Targeting the Northern Hub

Myanmar resistance forces are pushing the line with the latest drone attack against a civilian aircraft that was about to take off for Mandalay from Kachin State’s Myitkyina Airport. On 20 February 2026, a suicide drone struck a Myanmar National Airlines (MNA) ATR-72-600 aircraft, causing damage to its nose, fuselage and tail.

As expected, nobody claimed responsibility, given the likelihood of blowback from the international community—much of which is cheering for the rebels, not the military-backed Myanmar government. The latter recently concluded a general election that is neither accepted nor endorsed by much of the world, including ASEAN Member States (AMS).

According to one theory, the drone was targeting the adjacent Northern Command headquarters but was shot down by airport security, causing it to crash into the passenger plane. The military headquarters share the same border fence with the airport.

Nevertheless, it was too close for comfort by any measure. The attack marked a significant step up in escalation, given that rebel forces have generally left civilian targets – much less commercial passenger aircraft – alone.

Myitkyina Airport serves as a critical air transport hub for the northern Kachin State, facilitating the movement of people and goods to major cities like Yangon and Mandalay. Attacks on such infrastructure are intended to undermine governance and disrupt regional stability.

While the airport remained operational, 2025 saw resistance forces successfully using FPV drones against other high-value military targets in the region. For example, in May 2025, the Kachin Independence Army (KIA) used a drone to down a military Mi-17 transport helicopter in nearby Shwegu.

The 12 February 2026 FPV drone strike on the airport was intercepted, resulting in no damage to infrastructure, though it did cause flight cancellations.

Resistance forces in the region had already been using similar drone technology in other operations, such as the 8 February strike that destroyed a radar station at the nearby Nant Paung Air Base.

The lack of direct hits on Kachin airport in 2025 suggests that the more recent attacks in February 2026 – including the FPV drone strike on 12 February – represent a “significant escalation” in the resistance’s ability to penetrate the capital’s high-security airspace.

This highlights a shift toward precision-guided, low-cost technology that is difficult for traditional security to detect.

The Rise of the “Autonomous” PDF

Attacking a heavily fortified site guarded by approximately 20 junta troops at every entrance and protected by Air Defence Operation Commands requires a level of coordination.

The Myanmar government immediately accused the KIA and the People’s Defence Force (PDF), the latter of which is officially the armed wing of the National Unity Government (NUG), formed in response to the 2021 military coup.

But over the years, the term PDF has become a catch-all for newly emerged militia groups taking up arms against the junta. Not all PDF units fall under the NUG’s command and control.

A report released in May 2025 states that while the “Integrated” and the “Allied” PDFs are part of the NUG’s formalised military structure, the “Autonomous” and “Localized” PDFs operate without direct oversight from the NUG. These last two categories each have their own networks and generate their own funding through donations as well as small-scale business activities.

For the long-standing resistance forces such as the KIA and the NUG, both of whom seek global support against the military-backed government of Myanmar, civility and international norms must be respected. But when it comes to the actions of autonomous and localised PDFs, these long-standing organisations enjoy plausible deniability.

As Myanmar reaches a new threshold, such as the recently concluded general election, fighting on the ground will have to be understood in a post-election context. While the 20 February attack was widely seen as an escalation, no one can predict where this leads.

The “Lone Wolf” Threat to Chinese Interests

Some in the resistance community are not ruling out attacks on the Chinese pipeline that runs from the Rakhine State to Kunming in Yunnan province. While China has an agreement with the Myanmar government and long-standing ethnic armed organisations (EAOs) such as the Arakan Army (AA) to provide protection for the pipeline, independently organised PDF units who do not report to any long-standing groups could become that “lone wolf” behind such an attack.

In May last year, the PDFs’ highly coordinated offensive – Operation 9/A Nyar Myae – overran four Mandalay townships, forcing government troops to abandon a key off-take station for the Chinese gas and oil pipelines.

Approximately 50 government troops were killed during this one-day coordinated offensive targeting 12 government positions in the Mandalay region. The operation involved around 12 distinct resistance groups operating within the region. In response, government forces launched several days of intermittent clashes and conducted retaliatory airstrikes.

Beijing’s Heavy Hand: Relinquishing the Gains

By late 2025, Myanmar troops retook most positions; Chinese intervention played a key role in the resistance surrendering territory.

During the campaign to recover previously lost territories, there was no evidence indicating that the PDFs were utilising the pipeline as collateral. This demonstrates a shared recognition by both resistance forces and government troops of the strategic significance of the Chinese pipeline. Furthermore, any direct intervention by China could result in adverse consequences for all parties involved.

Beyond the PDFs in Mandalay, approximately 245km east, the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA) was compelled to return Lashio, which is the junta’s main defensive position in northern Shan State.

About the same time, the Ta’ang National Liberation Army (TNLA) was pressured to relinquish recently secured territories, including Mogok, a world-famous ruby mining centre, back to the junta.

The return of Nawnghkio, Kyaukme and Hsipaw allowed Myanmar to reopen the critical trade highway between Mandalay and the Chinese border. These handovers were made possible through China-mediated negotiations in October 2025, during which Beijing abandoned any pretence of acting as an impartial mediator.

The resistance forces’ setbacks at the hands of China were a stark reminder that nothing comes easy in Myanmar’s rugged conflict zones, where EAOs, PDFs and regime forces all play for keeps. The PDFs likely felt jaded after retreating from the Mandalay positions they had seized in May 2025. They were also frustrated with the TNLA, which had ordered them to do so. Hard feelings aside, one thing the resistance can agree on is that they cannot withstand Chinese pressure.

But has China crossed the line—no one in the resistance forces would say. There is little choice but to absorb the blow, regroup and continue fighting even if the playing field is an uneven one.

So why seize territory only to return it to the junta under Chinese influence? Groups like the MNDAA, the TNLA and the PDFs may not be willing to confront China directly about their objection. These groups understand fully the diplomatic and strategic costs if they choose to upset China. But the autonomous PDFs operate under no such constraint. For them, it becomes a matter of timing and opportunity, not principle.

Resistance forces in Myanmar have shown their objections in actions such as attacks on Chinese interest in Myanmar following the 2021 coup. Chinese-owned factories in Yangon’s industrial zones were burnt, as protesters accused Beijing of backing the coup. Frustration exists, indeed; the question is whether and through whom it finds an outlet.

Introduction

At the heart of Thailand and Cambodia’s stormy bilateral relations lies their border conflict that has gone through periodic flare-ups, but none as severe as 2025’s clashes.

The conflict’s root causes are now intertwined with modern forces of globalisation, such as transnational crime and information warfare, offering grave lessons in modern governance and addressing security threats that transcend borders.

Meanwhile, elite capture of domestic and foreign politics, major power involvement, and regional inertia on conflict management contribute to the conflict’s protracted nature, ensuring no easy solution for peace.

Background

Colonial-era boundary treaties between Siam (Thailand before 1933) and French Indochina placed various Khmer-style temples in ambiguously demarcated zones. With the exception of the Preah Vihear Temple, which the International Court of Justice (ICJ) ruled as belonging to Cambodia in 1962, the area around three other temples remains hotly contested, with little to no progress on border demarcation.

Between May and July 2025, severe fighting broke out along several border provinces in Cambodia and Thailand.

A fragile ceasefire was reached on 28 July, overseen by Malaysia, then chair of ASEAN, the United States and China. On the sidelines of the 47th ASEAN Summit in Kuala Lumpur, Thailand and Cambodia signed the Kuala Lumpur Peace Accords, witnessed by Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim and President Donald Trump.

After weeks of renewed fighting in December 2025, another ceasefire was reached on 27 December.

To complicate the already volatile border environment, Chinese-run transnational criminal networks housing thousands of trafficked workers are operating cyber-scam compounds along the Cambodian border.

