Background

The return of Donald Trump to the White House may cause new tensions geopolitically, which will not spare Southeast Asia.

Indonesia has also been under the spotlight since Prabowo Subianto took over the reins as Indonesia’s president. As the biggest democracy in the region, the country aspires to become a significant power in Asia.

Nevertheless, it faces a complex, crucial challenge with regards to how and what strategy Prabowo’s foreign policy will adopt to navigate the competition between China and the United States.

Indeed, Prabowo may likely contrast former President Joko “Jokowi” Widodo’s more passive approach to foreign policy. Prabowo seems determined to consolidate Indonesia’s place on the global stage and solidify its role as an emerging power in the region.

Such a vision will encourage Prabowo to focus on national security, e.g., Indonesia’s role in the South China Sea as well as China’s activity vis-à-vis the Taiwan question.

Nevertheless, Indonesia’s economic dependence on China imposes crucial constraints that Prabowo will need help to manage.

Trump’s return means that the US administration may pursue policies that erode Prabowo’s ability to keep Indonesia neutral within the parameters of its bebas (free) and aktif (active) foreign policy. This may eventually press Prabowo to make that hard choice between closer alignment with the United States or China.

Dynamic Engagement

Prabowo’s foreign policy views have shown signs of dynamic engagement with the two superpowers. Prabowo visited China in the second week of November 2024, where he met with President Xi Jinping and signed MoUs on cooperation in multiple sectors, particularly infrastructure, trade, and energy.

A key takeaway of the visit was the promise of increased investment in the blue economy. The agreement will not only regulate the role of fishing vessels but also the production and sale of marine products. Perhaps more importantly, the visit concluded with a commitment by China to support Prabowo’s free meal program, a key point in his campaign.

These are positive signals denoting Indonesia’s intent to maintain good relations with China despite growing regional tensions.

His second strategic destination of balanced engagement was the United States. The trip was an opportunity to recalibrate Indonesia’s position with the United States and explore future possibilities for economic and security cooperation with Washington.

Indeed, the visit facilitated Indonesia’s attempt at diversifying its economic portfolio, potentially inviting US investors to participate in sectors such as semiconductors and technology. The response was also positive; President Biden declared the importance of Indonesia and establishing new collaborations.

Nevertheless, how Trump will engage with Indonesia is another question. Politically, Prabowo’s move to open a dialogue with both superpowers separately shows his attempt at keeping a more politically-friendly approach in exercising the bebas dan aktif foreign policy.

In larger context, Jakarta has given signals that it is also open to breaking free from the United States’ economic influence. Through his foreign minister, Prabowo has indicated Indonesia’s interest in becoming a member of BRICS, a move that signifies his willingness to be somewhat independent from the Western-centric global order.

Specifically, the outcomes of both trips indicate that Prabowo is sidestepping the pressure to closely align with either of the two, as well as assuming a nuanced neutrality to maximize Indonesia’s geopolitical flexibility.

Running Up That Hill

Indonesia has based its philosophy of non-alignment on a vision that mirrored the political conception of Mohammad Hatta. Historically, one can see how this vision manifested clearly during the presidency of Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, with his “one million friends and zero enemies” foreign policy.

However, maintaining neutrality will become more intricate today. That is because, after Trump’s victory, his administration may step up pressure on Southeast Asian nations to align with Washington’s China containment strategy, seeking not only greater economic cooperation but also military support.

From a geopolitical perspective, developments in the South China Sea increase the complexity of maintaining a neutral position. The geopolitical tension stems from China’s attempt to expand its military influence across the zone, which includes areas of territory disputed by other countries like the Philippines. Indonesia, which claims an exclusive economic zone in the South China Sea, is particularly vulnerable to Chinese incursions.

A recent furore erupted when Prabowo, during his visit to China, seemingly agreed to China’s interpretation of the nine-dash line, a move that landed him as a subject of criticism over alleged foreign policy inexperience. While this has continued to put certain quaters on edge, it has also been interpreted as a step to managing the tension with China.

For Prabowo, therefore, the challenge will be in finding a balance between national security and the economic benefits of partnering with Beijing.

Yet this will be an increasingly uphill task in the near future. Trump’s administration may compel Prabowo to put pressure on China, potentially jeopardizing Indonesia’s own relations with the Middle Kingdom.

On the other hand, Indonesia cannot do this easily; China is arguably Indonesia’s most essential economic partner. Indeed, it can also be argued that this dependence on China may have become a potential vulnerability for Indonesia.

The Taiwan Question

Another critical issue that needs further examination is Taiwan, with which Indonesia has recently increased diplomatic engagement. This move could exacerbate tensions between Washington and Beijing, with the former putting pressure on Jakarta to take a more pro-stability stance in the Taiwan Straits.

In addition, Taiwan is strategically important for Indonesia. It is also home to a large Indonesian community, the second largest destination after Malaysia for its migrant workers. Indonesians number around 300,000 in Taiwan today.

Interestingly, the last presidential election saw almost 70% of Indonesian workers vote for Prabowo, driven by promises of reforms that would increase their protection as migrant workers.

Moreover, Indonesia is also a gem from the perspective of Taiwan’s. Indonesia is of its target countries for the New Southbound Policy, which sees Indonesia playing a vital role.

While closer relationship between the two is much desired by both sides, it might invite consternation from Beijing.

It remains to be seen if the Taiwan question could destabilize Indonesia’s relationship with China. One thing is certain: Prabowo needs to navigate this potential landmine tactfully.

Conclusion

Probowo has seen the rise of polarization in the international context and how foreign policy decisions could directly affect internal stability. He also understands that his political legitimacy is rooted in economic stability and the perception that Indonesia can prosper without outside interference.

A too-direct alliance with one of the two superpowers could disrupt the balance in Indonesia’s policy of non-interference. However, more studies should be undertaken to investigate how the public would perceive such a move by Prabowo’s administration. Finally, Trump’s return to the White House could also force Prabowo to make decisions that are unpopular with Indonesians. Yet, if the strategy is based on political autonomy and directed towards all without enemies, Indonesia could emerge as a new international player with Prabowo as a critical regional leader.

Part of an ongoing article series on the impact of the Middle East conflict on Southeast Asia.

Overview

Three things drive Malaysia’s policies on the Middle East: trade and investment, the calibration of Malaysia’s position in Global South leadership, and support for the Palestinian cause.

This article will provide an overview of Malaysia’s relations with the Middle East, the ongoing war in the region as well as how it has impacted Malaysia.

Malaysia’s historical connections to the Middle East began with maritime trade and the transmission of Islamic faith and learning, which heralded people-to-people relations, especially with Egypt and Saudi Arabia.

Today, Malaysia’s foreign policy places much emphasis on the country being an open trading nation, with efforts to expand trade with Persian Gulf nations under way.

Diplomatically, Putrajaya is friendly with these Middle Eastern states, including Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Qatar and Iran. In 2023, Malaysia welcomed the Arab League’s readmission of Syria, reopened its embassy in Baghdad after a two-decade closure and established a defence attaché office for its diplomatic mission in Cairo.

Malaysia also enjoys cordial relations with both the Palestinian Authority (PA) and Hamas. It has refused to forge diplomatic relations with Israel and advocated for Palestinian self-determination.

Putrajaya’s concern, above all, is to halt bloodshed and support efforts to rebuild war-torn countries in the Middle East while advancing trade and investment initiatives with the region. Since 2007, the Malaysian Armed Forces (MAF) has deployed a battalion to United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL)’s peacekeeping mission in South Lebanon.

After withdrawing troops from the Riyadh coalition in Yemen in 2018, Malaysia retained her commitment to restoring peace in Yemen by participating in the United Nations Mission to Support the Hudaydah Agreement (UNMHA).

Despite supporting Arab governments’ reengagement with Bashar Al-Asad, Malaysia has not reopened its embassy in Damascus, instead emphasizing the need to rehabilitate life for Syrians.

The 7 October attack did not change Malaysia’s policies on the Middle East. Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim has been maintaining Putrajaya’s support for a ceasefire in Gaza and an end to Israeli occupation and Palestinian statehood in no uncertain terms.

Accepting Malaysia’s lack of clout over Israel and its most powerful ally, the United States, the prime minister has embarked on a course of unrelenting diplomatic advocacy for Palestine.

Putrajaya’s position in the periphery of Arab-Muslim political leadership somewhat limits its stances to responding, as opposed to making far-reaching unilateral decisions, in the context of geopolitical and military developments in the region.

Mindful of this reality, it is instrumental to outline the factors that facilitate either stabilization or conflict in the region, which consequently guide Malaysia’s stances.

Where goes the Palestinian cause?

Following Yahya Sinwar’s death in combat with the Israeli army in Rafah, Israel pledged to continue Israel Defense Forces’ (IDF) offensive in Gaza for years to come. Their aim since declaring war is to replace Hamas rule with a government that is more pliable to Israeli occupation of the Palestinian territories.

Without a doubt, Israel has managed to reduce the Al-Qassam Brigades’ (Hamas’ military wing) operational capabilities and decapitate both its parent organization as well as Hezbollah.

Nevertheless, it would be foolish to believe that these movements will not reorganize and rebuild capacity for as long as there is reason to resist: the Israeli occupation.

Responding to Yemen’s Houthis announcing the fifth phase of their resistance campaign in solidarity with Gaza, Sinwar had assured them that “the resistance is well and in good stead, and is prepared for a long war of attrition”, while acknowledging that the people of Gaza are “positioned between suffering, famine and pain from the Nazi genocide and valiant resistance that has been led by Al-Qassam Brigade.”

With or without Sinwar, armed resistance will persist in the occupied territories.

The West Bank is not faring much better. In March 2022, Israel launched the brutal Operation Break the Wave to crush rising armed resistance in the West Bank. A year later, Israeli systematic demolitions and settler violence caused the highest number of displaced Palestinians in a single year since the UN’s Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) began recording demolitions in 2009. Before 7 October 2023, Israeli forces and settlers killed 243 West Bank Palestinians; in the subsequent 12 months, 728 were killed, mostly by Israeli security forces.

At the United Nations General Assembly, Mahmoud Abbas demanded for Palestinian Authority (PA) control of all Palestinian territories including Gaza and the Rafah crossing. Abbas’s insistence on a PA rule points to a persistent challenge in overcoming the division between Fatah and Hamas, despite both parties having signed a National Unity treaty with 12 other Palestinian factions in Beijing in June 2024.

It is unlikely for the  PA to gain political support and ascendancy in Gaza. A September 2024 poll reveals that while the majority of Gazans no longer believe that Hamas will win the war, Palestinians still overwhelmingly demand for Abbas’ resignation. Support for the two-state solution has risen in both territories. Most importantly, Israel does not want a Palestinian state.

Diplomatic efforts

Arab leaders are running on low patience and limited by their resolve to refrain from responding militarily. The vexation is shared equally by those who have relations with Israel – Egypt, Jordan, the UAE, Bahrain and Morocco – and those who do not.

