Muhammadiyah in the Era of Postmodernism
Indonesia’s Muhammadiyah was founded in 1912 on the principles of Islamic modernity and the purification of Islam. It came about as a form of resistance against the Dutch colonisation as well as the takhayul (superstition), bid’ah (innovation) and khurofat (fabricated claims) phenomena among the Muslim population, amusingly referred to as TBC in Indonesian colloquialism.
Naturally, Muhammadiyah has garnered a lot of support and members, becoming one of the country’s largest civil society organisations (CSO).
However, a survey conducted in 2023 showed that the number of people identifying with Muhammadiyah has decreased drastically. The same survey conducted in 2005 showed that 9.4% of those polled claimed to be affiliated with the organisation, but this figure dropped to 7.8% in 2014 and later to 5.7% in 2023.
On the other hand, Nahdlatul Ulama, Indonesia’s largest civil society organisation (CSO), saw its members increase from 27.5% in 2005 to 56.9% in 2023 among those polled.
This piece attempts to explain Muhammadiyah’s decline by highlighting issues impacting the organisation’s two principles.
Not So Modern?
Muhammadiyah’s long-standing pillar of Islamic modernity is increasingly out of sync with Indonesia’s current intellectual and socio-religious climate. Once appealing to educated Muslims in the pre-Reformasi era for its rational and text-based approach, Muhammadiyah’s modernist framework now faces growing critique from postmodernist and postcolonial thought, which exposes modernity’s Western-centric and exclusionary assumptions—especially in the Global South.
This shift has reshaped Islamic discourse globally, with Islamic modernism and Islamism giving way to post-Islamism—a discourse emphasising pluralism, reflexivity and individual rights.
In Indonesia, this trend has elevated Nahdlatul Ulama (NU), once seen as traditionalist but now an intellectually agile organisation capable of navigating postmodern issues. Under Abdurrahman Wahid, the group’s top cleric and former Indonesian president, many Nahdlatul Ulama youths studied in the West and returned with critical mindsets – ones informed by feminist hermeneutics, deconstruction and postcolonial theory – that now shape dominant Islamic discourses, from gender to environmental justice.
Meanwhile, Muhammadiyah remains anchored to an earlier rationalist-modernist paradigm that struggles to inspire newer generations. Despite its institutional strength in education and healthcare, its ideological relevance is fading.
The rise of post-Islamist and post-traditionalist frameworks has also opened the door for other actors to lead in shaping Indonesia’s evolving religious landscape, further marginalising Muhammadiyah’s position.
On the grassroots level, the people have struggled to comprehend Muhammadiyah’s commitment to modernity due to some of its tendencies to approach complex issues from a unidimensional perspective.
A good case in point is previous debacles regarding Muhammadiyah’s stance on cigarettes and mineral water, emblematic of the organisation’s debatable stance.
Many Muhammadiyah followers are business owners operating sundry and grocery shops, where cigarettes and bottled mineral water are sold freely. Many Indonesians are smokers, and being a tropical country, the population always gravitates to purchasing bottled mineral water whenever the temperature gets unbearable. This means Muhammadiyah-affiliated shop owners rack up lots of profit from sales of cigarettes and bottled mineral water.
However, Muhammadiyah’s fatwas on these two items seemingly ignore the economic realities of its members. In 2010, Muhammadiyah issued a fatwa declaring cigarettes haram, calling them unhealthy and wasteful. Such a fatwa dismisses the economic dependence of tobacco and clove farmers, factory workers and distributors on this particular commodity.
The fatwa induced a feeling of conflict among smoking Muhammadiyah followers, making them question not only the fatwa but also the organisation. Even long-time Muhammadiyah cadres have ignored this fatwa and continued to smoke, thus complicating their relationship with the organisation.
Meanwhile, in 2014, Muhammadiyah’s former chairman Din Syamsudin seemingly opposed what he called the monopolistic exploitation of water sources by foreign companies, which produce bottled mineral water in Indonesia. Din even pushed the organisation to declare it haram as well.
Unfortunately, such a drastic action would negatively impact thousands or even millions of individuals as well as businesses that are part of the commodity’s ecosystem. To roadside sellers and stalls, it does not matter whether the product is produced by foreign or local companies as long as they can put food on the table.