Stoking the Flames of War

While both sides blame the other for starting the hostilities, what is clear is that the lopsided domestic power balance enables the political and military elites in Thailand and Cambodia to needlessly prolong the conflict. This is done by shaping domestic and foreign policies based on ultra-nationalist sentiment, as well as exploiting information asymmetries of both local and international

Military information operations on both sides have each vilified the other and downplayed the significance of the temples as shared cultural symbols. Such operations have exponentially scaled up, exacerbated by the proliferation of fake news.

Former Cambodian strongman Hun Sen remains the most powerful actor in the country, despite his son serving as the current prime minister. He has been dictating all military decisions surrounding the conflict.

Although Cambodia is the militarily weaker nation, Hun Sen seems confident in waging war by utilising his authoritarian grip on power and deep knowledge and relationships with Thai politicians to destabilise Thai politics.

The country’s information vacuum – stemming from the stifling of government criticism and dissenting views of the war as well as scant information about the Cambodian military – has allowed Cambodian elites to perpetuate a narrative of victimhood.

On the other hand, the powerful Thai military has gained public trust and enjoyed a resurgence in popularity over its handling of the border conflict, with a view to shoring up support for pro-military parties in the next general election in February 2026. It has deliberately projected its image as a unified, disciplined unit and protector of national security, especially after pledging to regain the disputed temples.

Despite this, technical issues of border demarcation continue to be shrouded in secrecy, with the Thai military refusing to publicly disclose the results of its own border surveys.

Multidimensional Conflict

The conflict has become entangled with scam operations that operate openly on the Cambodian side, demonstrating the extent of corruption and complicity with organised crime inside the Cambodian government.

The global spotlight is now firmly on the border scam economy that likely provides illicit income for Cambodian elites, generating revenue equivalent to half of Cambodia’s GDP.

For much of 2025, the Thai government has largely been foot-dragging to tackle scam operations. Only recently have they begun seizing assets and expanding the investigation of Cambodian-Chinese criminal networks after being pressured by major power scrutiny. Thai air strikes now specifically target scam compounds housing Cambodian military assets.

As investigative reports increasingly point to an alleged connection between scam operators and high-level Thai elites, the tactic to cut off the Cambodian government’s alleged source of revenue has hit a wall of reticence by the current administration. This raises questions about possible vested cross-border business interests between the two countries’ elites.

Are Major Powers Helping or Hurting?

Prolonged b

As the world grapples with Trump’s erratic behaviour, the United States’ involvement is perceived as performative, with no sincere desire to resolve the conflict but to push for its economic interests in the form of high tariffs, which the Thai side has rejected.

The United States has not taken the opportunity to shore up its alliance with Thailand, its major non-NATO ally. Instead, it has been hedging its bets in the conflict by downplaying the grievances of Thailand and the thawing US-Cambodia ties after the peace accords by lifting an arms embargo and pledging to restart joint military trainings.

Nonetheless, the judge is still out on whether Cambodia can genuinely become the United States’ strategic partner, as it traditionally has close security ties with China.

Meanwhile, Cambodian Prime Minister Hun Manet has played up his shared authoritarian affinities with Trump – as well as the latter’s personal interest in peacemaking – by nominating him for the Nobel Peace Prize after the peace accords were signed.

Hun Manet’s friendship with fellow graduates from his alma mater, the United States’ West Point Academy, also raises questions about the neutrality of US policy decision-makers towards the conflict.

In contrast to the United States’ high-stakes diplomatic pressure, the Chinese have preferred low-profile, non-coercive diplomacy to mediate the conflict. But there is scepticism over China’s declaration of having no vested interest in the conflict, given its significant political, economic and defence ties with both countries as well as its desire to counter the United States’ overtures to its key partners in the region.

China already has a poor track record in conflict management in Southeast

ASEAN’s Role

ASEAN’s lack of binding frameworks and structured conflict management has prompted member states to rely on personal rapport and informal discussions over institutionalised mechanisms. But leaning on current mechanisms and personalities, such as Track 1.5 diplomacy, has failed to resolve regional conflicts.

Before last year’s clashes, the calculated military build-up in both countries was clear, but ASEAN did little to address heightening tensions.

The current ASEAN Secretary-General Kao Kim Hourn, a Cambodian, is not trusted to mediate the current conflict, as was the case with the former secretary-general, Surin Pitsuwan, a Thai, during clashes in 2008.

Malaysia’s Anwar has proactively mediated in the conflict by facilitating various ceasefire meetings and coordinating the work of the ASEAN Observer Team (AOT) that has provided a neutral source of facts from the ground. Nevertheless, his time for peacemaking has run out, as Malaysia’s chairmanship ended late last year.

ASEAN’s conflict management modus operandi cannot be reformed overnight. But stepping up peer pressure to bolster adherence to regional and UN mechanisms on early-warning systems, confidence-building measures, and weapons non-proliferation will go a long way to prevent escalations and encourage dialogue.

The region should coordinate with external partners to pressure both countries to clamp down on transnational crime that plays both a direct and supporting role in sustaining the conflict. Ramping up efforts to tackle illicit money flows in Thailand, the main destination for laundered scam profits from Cambodia, would be a good start.

Silencing the Guns

The border conflict has dragged on due to both sides’ belligerent, authoritarian tendencies and toxic ultra-nationalism, alongside the dubious attempts at mediation by external players.

There is little political will on both sides to de-escalate the situation, as pro-military parties attempt to win over hearts and minds of the public for Thailand’s general election in February 2026, while Cambodia’s Hun regime appears more entrenched in power than ever.

Although Thailand has the military advantage, the Thai side is mindful of Cambodian retaliation as well as backlash from the international community if military operations are stepped up. Thus, a stalemate is the current medium- to long-term scenario, especially if both sides do not sincerely return to mechanisms such as the Joint Boundary Commission, the main bilateral mechanism for negotiations on border demarcation.

To ensure neutrality and impartiality of mediation, returning to ASEAN-led mediation is the most constructive path forward as well as boosting the capacity of the AOT. The Philippines, as the current ASEAN chair, is expected to bring its conflict management skills from domestic experiences to the role of mediator.

A woman wakes at dawn to the whine of drones. A trader abandons a shop whose customers have vanished. A riverbank swells with families turned back at an international gate.

These are not isolated scenes; they form a pattern drawn across Southeast Asia. They are also the everyday reality in Myanmar, where conditions have worsened dramatically since the military coup in 2021.

Forced migration in and from Myanmar is not a humanitarian footnote. It is a political metric; the most visible indicator of who holds power, who loses it and how external actors shape the battlefield in the ongoing civil war.

Discussions around China’s role in Myanmar tend to be framed in familiar terms: strategic corridors, major investments, influence over the junta and ethnic armed organisations (EAOs). Those are necessary frames but insufficient. They describe the machinery of power without tracing its human consequences. If displacement is moved to the centre of analysis, a more accurate map emerges; a map shaped not only by frontline violence but also by Beijing’s quiet signalling, its silences and its calculations.

Border Politics as Geopolitical Messaging

China’s pu

This dynamic is most evident along the China-Myanmar frontier. Every major escalation in northern Shan or Kachin generates two immediate questions: will civilians run, and will China let them in? Beijing’s border behaviour, sometimes permissive, other times abruptly restrictive, acts as a form of geopolitical messaging. Allowing crossings can stabilise local conflict dynamics; tightening the border can discipline armed actors or register political displeasure.

The result: displacement patterns that align not only with violence on the ground but also with shifts in China’s interest, leading to waves of forced returns or surges of escape depending on the border posture.

Infrastructure, Strategic Zones of Protection and Exposure

China’s infrastructure architecture in Myanmar – such as the oil and gas pipelines, the Kyaukphyu port and the Muse-Ruili trade zone – form a network of leverage rather than isolated investments. These nodes create differentiated zones of protection and exposure.

