia is under an embargo by the European states due to its invasion of Ukraine. South Africa is facing an economic stagnation. Brazil is equally experiencing economic problems. China is facing a trade war with the United States and sluggish consumer spending. India is perhaps the only one in better shape, but it is lagging way behind China economically.
Moreover, at this point, trade between members of BRICS is actually not that robust, with most intra-trade between member states coming from their trade with China. Considering the fact that China has already been Indonesia’s main trade partner, it is questionable how much extra benefit Indonesia could gain from joining BRICS.
But Sugiono’s most crucial justification, which is as a manifestation of Indonesia’s independent and active foreign policy, does not hold water. In light of global political instability caused by the US-China tension and the invasion of Ukraine, Indonesia’s decision to join BRICS can and will be construed as Indonesia finally picking a side.
This suspicion is further reinforced after Prabowo decided to skip the G7 Conference in Canada to visit President Vladimir Putin in Russia instead. Furthermore, in the aftermath of the BRICS Summit in Brazil on 6-7 July 2025, President Trump started putting pressure on BRICS, threatening to slap a 10% levy on imports from member countries despite Indonesia’s protestation that the Summit did not aim to antagonise the United States.
A New Foreign Policy
Prabowo has all the intentions to finally place Indonesia at the centre stage of global politics and as a Global South leader. This is not something to be criticised for. Rather, it is high time for Indonesia to act like a global leader in light of global instability, the United States’ decision to scale down its role in global affairs and the desire of many nations, including Indonesia, for a more equitable global order.
The problem is in its execution. Prabowo’s whirlwind global tour has no strategic logic behind it. Indonesia simply shows up without any clear p
In fact, Prabowo should play with the cards that Indonesia currently owns. For example, Indonesia should play to its strengths as the ASEAN leader and a bridge between competing blocs.
Furthermore, Indonesia should invest time, energy and political capital into issues where Indonesia can and does make strong impacts. Forget the idea of being a global peacemaker that could end Israel’s continuing war in Gaza and genocide of the Palestinians, that is not supported by the majority of Israelis themselves, or Russia’s barbaric invasion of Ukraine. Neither Benjamin Netanyahu nor Putin will listen to Prabowo.
Instead, Indonesia should look at troubles closer to home.
The risk of ASEAN becoming more and more irrelevant is becoming higher. The management of the Mekong River remains rife with conflict. Border clashes between Cambodia and Thailand. The Philippines is slowly drifting away from ASEAN – and therefore Indonesia’s influence – and becoming closer to the United States due to the lack of support for its stance in the West Philippines Sea.
Myanmar remains a mess, with its government mistreating its population, creating more regional instability. Relationships with Australia and New Zealand are ripe for more strengthening, especially in light of Trump’s mistreatment of his erstwhile allies. Meanwhile, the ongoing cross-strait crisis in Taiwan demands more attention from Southeast