Jordanian Minister of Foreign and Expatriate Affairs, Ayman Al-Safadi, delivered a trenchant summary of the Arab-Islamic Ministerial Committee’s readiness to guarantee Israel’s security upon fulfilling the condition of Palestinian statehood, followed by an indictment of Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s determination to wage war.

Remarkably, nothing Al-Safadi stated was news – these terms for peace were committed to in the Saudi-led 2002 Arab Peace Initiative – but it was a rare instance of public takedown by a frustrated diplomat.

For Saudi Arabia and countries that do not have relations with Israel, normalization is dangled as the prize for an end to the war, occupation and for the establishment of a Palestinian state. Alas, this is not a big enough incentive for Israel to call for a ceasefire—not when it has been waiting for a chance to conduct an intensive dismantling of Hamas and Hezbollah.

Amidst a calculated exchange of fire with Israel, Iran has been conducting a flurry of diplomacy with Arab neighbors. The Iranian Foreign Minister, Seyed Abbas Araghchi, met with Saudi Crown Prince Mohammad Bin Salman and Egyptian President Abdel Fattah El-Sisi.

He also visited Jordan, Lebanon, Türkiye, Iraq, Qatar and Oman in a tour that signals active engagement with neighboring countries to secure regional support against Israel, which is bent on destroying Iran’s military and nuclear capabilities.

On top of that, citing the absence of a reason to talk to Washington unless the current crisis is resolved, Tehran has halted indirect communication with the United States via Oman.

How has Malaysia been impacted so far?

To date, the Houthi attacks on ships in the Red Sea have a limited impact on Malaysian trade. Container rates have increased and there have been shipment delays, but intra-ASEAN and China trade – which take the top two spots above Southeast Asia-European Union trade – have kept Malaysia buoyed from the primary effects of shipping disruptions in the Red Sea.

As for developments in the wider region, Malaysia refuses to recognize unilateral US sanctions on Iran but is by no means insulated from its implications.

In 2019, Malaysia was pressured to close bank accounts belonging to Iranians, causing their number to drop from 200,000 to fewer than 10,000 in Malaysia. This is a real barrier to encouraging Iranian business in and visits to Malaysia, and realistically one that cannot be fixed by diplomatic persuasion.

Meanwhile, Malaysia has always been wary of Shia influence domestically, but there is no real political threat as Sunni Islam is still very much dominant.

Unlike Iraq, Syria and Lebanon, Malaysia – incontrovertibly anti-Shia in its institutions and laws – does not face the problem of militant Shiites, so Putrajaya can afford to compartmentalize the sectarian issue in their bilateral relations with Tehran.

Again, Malaysia has the luxury of distance – geographically and culturally. Put simply, Iran’s hard power and Shiite influence has no currency in this Southeast Asian nation. As long as Malaysia navigates this issue tactfully, it should be able to pursue wider relations with Iran in the future if it so wishes.

In South Lebanon, after a year of anticipating the expansion of Israeli military offensive into Lebanon, the MAF are prepared for any eventualities, including the last resort of unilaterally withdrawing its troops from the mission and evacuating from the country, which will be very costly. Ultimately, Malaysia is expected to follow UNIFIL’s decisions.

Tracking the flow of aid to Gaza and Palestinian refugees

One of the most tangible ways for a private citizen in Malaysia to help victims of war is by donating money and goods.

The government and various NGOs have mobilized fundraisers for Middle Eastern refugees for decades. Following Israel’s military offensive on Gaza, the government launched the Humanitarian Trust Fund for the People of Palestine (AAKRP) in the amount of RM10 million. The sum was channeled to the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) on 17 November 2023. In August this year, Malaysia contributed a further RM10 million to the agency.

However, transparency is an issue that needs to be underscored, considering the Israeli blockade of Gaza and Egypt’s control over the Rafah crossing have prevented aid delivery.

The Norwegian Refugee Council recently reported that 83% of food aid does not make it into Gaza. A dismal average of 69 aid trucks per day were allowed to enter Gaza in August 2024, compared to 500 per working day in 2023, which was already inadequate to meet the needs of Gaza residents.

The Malaysian government’s coordinated coalition of charities for Palestine, Ops Ihsan, has delivered three loads of aid cargo to El-Arish, Egypt by December 2023. This initiative has also kept up the delivery of food packs into Gaza while looking into the option of shipping aid from Port Klang to Egypt. The Foreign Ministry has kept the Parliament informed about the progress of these donations.

But how much of the goods sent actually reached the besieged residents of Gaza? Besides, how much have reached those who have managed to escape to Egypt but are struggling to pay for housing, food, medical treatment and education as refugees?

At the moment, initiatives and civil society are filling in the vacuum left by the Egyptian government, which does not recognize displaced Palestinians in Egypt as refugees in a bid to preserve Palestinian presence in and hold over occupied land.

Meanwhile, research on establishing a Charities Commission for Malaysia was recently presented to the Prime Minister’s Department (Law and Institutional Reform), following the cabinet’s decision to study regulation of the charities sector.

This initiative was born out of a concern of misuse of public and private funds as well as money laundering through charity work. Beyond this, however, the successful set up and enforcement of the Charities Commission should assist charities in tracking the flow of aid and informing the public about donation delivery mechanisms.

Having this additional instrument of oversight would also provide hard data that can better inform Malaysia’s diplomatic efforts to push for ending the obstruction of aid into Gaza, particularly considering Egypt and Israel’s blame-trading on this matter.

Nevertheless, this initiative has a long way to go still; the government would do well to supply timely updates on the progress of donation drives under its patronage.

Conclusion

Prior to 7 October 2023, the Middle Eastern states were tentatively but determinedly rebuilding political stability and regional diplomacy after more than a decade of the Arab Spring uprisings and the rifts between Riyadh, Cairo, Doha, and Tehran.

The war that Hamas invited on that day only served to highlight the deep cracks in the region that was not filled by the UAE and Bahrain’s bold sidestepping of the long-held Arab paradigm of no peace with Tel Aviv until Palestine is sovereign and free.

Hamas’ incursion into Israeli territory also prompted a new stage in Palestinian resistance against Israel, who, by the looks of it, is determined to take advantage of this moment to militarily incapacitate its nemeses at any cost, for as long as the international community will allow it to.

To rehash, Malaysia’s top concerns are threefold: addressing the Palestinian humanitarian catastrophe, pushing for Palestine’s liberation from Israel and bringing Israel to justice.

As it currently stands, however, Putrajaya can claim no sway over Tel Aviv or Washington nor the political and geographic influence of Arab rulers over Palestine.

Recognizing the failure of the post-World War II international order to ensure the rights of sovereign states and protect the dispossessed, Malaysia has turned its focus towards strengthening the South-South cooperation.

Distance has spared Malaysia from the brunt of the Middle Eastern refugee crisis that has been exacerbated by Israel’s offensive in Gaza and Lebanon. Even so, Malaysians have long been supporters of the Palestinian cause and are not strangers to donation drives for the displaced in the Middle East over the past decade.

Besides exercising its diplomatic capital in regional and multilateral forums, Malaysia must play to its strengths by optimizing its humanitarian efforts, supporting Palestinian agency, and contributing legal expertise as well as testimony towards the International Court of Justice’s cases against Israel’s war crimes.

At this juncture, international humanitarian efforts cannot outpace the rising casualties of Israel’s lethal rampage, while diplomatic efforts have repeatedly failed to pressure Israel into a ceasefire, let alone withdraw from the territories it has invaded. What remains for a middle power like Malaysia is to maximize sustainable aid for the victims of war, who will need assistance for every aspect of life for years, realistically decades, until they can return to their homes or gain permanent residence in another country, or until Israel ends its occupation and Palestine is finally free.

Part of an ongoing article series on the impact of the Middle East conflict on Southeast Asia.

Introduction

Under the presidency of Prabowo Subianto, Indonesia’s role in the Middle East conflict is expected to reach a new level of commitment. The administration has signaled a shift towards a more hands-on approach, potentially intensifying efforts on many levels.

The Middle East Crisis

The situation in the Middle East has nosedived to a catastrophic low. One estimate by late October 2024 shows that the probable number of killed victims stood close to 45,000, among which were some 3,200 Palestinian children. This sky-high figure includes 130 journalists as well as media personnel and more than 200 humanitarian aid workers.

The number may continue to increase as time passes. Those who have escaped the shelling may yet succumb to disease, starvation, or a sheer lack of medical care.

Compounding this crisis is the displacement of the entire population, the destruction of infrastructures including refugee shelters and hospitals, and the spread of famine as aid workers are prevented from delivering life-saving humanitarian assistance.

The situation urgently calls for a ceasefire that also involves the return of the remaining Israeli hostages, the release of a commensurate number of Palestinian prisoners, the resolution of the humanitarian crisis in Gaza and the kickstart of negotiations towards a sustainable peace in the region.

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has consistently resisted a series of efforts by countries pushing for a ceasefire, such as Qatar, Egypt and Israel’s closest allies – the United States and France. Key demands by these countries include a permanent ceasefire and the withdrawal of Israeli troops from the Gaza Strip, but both the Israeli and Palestinian sides have not made the negotiation process easier.

Even pressures by the United States on Israel have not netted much result, despite these amounting to basic demands such as a refrain from targeting civilians and a demand to address Gaza’s humanitarian crisis.

The conflict has also laid bare a flaw in the multilateral system, as sessions conducted and resolutions passed by the UN’s General Assembly as well as Security Council (UNSC) have only brought about baby steps towards resolving the ongoing crisis.

For example, Palestine’s bid in April 2024 for full membership in the UN was blocked by a US veto, although the resolution had majority support. To the international community, this was frustrating but not unusual. Since 1945, a total of 36 UNSC resolutions related to the Israel-Palestine conflict have been tabled; 34 of these have been vetoed by the United States, the other two by Russia and China.

The preferences and interests of veto power holders within the UNSC towards the conflict exemplify the imbalance of power within the system and hinder the process of getting a just decision.

What It Means to Indonesia

If the regional and global powers are unable to bring about a ceasefire, while the UNSC is paralyzed by the veto system, how can Indonesia realistically offer solutions to the crisis? Besides, what role does it play in this whole dynamic?

Indonesia has paid close attention to the situation in the Middle East since its own independence in 1945. A strong supporter of the Palestinian people’s plight for sovereignty and statehood, Indonesia was among the very first countries to recognize the Palestinian state in 1988, when the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) declared its establishment.

In relation to the ongoing crisis, Indonesia has undertaken some proactive steps.

When Israel intensified its military incursion into Gaza, Indonesia strongly expressed its concern at the devastation and suffering inflicted on the local population. Indonesia deplored the escalation of the conflict not only within the UN system but at every available international platform.

Before she left office in October 2024, former Foreign Minister Retno Marsudi denounced the failure of the UNSC to address Israel’s blatant violation of international law when its military attacked a United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) post.