In areas critical to Beijing’s Belt-and-Road calculus, there tends to be a kind of “managed re

The recent displacement surges in places like Rakhine illustrate this clearly: China’s silence was not neutrality; it was permissive space.

Fragmented Regional Response: Why Displacement Remains a Crisis

Despite predictable patterns of forced migration tied to geopolitics, the regional response remains fragmented. ASEAN, via its Five-Point Consensus (5PC), remains structurally incapable of handling displacement at scale because it prioritises state sovereignty over cross-border humanitarian coordination.

The consequences of this fragmentation fall on individual states, which must improvise their responses rather than pursue a long-term strategy. For example, some countries allow temporary humanitarian corridors only to shut them with little notice. Others apply radically different approaches across their territories (often shaped by ethnic, political or security calculations). Many host secondary movements with newly displaced people routed via third countries without a unified legal framework linking domestic reception to regional displacement trends.

This policy fragmentation is not just inefficient. It is dangerous. The strategic choices of powerful external actors like China produce waves of movement. Southeast Asia’s inability to anticipate them creates cascading crises: overcrowded camps, expanding smuggling markets, fluctuating humanitarian access and political tensions among neighbouring states.

Displacement as a Strategic Diagnostic

The temporal dimension of displacement further complicates things. China’s engagement can generate brief, fragile pauses or rather windows in which families return, rebuild, or hide. But these are often replaced quickly by new surges when diplomatic restraint is withdrawn or armed actors attempt territorial gains.

Regional migration economies respond accordingly. When official borders close, smugglers expand routes and raise prices. When China allows temporary crossings, humanitarian organisations scramble to deliver aid amid shifting access rules. The business of escape grows more sophisticated in direct response to policy unpredictability. For many Burmese, paying a smuggler becomes the only consistent element in an inconsistent political landscape.

Crucially, none of this implies China is intentionally engineering displacement. Rather, displacement is a predictable externality of its strategic calculus, and predictable externalities demand structured responses. Treating forced migration as an unfortunate spillover invites only humanitarian triage

A Test for Regional Governance

If the junta’s planned elections proceed at the end of December amid regional ambivalence and weak accountability, Beijing’s leverage will harden. The military may intensify operations in areas where China exerts minimal restraining influence. EAOs will respond to shifting incentives. Civilians will move again, not because politics is uncertain, but because it is too clear.

The future of Southeast Asia’s displacement geography will be written by a combination of China’s calculations, Myanmar’s internal collapse, and the region’s willingness or refusal to respond collectively.

What is at stake is not simply the management of borders but the moral and strategic credibility of Southeast Asia itself. States that continue to treat migration as a peripheral risk are being overwhelmed by its con

Forced migration, then, is not collateral. It is a lens. It reveals which districts fall outside diplomatic concern, which borders are quietly opened, which routes smugglers exploit and which states absorb the consequences of decisions made far beyond their control. Every family pushed to a riverbank, every village emptied in a night, every makeshift camp beneath a shuttered border gate—these are not incidental tragedies. They are, line by line, the ledger of geopolitical choice.

Conclusion

To move forward, Southeast Asia must reframe displacement as a strategic diagnostic tool,

In Myanmar, population movements track political truths long before diplomats acknowledge them. When entire districts empty overnight, it is not because civilians misread the situation. But because they understood it sooner than the rest of us.

If regional governments analysed displacement flows with the same rigour they apply to trade flows, shipping lanes or military exercises, they would see emerging risks months in advance. Instead, states respond only when boats arrive

The years ahead will test whether the region can transcend habitual caution and reimagine migration governance as collective security. A coordinated framework could integrate climate-induced movement, labour mobility and refugee protection within a single regional architecture. Such a shift would not only mitigate humanitarian crises but also stabilise markets, reduce trafficking and foster regional trust. Th

Introduction

The collapse of the four crime families and other Kokang warlords in late 2023 reverberated throughout Myanmar, delivering an unmistakable warning to armed groups and criminal networks: that no one remains beyond reach – regardless of connections or perceived power – if they target Chinese citizens with scams.

For years, these criminal syndicates operated scam centres and conducted illicit activities along the Sino-Myanmar border. Their control of the Kokang Border Guard Force (BGF) positioned them as allies of Myanmar’s powerful military junta.

Their fortunes reversed when China determined that the situation had become intolerable. Beijing gave the Three Brotherhood Alliance (3BHA) – a coalition comprising the Arakan Army, the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA) and the Ta’ang National Liberation Army (TNLA) – an authorisation to dismantle these operations after Myanmar’s generals refused to act against their Kokang allies. The four families fled, seeking protection from the junta as their empire crumbled. With nothing to offer in exchange for sanctuary, Myanmar’s generals arrested them and extradited them to China. Many received death sentences, while others faced life imprisonment for their crimes.

The End of Tolerance

The downfall of the Kokang family and BGF resonated throughout Myanmar, including with the 7,000-strong Karen BGF led by Col Chit Thu, a powerful warlord controlling substantial territory along the Thai border.

Approximately a decade ago, Chinese criminal syndicates began relocating to Karen BGF territory, constructing compounds housing entertainment complexes, brothels, casinos and cyber scam centres generating billions of dollars annually. Chit Thu maintained publicly that he merely collected rent and bore no responsibility for his tenants’ activities.

However, witnessing the merciless dismantling of the Kokang and their BGF allies instilled apprehension in Chit Thu. Hoping to distance himself from the stigma of association with the Tatmadaw, Chit Thu announced in January 2024 that his organisation had withdrawn from the Tatmadaw’s chain of command. The rebranded Karen National Army (KNA) still gets referred to by media and locals as BGF, however. Despite his efforts, Chit Thu could not escape the tarnished reputation.

By 2025, international tolerance had reached its limit. The US Department of the Treasury sanctioned KNA as a transnational criminal organisation in May. In November, a smaller group operating under a ceasefire arrangement with the junta – the Democratic Karen Benevolent Army (DKBA) and its top four leaders – joined the sanctions list. The United States simultaneously launched a new Scam Center Strike Force targeting these cybercriminals. DKBA is a signatory to the government’s National Ceasefire Agreement (NCA), a nationwide accord hastily assembled by the Thein Sein government in October 2015.

Earlier this year, Chinese Assistant Minister of Public Security Liu Zhongyi made two successive visits to the Thailand-Myanmar border, pressuring both countries to take action. Thailand complied by cutting utilities and internet access, only to see them replaced by generators, Starlink terminals and smuggled fuel. Ironically, these measures impacted local communities more severely than the criminal operations.

KNA and its criminal associates released approximately 7,000 people from the scam centres, allowing them to flee to Thailand for processing and return to their home countries. Chinese nationals comprised the largest group.

Th

Evacuations and Optics

Eight months later, in late October 2025, an assault on KK Park, one of the Chinese-run notorious compounds in the Myawaddy area, forced approximately 1,700 mostly foreign nationals to flee across the border to Thailand. They came from 21 different countries—most were Chinese nationals.

Four weeks later, in late November 2025, Myanmar soldiers, this time joined reluctantly by KNA troops, attacked the Shwe Kokko compound, forcing thousands to flee as troops demolished over 100 buildings in a desperate demonstration to the international community that Myanmar’s military government takes law and order seriously.

Not everyone is departing Myawaddy, however. Many scammers have chosen to remain, dispersing throughout Myawaddy Township to continue illicit operations from privately rented homes, dormitories and hotels, according to Mizzima News.

Both KK Park and Shwe Kokko sit within Myawaddy Township, the Myanmar border town adjacent to Thailand’s Mae Sot district. The two compounds occupy territory controlled by KNA.

