Bordered by History: Tension in the Thailand-Myanmar Frontier (Part II)

Introduction

A 30-minute walk from the glamour and glittering of Ban Rak Thai village is a quiet border crossing that divides Thailand from a nameless checkpoint. It is manned by a lone soldier from the Wa National Army (WNA), a small outfit that came into being in 1973 under the leadership of Maha Sang, the son of Sao Maha, the saohpa of Vingngun, a region in Shan State just north of Panghsang.

They sided with the Chinese Nationalist Party (Kuomintang – KMT) against the China-backed Communist Party of Burma (CPB) back in the day. Like other warlords, Maha Sang survived the rugged Golden Triangle through deals and alliances with militia groups and their warlords.

His ailing brother, Maha Ja, took over Khun Sa’s Hua Muang stronghold immediately after his surrender and assumed the role of the town’s mayor with his own militia that functioned more like his personal security details.

Following the death of Maha Sang in 2007, the WNA placed itself under the United Wa State Army (UWSA) command and control. The group was permitted to keep their flag and uniform, as Thai authorities along the border are much more comfortable dealing with the WNA.

There are just too many his

tories with the UWSA, a senior Thai Army officer on the border said.

Thorny Relations

The UWSA and the Myanmar government established a ceasefire in 1989, but this was a far cry from a peace treaty. Thus, getting Myanmar to “talk sense” to get the UWSA to pull back – so that the Thai Prime Minister Paetongtarn Shinawatra does not have to look weak and bad in the eyes of the critics – is still a pipe dream.

In fact, said sources on the border, the Myanmar junta wants Thailand to “teach the Wa a lesson.” Myanmar’s State Admin

istration Council (SAC) could not do it, as it would open a new can of worms that the Tatmadaw may not be able to handle.

A Thai think tank Center for Strategic Policy presented its report “Myanmar and Thailand: Strategic Pathways to Regional Peace and Stability” at a December 2024 seminar. Author Supalak Ganjanakhundee said Thailand should not rule out the idea of strengthening cooperation with the UWSA as well as other ethnic groups on cross-border management that could facilitate trade, movement of people and humanitarian responses.

The question is this: why does Thailand want to be seen courting the UWSA?

Like any other organisations, the UWSA wants acceptance and recognition. Having demonised the group over the years, presenting the Wa as a trusted partner of the Thai government will not be an easy sell. The two sides have had several rounds of face-to-face talks between unit commanders on the ground, but these were not negotiations, as the Thai side did not go there with anything to offer.

Ethnic armed organisations along the Thai border are similarly disturbed by the UWSA southward expansion. These include the Shan State Army-South, the Karen National Union, the Karenni National Progressive Party, the Karen National Army and the Kawtoolei Army. Wa flags have been planted at locations where the Three Brotherhood Alliance scored victory.

Chinese Presence

The UWSA is presenting itself as a “peacekeeping force” in places like Lashio, the largest town in northern Shan State that was captured by the Three Brotherhood Alliance in late June 2024. This current role and newly conquered territories left open the question of what exactly constitutes a Wa state.

Moreover, will this arrangement become permanent and serve as a link between the UWSA in the north on the Chinese border and its southern command on the Thai border?

The UWSA and Chinese officials have always insisted that their relationship is more nuanced and based on mutual interest and respect. Thai security planners, on the other hand, are concerned that the Thailand-Myanmar border could fall under China’s sphere of influence.

Beside the UW

SA, Thai authorities are not comfortable with the presence of Chinese law enforcement officers poking around the Tak province and the adjacent areas. These are where militia-protected cyber scam centres operate freely in Myawaddy Township, opposite from the Mae Sot district.

In early 2024, dozens of Chinese police operated out of a resort that they had rented out for months. Royal Thai Police HQ in Bangkok instructed local officers to assist their Chinese counterparts to make their stay worthwhile.

Credit: Tha Lahu National Development Organisation/The Nation

But there was no sharing of intel. The Chinese police handled the investigation all by themselves, including their engagement with the Chinese crime syndicates behind the scam centres in and around the Myawaddy border town, adjacent to Mae Sot.

Things heated up in early February 2025 during the visit of Vice Minister Liu Zhongyi to Thailand. Pressured by China to do something, the government ordered a power cut to several towns on the Myanmar side of the border, including areas where the scam centres were operating.

Similar actions were taken two years ago, but the scam centres made up for it with powerful generators and a Starlink Internet connection.

Falling in Line

This time around, however, sensing that the Thais were serious, Colonel Chit Thu, leader of the 7,000-strong Karen National Army (KNA), the outfit that protects sizeable Chinese crime syndicates in his area, began to make moves. Starting with the press conference on 17 February 2025, he conveyed to Thai journalists that “We will take responsibility for clearing out the call centers in KK Park, Myawaddy, and Shwe Kokko and will send all foreign nationals to Myawaddy.”

“It is then the responsibility of the Myanmar police, as the Naypyidaw central government has sent officers to handle the cases. From the tripartite meeting, each country will

take their people back, but how they return, I don’t know,” said Chit Thu.

He added that he was disappointed that

some Thai lawmakers were calling for a warrant for his arrest, insisting that he had not broken any law. A number of Western countries beg to differ.

A much smaller outfit, the Democratic Karen Benevolent Army (DKBA), responded to Thailand’s request and set a 28 February 2025 deadline for all Chinese scam operators to leave Phayatongsu. This is a DKBA-controlled area (about 133 miles south of Myawaddy) opposite the Three Pagoda Pass of Thailand’s Kanchanaburi province.

On 13 February 2025, the DKBA sent 260 people of various nationalities over the border to Chong Kaeb subdistrict, 76 km south of Mae Sot. The group said another 400 of mostly Africans and South Asians were stranded with them, waiting to be sent to the Thai side of the border where they could link up with diplomats of their respective countries.

“It’s obvious that the DKBA wants to be seen as being helpful to Thailand as they depend so much on us for their survival,” said a Thai police officer with working relations with this Karen outfit.

The DKBA controlled an area opposite from the Chong Kaeb subdistrict where several casinos had been operating until Chinese scam centres moved

in this past year. Obviously, however, the DKBA weighed the two options – income from the Chinese scam centres vs a long-standing relationship with Thailand – and the latter made more sense for the outfit’s survivability. The KNA’s Chit Thu, on the other hand, is still holding out, weighing his next move carefully. If the history of this rugged region tells us anything, it is that the leaders and warlords of the Golden Triangle know how to compromise if the conditions and situations are right. They may not rush to the negotiation table, as seen by Panghsang not being too eager to resolve the border dispute with Thailand. Yet it does not mean they are unwilling to make compromises.