Indonesia also came to the rescue when the United States, Australia, Austria and other countries instigated a financial crisis inside the United Nations Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA) earlier this year by withholding their funding. In response, Indonesia tripled its contribution to the agency, reaching a total of US$1.2 million.

Indonesians are also closely following developments in the Middle East. Around 88% of respondents surveyed in 2021 knew and kept themselves informed about the Israel-Palestine conflict. When the war broke out in October last year, some two million Indonesians took to the streets to stage a big protest against Israel. However, as indicated by Hasbi Aswar in a previous article in this series, this show of solidarity appears to be waning lately.

Prabowo’s Likely Approach

The newly-minted President Prabowo Subianto is expected to be a “foreign policy president”, in contrast to his predecessor who adopted a laid-back approach in pursuing this area.

Former President Joko “Jokowi” Widodo was widely criticized for his inward-looking worldview, which greatly diminished Indonesia’s presence on the global stage and muted what could have been a stronger Indonesian voice on not only the Israel-Palestine conflict but also other pressing global affairs.

There is a possibility that Prabowo would reverse this. Even during his presidential campaign, Prabowo already emphasized that he would take center stage in asserting and promoting Indonesia’s foreign policy. He has stressed that his support for Palestinian sovereignty is ironclad and pledged to open an embassy in Palestine.

Even during his stint as defense minister, he granted scholarships to 22 Palestinian students to study at the Defense University of the Republic of Indonesia. During this period, Prabowo had also applied minor pressure on Jokowi regarding the Gaza situation, such as during an international conference in Jordan and the IISS Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore. On both occasions, Prabowo affirmed Indonesia’s commitment to support, contribute to and facilitate all efforts towards a two-state solution, while announcing Indonesia’s readiness to extend more aid to Palestine.

In his first presidential speech, Prabowo repeated this very point and highlighted Indonesia’s efforts on Gaza during Jokowi’s term, stressing the injustice of the conflict. Throughout the speech, he did not mention any other international conflicts, indicating the intense focus that Indonesia and Prabowo himself are putting on this crisis.

Prabowo has also appointed his loyalist Sugiono as the new foreign minister, making the country’s foreign policy much more predictable. Unlike Jokowi’s top diplomat, Retno, Sugiono came from outside the diplomatic corps. With a background in the military, he is known to the Indonesian media as Prabowo’s “ideological son”.

He left service in the Indonesian army early to continue serving as Prabowo’s personal secretary before launching a political career by joining the Great Indonesia Movement (Gerindra), Prabowo’s political platform. Sugiono’s political background includes having served as deputy chair of the House of Representatives Commission on Foreign Affairs, which gave him some exposure to foreign policy matters.

Prabowo’s choice of a non-diplomat as foreign minister can be interpreted as his way of claiming to be the face of Indonesia’s foreign policy. Precisely how Sugiono will lead Indonesia’s course in foreign policy is still a matter of conjecture. Very likely he will be more active in addressing global and regional issues, reflecting Prabowo’s foreign policy activism.

Moreover, the pursuit for peace in the Middle East might be further facilitated by the creation of three deputy foreign minister offices, one of which will focus on the Islamic world and the Middle East.

Prabowo’s stance has also been acknowledged by the country’s foreign policy scholars, such as Prof. Dewi Fortuna Anwar who recently wrote that Prabowo would be a “hands-on president who plays an active role in shaping and implementing foreign policy during his tenure.”

Conclusion

In short, there is an expectation that Indonesia will double or triple its effort to help facilitate peace in the Middle East, particularly after Prabowo took over the leadership role.

The new administration’s next steps will be something to watch out for. Pronouncements such as an embassy in Palestine and other promises made during his presidential campaign will need to see a follow-through. Realistically, Prabowo will likely send more peacekeeping personnel, more aid to the conflict region and increase funding to the UNRWA for the time being. After the destruction of the Indonesian Hospital in Northern Gaza, the administration may consider infrastructure-building projects once the situation has calmed down.

For now, Prabowo’s Middle East approach will be under everyone’s watchful eye.

Part of an ongoing article series on the impact of the Middle East conflict on Southeast Asia.

Introduction

Israel’s war on Gaza has sparked concern of a rise in insurgent activities in Thailand’s southern provinces.

The potential threat is significant: An active insurgency is destabilizing the contested region of Pattani, a Malay historical homeland encompassing Thailand’s three border provinces. There is a concern that anti-Israel protests in various parts of the globe would also galvanize Muslims in these Thai provinces to launch their anti-establishment activities.

Approximately two million people inhabit the Pattani region, with about 85% identifying as Malay, or Melayu, rather than Thai. These Malays vehemently reject Thailand’s policy of assimilation, which calls upon the Malays to adopt a Thai identity. For Muslims in this region, Islam and Malay identity are inextricably linked – changing one aspect inevitably impacts the other.

On the state level, Thailand’s relationship with Israel has never been the central defining factor in the interaction between the state and its Malay minority. However, when issues arise – whether related to the ongoing war or other events in the Middle East – the stance of Thai Muslims is unmistakably clear, as will be explored below.

Like other ASEAN Member States, Thailand also calls for an end to hostilities in Gaza and urges all sides to respect humanitarian norms and principles. However, Thailand would not take a strong political stance on the conflict. This is despite some Thai falling victims to this ongoing conflict.

Prior to Hamas’ 7 October attack that killed more than 1,200 people, including 39 Thai nationals, there were nearly 30,000 Thais in Israeli farms just kilometers from the Gaza border. These individuals went to work there under a government-to-government arrangement. Of the 240 taken hostage by Hamas, 32 were Thai nationals, some of whom have died.

Thailand has issued statements regarding developments on the warfront. However, its rather mild response could be explained by the fact that its bilateral ties with Israel are nowhere near as robust as its relationship with other Western governments. Besides, Israel has never featured prominently on any Thai political party’s agenda.

This, however, does not mean that Thailand’s security apparatus is not concerned about the possible spillover effect that Israel’s war has on its southern provinces.

Demonstrations and Parades in Southern Thailand

Not long after the onset of the war in Gaza, Thai military officials began visiting villages in these provinces, urging local chiefs and elders to keep the communities subdued. The last thing they needed was to witness unruly Malay demonstrators jeopardizing Thailand’s long-standing relations with Israel.

It did not take long for news of the officials’ activities to reach the youth activists in the region’s cities. Feeling compelled to respond to this perceived interference, these activists organized a march from the Pattani City Hall to the provincial central mosque in December 2023.

Palestinian flags flew high as local Muslims seized the opportunity to defy the state security apparatus, the very forces leading the government’s counterinsurgency strategy, which has yet to secure the loyalty of the local Malays.

The December 2023 march in downtown Pattani set off a small spark in Thailand’s Malay-speaking south. Palestinian flags, along with symbols and narratives of the Malays’ past and narratives, became a common sight in just about social and cultural activities, particularly among the youth.

This is the region that has been wracked with separatist problems and witnessed more than 7,500 deaths from insurgency-related violence since January 2004. Thus, the emergence of symbols and narratives that glorify the Malayness would rightfully raise anxiety on the part of the authorities.

The problem did not stop there. In May 2024, teachers at an Islamic preschool (locally known as tadeka)in Narathiwat pushed the line by dressing the children in military fatigues and led them in a march with toy guns, carrying Hamas and Palestinian flags to display solidarity with the people in Gaza.

Within days, the Ministry of Culture instructed the provincial governor to issue a public statement warning all tadeka in the region – about 1,660 altogether – that such demonstrations could lead to a halt in the government’s financial support for their school.

Unsurprisingly, the directive was met with discontent from the local Muslims, who have long felt alienated in this predominantly Buddhist kingdom, which embraced a separate set of narratives, heroes and myths from the Malays in the far south.

The tit-for-tat between the two sides seems to be a never-ending episode, however. Later still, in early September 2024, a paramilitary unit in Narathiwat broke up a village parade organized by a group of young people to remove Palestinian flags and portraits of Patani’s Malay historical figures and religious leaders. The unit’s reasoning was that these items have nothing to do with local culture.

As expected, social media and political activists responded ferociously. Narathiwat lawmaker Kamonsak Leewamoh even went on the parliament floor to demand a public apology from the local military unit for the alleged interference and called on the Royal Thai Army to investigate the incident.

The Dichotomy

Despite these concerning developments, we need to remember that the challenges facing the Muslims in Thailand bear little connection to the outside world, as the tensions are rooted in local dynamics. However, simply because the Malays’ response has been relatively muted, this does not mean they are apolitical.

Before we continue with this point, a dichotomy must be made. In this article, the “Malays of Patani” refer to traditionalist Muslims in the southernmost border provinces (the Patani region). Outside that, Muslims are referred to as “Thai Muslims.”

While Thai Muslims have to contend against anti-Islam sentiment and find themselves in a constant struggle to show the rest of the country that they are very much part of Thailand nationhood, the Malays of Patani, on the other hand, reject the Thai state-constructed narrative and constantly look for ways to assert their historical-cultural identity. For the latter, Malay identity and Islam are inseparable.

Thai Muslims, both Sunnis and Shiites, are patriotic and extremely loyal to the state. This explains their resentment towards the Malays of Patani for challenging Thailand’s nationhood and embracing separatism.

Despite their patriotism, Thai Muslims’ loyalty to the state is constantly questioned. They do what they can to avoid confrontation with the Thais, particularly the Buddhist nationalists who believe that Thainess is synonymous to being a Buddhist of the Theravada school.

Compared to heavy protests elsewhere in the world – the kind that is seen on US colleges – responses from the Malays of Patani and the Thai Muslims to the war in Gaza seem rather tame. As local writer and political activist Asmadee Bueheng explained, the lack of response must be understood in a proper context.

The vast majority of the Malays in the border provinces are traditionalist Muslims who embrace local culture and turn to the village ulema (religious scholars) for answers to personal and theological, sometimes political, questions. Conversely, they see the reformists as a bunch of globalized religious movements that compete among themselves to establish a modern identity at the expense of local culture. Groups like Hamas, the Muslim Brotherhood, Salafi, Wahhabi and Tablighi Jamaat are all considered reformists by the Malays of Patani.

Moreover, said Asmadee, local Malays have never been comfortable with “political Islam” as a concept. But being traditionalists does not mean they are not political. Their resistance to Thailand’s policy of assimilation has translated into an armed struggle for independence that keeps resurfacing generation after generation ever since the region was conquered by Siam in the late 18^th century.

However, not all reformists embraced political Islam: many Salafists, for example, take a “purist” or “quietist” approach and withdraw themselves completely from political affairs, while so-called “jihadists” take up violent actions to advance their political agenda in the name of religion.

The traditionalists among the Malays of Patani see the war in Gaza as very much a byproduct of political Islam. On the other hand, the reformist Muslims are calling for a more active response to the war in Gaza but fall short of calling on the government to make stern and concrete measures. They are concerned that their loyalty to the state would be questioned.

