Introduction
Controversial preacher Rizieq Shihab may become the top opposition figure in Indonesia’s current political dynamics after receiving his full acquittal in June 2024. Rizieq was previously slapped with a prison sentence for violating health quarantine laws during the pandemic and spreading fake news regarding swab test.
He has maintained a relatively low profile in recent years, during which he refrained from publicly criticizing the Indonesian government and commenting on political situations.
When his followers urged him to speak up about latest political developments at an Aksi 212 (the 212 Action) reunion in 2022, he instead reminded them not to bring up the subject due to his then status as a parolee.
Despite this, there is an indication that Rizieq would switch back to his old orientation. His first statement after acquittal denotes his intention to continue da’wah (preaching) and fight corruptors. Essentially, these were his agendas before his self-imposed exile in Saudi Arabia.
Rizieq’s return to Indonesian politics is potentially significant despite his checkered image, caused by his recent imprisonment, alleged sexting scandal and a bad record in extrajudicial activities during his stint as the leader of Islamic Defenders Front (FPI).
By examining today’s political context and Rizieq’s movement, this piece aims to investigate the possibility of Rizieq’s second bloom as an opposition figure in Indonesian politics.
The Near Absence of Opposition
Rizieq’s return comes against the backdrop of an absence of significant political opposition to President Joko “Jokowi” Widodo’s second term. This is due to several factors.
One, the co-optation of key Islamic entities (such as Ma’ruf Amin and Nahdlatul Ulama – NU) into Jokowi’s camp, which effectively dampens any accusation that Jokowi’s regime is anti-Islam.
Two, the regime has successfully embraced former opposition figures that rode the anti-government Islamist wave in the past, such as Prabowo Subianto and Sandiaga Uno.
Three, the use of Undang-Undang Informasi dan Transaksi Elektronik (Electronic Information and Transaction Act – UU ITE) to silence critics, which has seen hundreds of individuals sent to jail.
Four, most political parties in the House of Representatives (DPR) have been absorbed into a super government coalition.
The lack of an effective opposition, whether Islamist-based or not, opens a wide array of possibility for power abuse by the government. This is reflected in the downward trend of Indonesia’s Corruption Perception Index in the past few years. Some notable cases of embezzlement, power abuse and the culture of impunity could offer a good context as to why some measures of checks and balances are direly needed.
Yet, Rizieq’s second bloom would not be without stumbling blocks. His self-imposed exile and subsequent imprisonment may have diminished a modicum of his influence. Furthermore, the banning of FPI and Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (HTI) eliminated traditional platforms that Rizieq could utilize to launch his comeback. This measure is part of the wider effort to suppress Islamist-based opposition in the last few years.
The removal of the Islamists from the equation has altered the political constellation and trends which differ greatly from the time before Rizieq’s exile. This can be demonstrated in at least two instances.
Firstly, political figures are now exempt from the “shackle” of Islamist orientation, which allowed them to explore new modes of campaign and messaging. In the 2024 presidential election, candidates optimized the use of TikTok to rollout campaigns that are free from Islam-related messaging.
Prabowo displayed a soft and approachable side by portraying his “gemoy” (cute daddy) personae. Meanwhile, Anies Baswedan largely ditched his Islamist-based campaign and presented himself as a wise “abah” (father). Ganjar Pranowo, on the other hand, projected a humble and populist figure that suit the expectation of young voters. These are just snippets of how the absence of Islamist pressure has enabled politicians to explore other messages and options.
Secondly, it has allowed figures and entities with more secular leaning to gain traction. Rocky Gerung, Pandji Pragiwakso and the magazine Tempo are at the forefront of this, constantly criticizing the government’s policy and steps through speaking engagements and publication.
