Introduction
After years of military rule in Thailand, democracy seems to be back in full swing. With an eye to win the next general election in March 2026 or possibly sooner, new players, power brokers and alliances have emerged, while the public has grown generally more progressive, calling for deep structural reforms.
Three main political parties and their alliances – namely the “blue” (Bhumjaithai Party – BJT), “orange” (People’s Party – PP) and “red” (Pheu Thai Party – PT) factions – are the main contenders in Thailand’s upcoming general elections, likely held in March 2026 or sooner.
The year 2025 saw several unexpected developments, such as the fall of populist PT as a major political force and the rise of conservative BJT, while progressive PP is still the most popular party among the public.
However, despite the return of democratic dynamism, it remains to be seen which of the three biggest parties can join hands to form a coalition government and come to
This is the very constitution that has time and time again been exploited to remove politicians and facilitate elite capture of key democratic institutions.
Uneasy Alliances
In August 2025, the Constitutional Court removed then prime minister Paetongtarn Shinawatra of PT from office after a controversy involving a leaked phone call with Cambodian strongman Hun Sen.
The power vacuum was filled by BJT leader Anutin Charnvirakul who succeeded her with the lower house’s majority support, enabled by a surprising new coalition between BJT and PP, albeit with certain conditions.
The surprising alliance came on the heels of the growing rift between PT and BJT over the legalisation of cannabi
All eyes are now on Anutin to keep his word to meet PP’s conditions that led them to support BJT in forming a majority government, outlined in a Memorandum of Agreement (MoA) to cement their new alliance.
The agreement includes resolutions to dissolve the Parliament by 31 January, organise general elections, conduct a referendum to set up a constitution-drafting assembly for a new charter and remain a minority government. All these must be completed within a four-month timeframe, with PP remaining as opposition all the while.
However, recent moves by the blue party suggest that they are prepping to consolidate power and win the election at the expense of genuinely reforming Thailand’s democratic system.
Constitutional Tussles
Charter change is undeniably one of the main contentious points today that is needed to level out the democratic playing field.
Under the current constitution, one of the main difficulties for elected politicians to assume power lies with the upper house. Consisting of 200 interim unelected senators, the Senate can block prime minister candidates as well as pick and choose elites for unelected agencies – including the Election Commission (EC) and the Constitutional Court that have frequently intervened in political disputes – mandated the dissolution of political parties and paved the way for military coups.
PP’s predecessor, Move Forward, won the last election but was blocked from assuming power under current constitutional provisions. Thus, constitutional amendment has become PP’s flagship issue. Other parties appear not as committed; they are less interested in democratic change and more geared towards preserving the status quo, winning the election, and gaining power.
In September 2025, the Constitutional Court ruled that three referendums are required for charter change, but the public is not allowed to elect a Constituent Drafting Assembly. PP is racing to finalise their draft bill that focuses on expanding public participation as much as possible by the end of this year, which would enable them to gain popularity as the party that prioritises democratic reforms.
The Meteoric Rise of the Blue
Anutin and BJT’s true agenda seems not on furthering charter change but on laying the groundwork to lead BJT to electoral victory. Consider this: in open violation of the MoA, BJT continues to poach parliamentarians and support from smaller parties.
Anutin’s background also casts doubt over his commitment to democratic change. The rise of Anutin, a former president of Sino-Thai – one of Thailand’s largest construction conglomerates – is in large part thanks to his shrewd cultivation of close ties with military, bureaucratic and business elites over decades. His connections and associates now populate the Senate and hold key ministerial positions; he also acts as their proxy in Thai politics while advancing his party’s interests. He has kept the powerful Minister of Interior portfolio for himself to oversee provincial administration and voting in key constituencies, such as Northeastern Thailand.
Having served in the military-aligned administration of Gen Prayut Chan-o-cha as well as that of PT-led ruling coalitions of his immediate predecessors, Anutin has taken a direct leaf out of PT’s past playbook in befriending parties of all ideological persuasions. He does this by doling out favours to local politicians in key constituencies, which enabled him to seamlessly seize the opportunity for power.
On the economic side, the Anutin administration is implementing “Quick Big Wins”—populist policies such as tax relief and stimulus programmes for consumer goods. It has also conducted a flurry of free trade negotiation talks with several large economies that have temporarily curried favour with the business community and public. However, thus far, it has failed to address structural economic reforms that could meaningfully jumpstart Thailand’s sluggish economy, which has one of ASEAN’s lowest GDP growth rates at 1.8%.
The Thai-Cambodia border conflict has shed light on the alleged links of elites on both sides to illicit border activities, including cyber-scam and money laundering operations. Curiously, however, despite mounting domestic and international pressure, the Anutin administration appears to be dragging its feet in proactively safeguarding the integrity of Thailand’s financial system and investigating numerous Thais and foreigners residing in Thailand allegedly linked to this widening ring of criminality.