In spite of these differences, however, there is no open hostility between the two groups, as both keep to themselves.

The absence of major outbursts against Israel’s genocidal tendency in Gaza does not mean that the Malays of Patani or the Thai Muslims have shut themselves out of the affairs of the Islamic world or that they are indifferent to the suffering of fellow Muslims elsewhere.

Both groups have consistently engaged Muslim communities abroad on various platforms and on occasions. Many of these families continue to send their children to universities and madrasa in the Middle East and South Asia, where they are exposed to other schools of thought and competing ideas.

In the 1980s, for example, more than 1,000 Pattani Malays combatants joined fighters from Aceh and Mindanao in training camps in the Middle East and North Africa.

This is where they come to know fellow “revolutionaries” from other parts of the world, including Palestinian leftists who made a huge contribution to the development of the Palestinian national movement back in the day but no longer feature in today’s conversations.

In fact, Patani itself, prior to its defeat by Siam in 1786, was a flourishing commercial center where East Asian traders met and carried out business with their counterparts from Europe. This is the historical precedence of the region’s openness and willingness to engage others from the outside world.

Explaining the Authorities’ Anxiety

Two decades ago, when the current wave of Patani Malay separatists resurfaced to pick up what the previous generation had left off a decade earlier, several so-called security experts were quick to label the southern Thai conflict a new front in the global war on terrorism.

Such a label was convenient. After all, various factors at the time made it easier to do so. These include the political climate, the prevailing mood and narrative, the emergence of a new set of vocabulary, and a booming industry under the banner of a global war on terrorism that came to life following 9/11.

However, in the case of Southeast Asia, it did not take long to see that lumping ethno-nationalist struggles in the same basket as radical jihadist groups such as al-Qaeda or Jama’ah Islamiyah has no merit.

Separatist movements such as Barisan Revolusi Nasional (National Revolutionary Front – BRN), Gerakan Aceh Merdeka (Free Aceh Movement – GAM) and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) would eventually come to the negotiating tables with the government that they had been fighting. Today, the GAM and the MILF have signed a peace agreement with their respective governments. The BRN, on the other hand, is still negotiating with the Thai government.

Unlike radical jihadists, these Southeast Asian separatist groups never established the kind of global network because the banner of their struggle has always been centered on liberating their homeland from outside forces.

Conclusion

While the end to the southern Thai conflict is still nowhere in sight, there is nothing to suggest that the political context of the conflict in Patani will evolve from an ethno-nationalist to violent jihadist where the banner of the struggle becomes a religion. Nevertheless, local and foreign counterterrorism officials are on a constant lookout for any possible incursions of radicalism, the kind that Southeast Asia had witnessed in the early 2000s when violent extremist groups had penetrated the Mindanao region of the Philippines and in the various pockets of Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore.

The thinking among these officials is that one cannot afford to be complacent. Hence the anxiety of the Thai officials following the eruption of Israel’s war on Gaza, despite the rather mild response by the Malays of Patani so far.

Introduction

Indonesia’s Foreign Minister Sugiono declared Indonesia’s interest in becoming a member of the Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa (BRICS) grouping. According to him, this is an exercise of Indonesia’s bebas aktif (independent and active) foreign policy approach.

Many view this move as an opportunity for economic growth and diversification. However, a closer look raises a crucial question: Are the potential benefits worth the risks?

There are significant opportunities and risks. Beyond the promise of wider market access, Indonesia’s alignment with BRICS could strain its relationships with key Western partners and even limit economic opportunities with traditional allies.

To maximize national interest, the government must carefully weigh whether a BRICS membership genuinely advances Indonesia’s economic goals or risks isolating it from existing engagements with Western economies.

Economic Opportunities

President Prabowo sees BRICS as a path to expand Indonesia’s economic alliances, offering new markets, investment sources and more autonomy from traditional Western partners. BRICS countries make up around 30% of the global economy and represent 43% of the world’s population, driven mainly by China and India.

This substantial market size and consumer base underline the organization’s potential influence as a global economic force. In 2022, BRICS countries contributed US$9.25 billion in FDI to Indonesia, or 21.2% of its total. Given its existing economic relations with these countries, Indonesia’s participation may bolster its export-orientated economy by diminishing tariffs and other non-tariff barriers.

Prabowo is also advocating for Indonesia to embrace the BRICS bilateral currency exchange initiatives to strengthen trade amidst global financial volatility and lessen its reliance on the US dollar.

Moreover, reducing reliance on Western economies appears aligned with Prabowo’s nationalistic stance. Indonesia is seeking increased independence and resilience in the face of global economic instability. Given its strong connections to Western markets, diversifying Indonesia’s economic portfolio is a necessity, which can be done by engaging BRICS countries.

To illustrate this, the United States is Indonesia’s second largest export destination, with US$23.28 billion in commerce in 2023. Therefore, a BRICS membership has the potential of diverting Indonesia’s strong economic relationship with the West, provided strong economic activities between Indonesia and BRICS countries can be fostered.

Indonesia’s natural resource wealth can be an attractive point for other BRICS members. In 2023, Indonesia was the world’s largest palm oil exporter, producing 47 million metric tonnes of crude palm oil, thereby meeting 54% of the global demand and generating US$23.97 billion in revenue. In addition, Indonesia is the fifth largest coal producer and possesses substantial nickel as well as other mineral reserves that are essential for modern technologies. These make Indonesia an attractive potential member in the perspective of BRICS countries.

Joining BRICS would afford Indonesia greater opportunities to increase exports and maximize profit from investment projects in its natural resources. As per the government’s data, Indonesia’s export value stood at US$258.82 billion in 2023, a figure that might further expand if Indonesia could tap the potential of the BRICS markets.

While Indonesia can benefit from its resource industry, there is also a strategic imperative to reduce overdependence on it. A membership in BRICS could help Indonesia attract foreign investment into non-resource sectors, thus creating a more balanced and resilient economy.

Unlike historical exploitative practices by Western countries or even China itself, which have often involved one-sided agreements that benefit foreign powers at the expense of local economies, Indonesia must negotiate terms that protect its economic interests. The varied economic interests of BRICS members can create opportunities for Indonesia to negotiate deals that are mutually beneficial rather than exploitative.

Besides, BRICS consists of a diverse group of countries that have different economic systems, political ideologies and development strategies. Many BRICS nations, including Brazil and India, have demonstrated a commitment to sustainable development. Indonesia can advocate for agreements that prioritize sustainable practices, promoting its own environmental and economic goals while engaging with other BRICS countries.

Economy vs. Autonomy

While BRICS offers promising economic opportunities, Prabowo’s administration is tasked with managing the potential complexities of such an accession. China and Russia have enhanced their geopolitical influence through economic alliances. Given its non-alignment policy, Indonesia must remain vigilant to prevent the erosion of its sovereignty that might transpire from its closer engagement with BRICS countries.

In other words, Jakarta should carefully manage its economic relationships within BRICS to maintain policy independence and avoid overreliance on a single partner.

The decision to accede to BRICS suggests a willingness to participate in a “revisionist” group. BRICS countries, such as China and Russia, are known for their efforts to reorganize international norms and institutions to reflect a multipolar power structure. They also seek to challenge the Western-established global order.

Prabowo considers that Indonesia is capable of placing itself on the world map in a multipolar setting; however, the journey is accompanied by a lot of risks.

Indonesia has not taken any sides in international conflicts, but being part of the BRICS block can change this scenario. The aspirations of the BRICS countries to create a third or even a fourth currency system may lead to a head-on collision with Western countries. Such a position from the bloc, which openly seeks to revise the global order and financial system designed by the West, poses a danger to Indonesia’s ties with other Western countries.

The threat is not only limited to the Western links. For quite some time, Indonesia was able to make inroads in Southeast Asia owing to its policy neutrality. This has enabled Indonesia to take on the leadership roles of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) as well as ASEAN. By virtue of ASEAN’s non-alignment, Indonesia is able to exercise strategic independence and manage relations with the Western and BRICS countries in a balanced manner.

However, a BRICS membership may also raise questions among other ASEAN Member States (AMS). It may signal that Indonesia seeks to diversify its attention away from ASEAN, which ironically may weaken ASEAN’s unity, cohesion and capacity to assert its centrality vis-à-vis global affairs.

While BRICS promotes trade cooperation, Indonesia may face challenges from member countries, particularly China, as they would also seek to compete with Indonesia’s domestic market.

This is evidenced by recent events. The large volume of Chinese imports into Indonesia has had a negative impact on both the Indonesian manufacturing and textile industries. Many local companies have been put out of business because of the adverse effects of Chinese products, which are too cheap to compete against.

It is still possible for Indonesia to see more imports from BRICS, though this would entail creating more uncertainty within its domestic market. Therefore, it is essential for Indonesia to promote the establishment of equitable trade norms within BRICS to ensure fair competition and avert dumping practices, or the sale of commodities at excessively low prices.

Indonesia’s most recent experiences with Chinese investment are noteworthy. Under President Joko “Jokowi” Widodo, Indonesia’s economic initiatives were significantly influenced by Chinese investments, particularly in the downstream processing of nickel.

There has been criticism that 41% of Chinese investment goes to metal processing companies that are environmentally harmful. In addition, many Chinese-operated nickel smelters in Indonesia have free foreign exchange agreements to allow the transfer of revenues back to China. Such agreements limit Indonesia’s economic gain, considering it also plays a role in processing the nickel exports.

These examples demonstrate the urgency to implement stringent regulatory criteria when engaging BRICS countries to guarantee that foreign investments contribute rather than incurring losses to Indonesia’s economy and environment.

Prabowo’s administration must assess the symbolic and substantive value of BRICS. Indonesia’s accession to BRICS may turn out to be theatrics without sound strategies and policy measures. Besides, membership in one more international economic association does not, as practice shows, automatically accord economic benefit. Additionally, its membership in BRICS may be nominal, as it could be unproductive participation that only drains effort and resources when the domestic economies are weak.

Instead, the new administration needs to address the weak points of Indonesia’s economy and enact policies that could protect it from unfair trade as well as investment practices.

Balancing Ambitions

The government’s plan to join BRICS must incorporate a strategy that focuses on bolstering the Indonesian economy, the independence of its diplomacy and its regional power. Indonesia needs to be able to continue exercising its non-alignment policy but wrest the economic opportunity offered by BRICS. Furthermore, Indonesia must intensify its engagement with AMS, pursuing policies and projects that prioritize intra-ASEAN cooperation to stave off any potential undue influence emanating from BRICS countries.

Moreover, Indonesia must stay true to its strategy of putting its eggs in multiple baskets. Indonesia can seek to enhance its trade agreements not just with BRICS but also with key partners like Japan, South Korea and Australia. For instance, Indonesia could negotiate a multitiered trade agreement that allows for preferential tariffs with AMS and these partners while also facilitating trade with BRICS countries.