These figures have somewhat assumed the political parties’ role in providing a counterbalance to the executive branch, especially when many of these parties have not determined their position in the upcoming administration. For example, NasDem leader Surya Paloh has indicated his wish to align with Prabowo’s coalition despite having backed his rival Anies in the last election. Meanwhile, Partai Demokrasi Indonesia Perjuangan (PDI-P) is still trying to ascertain the best position it should assume after the loss of its candidate, Ganjar.
Too Dependent
Similarly, the biggest Islamic mass organizations, Muhammadiyah and NU, cannot be expected to assume the opposition role due to their deep involvement with Jokowi’s government.
For example, Muhammadiyah’s extensive infrastructure in various sectors, such as its vast network of educational institutions, makes it hard for the group to emerge as a critical voice due to its dependence on the government to issue permit.
Even dissenting voice from within Muhammadiyah would be undermined by the group’s leadership. Individuals such as Muhammad Busyro Muqoddas and Anwar Abbas have criticized Jokowi before, only to be responded by General Chairman Haedar Nashir’s public appreciation of Jokowi. One of his reasonings for defending Jokowi was the president’s frequent attendance at Muhammadiyah’s events.
Many of NU elites also rely on Jokowi’s administration for access to projects and power. For example, when the government changed its regulation pertaining to mining concession, NU became the first religious organization that applied for permit. Their argument was that NU needs financial injection to run its various programs and projects.
Would Rizieq Bloom Twice?
Amidst the near absence of opposition emerges a window of opportunity for Rizieq to bloom once more.
Firstly, Rizieq might use the issue of the curious deaths of six FPI members in a December 2020 shooting incident to propel his campaign against impunity and power abuse, framing it as an endeavour to seek justice for the deceased’s families.
Rizieq might capitalize on the growing public dissatisfaction at the police instigated by massive cases of abuse in the past two years alone. The Ferdy Sambo scandal, the Kanjuruhan incident and the chaotic handling of the Vina murder case were among the cases that exemplify this. This is a notable opportunity for Rizieq, whose anti-corruption stance is well documented.
How this will affect Prabowo’s administration will be something to look out for. The previously close relationship between Rizieq and Prabowo, particularly in the pre-Covid-19 years, might shift depending how Rizieq approaches his opposition role. With Rizieq’s substantial following, he might yet impose some challenges to Prabowo’s administration as well as the police.
Secondly, the upcoming Pemilihan Gubernur Jakarta (Jakarta Gubernatorial Election – Pilgub) may emerge as a perfect ground for Rizieq to relaunch his political campaign.
A caution should be placed here as the context of the upcoming Pilgub Jakarta differs greatly from the one in 2017, when double-minority candidate Basuki Tjahaja Purnama (Ahok) contested. It might not be as easy for any Islamist faction to identify their entry point this time, owing to the absence of major factors such as Ahok’s blasphemy case and double-minority status.
Hence, Rizieq’s re-entry into Jakarta politics might not be as straightforward as when Ahok was contesting. He would need to identify and exploit platforms that resonate with the people. It would also be dependent on who are running for the position this time, which at the time of writing has not been identified.
Regardless, his massive following in Pilgub Jakarta 2017 was a testament of his power of influence, even if only in the past. His will surely be a factor that candidates need to anticipate and, potentially, court. There is already a sign for this. Former Jakarta Governor Anies, a close ally of Rizieq, was seen attending the latter’s daughter’s wedding in Petamburan on 8 July 2024. This showcases Rizieq’s lingering influence.
Conclusion
Ultimately, the lack of substantial opposition or government critics is the main factor that would usher Rizieq’s second bloom. Dissatisfaction towards government and the authorities are highly palpable in social media platforms such as X, despite Jokowi’s sky-high approval rating. Rizieq has the potential to galvanize these disenfranchised voices and launch his salvo against the incoming administration and state apparatus, provided he can take advantage of the available momentum and platforms. It remains to be seen whether his former alliance with Prabowo would deter him from becoming Indonesia’s top opposition in the years to come. However, as identified above, he has all the opportunity to bloom once again.
