Introduction
In January 1998 – when the Malaysian government handed over four senior members of the Patani United Liberation Organization (PULO) to Thai law enforcement – few knew what to make of it.
Thailand’s Malay-speaking South was relatively peaceful at the time; armed insurgency had already subsided for some years. The blanket amnesty given to various separatist groups from the late 1980s to early 1990s appeared to have paid off—or so it seemed.
While combatants put down their arms and returned to their villages, many leaders remained abroad, obtaining residency status or citizenship in Northern European countries and Malaysia.
Thailand wrongly assumed that peace had been achieved in this Malay historical homeland known as Patani. So, when Malaysian authorities detained Abdul Rohman Bazo, Haji Daoh Thanam, Haji Mae Yala, and Haji Sama-ae Thanam and handed them over to Thai counterparts in January 1998, Patani residents and members of various Patani liberation groups were dumbstruck.
Four years later, when a new generation of Patani Malay fighters under the command of the Barisan Revolusi Nasional (BRN) resurfaced – carrying out sporadic attacks against police and military outposts in the region – Malaysia realised they had shot themselves in the foot with the handover of the four PULO members.
Rocky Road
The official explanation as to why the Thais were after these PULO leaders was unconvincing. No one believed they were trying to start another standing army, as they were living openly in Malaysia, running legitimate businesses such as a restaurant.
One explanation that made the most sense came from a senior Thai diplomat who said the request for the arrest of the Thanam brothers and their associates was Thailand’s way of testing the waters with Malaysia—to gauge the level of commitment from then-prime minister Dr Mahathir Mohammed to his Thai counterpart, Chuan Leekpai.
At first, as sporadic attacks occurred in mid-2001, the then-government – led by Thaksin Shinawatra – was dismissive, calling the insurgents “sparrow bandits”. Following the 4 January 2004 arms heist, in which BRN combatants made off with more than 350 military weapons from an army battalion in Narathiwat, Bangkok could no longer deny the political underpinnings of these attacks.
Suddenly, there was acknowledgment that a new generation of Patani Malay Muslim separatist combatants had resurfaced.
The first few years were not smooth sailing for the two countries as public accusations and microphone diplomacy took their toll on bilateral relations, with each side accusing the other of not doing enough to quell the insurgency.
Fleeing Villagers
One low point came in August 2005 when 131 Malay Muslim villagers from Narathiwat’s Sungai Padi district crossed the border and took refuge in Kelantan’s mosques following alleged harassment by Thai security forces.
Deporting these villagers back to Thailand would have been difficult as Malaysia sought to maintain its place in the Muslim world. Moreover, the 131 displaced villagers were not just Muslims; they were fellow Malays who shared the same cultural and linguistic traits as Malays in Malaysia.
At the time of the exodus, death squads were on a killing spree, targeting ethnic Malays at village teashops; the imam from Narathiwat’s Sungai Padi district and a female teacher at an Islamic preschool in the village were shot dead by unknown gunmen.
The atmosphere was tense and a climate of fear enveloped the entire region.
Malaysia did not push the 131 back to the Thai side but refused to recognise or treat them as asylum seekers. There were concerns that more would come. Eventually, the Malaysian government asked the United Nations High Commission on Refugees (UNHCR) to assist these fleeing Patani Malay villagers, thus internationalising the issue.
Thaksin was furious because he never wanted the problem in the far South to be more than a bilateral issue. Putting Patani on an international stage forced Thailand to confront this disturbing aspect of its state-minority relations. This is not to mention its failed assimilation policy that Patani Malays violently rejected because it threatened their ethno-religious identity and historical-cultural narrative.
Eventually, over the years, the issue faded from officials’ memories. Some of the displaced villagers quietly returned to their homes in Narathiwat, while others remained in northern Malaysia as undocumented migrants.
Yet, someone must pay the price. Thaksin was ousted in a coup in October 2006 by an army general who cited his handling of the separatist insurgency as one of the reasons.
Strings of Prime Ministers
The relationship between Malaysia and Thailand during the reign of prime minister Surayud Chulanont was described as cordial and respectful. The former army chief placed great emphasis on the root causes of the conflict. In late 2007, Surayud made a public apology to the people of Patani for the deaths of 87 unarmed protesters in Tak Bai in late 2004.
