A Four-Part Series on Political Islam and Pemilu 2024 – Part 1: Political Islam in Indonesia: Looking at Pemilu 2024 and Beyond
A Rather Simplistic Early Look
How will political Islam shape Indonesian politics in the coming years? What impact does it have on the rights of religious minorities and the general civil liberty climate?
Observers of Indonesia are no strangers to these questions. Right after the downfall of Soeharto’s authoritarian regime in 1998, one of the more pressing questions at the time was figuring out what the opening of the political space meant for political Islam in Indonesia. Unfortunately, in these early years, political Islam was defined rather narrowly as electoral victories by Islamist parties.
A pertinent, follow-up question then arises. Would Islamist parties dominate the elections and turn Indonesia into an Islamic state?
A vast majority of the Indonesian population, roughly 87 percent, were Muslims, giving Islamist parties such as Partai Keadilan Sejahtera (Prosperous Justice Party – PKS) and Partai Persatuan Pembangunan (United Development Party – PPP) a solid voter base. Furthermore, while Soeharto was initially distant, if not antagonistic, towards Islamist organizations, he became increasingly close to them from the 1990s onward, exemplified, for instance, by the founding of Ikatan Cendekiawan Muslim Indonesia (Indonesian Association of Muslim Intellectuals – ICMI). These gave observers reasons to suspect an electoral domination by Islamists.
So, when Islamist parties failed to dominate the 1999 and subsequent elections, observers were quick to note the secular nature of Indonesian democracy and how political Islam, embodied in Islamist parties, was unlikely to become a significant force in Indonesian politics.
Out of Office, but Influential
The optimism, however, proved premature. The culprit was on the narrow definition of “influence” that placed too much emphasis on electoral victories. The assumption was that political Islam was a strong political force only insofar as Islamist parties won elections, seats and public offices. There was no influence if one was not in the government.
Post-Soeharto political developments demonstrated that the opposite was actually true. There are ways for political Islam to be influential even if Islamist parties fared poorly in the elections.
First, Islamist organizations and Muslim elites are influential because of their networks and masses. These masses, while may not constitute the majority of Muslim voters, are nonetheless more solid, better organized and to some extent better educated than the average voter. This makes them an invaluable electoral base.
As such, aspiring politicians would be wise to seek and obtain the blessings, if not endorsement, of such organizations and figures. President Joko “Jokowi” Widodo’s decision to take Maruf Amin as vice president was the clearest example how it could help to have a reputable cleric in one’s campaign. At the very least, blessings and endorsement from such figures would be helpful in signaling a bona fide religious credential and shielding from attacks based on identity politics.
Second, in part due to their ability (real or perceived) to deliver votes, Islamist organizations and Muslim elites have the power to influence policymaking. Political scientist Michael Buehler wrote about how a significant number of sharia laws in Indonesia were passed not by politicians from Islamist parties but ones from nationalist parties. Lacking religious credentials and networks coming from non-religious parties, these politicians appealed to the electoral potential of Islamist organizations by endorsing the implementation of sharia-based policies on the local level.
While such policies mostly target morality issues, more recent cases suggest that they have increasingly directed toward restricting minorities. For example, the refusal of the mayor of Cilegon, Banten to allow the construction of a church in the city was closely related to demands of a conservative Muslim organization. Cases concerning local governments’ treatments of the Ahmadiyya and the Shia communities were other good examples.
The willingness of nationalist parties and their politicians to appeal and cater to the demands of Islamist organizations, in turn, blurs the distinction between Islamist and nationalist parties. Indeed, perceptive observers have argued that a key reason why Islamist parties do not perform very well in the elections is not because their Islamist agendas are unpopular. Rather, it is because Islamist agendas are so popular that even nationalist parties embrace them, thus depriving Islamist parties of their uniqueness.
Looking at 2024 and Beyond
The preceding sections illuminate how political Islam is alive and well in Indonesia once we broaden the definition of success from simply electoral victories to being able to influence policymaking and being in a position where one’s approval is highly sought after. This gives us the foundation on which to look at Pemilihan Umum (General Election – Pemilu) 2024 and beyond.