If such a fatwa was issued, it would place business owners, sellers and consumers alike, including Muhammadiyah followers, on a delicate surface, as selling and consuming bottled mineral water would be considered a sin.
These two episodes show that while Muhammadiyah promotes the principle of modernity, it has also engaged in debacles that question not only the depth of its understanding of the concept but also the intellectual roots that underpin its claim of modernity. As a result, Muhammadiyah followers and the public alike are left uncertain regarding their views towards the organisation.
Lack of Drive
Secondly, Muhammadiyah’s drive to purify Islam, especially from the aforementioned TBC, has also faced hurdles on multiple fronts.
Muhammadiyah’s recent efforts in thishave moderated and no longer become the main focus of their campaign. It has now switched focus to social services by managing social institutions and subsidiaries such as hospitals, schools, universities, orphanages, waqf (charity) institutions, and others.
This signals a shift in Muhammadiyah’s worldview. Muhammadiyah still does not propagate Islamic branches of worship (furu’iyah) that are considered part of TBC, but neither does it openly challenge traditionalist Islamic groups that continue to practice it. Among the practices that Muhammadiyah disregard are qunut prayer, tahlil, tawasul, maulid, barzanji and tabarruk.
Today, the grouping has even decided to live side-by-side with all Islamic sects and communities in the country and has even avoided labelling TBC practitioners as heretics.
Furthermore, and because of this, transnational Islamic movements have passionately taken over the driver’s seat in purifying Indonesia’s Islam. These are mass organisations that originate from outside the country but have found a solid following among some quarters of Indonesians, such as Wahhabi, Ikhwanul Muslimin (Muslim Brotherhood), Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (HTI) and Salafi-jihadi groups (including Al-Qaeda and ISIS).
Muhammadiyah shares its Sunni Islamic theology and a focus to challenge TBC with these transnational groups. However, due to Muhammadiyah’s waning drive to champion the purification of Islam in Indonesia, these groups are afforded the space and opportunity to spread their teachings and influence among Indonesian Muslims. This subject will be further explored in the next section.
Drowning Influence
Meanwhile, transnational Islamic groups have been opposing the practice of TBC with a fervour, carrying out criticism through their social media and study circles. From my interaction with Muhammadiyah supporters, such enthusiasm has even appealed to them, who sense a growing distance with their organisation due to the latter’s lack of drive in purifying Indonesia’s Islam.
While Muhammadiyah used to dominate this agenda, transnational Islamic groups have become the main face of the campaign, thus diminishing Muhammadiyah’s appeal to the general public.
It could also be argued that these groups have a stronger claim to be the champions of this agenda. Thanks to their origins in the Middle East, their brand of Islam is perceived to be purer, more authentic and more militant. Compared to this, Muhammadiyah’s teachings have been adjusted to suit the social conditions in Indonesia; thus, its “authenticity” claim is not as strong as these groups’.
All of this is compounded by the fact that the transnational Islamic group is supported by petrodollar funds from the Middle East. Funded by countries such as Saudi Arabia and Qatar, as well as by like-minded sympathisers spread across the region, these movements were able to expand rapidly due to substantial financial backing. This is even with Saudi Arabia’s less enthusiastic stance on financing the global spread of Wahhabism in recent years.
In addition, their activists were nurtured through scholarship offers to study in Middle Eastern countries, an incentive that attracted many to join transnational Islamic groups. Indeed, no ideology can grow swiftly without sufficient funding and a robust support network.
The growing prominence of these groups spells more trouble for Muhammadiyah than for Nahdlatul Ulama.
The latter has sharp differences with these groups in the domain of Islamic laws and practice, which means its masses would be more likely to reject the groups’ teachings. Conversely, the former, as mentioned above, shares its theological roots with these groups, making it easier for preachers of these groups to relate to the followers of Muhammadiyah.
This has induced some to stage resistance, however. Concerns have been raised that Muhammadiyah mosques are being taken over by transnational Islamic groups. This message was also amplified by Zulkifli Hasan, chairman of Partai Amanat Nasional (PAN), which is affiliated with Muhammadiyah, thus magnifying the opposition of Muhammadiyah followers against these groups.