He reached out to the international community for help to establish a foundation for peace negotiations with the rebels, but his time in office lasted just 16 months. The foundation he laid was largely ignored by the subsequent government of prime minister Samak Sundaravej of the Thaksin-linked People Power Party (PPP).
In March 2012, Thaksin held a quiet meeting in Kelantan with leaders from various Patani Malay separatist organisations, during which he blamed his heavy-handedness on distorted information given to him by the Army. Thaksin thought his direct participation would help improve the situation. He urged all participants to let bygones be bygones and start over.
Two weeks after the meeting, a triple car bomb exploded in the heart of Yala, one of Thailand’s three southernmost border provinces, killing 13 and wounding about 140 civilians. Conflict observers and Thai security officials said the attack was a stern message to Thaksin that nothing in the far south comes easy.
The following year, on 28 February 2013, prime minister Yingluck Shinawatra, Thaksin’s sister, caught everyone by surprise, including the Royal Thai Army, by launching a peace process with a group of exiled old guards claiming to be BRN members. Malaysia was officially designated as the facilitator.
It has been repeatedly pointed out that, due to geographical proximity, Malaysia cannot be seen as an honest broker. Some conspiracy-minded officials in Thailand even suggest that Patani wants to join Malaysia.
However, among security officials, it was generally understood that mainland Southeast Asian borders have a life of their own. At one time or another, buffers and proxies along borders were common among countries in the region while diplomatic relations took their course.
To some BRN members, Malaysia’s opposition to an independent Patani already disqualified them as an honest broker. But this is Southeast Asia, where peace and conflict resolution theories do not align well.
Malaysia took up the mediation role, thinking that Thailand was politically stable. Nevertheless, just over a year after peace negotiations launched, Yingluck was ousted in a coup.
The coup leader, General Prayut Chan-ocha, appointed himself the country’s prime minister and deliberated continuing Yingluck’s peace initiative. After all, the Army had not been consulted and learned about it just days before the official launch in Malaysia. In the end, Prayut relented and allowed the talks to continue.
From the start, Yingluck’s peace initiative wavered between a hoax and a leap of faith. The representatives at the table lacked command and control over the combatants on the ground. But when BRN finally came to the table in January 2020, these old guards from the 2013 talks were immediately sidelined.
Having the real BRN at the table did not mean violence on the ground would end. The new chief negotiator, General Udomchai Thamsarorat, was appointed in October 2018 and immediately sought help from local civil society organisations, hoping they could amplify messages to BRN about the need to talk and reconcile differences.
However, it remained unclear what the Thai side had to offer or what concessions the government was willing to make to the people of Patani. Besides engaging local CSOs, Udomchai also asked Malaysia to bypass BRN negotiators and arrange a meeting for him with top leaders from the BRN military wing. BRN refused.
Decline
Another low point between Thailand and Malaysia came in late 2019 when Bangkok created a back channel with BRN through foreign mediation without informing Malaysia.
There are several reasons as to why Malaysia was uninformed. Firstly, Thailand blamed Malaysia for its failure in bringing BRN’s military leaders to the table. Secondly, Thailand was still not satisfied with talking to the BRN negotiators, even through a proper channel.
Thailand assumed that if it can talk to the military wing, it can (somehow) convince the movement to lay down their arms. Thus, Thailand approached a foreign NGO to establish a back channel with BRN, with the assumption that this could be done without giving any concession to BRN or the Malays of Patani.
In theory, a back channel is supposed to support the main (official) channel. However, in this case, the two tracks continue to compete against one another (the official track with Malaysia as the lead and the back channel with a foreign NGO trying to convince everybody that Malaysia needs to be dumped because it is not an honest broker).
Tensions arising from this competition took their toll on BRN unity. Thus, in early 2022, the BRN central committee decided to end all forms of back channels unless Malaysia is kept in the loop.
Udomchai was replaced by retired National Security Council (NSC) chief General Wallop Raksanoh, who spent the next three years developing a blueprint to serve as the roadmap for the peace process. A commitment from BRN that future negotiations would align with the Thai Constitution was a significant victory for Wallop, but more work remained for the Malaysian mediator to get both sides to agree on the roadmap’s content.