The crackdowns have proven inconsistent. A Thai security officer said weeks before the October assault on KK Park, KNA had been relocating Chinese site managers and “bosses” from these scam compounds to a new location north of Mae Sot.

“They (KNA) were charging substantial sums of money and splitting it with Myanmar authorities,” said a Thai security officer monitoring the border situation. The attack against Shwe Kokko a month later followed the same pattern, with site managers and those who could afford it being evacuated before what was supposedly a surprise attack, the officer said.

Mizzima News, citing local sources, reported that Chinese nationals believed to be crime syndicate members were evacuated on the evening of 17 November 2025 by KNA troops, the night before the raid on the Shwe Kokko compound.

“They won’t let us go outside. All the doors are locked. There are no more Chinese inside, only us Myanmar people and some other foreigners. The building lights are off, and we’re not allowed to use phones. I think they freed the Chinese and are keeping us as hostages,” a 22-year-old Myanmar woman inside one of the buildings told Mizzima News.

Observers suggest Myanmar wants to demonstrate to the world that it takes crime seriously and that it regards the upcoming general election as significant. However, compelling Chit Thu’s KNA to destroy the source of his wealth, from which the government gets a cut, has not achieved the desired public relations outcome.

Speaking in Bangkok, Prof Yanghee Lee, former UN Special Rapporteur for human rights in Myanmar, called on ASEAN and the international community to adopt a more active role and principled engagement to bring about change in Myanmar.

“Unfortunately, Myanmar possesses abundant natural resources that other countries want. Once the election concludes, many countries will reach out and enter the country, which will be devastating news for the people of Myanmar. It will be on our watch that the people of Myanmar will be crushed even more,” Prof Lee said.

Shifting Alliances

Indeed, the fragile dynamics between DKBA, an NCA signatory, and Karen National Union (KNU), a major rebel outfit fighting the junta, erupted on 21 November when they clashed in a brief gunfight near Min Let Pan village, approximately 16km south of Myawaddy.

According to a DKBA liaison officer in Mae Sot, stray gunfire struck their position, triggering limited retaliation—standard operat

KNU, however, characterised the incident in a 25 November statement as a “coordinated attack”. A subsequent ground assessment uncovered an active scam compound in the area housing more than 2,000 foreign workers, predominantly Chinese.

According to a Thai intelligence officer on the border, DKBA had closed the Hpalu-Wawlay Road – strategically crucial as it has been the site of intense fighting between the Tatmadaw and resistance forces – as leverage to secure the return of the 230 captured fighters. Within a week, KNU returned all captured DKBA members and their weapons.

As the Tatmadaw intensified operations to retake the area around Min Let Pan, KNU warned on 2 December that it could no longer guarantee the safety of the 900 remaining foreign nationals refusing to evacuate a compound.

In their statement, KNU spokesman Padoh Saw Taw Nee called on China to pressure the Tatmadaw to halt heavy weapons fire and aerial bombardment, warning that lives hung in the balance.

In a statement dated 6 December, KNU accused the Tatmadaw of deliberately targeting unarmed civilians with mortar fire into the Shunda Park compound, noting that some rounds strayed across the border, forcing villagers on the Thai side to flee.

KNU suggested that some people trapped in the compound might be high-value criminals and urged the international community to intervene quickly.

KNU said 2,460 out of 2,665 persons had been transferred from Shunda Park to Thai authorities. Many had fled the compound independently, refusing to surrender to Thai authorities, possibly from fear of persecution back home. The borderlands remain a volatile mosaic of shifting alliances, criminal enterprises and desperate civilians—a testament to a decades-old conflict now deeply entangled with the global scourge of cyber-scamming.

Introduction

Indonesia has consistently supported the One China policy, which views the Republic of China (Taiwan) as an inseparable part of the People’s Republic of China (China).

Recently, however, several countries have questioned the essence of the One China policy and challenged the United Nations Resolution 2758, which views the latter as “the only legitimate representative of China to the United Nations.” This Resolution, which was passed in 1971, consequently removed Taiwan’s seat.

These countries maintain that the Resolution does not restrict Taiwan’s participation at the United Nations and objects to the notion that China could assert authority over Taiwan, although rising geopolitical tension might have encouraged such a position.

The Netherlands and the European Parliament are of the position that the Resolution does not entail Taiwan’s exc

Although these are the stances of certain European countries, their arguments are nonetheless valid and need to be taken into consideration.

Since the adoption of the Resolution, China has been actively promoting the “One China, Two Systems” principle, despite differing interpretations by both nations. Even in Taiwan, the two largest political parties – the Kuomintang (KMT) and the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) – have distinct China engagement policies.

DPP, for instance, is pro-independence from China. Its victories in the 2016 and 2024 elections incited concerns on the mainland’s part, which has pursued the agenda of reunification. In response, DPP has consistently sought international support to enhance legitimacy and reduce its dependence on China, including in the economic sphere.

In 2016, for example, then president Tsai Ing-wen introduced the New Southbound Policy (NSP) to diversify Taiwan’s economic partners. More recently, Vice President Hsiao Bi-Khim made a rare speech in Brussels, echoing Taiwan’s values of democracy and pleading for international support.

Instances such as this have worsened relations between the two. In response, Beijing has undertaken multiple steps to lessen Taiwan’s legitimacy, such as influencing Taiwan’s allies to cut off diplomatic relations. In 2019, the Solomon Islands announced it recognises only China, prompting Tsai to state that China used dollar diplomacy to shake Solomon’s decision. Similarly, in 2024, Nauru cut off diplomatic ties with Taiwan in favour of China.

Between China and Taiwan

With mounting pressure to reinterpret the Resolution, Indonesia would be inadvertently pressured to revisit the matter as well.

Indonesia has diplomatic relations with China but also acknowledges Taiwan as a nation. Indonesia’s relationship with China has varied in history, marked by strong political ties during the Soekarno years that were suspended following China’s alleged involvement in the 1965 tragedy. Ties were restored in 1990 and have seen an upward trend since. On the other hand, Indonesia and Taiwan agreed to establish the Taipei Economic and Trade Office (TETO) in Jakarta, though this does not function as a normal embassy.

In his first overseas visit, President Prabowo Subianto reaffirmed Indonesia’s relationship with China, rehashing Indonesia’s stance with regard to Resolution 2758 and supporting China’s efforts to achieve a peaceful reunification with Taiwan. These are consistent with his predecessor’s policy, which also subscribed tosupported the One China policy. 

Indonesia and China have extensive economic relations. In 2024, Indonesia received the highest amou

At the same time, Indonesia seeks to m

Trade volume between Indonesia and Taiwan in 2024 was US$10.8 billion, far below that with China. Meanwhile, Taiwan’s investment in Indonesia, by 2024, reachedamounted to US$184 million, primarily in the tech sector.

At the same time, people-to-people relations have also improved; Taiwan hosts students who attend many top-ranked Taiwanese universities that charge lower tuition costs than European and American universities do. Taiwan is also home to Indonesian migrant workers. In 2025, the number of Indonesian migrant workers reached 313,000, up from 2024, making it one of the top sending countries for three years in a row.

Indonesia’s Stance

With the ongoing push to reinterpret the Resolution, Indonesia may soon find its position precarious, albeit marginally, especially if the geopolitical tension involving China worsens.

It would be challenging to expect countries with strong political, economic and sociocultural links to China to revise their position. They might, nonetheless, face a dilemma in which they are forced to choose between China and those seeking to reinterpret the Resolution.

The difficult position does not emanate from diplomatic or non-diplomatic relations but from pragmatic considerations. 

Since Prabowo took office, his foreign policy has demonstrated Indonesia’s intent to get closer to China. In January 2025, Indonesia officially joined BRICS, despite the previous administration’s intent to join the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) instead for its economic benefit.