His deputy finance minister already resigned over allegations of his connection to money laundering practices. If not tackled seriously, more scam-related scandals could prompt an overthrowing of the government and inflict serious damage to Thailand’s political and economic credibility.
Anutin is also seen as pandering to nationalist sentiments to keep ultra-nationalist politicians on his side by playing the role of the strongman who will not “yield a single centimetre” to Cambodia. He has also deferred to the army for border management decisions in northeastern provinces along the Thai-Cambodian border, which are all BJT strongholds.
However, there exists some distrust of Anutin’s cosy dealings with the military – the latter is seen as interfering in civilian politics once more – as well as his clumsy diplomacy with President Donald Trump, who raised the stakes for both sides to comply with the US-supported Kuala Lumpur Peace Accord in return for favourable negotiations o
PP’s Fight for Office
Public support for progressivism appears to be unwavering despite the MoA with BJT and numerous attempts to cripple the progressive movement, including the dissolution of Move Forward and the banning of key party leaders – such as Pita Limjaroenrat – from politics for 10 years.
PP continues to maintain popularity by fielding a plethora of young, magnetic and informed members of parliament and portraying themselves as a clean, reform-minded party under the slogan “Thailand ungrey, equal and future-ready”. The “grey” term refers to capital funding from illicit activities that is embroiling other parties in scandal.
PP have abandoned Move Forward’s key policy platforms, such as pledges to reform the military, break up business monopolies and reform Article 112 of the Thai Penal Code (lese-majeste law). The party is now prioritising political practicality over values by putting these sensitive issues on the backburner while they forge an alliance with BJT and continue talks with PT on keeping the government accountable.
Is PT Declining?
Despite winning the second most votes in the last election, PT’s popularity has steeply declined since then due to a series of mishaps from overplaying their hand and overestimating the sincerity of conservative factions.
Supporters view that PT abandoned their democratic credentials by joining the conservative coalition government after the 2023 election—something they explicitly promised not to do during their election campaign. An alleged informal deal made between the Shinawatra clan and the elite establishment to pave the way for PT to govern once more also appears to have allowed the return of former leader Thaksin to his homeland after a 15-year self-imposed exile. This further alienated the public that increasingly rejects secret deals among el
However, this deal appears to have broken down, as Thaksin, one of Thailand’s richest and most powerful men, is now serving a one-year imprisonment sentence. Meanwhile, the short-lived Srettha and Paetongtarn administrations failed to deliver outstanding policy achievements and significant democratic reforms during their terms.
To cap off a disastrous year in power, Paetongtarn resigned in disgrace after nationalist-leaning elites and the public were extremely displeased with her leaked phone call with the former Cambodian leader. The severe backlash from across the political spectrum and the public demonstrates a red line that cannot be crossed regarding strong nationalist sentiment but also the renewed respect and trust towards the military in safeguarding national security.
Nonetheless, even as the family brand lost its widespread appeal and the party is now headed by a non-Shinawatra, PT has demon
Rocky Road Ahead
The dynamic competition between the three big parties and the spirited public debate indicate the positive return of a freewheeling democratic and policy discourse that has largely been missing during the rule of previous military-aligned governments.
Each party is utilising the constitutional drafting process as a tool to pressure their rivals and gain political legitimacy to win over the public. As the election and referendums are slated to be organised simultaneously on 29 March, Anutin and EC must declare the constitutional referendums by December 2025.
Both PP and PT are urgently ramping up the pressure on Anutin to finalise the constitutional amendment draft bill by this year; otherwise, they will trigger a no-confidence motion against the government when the new parliamentary session opens on 12 December. Anutin may boldly take advantage of BJT’s growing popularity by dissolving Parliament within this year in order to move forward the election date and avoid scrutiny over corruption and influencing. This would nullify the current constitutional amendment process, which would need to be restarted and represent a significant setback for recalibrating Thailand’s political landscape.
None of the three parties seem capable of a landslide victory in the next election and will need to team up with one or the other for enough seats to form a coalition government. PT and PP are both kingmakers, but PP could be left out in the cold and out of office again if PT or BJT decide to put aside their differences and team up once again. Given the flexible nature of PT and BJT in forming and breaking alliances, as well as the continuous attempts to block the success of the progressive faction, this scenario cannot be discounted.
The political battles are happening amidst a backdrop of an increasingly frustrated public who are discontent with the lack of effectiveness and political will to tackle immediate challenges, such as economic doldrums, ballooning corruption cases and the prolonged border conflict, as well as recent mismanagement of severe flooding in Southern Thailand.
With few outlets left to express public frustration, large-scale protests, such as the youth-led 2020-2021 demonstrations that saw unprecedented