There are at least three predictions that we can make about the trajectory of Indonesian political Islam. First, we will likely see a continuing trend of supposedly nationalist parties and candidates embracing religious agendas and catering to conservative Muslim voters. A group affiliated with Partai Gerakan Indonesia Raya (Great Indonesia Movement Party – Gerindra), for example, publicly said that they are gathering ulema’s support for Prabowo Subianto.
Similarly, as in the past elections, party coalitions would not be defined by ideology. It would not be surprising to see supposedly secular or nationalist parties like the Gerindra Party, Partai Demokrat (Democratic Party), or Partai Nasional Demokrat (Nationalist Democratic Party – Nasdem) coalesce with Islamist parties such as PPP or PKS.
Observers may note that such coalitions of convenience or embrace are hardly harmful, at least to Indonesia’s diversity. But that would be too optimistic of a view. When parties and politicians are willing to move to the right to appease conservative voters, it is a strong confirmation for the importance of these voters―or, in this case, a strong affirmation for the benefits of embracing political Islam.
Second, non-Muslim minorities will continue to be captured minority. Just like in Pemilu 2019 where a vast majority of non-Muslim voters supported Jokowi even when religious freedom violations were rampant under his watch, non-Muslim voters likely would support presidential candidate who is least closely associated with conservative Islam.
Engaging in what political scientists call negative voting, Indonesian religious minorities would look at which candidate is endorsed or supported by Islamist parties and organizations, such as PKS or Persaudaraan Alumni 212 (212 Alumni Brotherhood – PA 212), as well as by notable conservative figures such as Rizieq Shihab and then vote for the other candidate.
These votes pretty much would be guaranteed and the candidate would have to do only little to attract these votes. Even if the candidate is not doing much to advance religious liberty, the religious minorities would still prefer them to the Islamists-backed candidate―hence the term “captured minority”.
Third, Jokowi’s failures in maintaining and creating a free civic space has weakened civil society’s capability to respond to threats posed by intolerance, identity politics and conservative organizations. Security apparatus has been eager to disband discussions on topics considered sensitive, such as on Papua or ones that are critical toward the president.
While these discussions may not be directly related to religion or political Islam, maintaining the liberty to discuss sensitive topics is critical to counter intolerance and extremism. Studies have shown that exposures to different ideas in a free society enable citizens to engage and respect different viewpoints and enhance their tolerance levels.
As opposed to cultivating a free civic space, Jokowi and his administration have been more eager to deal with Islamic conservatism in a top-down, security-based approach. The disbandment of the Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (HTI) and Front Pembela Islam (Islamic Defenders Front – FPI) are two clear examples.
This sets undesirable precedence. Rather than engaging political Islam as a matter of civil discourse and political preferences, Jokowi has created an ecosystem where opaque standards and virtually the whim of the ruling power determine whether certain strands of political Islam are allowed to thrive.
While even some civil society activists welcome such a heavy-handed approach as long as it is applied to conservative organizations, the approach is not a sustainable one. From post-Soeharto Indonesia to post-Mubarak Egypt, history has told us that such an approach would actually embolden conservative organizations. Once the repression of the state is lifted, these organizations and their ideas would come out stronger.
The state cannot be the primary defense against conservative political Islam. The civil society is. Unfortunately, Jokowi’s state-oriented approach has eroded the latter’s capacity to tackle these challenges.
Summary
Understanding whether or how political Islam thrives in Indonesia should involve looking beyond how Islamist parties perform in the elections, win seats and occupy public offices. Such an examination needs to look as well into how Islamist organizations and elites at large influence the decision making and policymaking of those who are in office.
More than two decades after the start of its democratization drive, it is clear that Indonesia’s political Islam is alive, well and flourishing. Politicians seek endorsement from Islamist organizations and elites. Such organizations and elites, through their mass bases and mobilization capacities, also influence and constrain politicians’ decision making.
The trend likely will continue, if not strengthened, in the 2024 election and beyond as the Indonesian civil society, which should play the primary role in balancing certain strands of political Islam and their potentially divisive consequences, has been severely weakened by Jokowi’s state-centered approach.
Part 2: Sharia Politics in 2024: Ideology or Commodity
Part 3: The Recent Decline of Interfaith Dialogue in Indonesia: Causes and Challenges
Part 4: Identity Politics and Pilpres 2024: Learning from Aksi 212