By aligning closer with the Global South, especially Russia and China, Prabowo might have intensified the previous administration’s inclination to grow closer to these countries. A case in point: despite violent riots spreading across Indonesian cities in late August, Prabowo still made an effort to attend the 2025 China Victory Parade a few days later.

Furthermore, a leaked conversation between Prabowo and Minister of Defence Sjafrie Sjamsoeddin pointed towards the former’s commitment to mainta

Conclusion

These signs suggest that, under Prabowo’s leadership, Indonesia aims to consistently adhere to the One China policy, despite Taiwan’s efforts to rally international support. This seems to be motivated more by pragmatic considerations than a strict observation of an international norm.

Indeed, Indonesia’s position is intertwined with China’s that it is almost impossible to imagine a scenario whereby Indonesian policymakers would seek to revise this. However, this does not mean that the country cannot extend its diplomatic hands and support to Taiwan, albeit with certain constraints. Despite the awkwardness that the One China policy creates, Indonesia would always welcome cooperation with Taiwan, such as through the NSP umbrella. Finally, amid growing tensions between Japan and China over Taiwan, Prabowo will likely be pragmatic and avoid meddling in China’s internal affairs. Although the call to revisit Resolution 2758 might come in the future, Indonesia will certainly approach the subject wit

Introduction

Let us be honest: the rise of China has a lot of people in Malaysia feeling nervous—sometimes even a little panicky.

As Chinese businesses pop up across the country (think of MiXue, Luckin Coffee, BYD and more), it is not uncommon to hear whispers about whether local businesses might soon be crowded out.

In the middle of all this, Malaysian Chinese often find themselves caught in the crossfire, with everyone quietly wondering: where do their loyalties truly lie—not just when it comes to business, but as Malaysians, too.

But these questions run deeper than who is opening the next bubble tea franchise or launching a tech startup. Beneath the surface, there is a long-standing, unspoken anxiety, rooted in years of different lived experiences and shifting opportunities. Thus, whenever China’s influence makes the headlines, it stirs up old debates about belonging, identity and what it really means to call Malaysia home.

One thing we have to be clear about: being Malaysian Chinese is not just about eating dim sum and watching Hong Kong dramas. For generations, Chinese families have called Malaysia home—some arriving as British-imported tin miners, others as adventurous migrants long before the words “Malaysia” or “Malaya” ever existed.

Along the way, the Chinese community built tight-knit networks, banding together in clan associations, dialect groups, business guilds and temples. Think of it as the original social network, long before Facebook: if you needed a job, a loan, free education, a wedding MC, or even when you were sick, you turned to these associations or temples. There were secret recipes, family feuds, and plenty of uncles and aunties whispering about who was marrying whom.

Through it all, solidarity – 团结 – has always been the secret sauce for survival.

Cracks in the Promise

But things changed – quietly yet drastically – during the time of independence and in the years after. Malaysian Chinese had real hope that everyone could find a seat at the table—maybe not all feasting together, but at least following the old saying: “你吃肉，我喝汤” (“You eat the meat, I drink the soup”).

The Malaysian Chinese Association (MCA) promised to speak up for Chinese interests and help secure a fair share. Over time, however, cracks began to show. Many Chinese Malaysians started to feel that the MCA’s voice was a little too soft and that even getting “the soup” was getting tougher.

Disappointment simmered and, by the late 1960s, frustration had reached a boiling point.

Growing disillusionment with the MCA led many to support opposition parties like the Democratic Action Party (DAP), Parti Gerakan Rakyat Malaysia (Gerakan) and other fiery opposition leaders, resulting in major opposition gains in local elections.

Suddenly, coffee shop talk turned to politics. “Can this one really protect our schools? Will that one fight for our business rights?”

The drama was real, and just like any family soap opera, trust was hard to rebuild once it was broken.

As we all know, this dramatic shift in Malaysia’s political winds did not just stay within the kopitiams and election halls. It eventually erupted into the 13 May 1969 riots—a national trauma that left scars still felt today. For many Chinese Malaysians, those tense days in 1969 were a harsh wake-up call: suddenly, the sense of security and hope for genuine representation vaporised overnight.

In the aftermath, the government rolled out the New Economic Policy (NEP), a sweeping effort to reshape Malaysia’s economic and social structure.

On paper, NEP aimed to address economic disparities by setting ambitious quotas for businesses – many then owned or run by Chinese Malaysians – were now required to offer at least 30% equity to Bumiputera stakeholders, alongside other measures intended to help uplift disadvantaged communities.

Overnight, the rules of the game changed. Boardrooms were reshuffled, business deals rewired and Chinese entrepreneurs found themselves navigating a whole new landscape, one where opportunity felt just a little further out of reach.

These changes were not just about the numbers or the policies on paper—it was about the message those changes sent. Many Chinese, at that time, felt as if the rug had been pulled out from under their feet.

Whatever It Takes

Here is where things got interesting: the Chinese community gradually realised that no matter how united or resourceful, shaping national policies fairly or based on merit was nearly impossible, at least without someone powerful by their side.

Hence, a unique messiah complex emerged—not about saving others, but about looking for a Malay hero to set things right. Whether it was a former rival, an unlikely ally or a leader with a complicated past, if someone seemed capable of fighting for a fairer deal, old grudges were quickly set aside.

The most striking example wa

And it is not just that; under his rule, Chinese schools faced constant pressure and underfunding, and the community’s sense of being “second class” was never far from the surface.

A similar pattern emerged with Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim. Since splitting from Mahathir in the late 1990s, Anwar’s opposition Parti Keadilan Rakyat (PKR) garnered substantial Chinese support. Many overlooked how, as Education Minister in the 1980s, he infamously allocated just RM10 to Chinese schools, appointed non-Mandarin-speaking civil servants to key positions in Chinese schools, and popularised the phrase “Cina balik Tiongshan” (“Chinese go back to China”), cementing him as a villain in the community’s memory.

Yet, when political stars aligned, that painful history was swept under the rug amid hopeful chatter in kopitiams and WhatsApp groups.

We Need a Stronger Brother

But over time – especially after Pakatan Harapan (PH) took over Putrajaya for the second time – the big dream of “Malaysia for all” started to unravel for many.

Instead of moving toward real equality, PH was soon tangled up in political drama, scrambling for legitimacy and “stability” as a stri

Kopitiam chatter grew cynical: “Where is the ‘harapan’ that we voted for?”

While PH stumbled, China’s charm offensive was just getting started, and it went all out. The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) talks about how a stronger, richer China is good news for Chinese everywhere, and especially for Malaysian Chinese. China is also constantly portraying itself (sometimes blatantly) as the “protector of overseas Chinese”. It is not just propaganda: China puts its money (and influence) where its mouth is too.

China’s All-in Tactics

Over the past few decades – especially in the last 10 years – China has been on a shopping spree in

Ads pop up insisting that Xinjiang cotton is not the result of forced labour but actually a poverty-alleviation policy for the Xinjiang people. When Xi Jinping was in town, the headlines promised a wave of prosperity for Malaysian Chinese (and, of course, they messed up the Malaysian flag).

Behind the scenes, China is quietly bankrolling content farms and influencers, filling feeds and op-ed pages with glowing stories about the “Chinese dream” for Chinese all around the world.

China’s soft touch has been just as noticeable. Over the years, it has rolled out “root-seeking” summer and winter camps, inviting Malaysian Chinese teens to visit their ancestral villages and “discover their origins”.

Generous scholarships are on offer for those wanting to study at China’s top universities. At h

Through these feel-good programmes, CCP has skilfully showcased how the “ancestral homeland” has grown stronger and more impressive—thanks, of course, to its own brand of politics and leadership.