Indonesian or Muhammadiyah Holidays?
Muhammadiyah’s declining number of followers could also be partly attributed to its frequent disagreement with the government regarding the determination of holy periods such as Ei
Uniquely, Muhammadiyah does not share this discrepancy with other major Islamic groups in the country. It is the only one that strictly uses the hisab method (calendar calculations) to determine the dates of Ramadhan and the two holy days.
The government, Nahdlatul Ulama and various Muslim groups from across the spectrum – including Persatuan Islam (Islamic Union – Persis), Al-Irsyad, Indonesia Institute of Islamic Dawah (LDII), Wahhabi, Muslim Brotherhood and Hizbut Tahrir – as well as the Shia and Ahmadiyya communities, adopt both hisab and rukyat (astronomical observation of the crescent moon).
This divergence has not only caused a degree of confusion among the general Muslim population but also Muhammadiyah followers themselves, some of whom are working as civil servants who must adhere to the government’s calendar and decisions.
Meanwhile, nominal Muslims who are not familiar with the hisab vs rukyat debate would only perceive Muhammadiyah through a strange lens, treating the organisation with apprehension and wariness.
Ground Realities
Last but not least, Muhammadiyah has also had issues with cadre formation.
Despite its wide network of schools and universities, it is a fallacy to assume that the alumni of these institutions would automatically form Muhammadiyah’s core following.
Such an assumption has been challenged before; some graduates do not become members of the grouping, while others cross over and join Nahdlatul Ulama.
Some university students of Muhammadiyah families, as well as those who graduate from Muhammadiyah high schools, also join their university’s Lembaga Dakwah Kampus (Campus Dakwah Institute), whose murobbi (mentors) are oftentimes Muslim Brotherhood cadres.
This means that those students are more likely to be exposed to the Muslim Brotherhood teachings, and the shared theological roots between Muhammadiyah and the Muslim Brotherhood, as mentioned above, could facilitate this.
Muhammadiyah is also struggling in the digital space. In terms of preaching through social media, its efforts are not as sophisticated as other Islamic organisations. While Nahdlatul Ulama and transnational Islamic organisations have a lot of popular online preachers, Muhammadiyah has only one: Ustadz Adi Hidayat.
Some self-criticisms have been expressed regarding the inability of Muhammadiyah preachers to deliver lively and engaging preaching online, many of whom prefer to engage in formalistic seminars or write inaccessible scientific papers.
Conclusion
Muhammadiyah remains on
However, this long-established institutional strength may have also bred a degree of complacency.
Despite its expansive infrastructure, Muhammadiyah appears to be losing relevance – especially among younger generations and the urban Muslim middle class – who are increasingly drawn to discourses and platforms that are more reflexive, context-sensitive, and digitally savvy.
This declining influence is not merely the result of external competition or changing tastes, but also of internal stagnation. Muhammadiyah’s attachment to an early 20th-century vision of Islamic modernity has made it less adaptable to postmodern and post-Islamist currents shaping contemporary Muslim thought.
As shown in the rise of Nahdlatul Ulama’s post-traditionalist thinkers and the growing appeal of transnational Islamist groups, the discursive terrain has shifted. While Muhammadiyah continues to uphold rationalism and scriptural purism, these are increasingly perceived as rigid and disconnected from the lived realities of modern Indonesian Muslims.
Moreover, Muhammadiyah’s responses to moral and economic issues – such as its fatwas on cigarettes and bottled water – have highlighted a lack of sensitivity to grassroots socioeconomic realities. Its disconnection from the digital culture, limited cadre regeneration and diminishing public intellectual presence have also contributed to the erosion of its symbolic capital in the national discourse.
To regain its footing, Muhammadiyah must not only rejuvenate its digital presence and communication strategy but also critically re-evaluate its epistemological foundations. This may involve engaging more deeply with pluralist, contextual and interdisciplinary approaches to Islamic thought without losing its reformist spirit. Only by doing so can Muhammadiyah remain relevant as both a moral force and a strategic actor in Indonesia’s ever-evolving religious and sociopolitical landscape.