Conclusion

The strategic entry of Indonesia into BRICS is a complex decision that will put Prabowo’s ability to reconcile economic ambition and Indonesia’s professed non-alignment position to the test.

By joining BRICS, Indonesia can enhance its exports, attract international investment and reduce its reliance on the US dollar. This progress, however, is dependent on Jakarta’s ability to contain the potential vulnerabilities that might come from the engagement, especially the political and economic challenges arising from an enhanced partnership with China and Russia.

Acceding to BRICS may boost Indonesia’s economic potential and its standing in the multipolar world order. However, such a step comes with its own challenges. Indonesia’s priority is to ensure that its domestic economy and environment will not be undermined by economic engagement with BRICS countries. Active and measured diplomacy must also be exercised. Indonesia must retain its non-aligned posture and anticipate shifts in global politics.

The bottom line is, Indonesia’s accession to BRICS must not come at the cost of giving up parts of its sovereignty and national interest.

Part of an ongoing article series on the impact of the Middle East conflict on Southeast Asia.

Introduction

Switching on the hourly news in Malaysia, whether in Malay, English, Tamil or Chinese, a viewer might be a little surprised to see the broadcasters wearing a Palestine solidarity scarf around their neck.

Since the eruption of the recent Israel-Gaza war on 7 October 2023, Malaysia, under the leadership of Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim, has placed itself strongly in the Palestine camp.

In international forums, he has called for Western leaders to halt arms sales to Israel and has publicly sided with Hamas leaders—offering support and pledging solidarity.

The ever-escalating situation in the Middle East has invariably caused disruptions, increased global tensions and sustained the Palestine solidarity movement in new ways.

Frequent large-scale demonstrations all over the world have changed the narrative of the Palestine solidarity movement, bringing new awareness and supporters to the cause.

The involvement of new countries such as Iran also shifted the narrative to view the Islamic Republic as proactive and able to stand up to Israel.

Malaysia’s Stance

For Malaysia, these developments have solidified the country’s traditional foreign policy stance as well as its societal behaviors and discourse. The governmental rhetoric on Palestinian solidarity brings home Malaysia’s unique foreign policy alignment in the ongoing Israel-Gaza war. On one hand, it can show outward support for Palestine without jeopardizing its relations with the West.

Malaysia has often regarded itself as a “small country” but possesses the self-awareness and confidence to be able to punch above its weight and shift foreign policy stances when necessary. With its upcoming chairmanship of ASEAN, Malaysia will be playing an even bigger symbolic regional role to ensure stability and economic advancements for its members.

During the Cold War, for instance, despite a history of fighting a communist insurgency, Malaysia refrained from joining the Southeast Asian Treaty Organization (SEATO) and instead opted for non-alignment.  

Driven by its desire to be friends with all, Malaysia has historically opted for neutrality as well as being morally balanced in its international approach. However, this does not mean that it refrains from being active in its support for certain causes.

Despite keeping cordial relations with the West, Anwar has maintained pressure for a ceasefire and, when possible, has shown Malaysia to be aligned with Palestine.

In April 2024, Anwar made an official trip to Germany to discuss trade relations and bilateral ties. He openly criticized Chancellor Olaf Scholz’s pro-Israel alignment, which drew international attention.

The situation appears a little more complex when examining Malaysia’s relations with the United States in the last year.

Washington has expressed concerns over Malaysia’s support for Hamas, especially after Anwar met with Ismail Haniyeh before the latter’s assassination in July 2024. Furthermore, it is the US government and businesses that have become the target of Malaysian anti-Israeli sentiment.

For years, Malaysian leaders have kept alignment with Washington deliberately opaque so as not to draw the ire of the country’s Muslim majority population, who oppose US support for Israel.

Since the war, any major deals between the two countries have come under scrutiny. When it was revealed that US company BlackRock was going to buy a 30% stake in managing Malaysia Airpots Holdings Berhad (MAHB), Anwar was accused of duplicity.

The war has revealed the difficulty Malaysia has always faced between support for Palestine and its desire to be close to the West.

In many ways, the rhetoric Malaysia has built around support for Palestine helps to mitigate this. From regulated demonstrations with Anwar in attendance to newscasters with Palestine scarves, there is a performative aspect of Malaysia’s support.

When Others Joined the Fray

Since its start, the Israel-Gaza war has come to include other countries and organizations, such as the Houthis in Yemen, Hezbollah in Lebanon and Iran. Malaysia has expressed support for all of them, venturing into new kinds of rhetoric and public support.

Despite not having any ties with Hezbollah, in comparison to Hamas, Malaysia condemned Israel’s assassination of Hasan Nasrallah. Similarly, Malaysia has openly supported Iran’s sending of missiles to Israel.

Such statements reflect an emerging shift in Malaysia’s foreign policy that is open to alignment with Iran.

Malaysian-Iranian relations have not always been straightforward, with Malaysia outwardly partaking in sanctions but also breaking sanction regulations when it comes to shipping and economic exchanges.

Furthermore, anti-Shi’i sentiments exist in Malaysia, with strong religious laws that discourage Malaysians from practicing Shi’ism.

Despite this, Malaysia has always made a distinction between Iran and Shi’ism, allowing for cordial bilateral relations but ensuring the practice of Shi’ism by non-Malaysians is discreet.

The conflict and Malaysia’s support for Iran are political and this distinction remains in place, meaning that there is unlikely to be a relaxing of anti-Shi’i sentiments or regulations.

The escalation of the war in the Middle East and the possible increased involvement of Iran may see Malaysia stepping up its support for Tehran, which may reduce sectarian tensions but place further strain on its relations with the United States.

Malaysians React

The Israel-Gaza war has also impacted the Malaysian society in extraordinary ways. On one hand, it has led to interesting discussions on Malaysia’s role in international solidarity, on immigration and on social consciousness. On the other hand, it has also contributed to societal tensions with the dominance of the Malay-Muslim community in the Palestine issue.

Indeed, since 7 October, Malaysia and Malaysians have shown a strong front against Israel, while actively taking part in the boycott movement against corporations that have shown support for Israel or who have refrained from divesting.

McDonalds and Starbucks became the main targets of boycotts, with both companies reporting losses in the millions of ringgit.

The Boycott, Divestment, Sanctions (BDS) movement is regarded as the most significant and effective form of international solidarity for the Palestinians. Since 2005, it has brought awareness to the struggles of the Palestinian people against the Israeli apartheid regime and has brought together people from across the world to be a part of a highly globalized resistance movement.

For the first time, Malaysia has joined this movement in full force, actively supporting BDS. Calls for boycotting, divesting, and sanctioning have come from different corners of Malaysian society, from the government, politicians and social media influencers. Indeed, there is a lot of pressure to use social media as a platform of solidarity.

In Malaysia, the pro-Palestine movement is divided along racial lines, with the Malay-Muslim population leading the narrative of presenting Palestine as a predominantly Muslim cause.

However, this is not to say that other races and religions are not engaged or that all Malays are fully supportive. Palestine, with a Muslim majority, has since the 1980s been seen as a key plight for the Islamic world. The symbol of Al-Aqsa, the third holiest site in Islam after Mecca and Madinah, is palpable and reaches Muslims all over the world at a basic and instinctive level.

This narrative has not changed, with many Muslim charities and organizations from Islamic Relief to Friends of Al-Aqsa, using Palestine as a focus point. 

The adoption of Palestine as a Muslim concern is not something novel. After all, Palestine had for a long time become a focal point for the Islamic world, even if the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) is seen to have abandoned the Palestinian liberation movement.

This in turn has led to the rise of Muslim youth fundamentalism and the adoption of Palestine as an issue by individual Muslim countries. The prolonged Israel-Gaza war has placed Palestine again at the heart of the debate, with growing frustration at the lack of collective response and reaction from the Muslim world, particularly the Arab countries.

As such, the conflict has seen Malaysia and Malaysians become part of a new global movement for Palestine. This increases Malaysia’s confidence on an international level and within the Islamic world, something that Anwar builds on from previous Prime Ministers, including Najib Razak, who made Malaysia into a guardian of disenfranchised Muslims.

Palestine has certainly provided Malaysians with an avenue for expression and political participation on a wider level. A country that has avoided protests, Malaysia has allowed for controlled public demonstrations for the public to show their solidarity, often with Anwar in attendance.

In addition, participation in BDS has made Malaysia a part of a wider movement, building transnational solidarity links with the establishment of BDS Malaysia. This in turn has become a new platform of scrutiny for Malaysia’s deals with foreign companies.

Conclusion

The tensions in the Middle East do not show any signs of dissipating. A year since the start of the Israel-Gaza war, Malaysian society has also reached a state of sustained solidarity for Palestine and Palestinians, with the boycott continuing against businesses considered unfriendly to the cause.

With the change in the global narrative towards the Palestinian issue, more widespread support from all aspects of Malaysian society may be observed, with growing awareness of Palestine as a human issue rather than a religious one. However, the dominance of the Malay-Muslim in directing the solidarity will most likely stay in place.

Malaysia has opted for a balancing act between support for Palestine and continuing cordial relations with the West. However, if a war were to erupt between Iran and Israel, we might see strong rhetoric in support of Iran, though this may not mean a break in the relationship with the West. Malaysia’s positioning as a neutral “friend to all” should be able to withstand some strain on its relationship to the West while accommodating an orientation in its foreign policy that sees support for Palestine and Iran.

Introduction

Since the Xi Jinping presidency started, China has undertaken major domestic monetary and fiscal reforms to maintain China’s centrality to the region’s economy. The Middle Kingdom may have faced an economic downturn lately, but its government has taken proactive steps to ameliorate the situation.

The latest pronouncements by the Chinese government regarding its economy are meant to strategically signal its resilience while also restoring market confidence from those in Southeast Asia and beyond.

China’s Economic Reform and Regional Opportunities

The 26 September 2024 session of the Political Bureau of the Communist Party of China Central Committee stressed the importance of such executive measures as cutting the reserve requirement ratio (RRR) and altering the mortgage rate. The Bureau deemed these necessary to stimulate the property sector and improve the financial outlook.

Such policy shifts are a realistic response to the regional context, opening opportunities for Southeast Asian countries such as Indonesia to deepen their engagement with China’s economy and seek out cooperative benefits.

The announcement that China will inject approximately 1 trillion yuan into the financial market and reduce the reserve requirement ratio by 0.5% underlines China’s intention to enhance liquidity and promote growth in the economy.

In a way, such measures aimed to reinforce the soundness of China’s financial markets and reassure its regional allies that Beijing remains committed to stabilize its economy irrespective of external and internal headwinds.

The effect of the policy was immediate and broad, as seen by the Shanghai Composite Index increasing by 4.59%, the Shenzhen Component Index increasing by 9.17% and the technology-biased ChiNext surging 17.25% after the National Day holiday reopening.