On top of that, China’s “hard money” approach has opened plenty of doors for Malaysian Chinese. Big-name, CCP-backed companies like Huawei and ZTE are always on the lookout for Mandarin-speaking Malaysians to join their teams.

When it comes to mega-project investments, there always seems to be a local Chinese middleman with the right connections, bridging deals between Chinese investors and state officials. For many, these business ties feel like a golden ticket—and another sign of just how closely China is working to win hearts (and bank accounts) in Malaysia.

As the old saying goes, “money can buy everything”. China did not just stop at business deals, scholarships or summer camps—they have also been quietly wooing politicians, offering up planeloads of Chinese tourists to boost local tourism or dangling investment projects that promise jobs and growth.

In return, CCP gains a bit more access—sometimes to our democratic processes, sometimes even a peek into sensitive areas like security and defence.

What starts at the top does not stay there for long. When regular folks see leaders – no matter the party – rolling out the red carpet for Chinese investors and officials, it sends a ripple through the community. Suddenly, the idea of China as a “protector” or “saviour” feels less like a far-off story and more like part of daily reality.

Whether you are running a small business, applying for a scholarship or just chatting over kopi, the sense grows: maybe looking East really is the safer bet, especially when the people in charge seem to be doing it too.

Local Stumble Is Pushing Chinese towards China

With local ethnic tensions simmering as a constant push factor and China’s steady reminders that “no matter where you go, you will always be family”, it is no wonder that Beijing is looking more and more like the new messiah for Malaysian Chinese. When homegrown policies make you feel like a second-class citizen, the idea of a powerful, rising China watching your back suddenly seems pretty appealing—even comforting.

But if we look at how China acts almost everywhere else in the world, this comforting idea of China as the messiah feels a bit like the lyrics “killing me softly with his song”. Put simply, propaganda. Local Chinese should really pause and reflect on the questions quietly wondered by other Malaysians: where does our loyalty lie when there’s a conflict of interest between Malaysia and China? Which identity comes first—Chinese or Malaysian?

Introduction

As many as 169 states have agreed, in whole or in part, to the provisions of the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), which provisions cover such maritime aspects as definition of territorial waters, Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs), deep sea mining, and marine environmental management and requirements.

However, UNCLOS still faces significant challenges from the bending and manipulation of political rules for strategic maritime interests, particularly by great powers. Can UNCLOS survive this and maintain its integrity?

To be fair, great power abuse is a common phenomenon in international affairs, typically when these powers ignore or break international law when rules and regulations no longer serve their interest. The invasion of Iraq by the United States and Russia’s annexation of Crimea are the most obvious examples.

In the maritime domain, China has also gained notoriety. Although a signatory to UNCLOS, China has made extensive claims over 90% of the South China Sea, in violation of the convention.

Despite The Hague’s 2016 tribunal ruling that China’s activities in the region were inconsistent with international law, the Middle Kingdom has ignored this stipulation and continued asserting its power and presence there, showcasing China’s non-compliance with international law.

Meanwhile, the United States is often cited as the first country accused of “deviance” in the maritime sector. Curiously, the United States has never ratified UNCLOS, arguing that it observes most of its provisions as customary international law.

This, however, has added more complexity to the subject matter. While the United States has openly challenged and criticised China’s maritime claims, the United States is doing so without any legal obligation to comply with the very set of rules that regulate maritime conduct: UNCLOS. Such situations not only make the US criticism of China hollow and unreasonable but also ultimately undermine the supremacy of UNCLOS.

Is UNCLOS Relevant?

Despite all this, UNCLOS remains central to maritime governance. Its standing has not faded; instead, nations still turn to it as a trusted legal and diplomatic shield to protect their interests.

The treaty is especially a powerful tool for smaller and mid-sized maritime powers, spelling out their territorial boundaries and economic rights.

UNCLOS stipulations relating to the management of territories and resources under the EEZ, for example, are crucial for coastal sta

Indonesia, for instance, routinely cites UNCLOS when arguing for its rights in the Natuna Sea and when confronting illegal foreign trawlers. The Philippines also leaned on the treaty when it legally contested China’s sweeping claims in the South China Sea; The Hague’s 2016 ruling, though ignored by Beijing, gave Manila a renewed diplomatic standing.

UNCLOS also sits at the heart of modern maritime activity. Nearly every navy, port authority and ocean protection body looks to its core rules to steer daily operations. The treaty serves as a framework for settling sea boundary disputes, overseeing commercial traffic and safeguarding marine ecosystems.

Even countries that have yet to ratify it – like the United States – tend to apply its provisions in practice, because they are regarded as universal standards, such as in the case of Freedom of Navigation Operation (FONO). This widespread acceptance indicates that UNCLOS has become woven into the fabric of seaborne governance and that its legal blueprint still shapes conduct on the world’s oceans.

UNCLOS, crucially, still equips states with mechanisms to address breaches. Although the 2016 ruling failed to compel Beijing to alter its conduct, it armed the Philippines and other Southeast Asian governments with a robust legal rationale and an international backing.

The ruling also highlighted the continuing relevance and operational capacity of international judicial bodies such as the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA) and the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS).

Rule violators, therefore, remain vulnerable to diplomatic censure and damage to their global stand

As the international scene shifts towards a multipolar balance, where no one or two powers alone dominate global politics, UNCLOS remains highly relevant. Nations like India, Brazil, South Africa, Indonesia and Turkey now press firmly to uphold their sea-based interests. To defend their claims, they often turn to UNCLOS as an impartial, rule-bound forum, sidestepping the need for the bigger militaries or economic threats that stronger states wield.

India, for example, anchors its Indian Ocean strategy in UNCLOS and champions legal cooperation across those waters.

The treaty still matters because it offers order, equity and a common framework for maritime conduct. It enables smaller states to claim entitlements, pressures violators to back down and remains vital to the broader international system. Amidst rising geopolitical strains, its legal and political weight is perhaps greater than at any time in recent memory.

Risks

If the legal framework established by UNCLOS falls apart, its consequences would ripple across the geopolitical, trade and ethical dimensions.

Absent a strong, agreed-upon ocean rule book, nations may resort to a maritime order forged by power rather than by shared principle. Seas that ought to

Such a collapse would generate a dangerous legal and moral void. States might begin to stake claims on water and seabed without worrying about legal pushback. Questions over territorial belts, shipping corridors and mineral-rich floors would be settled not in neutral tribunals but in face-to-face standoffs. Tension could easily escalate into shooting conflicts in already volatile arenas such as the South China Sea, the Eastern Mediterranean or the Arctic.

Smaller countries would bear the brunt of this disorder. Lacking the shield UNCLOS provides, they become easy targets for bullying by much larger navies. Nations like the Philippines, Kenya or Vietnam wo

Moreover, UNCLOS’ failure would send a loud message that even the strongest treaties cannot rein in powerful countries. With the world in the geopolitical flux that it is in today, who can guarantee that nations would not also unravel other equally important treaties, such as climate pacts, cyber rules or nuclear control?

Weakening one fence encourages others to rust. In short, the fate of the oceans now doubles as a test of international law in a world of shifting power.

The economic costs would be harsh as well. Roughly 80% of daily trade sails through route lines drawn by UNCLOS. Countries that depend on steady sea links – including landlocked nations that rely on coastal neighbours – quickly become unintended victims of an ocean run wild.

If those sea lanes turn risky because of piracy, border fights or aggressive warships, traffic would slow down. Insurers would jack up premiums, traders would pass along the bills and poorer countries, which can absorb them the least, would suffer first.

At the same time, crime at sea would spike. Gaps in rules invite illegal fishing, piracy, smuggling and human trafficking to flourish. With no common authority to monitor the waters, criminal networks would move into empty zones and deepen regional unrest.

