Introduction
Unlike the previous presidential election in 2019, the echo of Islamist populism is almost completely inaudible ahead of the 2024 Presidential Election in Indonesia, which will be held on 14 February 2024.
Five years ago, the Islamist populist movement was drummed up by Gerakan Nasional Pengawal Fatwa Majelis Ulama Indonesia (the National Movement to Safeguard the Indonesian Ulema Council’s Edict – GNPF-MUI), the 212 Alumni and Islamic Defender Front (FPI). All of these groups played a significant role in campaigning for Prabowo Subianto and Sandiaga Uno for the country’s top posts. The two figures were perceived to be capable to protect Muslim’s interests and bring Islamic agenda to the governance realm.
The movement’s successes in contributing to the downfall of ex-Jakarta Governor Basuki Cahaya Purnama (Ahok) and paving the way for Anies Baswedan’s election victory in the 2017 Jakarta Gubernatorial Election became their selling point that attracted the Prabowo-Sandi pair to engage them ahead of the presidential election two years later.
Therefore, it is peculiar that in 2024, the movement has largely fallen silent, at least in the public space. Where is it now and does it still play a vital role in the upcoming national vote?
The Power of Islamist Populism
Ahok’s blasphemy case that precipitated his political bane serves as an obvious sign of how religious issues could shape voter’s behavior. Religion, in this context Islam, is useful in driving public demand for populist political and social agendas.
The 2017 Jakarta Gubernatorial Election shows that religion and religious identity can be readily exploited to create divisions within the Indonesian society, drawing a dichotomy between “the pure people” of faith and the “evil” or “corrupt” people who are outside the circle of the faithful.
Anies’ engagement with the populist Muslim groups has also been used by several populist leaders in various countries such as Narendra Modi, Recep Tayyip Erdogan and Imran Khan. They may all be considered “religious populists” insofar as their utilization of religious discourse to not merely construct what constitutes “the people”, but to actively create a more religious society in conjunction with religious authorities and/or religious organizations.
For example, Modi wears saffron to connect with the deeply religious Hindu masses through the sacred color. Erdogan has repeatedly used firebrand rhetoric laced with religious undertones in championing oppressed Muslims across the world. Imran Khan, in a similar manner, talks about Muslim victimhood under the pressures of Islamophobia, whilst making a show of carrying prayer beads as a sign that he is constantly seeking divine help during his “trials and tribulations”.
The momentum for the rise of Islamic populism was hereinafter harnessed by Prabowo, chairman of the Gerindra Party, who previously supported Anies’ candidacy in the 2017 Jakarta vote. Probowo once again incorporated them in his campaign for the 2019 national vote. However, he was not as successful as Anies was, as Prabowo was bested by incumbent President Joko “Jokowi” Widodo.
Scholars have conducted many academic studies related to the populism movement in general. There are at least four specific conditions agreed upon by scholars that most give rise to the emergence of populism in a government.
First, pre-existing religio-racial, regional, or class divisions. Second, the politicization of socio-economic inequalities within the framework of those divisions. Third, the availability of minorities as mobilizing targets for populist campaigns. Fourth, the willingness of established parties to support populists in order to retain political significance.
Aksi 411, Aksi 212, the 2017 Jakarta Gubernatorial Election and the 2019 Presidential Election all provide precedents of the rise of Islamic populism in Indonesia. The successful exploitation of Ahok’s blasphemy case, which first emerged in 2016, reverberated all the way to the 2019 national vote, a testament of how powerful it was, even if it ultimately failed to deliver victory to Prabowo.
The Quiet Today
It has been argued before that religious populists are “populist leaders/parties/movements with close links to organized religion, and which have a religion-based political program influenced by Holy Books and theology.” Therefore, religious populists, in Indonesia’s context Islamist populists, always have political agendas to oversee the implementation of Islamic values in state governance.
However, in the upcoming presidential election, their voice is eerily quiet and they do not feature heavily, if at all, in the campaigns of two presidential candidates that previously engaged them. This is because the momentum of Islamic populism has waned, in addition to the different political strategies pursued by the presidential candidates.