Joint trading volumes reached new heights, totaling 3.45 trillion yuan on the Shanghai and Shenzhen exchanges, surpassing the former high of 2.6 trillion yuan. This demonstrates the effectiveness of China’s regulatory reforms to restore investor confidence and increase economic activities.

Many in China must feel optimistic about the Chinese real estate market and for good reason. Beijing’s attempts to solve problems within the sector, which constitutes an essential part of China’s economy, include cutting the opening down payment for new residential mortgages from 25% to 15%.

These mortgages, which are expected to relieve loan burdens to around 50 million households and bring older mortgage rates up to the current standard, are predicted to save the country large amounts of resources, approximately 150 billion yuan annually. The significance of such crucial measures is also to help reverse the continuing decline of the real estate market within China.

By bringing back the property market, it has been reported that the primary goal the Beijing government seeks to achieve is enhancing the domestic economy. Most significantly, it creates the conditions for more effective regional economic integration since a strong economy in China is a powerful engine of growth for co-development with others in the region.

Complex Interdependence

Southeast Asia stands to gain considerably if China undergoes an economic revival. The revival of the A-share market has seen an increase in demand from foreign investors, which is likely to result in many investments in the Southeast Asian markets.

This is especially pertinent for countries like Indonesia, which has received Chinese FDI in the development of critical infrastructure. For instance, China’s intent to improve regional connectivity – which was demonstrated with projects like the China-Laos Railway – offers prospects for other investments that would enhance Indonesia’s trade and integration in the region.

China’s development of the town of Mohan – an important border site is situated in Yunnan province (a vital connecting point between China and Southeast Asia), underscores China’s pledge to promote regional economic development and joint progress. This development aptly exemplifies China’s openness to enhance economic relations with the rest of Southeast Asia.

Moreover, with its dominating position in the foreign trade, China has also emerged as an integral component in the regional economic system. The total volume of the foreign goods trade reached US$5.88 trillion in 2023, which means it accounted for 12.4% of the total global trade.

China has managed to retain its position as the most dominant trading nation in the world for the seventh year in a row and this only goes to reinforce its standing in terms of regional trade. Furthermore, with a service trade volume of US$933.1 billion, Southeast Asian countries have the capacity to gain economic benefits by engaging in a deeper trade relationship with China.

These figures show that there is still a need for countries such as Indonesia to engage themselves passively with China’s developmental strategies, such as the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), which has the potential to increase trade volumes and create new markets.

The increasing economic ties of China with Southeast Asia may be understood in the context of the complex interdependence theory, which states that as states become more interlinked economically, socially and politically, the probability of conflict decreases because it is too costly.

This model helps us comprehend why it may be in the interest of some Southeast Asian countries like Indonesia to become more integrated with the Chinese economic model, which would, in return, enable the creation of a more constructive and harmonious regional context. By implementing an interdependence model, regional economies can avert risks of instability and promote joint growth, which ensures that all parties benefit.

Challenges

Nonetheless, developing more active economic engagement with China is not without problems. Greater economic engagement means that any policy shift or economic activities derived from China will have implications across the region.

For Indonesia, which is a major recipient of Chinese investment in key sectors such as infrastructure, manufacturing and real estate, this dependency poses hazards as variations in Chinese investments tend to import volatility to the local market and economies.

China has taken steps such as issuing extremely long-period treasury bonds as well as special local government bonds to help stabilize shocks to its financial and real estate markets. These measures indicate that China understands that its activities affect the economy of the region; Southeast Asian countries can rest assured that China is mindful of its potential pitfalls.

However, while the increased flow of Chinese capital into Southeast Asia is critical for meeting the financial needs of development projects, it can also imbalance the markets and stifle efforts to improve local capacity.

Therefore, Indonesian authorities are required to manage foreign investments, including foreign capital coming from China, to ensure that these investments are aimed at achieving sustainable development goals that will benefit its domestic economy.

Recent crises such as the crash in Indonesia’s textile industry – due to massive capital inflow and import of textile products from China – exemplify this concern. Such cases further underscore the need for Indonesia to erect some rules and regulations that could shield local industries.

Constructing a legal regime that encourages cooperative ventures and technological transfer would allow Indonesia’s enterprises to utilize Chinese capital in a more efficient manner, resulting in development without surrendering control of essential sectors and assets.

Strategic options for ASEAN and Indonesia

To deal with the economic resurrection of China, Indonesia and its ASEAN peers should take a more aggressive stance, allowing for deepened economic cooperation while diversifying their economic relations.

With shifts from primary commodity export reliance to developing core sectors such as manufacturing, technology and services, Indonesia could skillfully integrate itself within regional supply chains with China at the center.

For instance, rather than chiefly importing finished goods, Indonesia could aid in China’s production networks by establishing its own electronics and automotive components industries. Predominantly, this strategy would assist Indonesia’s economy by retaining more foreign earnings but majoring in the core activities of such industries.

However, to avoid being “swamped” by imported goods, Indonesia does require a framework of policies to aid domestic industries, especially in their formative stages including trade standards and promotion of sectors where it has a comparative advantage. Such strategy could attract more foreign investment into Indonesia and improve the country’s economic position. 

Central to this strategy is financial regulation and financial stability. Indonesian policymakers must concentrate on building sound financial institutions and laws that will adequately absorb the sudden influx of Chinese capital while reducing risks associated with volatile capital inflows.

Reinforcing its financial control and risk management policies will allow Indonesia to withstand almost any impact even after internal changes in Chinese policies.

There is a great need for ASEAN to pursue better economic integration with China. When bargaining with Beijing, especially in regards to the BRI, ASEAN ought to seek to remain true to the ASEAN centrality and encourage a more even distribution of Chinese investments around the ASEAN countries.

However, such commonality of purpose is not easy due to the very diverse political and economic structures within ASEAN. For example, Malaysia’s engagement with the BRI projects has demonstrated the extent to which such investment can be politicized which hampers ASEAN’s effort to voice out as a single entity.

To ensure ASEAN centrality vis-à-vis these complexities, the bloc could seek to focus on developing broad parameters, which would enable them to promote common interests within the region. This would guarantee a united regional position on engagement with China while ensuring that individual member countries are allowed the leeway to pursue bilateral deals that suit their domestic variables.

ASEAN Member States can leverage regional projects that foster infrastructure development, technological advancement and agricultural growth in a manner that is sustainable for the region. Such a position would enable these countries to engage China in a manner that is beneficial to them, alleviating excessive dependency on Chinese capital and promoting a coherent as well as cohesive regional economy in the process.

Conclusion

To sum up, as a result of recent changes in the strategies of the Chinese authorities, Southeast Asia and Indonesia have been presented with a new opportunity to enhance their economic relations with China while fostering their own economic advancement.

The region’s response should be neither too cautious nor too aggressive in order to augment its integration with China while improving its strategic stance. Since China’s economy is now poised to expand steadily, there is an opportunity for ASEAN to establish itself as a regional bulwark that focuses on regional economic progress and stability.

Part of an ongoing article series on the impact of the Middle East conflict on Southeast Asia.

Introduction

Israel continues to face pressure to cease its attacks after a year of aggression in Gaza. Commemorating a full year of Israel’s war, various pro-Gaza solidarity actions were carried out worldwide, including in Europe, Japan, South Africa, the United States and Indonesia.

In the United States, for example, several protests were carried out in some states, including New York and Washington. There, the pro-Gaza support has been quite consistent, despite resistance from pro-Israel groups.

In contrast, in Indonesia, the commemoration only saw protests in two spots: one in front of the United States embassy in Jakarta and another in Surabaya. These protests paled in comparison to nation-wide solidarity actions seen when the war first erupted in October 2023.

The public’s response in America is understandable because of the country’s direct ties to Israel. Universities became hotspots for protests, considering many US universities have invested in companies linked to Israel or benefitting from Israel.

The backlash in the United States is not just a form of solidarity for the Palestinians but also a direct political pressure on the US and Israeli governments.

Protest as a Political Tool

Throughout 2024, public protests in defense of Gaza in the United States have succeeded in pressuring the Biden administration to be proactive in facilitating peace process and sending aid to Gaza.

In one instance of a public victory, the protests in South Africa were successful in motivating its government to bring a case against Israel to the International Court of Justice, on account of genocide.

Since the Israeli aggression in October last year, Indonesians have also supported Gaza in a variety of ways, including through street protests and social media posts. The Indonesian public also calls for boycotts of products that have ties to Israel.

On social media, activists launched the julid fi sabilillah movement on the X platform to challenge narratives that justify Israel’s attack on Palestine from Israeli military, policymaker and pro-Israel social media activists. Supporters of the movement are seen terrorizing Israeli soldiers through online attacks and condemnation.

Pro-Gaza Support is Waning in Indonesia

By right, Indonesia should be at the forefront of supporting Palestine, given its status as the country with the largest Muslim population in the world. Furthermore, Indonesia remains a democratic nation, despite a dramatic decline in its quality in recently.

Therefore, Indonesians, in theory, have an almost unbridled freedom to voice out their support towards Palestine, one that is fuelled by the emotive factors of Muslim solidarity and disdain against all forms of colonialism.

Meanwhile, the Indonesian government’s pro-Palestine stance guarantees the space for the public to assert political pressure or undertake humanitarian actions without fear of repercussions.

This stands in contrast to the experiences of Muslims in Arab or Western countries where expressing support or participating in pro-Gaza demonstrations can lead to confrontations with security forces or other forms of intimidation.

Despite this, what we are seeing on the ground today is the waning of this pro-Gaza spirit that has inflamed the Indonesian society until just a while ago. Several factors may influence this issue:

First, unlike the United States, Indonesia does not have diplomatic relations with Israel, so there is no reason to demand the Indonesian government take certain steps. Furthermore, for a long time, Indonesia has been active and vocal in fighting for the Palestinian issue politically and through delivery in humanitarian aid. The bombed-out Indonesian Hospital in Gaza is one such manifestation.

The public is most likely to urge the Indonesian government to boycott products linked to Israel in Indonesia, yet this action remains unfulfilled. Despite some chatters online, there has been no concrete, organized action that demands the Indonesian government to cease its cooperation with companies that have Israeli affiliations. For now, the public is simply calling for a boycott or a call to not buy these products.

In addition, the rather covert trade relations between Indonesia and Israel could become an issue raised by the public to demand transparency from the government and potentially serve as a leverage tool against Israel. However, this issue, for some reasons, has not become a major point in pro-Gaza discourse in the country.

Second, Islamic groups have championed most of the discussions and actions in response to the Palestinian issue, thus limiting its scope. This stands in stark contrast to other national political issues, where diverse societal elements and students from various Indonesian campuses participate simultaneously.

These include the national protests against the revision of the Corruption Eradication Commission law (KPK) in 2019, the Omnibus Law in 2020 and the regional election law (Pilkada) in 2024.