UNCLOS may seem like a set of technical regulations, yet it also stands as an emblem of cooperative statecraft. Should the treaty collapse, the world would suffer a loss of legal certainty and, more seriously, a blow to confidence

Strategic Policy Measures

Defending UNCLOS in today’s turbulent world demands coordinated action that blends legal initiatives, active diplomacy and timely reforms of key institutions. Such a structured policy framework enables coastal states to counter the rising trend of great powers ignoring the treaty with greater collective strength.

A central tactic is to enhance the role of international legal tribunals, particularly the ITLOS. Despite lacking an enforcement entity, their judgements nonetheless carry considerable diplomatic authority. Each of their rulings creates an official record of misconduct, aids affected states in forming coalitions and influences how the broader global community interprets behaviour at sea.

The Hague’s 2016 arbitral ruling in the Philippines v China case illustrates this clearly, as it empowered smaller nations by publicly reaffirming their entitlements despite Beijing’s assertiveness.

Beyond legal action, boosting Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA) is equally important.

The main obstacle to enforcing UNCLOS in remote waters is simply the inability to monitor what occurs there. Governments need to fund satellite-monitoring networks, synchronised naval patrols and regional data-sharing hubs—assets that help officials spot and record illegal fishing, maritime blockades and boundary intrusions.

Verified proofs like clear satellite photos or videos make it easier to raise international awareness and apply diplomatic pressure. Without visibility and trust in the data, holding wrongdoers accountable is much harder.

Another key measure is to persuade the United States to ratify UNCLOS, as its refusal to ratify it formally weakens both its credibility and its leadership.

The United States regularly contests China’s moves in the South China Sea, yet its outsider status can make those legal claims seem selective. Signing the treaty would ground the United States’ policies in the prevailing legal system and renew global confidence in the rules-based maritime order.

Finally, introducing

Led by a rotating team of legal scholars and career diplomats, the exercise would yield regular, public reports on compliance. Though no binding penalties would attach, the spotlight on habitual offenders tends to spur states to avoid reputational harm.

UNCLOS still sits at the heart of ocean governance. Its durability hinges on countries defending its rules, updating them when needed and jointly confronting those who breach them. The sea is a shared global commons. Treating it fairly and according to law is a duty that cannot be postponed.

Understanding Trump’s Tactics

In the first few weeks since his inauguration, President Donald Trump followed through on his campaign promises to impose tariffs on other countries.

Initially, his administration imposed 25% tariffs on goods from Canada and Mexico – except for energy imports from Canada at 10% – plus additional 10% tariffs on all Chinese products coming into the United States.

The media and pundits quickly signalled the return of Trump’s trade war. However, it is worth considering that Trump’s imposition of high tariffs is not an end in itself – it is part and parcel of his psychological warfare with other countries.

This was demonstrated when Trump decided to delay the tariffs on Canada and Mexico after “fruitful” discussions with both countries’ leaders. In this regard, tariffs should be understood simply as an economic tool to achieve the United States’ national interests, though critics have decried and deemed it illegal.

Trump’s co-written book The Art of the Deal gives an insight into his aggressive and assertive negotiation tactics in doing business, which he has

This is called the anchoring tactic, though he likes to impose extreme terms to turn the negotiations in his favour. His recent ordeals with Mexico and Canada exemplify this – he has also issued follow-up threats of increased tariffs should these countries retaliate.

Trump understands that his unpredictability has given him an advantage over others, thus making his threats more effective. He succeeded; following these salvo of threats, Canada and Mexico agreed to address the issue of drug smuggling and illegal immigration in exchange for a one-month pause in tariffs.

Unlike his first term – which saw him imposing tariffs on others and allowing negotiations only after some time had passed – this time he had reached an agreement with Canada and Mexico before any real actions were taken.

This is exactly what Trump hopes to achieve. He is using aggressive tactics by instilling fear and unpredictability to get what he wants before really starting a tariff war. In fact, a tariff war might be something that he does not desire after all, as it would cause inflation in the United States.

Sun Tzu might have approved – in The Art of War,he postulated that a “skillful leader subdues the enemy’s troops without any fighting.”

Past Lessons

As this is his second and last presidency, Trump understands that he is running out of time to achieve his political agenda. He hopes to quickly achieve concessions that others will make in exchange for not imposing high tariffs.

Although Trump has toyed with the idea of running for a third term, the odds are almost zero. The US

Constitutional expert Bruce Fein argues that one possible way for Trump to hold on to power is by disregarding the law, though this is very unlikely to happen given that the United States has a long democratic tradition that provides checks and balances. A case in point: Trump’s bid to hold onto power after he lost the 2020 election was unsuccessful.

Even more important is that Trump seemed to have learned lessons from his first presidency.

After a years-long trade war with China, Trump concluded his Phase One trade deal successfully. This trade deal appeared to be a massive victory for the United States, as China pledged to protect intellectual property rights and agreed to purchase more goods from the United States to correct the trade imbalance between both countries. However, China failed to fulfil its obligations under the Phase One trade deal.

Trump is not keen to repeat this mistake, which could explain why Trump would want to achieve concessions as soon as possible.

He is using this plan of reciprocal tariffs as a bargaining tool for countries to reduce tariffs or eliminate non-tariff barriers.

A recent poll run by Reuters showed that over 90% of economists believe that the rapidly shifting trade policies would increase the likelihood of a recession, which could lead to unintended consequences of Trump’s own doing. This is a situation that Trump would want to avoid.

Weeks before he unveiled his “Liberation Day” plan, Trump also announced the imposition of 25% tariffs on all aluminium and steel imported to the United States without any exceptions or exemptions.

Interestingly, after a phone call with Australia’s prime minister, Trump said that an exemption for Australia is under consideration, given that Australia is one of the few countries with which the United States has a trade surplus. Such statements have sent an ambiguous signal to other countries, thus prompting countries such as South Korea to also request exemptions.

Trump also managed to extract concessions from India and Japan, both of which promised to buy more goods from the United States. Before the meeting with Trump, Modi announced that India would cut import tariffs on selected products. Following the meeting between both leaders, India agreed to buy more energy from the United States, thus aligning with Trump’s goal to make the United States the leading energy supplier.

Trump’s tariff tactic would be a mainstay in his administration – his unveiling of a base 10% global

Trial and Error

However, this kind of psychological tactic may not always work.

The United States and China were unable to come to an agreement and have since led to China’s quid pro quo levies. While the Chinese do not want to back down from the trade tensions with the United States, news reports from early March showed that Trump might visit China in April to hammer out a deal. This indicated that Trump might not be interested in fighting a tariff war.

Though the prospect of Trump visiting China has been da

Due to the price and quality competitiveness of Chinese products, Chinese products are not easily replaceable. Since American consumers have to bear the brunt and inflation is expected to rise, Trump will be put in a difficult position, potentially prompting a revision to his tariff policies.

Impacts to Southeast Asia

Trump announced his Liberation Day global tariff plan on 2 April 2025, a drastic move that caused stock markets across the globe to tumble. A baseline of 10% tariffs on all exports to the United States are imposed, but all Southeast Asian countries are levied different rates of tariffs depending on their trade balance with the United States.

Cambodia and Laos are slapped with the highest tariffs (at 49% and 48%, respectively), followed by Vietnam (46%), Myanmar (44%), Thailand (36%), Indonesia (32%), Malaysia and Brunei (24%), the Philippines (17%) and finally Singapore (10%).

Barely a day after the new regime came into effect, however, Trump announced a 90-day pause on tariffs for 75 countries, including those in ASEAN. This hard reverse adds on to the psycho

Before the Liberation Day announcement, ASEAN countries had diverse responses to the ongoing situation. Vietnam was already restless and expressing willingness to purchase more US agricultural products, open its market to US investments and refrain from imposing retaliatory measures. Thailand, on the other hand, was seen to be slow in responding to the trade issue and had no clear negotiation strategy, which was a great concern for the private sector in Thailand.