Prabowo now has massive political capital drawn from the sizeable party coalition supporting him and the perceived “indirect support” from Jokowi, after agreeing to put the latter’s son Gibran Rakabuming Raka in his ticket. Islamist populists have also grown wary of Prabowo in the past years, owing to Prabowo’s willingness to be coopted into Jokowi’s cabinet as Minister of Defense.
Anies, on the other hand, still accommodates this element, albeit to a limited extent. This can be seen from the appointment of Yusuf Martak, Chair of the GNPF-MUI, as a member of his national campaign team (tim sukses – success team). Although Partai Keadilan Sejahtera (Prosperous Justice Party – PKS), a champion of Islamic populism, makes up the coalition that backs Anies, their influence is moderated by the inclusion of Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa (National Awakening Party – PKB). With PKB Chairman Muhaimin Iskandar in Anies’ ticket, the camp is set to incorporate more traditionalist-moderate undertone. In one of the interview sessions, Anies openly admitted that Muhaimin’s appointment could garner him support from voter bases which he had yet to control.
It remains to be seen how the inclusion of PKB and PKS under Anies’ banner could work in the long-term. Needless to say, PKB’s base – traditionalist-moderate Muslims – does not necessarily jive with Islamist populist actors, particularly because of the traditionalist vs modernist debate that is deeply rooted in Indonesian society. Populist actors – comprising many urban Muslims – feel that traditionalist groups are perpetrators of heresy. On the other hand, traditionalist groups consider that modernists are newcomers to the religious scene in Indonesia who are disrupting the establishment and status quo that they have enjoyed so far.
Perhaps due to this uncomfortable mixture, the Islamic populism tone in Anies’ camp does not flourish the way that it did last time. It would not work for him if he were to play this card anyway. Firstly, Anies has had trouble to shake off his image as the “Father of Identity Politics”, which may have put a distance between him and voters from other backgrounds. Secondly, drumming up this sentiment would lose him the support from PKB. It would be interesting to see if this arrangement is sustainable in the future, especially if Anies were elected as president.
More interesting is the contest to win Nahdlatul Ulama’s (NU) vote and support, which PKB supposedly represents in the political space, though recent dynamics suggest discord between the two. Incumbent Vice President Ma’ruf Amin managed to galvanize NU’s vote back in 2019, a contributing factor to Prabowo’s loss, whom then was supported by Islamist populists.
Today, NU’s vote might be divided among all three candidates. Anies’ running mate is Muhaimin, PKB’s chairman. Prabowo’s camp recently received a boost from Khofifah Indar Parawansa, a powerful figure in NU’s women wing (Muslimat). In addition, Ganjar Pranowo is paired with Mahfud MD, a popular figure often portrayed as a Nahdlatul Ulama cadre.
Both Muhaimin and Mahfud have evidently vied for the sympathy of NU supporters, often quoting wisdom and statements by NU leaders in official debates. They have also quoted Qur’anic verses, in addition to stating that they went to NU pesantrens, in obvious attempt to showcase their affiliation with the NU community. This only goes to suggest that Islamic populism is currently not a political currency being exploited by the key players.
From the description above, we can understand why the voice of populist Islam does not resonate in the 2024 Presidential Election. The movement has less bargaining power in Indonesia’s political context today, compared to the roles played by Erdogan’s Justice and Development Party (AKP) in Turkey and the Muslim Brotherhood (Ikhwanul Muslimin) in Egypt. While the former has established strength in the structural-governmental realm, the latter has strong roots as a cultural-mass organization.
Conclusion
In the past, Indonesia had witnessed how Islamist populism featured heavily in political contestations. While it was effective as a political capital in 2017, it fell short of delivering victory to Prabowo in 2018. In 2024, due to various social and political changes, the role of identity politics seems to have declined. There are at least three reasons for this. First, the Islamist populists’ disappointment with Prabowo who joined Jokowi’s cabinet. Second, Anies, a key figure in Islamic populism, coopts PKB as the traditionalist group, which is often at odds with the tenets of Islamist populist movement. Third, key players in the election are prominent individuals with NU background, which means the Islamic populism influence is largely marginalized in today’s context.