Meanwhile, Thailand held a general election in May 2023 that created a coalition government, with Thaksin’s Pheu Thai Party coming in second but successfully forming a coalition with like-minded partners, including parties from the junta leaders who ousted Yingluck in 2014.
Later, real estate tycoon Srettha Tavisin became prime minister. During his tenure, Malaysia was left pondering when Thailand would appoint a chief negotiator. This was because national security was not an immediate concern of the Srettha administration.
This was demonstrated with Srettha making no reference to the far south (or to Burma) during his speech to the Parliament. His priorities were clear. Firstly, to prioritise the economy as a means to winning back the constituency whom his party had lost after the Faustian deal with the pro-junta/military camp to get Thaksin back to Thailand. Secondly, to deny the Move Forward Party the lead in setting up a government. Thirdly, to make the Pheu Thai Party the overall lead in this coalition of political parties that compromised their stated democratic principles in exchange for a political truce that may not last very long.
Eventually, then-NSC deputy chief Chartchai Bangchuad was appointed as chief negotiator. His stint lasted only a few months, as the Constitutional Court removed Srettha from office in August 2024 following ethical violation charges.
The government of Prime Minister Paetongtarn Shinawatra, much like the one preceding it, showed little concern for the conflict in the far south. Last December, BRN threatened to walk away from talks and withdrew its earlier commitment to operate under the Thai Constitution if Thailand continued to drag its feet on the peace process.
Bangkok refused to yield and insisted that a new negotiating team would be appointed only after BRN curbed violence on the ground. BRN maintained that even the reduction of violence had to be negotiated.
Just before Ramadhan in 2025, the new Malaysian facilitator, Datuk Mohd Rabin Basir, tried to help Thailand secure a ceasefire during the holy month. However, Bangkok found BRN’s demand for international observers to monitor the ceasefire too much to accept. Thailand has always resisted outside intervention, leading to the rejection.
Interestingly, BRN sources had shared with the author that Datuk Mohd Rabin’s appointment to replace Tan Sri Zulkifli Zainal Abidin, the retired chief of the armed forces and a professor at the National Defence University of Malaysia, was perceived as a setback to the peace process. This was because Tan Sri Zulkifli had worked hard to gain BRN’s trust and respect during his appointment as Malaysia’s facilitator.
The recent spike in violence has become the new normal. Targets include Defense Volunteers (DV), locally hired security personnel assigned to the Ministry of Interior’s provincial governors and district chiefs. These DVs have been asked to serve as government informants. BRN has demonstrated that they have no qualms about targeting DVs who spy on them.
In March 2025, Thaksin offered to carry out a direct talk with BRN leaders from the military wing. He suggested Phuket as the venue and offered legal immunity. BRN leaders turned down the offer, as no one was certain about what kind of mandate Thaksin had to be making such an offer.
Observers said Thaksin just wanted photo ops with BRN military leaders. For BRN, the peace process is the start of a very long journey, one that should not be taken lightly, much less used as a photo op for an ageing, former fugitive prime minister who does not seem to know his place.
Conclusion
Despite the challenges, Malaysia plays an important role in attempting to resolve the long-running insurgency in Thailand’s southernmost provinces. The relationship with Thailand has become much calmer compared to the early days of microphone diplomacy.
Both Thailand and BRN see Malaysia’s geographical proximity as beneficial to their logistical and operational needs. Furthermore, ethnic Malays in Malaysia may share similar cultural-religious characteristics with the Malays of Patani, indicating that a great sympathy for the plight of the latter might exist among the former.
But it stops there. Both government and non-government entities in Malaysia know that nurturing this bilateral tie is extremely challenging, as one wrong move could bring down the whole house.
Balancing its relationship with Thailand while maintaining credibility with insurgent groups has not been an easy act to follow for Malaysia. Some in Malaysia say the Malaysian government should do nothing more than facilitate discussion, while others said the proximity makes the country a stakeholder and intervention is extremely necessary. Nevertheless, it is generally agreed that BRN needs all the help it can get from members of the international community and that Malaysia should facilitate the discussion. Getting Thailand to go along with the idea, on the other hand, is like moving a mountain.