In contrast, when it comes to the Palestinian issue, there is no national solidarity movement that cuts across identities and elements, except by Islamic groups per se.  

Indonesia’s lack of diversity in pro-Gaza action might stem from the perception that the Palestine issue is a religious conflict between Muslims and Jews. The majority of Indonesians, for example, continue to perceive the Palestinian-Israeli issue as a conflict between Islam and Judaism.

Such is not a standout in the region – earlier in this article series, it was put forward that Catholics in the Philippines believe that Israel is the “promised land”, denoting the religious value ascribed to the whole dynamics.

Regardless, the Islam-heavy narrative the conflict in the Palestinian issue is likely to demotivate non-religious movements – including nationalist groups and other critical movements in Indonesia – from mobilizing solidarity actions for Palestine.

This distinguishes Indonesia from the United States and European protests, where pro-Palestinian movements were led by non-religious groups, with participants fluidly coming from all walks of life.

Third,Muslim groups NU and Muhammadiyah actually possess the potential to mobilize these significant actions, given their extensive network of organizations, schools, Islamic boarding schools, universities and millions of members across Indonesia.

However, NU and Muhammadiyah do not have a tradition of carrying out movements by taking to the streets to express their aspirations. These two groups are mostly involved in humanitarian actions, especially fundraising, in response to the Palestinian issue.

Indeed, NU and Muhammadiyah activists were involved in protests in 2016 regarding the issue of religious blasphemy, but this action was led by a coalition of activists and Islamist movements, including the Islamic Defender Front (FPI) and Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia. In this protest, NU and Muhammadiyah did not establish a formal alliance with the Islamist groups, nor did they lead the movement in any way.

The credibility of NU has also been somewhat blemished by the visit of five NU academics and activists to Israel. The visit was facilitated by Itrek, an American Jewish NGO, and their meeting with the Israeli president in July 2024 sparked controversy as well as criticism toward NU’s stance on Palestine.

Subsequent pressures forced NU to clarify its stance on Palestine, emphasizing that they were unaware of the situation and planned to impose sanctions on these individuals.

It also does not help that engaging with NU’s members and figures has become Israel’s tactic for normalizing relations with Indonesia. Some of its figures, including the current chairman, Yahya Cholil Staquf, have visited Israel before.

This “normalization” program also targets young people, including NU academics, for visits to Israel. Israeli networks of NGOs, such as the American Jewish Committee (AJC) and the Australian Israel Jewish Affairs Council (AIJAC), have facilitated such programs.

If NU elites or activists continue to be involved in this program, it is possible that NU’s attitude towards Israel could be softer in the future and thus influence a potential shift in the Israeli-Palestinian narrative in Indonesia.

What makes NU susceptible to being drawn into Israel’s political strategy is its inclusive and pragmatic political stance, both in domestic politics and in its relations with other countries.

NU’s pragmatism in international relations is evident, for instance, in its decision to maintain good relations with China despite widespread criticism of China’s treatment of Xinjiang. This close relationship has led to NU receiving significant assistance from China, particularly for social and educational activities.

It should not be a surprise that NU circles have also become targets of Israel’s, as it is likely that Israel has taken note of NU’s political track record, both locally and internationally.

In contrast, Muhammadiyah tends to distance itself from those in power, with its leaders often voicing criticism of the ruling regime in Indonesia. As for Israel, there is no record of Israel making concerted efforts to approach this organization intensively.

Conclusion

The global actions carried out in various countries have successfully pressured governments to urge Israel to halt its brutal attacks on Palestine. The stances of various nations, including during UN sessions, show that these leaders are listening to the aspirations of their people, which are continuously voiced through actions on different platforms.

If this cross-national solidarity is not consistently expressed, it is possible that the responses of these leaders would be different regarding this issue.

The actions taken by activists in the United States have managed to inspire university students in various parts of the world, such as in Europe and Australia, to launch similar pro-Gaza actions. These activities should not only be seen as pressure on governments to change their policies but also as part of raising global awareness about the ongoing issue.

Indonesian citizens, including students, have even greater opportunities to engage in such actions, given the political conditions, the large population – many of whom are Muslim – and the Indonesian government’s stance on Palestine. However, this potential has yet to be fully maximized, with support towards Gaza seemingly waning a year after the start of the war. This should serve as a reflection for all groups in Indonesia, whether Muslim groups, nationalists, students, or other movements, to actively engage in voicing the issue of Palestine. When opinions are strongly and massively expressed, they will be appreciated and followed by other publics across the globe.

Part of an ongoing article series on the impact of the Middle East conflict on Southeast Asia.

The Context Today

The ongoing Israeli war on Gaza has reached a critical juncture. Despite efforts by negotiators towards an immediate ceasefire and for humanitarian aid to be delivered, the talks have borne frustrating results.

In brief, the future of Israel-Palestine relations remains uncertain, as does the stability of the Middle East region at large.

The inability of the UN and other intergovernmental institutions to effect change in the geopolitical situation not only worsens the humanitarian crisis but also renders the legitimacy and capability of global regimes questionable.

The failure of the UN to protect Palestinian civilians exposes the ugly reality that even trusted global institutions and legal regimes can do nothing when the interests of global power are at stake.

The position of powerful Western countries in support of Israel and the opposing policy of non-Western powers like China and Russia have made it difficult for the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) to function effectively. The polarized responses of powerful countries on the issue, in the UNSC and beyond, have further deepened human rights violations in Gaza.

Regional insecurity has become more profound. Middle Eastern countries have been careful in calculating their moves vis-à-vis the crisis to preserve relative regional peace and security.

Still, certain geopolitical dilemmas and nuances begin to manifest themselves. For one, the conflict has also expanded to Lebanon and potentially Iran at the time of writing.

The inability of the UNSC to mediate may force other countries, both inside and outside the region, to directly or indirectly engage in the conflict.

For decades, the region has been mired in conflict as a result of long-standing colonial legacies and sustained external intervention pitting Middle Eastern countries against each other.

The Western deterritorialization project affecting geographic and socio-cultural domains in Arab and non-Arab Middle East has created multiple sovereignties and given way to sustained rivalries among state and non-state actors in the region.

The creation of Israel in 1948, for example, was received unfavorably by the Palestinians and several Arab countries. The series of Arab-Israeli wars and Arab-Palestinian conflicts, hence, have become the main determinant of past, present and possibly future peace discussions.

The polarizing policies of Western countries favoring Israel questions the West’s long-standing claim of championing humanitarianism. Scholars, politicians, students and the grassroots begin to ask if these countries still hold moral and ethical ascendancy, at least in the context of the Israeli war on Gaza.

Meanwhile, Al Jazeera’s uncensored coverage of the war presents the graphic reality of violations of human rights and international conventions, such as protecting public spaces like schools and hospitals during wartime.

The protests not only question the inhuman treatment of Palestinian civilians but also the motivations behind continued investment in Israel; they put pressure on many companies, universities and governments to reconsider their support as well as complicity in Israel’s atrocities. The diversity of Southeast Asian responses to the humanitarian crisis in Gaza can also be exploited by existing fundamentalist organizations in the region.

Nonetheless, some take the pro-Israeli position, arguing that Israel has the “right to exist” while condemning Hamas’ attacks on Israel as acts of “terrorism”.

Divergence in Southeast Asia

Southeast Asian states have diverging positions on the issue. Muslim countries like Malaysia, Indonesia and Brunei condemn Israeli forces for killing Palestinian civilians and question the effectiveness of international law and rule-based order.

The Malaysian Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim decried the Israeli war on Gaza, banning Israeli ships from docking on Malaysian ports. Meanwhile, Indonesia has pledged to continue its support for the Palestinian people by advancing the two-state solution.

Both Malaysia and Indonesia have even included the future of the Palestinian people in their foreign policy agenda.

Similarly, Singapore consistently supports the two-state solution and the primacy of international law. Considering its sizeable Muslim population, Singapore takes the “principled decision” of being a “friend to all and enemy to none”. Essentially, it aims to maintain relations with Israel while balancing its national interests and humanitarianism.

The Philippines takes a different approach altogether, continuing its official policy to support Israel but condemning the “terrorist” attacks of Hamas on Israeli citizens. The Philippines sees Israel as an allied country, second only to the United States. This may have created an awkward yet inevitable contrast between the Philippines’ stance and others in Southeast Asia, particularly the Muslim-majority nations.

Thailand and Singapore’s muted condemnation of Israel is calculated, as each has its own strategic and economic interests both with Israel and the United States.

Geopolitical uncertainties would force countries in Southeast Asia to re-evaluate their policies and approaches toward the region. It is important to note that these countries are also acting based on their national interests and domestic concerns.

Given the global strategic relevance of the Middle East in terms of history, energy supply, trade routes and migration, a prolonged war can cause further damages to global trade as well as foreign relations, while also weakening the prospects for humanitarian protection.

Historical Connection and Alliance with the United States

The position of the Philippine government and the support of the Filipino people to Israel are not without basis.

Officially, the Philippines voted for the partition of Palestine and the eventual creation of the State of Israel under UNGA Resolution 181 in 1947. In fact, the Philippines was the only Asian country that supported the creation of Israel.

Even earlier, in 1934, the government of former president Manuel Quezon welcomed the Jews who fled Europe amid Nazi persecution. With US High Commissioner McNutt and the Frieder brothers, the Philippines implemented an “open door” policy and authorized the issuance of 1,300 entry visas to Jewish refugees.

From the strategic point of view, the Philippines has always followed the United States as a big brother: its “blind support for Israel” is rooted in the unquestionable American-Israeli alliance.

In addition, a strategic partnership between the Philippines and Israel was inked in 2022 when both signed the Investment Promotion and Protection Agreement (IPPA), which covered areas such as water management, agriculture, cybersecurity, defense industry, smart transportation, manufacturing and diamond industry development, among others.

From the religious point of view, the predominantly Catholic Filipino people believe that Israel is the “promised land” and the place where Jesus was born. Indeed, around 40% of Filipinos mirror the government’s position on the war, while more than half are neutral.

Implications for the Philippines

The Philippines has always been vulnerable to geopolitical and security tensions in the Middle East. This has been the reality for the Philippines since the 1970s and it will continue until the country can fully exercise an independent foreign policy. This vulnerability arises from the country’s inability to direct its interests beyond its territories.

Furthermore, the country depends on the international labor market. 10% of its population is working and residing abroad. The majority of Filipino migrant workers are in the Middle East and their exposure to the regional conflict is undeniable.

The National Economic Development Authority’s claim that the war has “hardly any impact” on the Philippine economy is shortsighted. This is because of the country’s dependence on two critical elements of its relationship with the Middle East: oil and overseas Filipino workers (OFWs).  

These elements are vital to Philippine economic growth and development, yet their relevance is challenged by compounding regional events beyond the Philippine government’s control. Hence, for the Philippines, a peaceful Middle East is good for business, as it allows the smooth flow of oil as well as Filipino workers to the region and foreign remittances to the Philippine economy.

The Philippines’ position on the conflict is influenced by several considerations, the most important of which are history and the Philippine-American alliance, along with economic reasons and the safety of OFWs.

OFWs and Remittance

The conflict threatens the lives and safety of OFWs in the region. Recent data from the Philippine Statistics Authority shows that in 2023, the breakdown of OFW destinations is as follows: Asia (77.4%), North and South America (9.8%), Europe (8.4%), Australia (3.0%), and Africa (1.3%). Saudi Arabia was the leading destination for OFWs, accounting for 20% of the total, followed by the UAE at 13.6%.

Around 30,000 OFWs, mostly caregivers, are living and working in Israel. In 2023, their cash remittances to the Philippines reached ₱109.14 million, slightly lower than that in 2021 and 2022, which totaled ₱119.86 million and ₱110.63 million, respectively.

This is minimal compared with records from Saudi Arabia, the third largest source of overall remittances, from which OFW transfers amounted to US$307.981 million, or 5.6% of the total.

Saudi Arabia is followed by the UAE, which recorded remittances amounting to US$206.29 million, or 3.8%.

In comparison, available data shows that there are only a hundred plus Filipinos in Gaza, mainly married to Palestinian nationals. There is no available data so far on remittances coming from Filipinos in Gaza.

Great Concerns for the Philippines

Beyond the scope of OFWs, the Philippines are also facing other challenges emanating from the conflict. These include: 1) political and energy instability; 2) emergence of anti-Israeli sentiments; 3) conflict exploitation by domestic and regional terrorist organizations, and; 4) potential influx of Palestinian refugees.

As the conflict extended to Lebanon, Yemen and potentially Iran, there is a great deal of anxiety for a potential regional war. This could have global economic and security implications. It may impact the delivery of crude oil to the global market and lead to energy price volatility due either to shortage or market speculation.

Given the Philippines’ massive dependency on Middle Eastern oil, its volatility could affect the price movements of basic commodities and services domestically.

Another potential challenge for the Philippines and the rest of Southeast Asia is the rise of pro-Palestinian sentiment. All around the world, many students of big and small universities take part in public protests to demand the cessation of the Israel-Hamas war.

For instance, students at Columbia University in New York demanded the university’s divestiture from Israel over the “genocide” committed by the Israeli Defense Forces. Despite the government’s policy, modest protests could still be observed in several parts of the Philippines, although not as intense and disruptive as in other countries like the United States.

Finally, as the war continues, more Palestinian refugees may reach the Philippines, although so far only Filipinos married to Palestinians in Gaza have sought refuge in the archipelago since the beginning of the war. The presence of refugees in the country may add to the economic, legal and socio-cultural pressures that burden the host government.

Conclusion

The ongoing Israeli war on Gaza exposed the inability of governments and institutions to take action in favor of an immediate ceasefire. Existing international conventions and legal regimes supposedly for the preservation of humanity are powerless. With the polarizing attitudes of the UNSC permanent members and other powers, the UN has so far not been able to make an impactful decision to stop the war.

The Philippines’s strong support for Israel is based primarily on historical precedence and its national interests. Materially, the country’s strategic economic and political partnerships with Israel and the United States defined much of the country’s policy rhetoric. However, the country also stands to lose if the conflict in the Middle East expands to the whole region.

Introduction

President Joko “Jokowi” Widodo’s choice to forgo the 44^th ASEAN Summit – which took place in Vientiane, Laos, on 9 October 2024 – constitutes a strategic miscalculation that might deeply affect Indonesia’s regional stature and foreign policy aims.

As the largest member and de facto leader of ASEAN, Indonesia’s participation in the high-level event is crucial for steering the bloc’s direction, fostering unity and addressing common concerns among all members.

At a critical moment requiring Jakarta’s leadership, Jokowi unintentionally undermined Indonesia’s dedication to ASEAN by attributing his absence to domestic transitional factors.

Indonesia, ASEAN’s (Supposedly) De Facto Leader

The constructivist theory posits that state behavior is shaped by both their material capabilities as well as the values and norms they aspire to project and embody.

Indonesia’s sustained role as the de facto leader of ASEAN is predicated on its active engagement, influence and commitment to the collective norms and ideals of the region. This is because norms and ideas about leadership are established via ongoing actions and interactions.

This is also evidenced through the pivotal role Indonesia has played under Jokowi’s administration, influencing the overall trajectory of the ASEAN through its advocacy for initiatives such as the ASEAN Charter, the ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific (AOIP) and the Five-Point Consensus concerning the Myanmar crisis.

These contributions profoundly influence ASEAN’s identity and strategic stance in recent times.

Furthermore, the constructivist perspective also posits that ongoing interactions and sustained engagement in diplomatic contexts influence the comprehension of leadership. For example, Jokowi’s participation in past summits enhanced Indonesia’s standing and emphasized the nation’s normative position as the primary catalyst of ASEAN.

The prevailing view of Indonesia as a reliable leader and guardian of ASEAN principles is thus threatened by Jokowi’s choice to abstain from the Summit. The dual nature of leadership – encompassing both authority and the preservation of credibility to exemplify effective guidance – suggests that this change in perception could hinder Indonesia’s ability to influence the agenda inside the bloc.

In light of Jokowi’s absence, Vietnamese Prime Minister Pham Minh Chinh conveyed his hope for Indonesia’s ongoing contribution to ASEAN’s development under the new administration’s leadership.

Even Prime Minister Sonexay Siphandone of Laos commended Indonesia for its historical achievements and recognized that Jokowi’s attendance would have bolstered the bloc’s cohesion in tackling regional concerns.

Such sentiments represent the heightened expectations of Indonesia’s ASEAN allies, rendering Jokowi’s absence even more significant.

Jokowi is also a prominent leader who has established contacts within the bloc—his absence has thus deprived Indonesia of an opportunity to reaffirm its leadership role and presence in the region.

This absence could potentially create a leadership gap, opening the door for other parties with differing or competing interests to assert themselves and shape the regional agenda in ways that might not align with Indonesia’s strategic goals.

While Vice President Ma’ruf Amin’s participation guaranteed Indonesia’s representation, the nation’s diplomatic stature was not on a level with that of other countries. Due to Ma’ruf’s insufficient expertise in international diplomacy, he was unable to effectively convey Indonesia’s influence and engage in critical discussions.

This is not the first time Jokowi has skipped international events. Foreign Minister Retno Marsudi has consistently championed Indonesia’s interests internationally, often compensating for the president when Jokowi prioritized domestic and political interests.

In the absence of the head of state’s direct involvement, even the most adept diplomat can achieve only marginal success in their diplomatic efforts. Indonesia’s foreign policy necessitates more than a mere assortment of activities; it demands sustained high-level engagement to ensure legitimacy and efficacy.

The Reason

The Foreign Ministry press briefing stated that Jokowi’s absence is due to his involvement in the power transition process, as Prabowo Subianto is slated to take over the presidency post later this month. However, this inadequately justified the choice to forgo such a significant gathering.

With more than a week remaining before Prabowo’s inauguration, Jokowi has more than sufficient time to complete all his outstanding obligations to ASEAN. His participation in upholding the legacy of his foreign policy and assuring ASEAN allies of Indonesia’s steadfast commitment would have been appropriate.

Jokowi’s decision to stay back thus eclipsed the objectives of his administration, leading many to question whether ASEAN was genuinely a priority for Jakarta during his tenure.

What This Means to ASEAN

The current situation in ASEAN renders this omission particularly noteworthy and troubling. The region is presently confronting multiple intricate challenges, such as the escalating rivalry between the United States and China, the humanitarian crisis in Myanmar, and repercussions from major conflicts in several parts of the world.

The leadership of Indonesia is crucial for guiding the bloc through what will seem to be several tumultuous years in the future. Under Prabowo’s administration, Jakarta must reaffirm Indonesia’s position as the regional anchor in order to maintain Indonesia’s proactive involvement and ensure continuity as well as stability within ASEAN.

The constructivist thesis also argues that Indonesia’s leadership role in ASEAN is dependent on both power dynamics and the norms and expectations of other nations regarding Jakarta. The normative authority of Indonesia is undermined if it fails to fulfil these expectations, thus obstructing the nation’s capacity to lead by consensus and secure backing for its initiatives.

Jokowi’s choice may inadvertently prompt other regional leaders to scrutinize Indonesia’s dedication to the collective ideals and principles of ASEAN, unbeknownst to him. Given that Indonesia – the conventional linchpin of ASEAN – may forgo participation in such a significant assembly, it is perplexing why other nations would feel obligated to attend every conference.

Worse, it might send the wrong signal that ASEAN high-level meetings are no longer worthy of its leaders’ time and effort, a significant blow to the multilateral process in Southeast Asia.

Moreover, it might trigger a broader concern with Indonesia’s foreign policy. Despite the administration’s focus on pragmatic diplomacy and economic development, it often lacks constructive engagement in regional and global issues.

For example, critics pointed out Indonesia’s lack of gusto in asserting pressure to stop violence in Myanmar, even as the country chaired ASEAN last year. This reflective viewpoint has strengthened the suspicion that Indonesia may have diverged from its conventional leadership role in the region, though deeper investigation is necessary.

Although Jokowi’s decision may yield short-term benefits to his political agenda, it undermines the nation’s global influence and reputation. This disengagement may have enduring consequences for the strategic significance of a nation seeking to establish itself as a middle power in Southeast Asia and the Indo-Pacific while expanding its economic influence in Latin America and the Caribbean.

Conclusion and Ways Forward

Indonesia’s involvement in ASEAN Summits and other regional fora should be regarded as essential platforms for the nation to assert its influence on the future trajectory of regional developments.

Jokowi’s absence jeopardizes Indonesia’s regional standing and somewhat weakens ASEAN’s unity in navigating a challenging geopolitical landscape, constituting a diplomatic misstep and a strategic error.

This is unfortunate considering Indonesia is gaining significance amid the intricate dynamics of the region, characterized by competition among major countries and domestic political instability.

The Indonesian authorities must acknowledge the imperative for a more assertive and engaged foreign policy to uphold ASEAN’s centrality as well as to ensure Jakarta’s prominence in regional leadership.

Only through unwavering engagement can Indonesia sustain its role as the cornerstone of ASEAN and a significant contributor to Southeast Asia’s growth.

With the transition to a new administration under Prabowo, Indonesia has a substantial chance to realign its foreign policy and restore its leadership role within ASEAN. Prabowo clearly comprehends the importance of regional and international ties, as evidenced by his broad diplomatic initiatives following his decisive political triumph.

Prabowo must prioritize fortifying Indonesia’s standing within ASEAN, championing initiatives to uphold regional tranquillity and ensuring that Jakarta remains a reliable leader and ally. In short, he needs to quickly ameliorate this reputational damage.v