The Philippines and Malaysia appeared more optimistic, holding the opinion that the United States’ tariff policies have less direct implications on them. Both believed that they should maximise the existing regional trade agreements and diversify their trade partners in light of the steps pursued by the Trump administration.

Needless to say, the announcement must have sent massive shocks across the region, espec

Moving forward, ASEAN countries need to understand that Trump’s end goal is not to have a tariff war with the rest of the world. The United States is simply using threats of tariffs to force other countries – particularly those who have trade deficits with the United States – to reduce or remove tariffs and non-tariff barriers.

If this is a psychological war, how should Southeast Asian countries respond to it?

In such a setting, it is never a good idea to fully accede to the demands, as it would only lead to more concessions. We have seen, for example, how Vietnam’s good offer to the United States was being rejected.

Instead, countries should preserve their autonomy and continue to engage with the United States to get a mutually beneficial deal. A good instance is how the president of Mexico handled Trump – she kept a “cool head” and persuaded Trump with evidence that the deployment of Mexican soldiers to the borders has slowed down the flow of fentanyl.

Such a diplomatic approach led to praises from Trump and also to Trump’s decision to reverse some of the tariffs. Though Trump also reversed some of the tariffs on Canada, Trump continues to target its prime minister due to the latter’s more aggressive approach.

As ASEAN chair this year, Malaysia bears a huge responsibility to ensure that ASEAN has a united and coordinated response towards the trade issue. Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim has engaged some ASEAN leaders and called for a united front against this challenge.

If ASEAN is divided and chooses to negotiate bilaterally with the United States, the deals that each member secures would be different, potentially benefiting the United States more than ASEAN collectively. In the negotiation, ASEAN must present the hard facts to the United States, showing that the tariffs would not only harm ASEAN but would also be equally damaging to the US economy. If it is indeed psychological warfare, then ASEAN needs to know that it goes both ways.

Introduction

China’s maritime coercion directed against the Philippines reached a peak in 2024, with ships and boats from China harassing Philippine civilian vessels between July and September 2024.

Such reports of aggressive and dangerous conduct on China’s side have been increasing at an alarming rate. Since February 2023, the Philippines has accused China of unsafe behavior on at least 12 occasions, often within its exclusive economic zone (EEZ).

To illustrate this, there were two separate “ramming” incidents that had taken place between the ships of the Chinese and Philippine coast guards. One of such incidents caused severe damage to the hull of one of the latter’s vessels in waters near Sabina Atoll, well within the Philippines’ EEZ.

A spokesperson of the Philippine National Maritime Council stated that China’s illegal actions do not contribute to confidence-building measures that are necessary to achieve mutual respect and preserve a rules-based international order.

Despite both sides agreeing in July 2024 to avoid confrontations during resupply missions to Philippine troops at a disputed shoal, recent events have called into question China’s sincerity. A month later, two Chinese planes released flares in the path of a Philippine military aircraft over the Scarborough Shoal, thus contradicting the agreement.

Geopolitical Concerns and Chinese Maritime Aggression

Southeast Asia is beset by a host of maritime security threats, including illegal, unreported and unregulated (IUU) fishing, piracy, sea robbery, illegal trafficking in arms, people, and drugs, as well as environmental crimes.

Institutions responding to these issues have proliferated, both inside and outside the purview of ASEAN. Indeed, the region is considered the “center of intensifying geopolitical competition with multiple potential flashpoints.”

Within Southeast Asia, the Philippines is a major maritime trading hub. Its territorial waters abound with enormous natural resources

Given the tremendous maritime traffic, the Philippine Navy and the Philippine Coast Guard are tasked with dealing with IUU fishing, piracy, armed robbery, the trafficking of drugs and people, as well as the transport of illegal goods by sea.

With such hefty tasks at hand, the intrusion of Chinese vessels has thus added another problem to the mix.

However, it is a mistake to perceive this problem solely from the Philippines’ perspective, as China’s maritime activities can never be extricated from its broader strategic competition with the United States in the Indo-Pacific region.

On the United States’ part, it has political and moral obligations to maintain its position in areas threatened by Chinese incursions, including in the South China Sea, the East China Sea and the Yellow Sea.

Among others, these include: 1) keeping the regional balance of power favorable to the United States and its allies; 2) safeguarding US-led security architecture in the Western Pacific, and; 3) upholding its commitments to Japan and the Philippines.

The United States has undertaken various actions to attain these goals, which comprise activities such as: 1) transferring military personnel, equipment and supplies to bases at sites occupied in the South China Sea, and; 2) upholding the July 2016 tribunal award in the South China Sea arbitration case of the Philippines and China.

The Academic Perspective

It should be noted that China’s maritime strategy is derived from serious academic works on naval study and the alignment of military doctrine with national defense modernization, as written by Lidong Wang in “Theory of National Maritime Interest.”

These studies are done by the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Academy of Military Science and the PLA National Defense University, which focus on the use of armed force, tactics, and military theories.

Many sea power theorists center their assessments on China’s continental power and its rising international status. Interestingly, some, like James Holmes and Toshi Yoshihara, found the commonalities between China’s strategy in the South China Sea and the United States’ in the Caribbean Sea.

These studies offer adequate knowledge regarding China’s increasing naval capability as well as the implications of China as a sea power—China’s intrusion into the Philippines’ waters being o

Accordingly, a narrative has emerged into how the state should pursue its maritime policies. Such studies suggest the expansion of naval influence, the acquisition of deterrent sea power and the focus on the protection of sea lines of communication, according to Wenmu Zhang in Discussion of China’s Sea Power.

As shown, extensive research has been pursued pertaining to Chinese maritime power development.

In 2009, Chinese academics such as Wu Shicun, Xu Liping, Zhang Jie and Zhong Feiteng promoted their ideas on China’s international roles, diplomatic relations with the United States and China’s prominence in Southeast Asia. Their research centered on raising possible policy approaches to resolve debates and foster collaboration in the region.

Other studies also cover non-dispute-related maritime issues. Scholars of these areas posit that the information environment is strategic to China’s energy and logistic supply. Examples include studies on the “Malacca Dilemma” and the “String of Pearls,” which are associated with China’s energy imports and sea control.

Efforts to Safeguard Territorial Integrity

The Philippines has undertaken steps to safeguard its territorial integrity by emphasizing the importance of international law and through engagement with ASEAN.

While leveraging on international law is important, the Philippines still needs to continuously highlight in international forums about China’s violations of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), especially considering both the Philippines and China are parties to UNCLOS.

For example, the Philippines needs to highlight the outcome of the 2016 South China Sea Arbitration that found China’s claim as incompatible. The arbitration resulted in several key decision points.

Firstly, China’s claims to historic rights and resources have no legal basis. Secondly, none of China’s claimed land features in the Spratly Islands are islands capable of generating a 200-nm EEZ. Thirdly, China violated the Philippines’ sovereign rights on several layers: 1) interfering with the latter’s oil exploration activities; 2) prohibiting its fishing vessels from operating; 3) failing to prevent Chinese fishing vessels from operating and; 4) conducting land reclamation in areas where the Philippines enjoys sovereign rights to explore for and exploit natural resources. Lastly, China violated its marine environmental protection obligations under UNCLOS by causing “severe harm to the coral reef environment” with its land reclamation activities and harvesting of endangered species.

Despite this, China has lodged its non-participation and non-acceptance of this ruling.

The impact of the 2016 arbitral ruling is threefold. First, the arbitration denies the effectivity of China’s maritime security strategy in the South China Sea. Second, it denies China’s historic rights claim. Third, it gives independent states recourse to the merits of UNCLOS in the face of China’s sea power in the South China Sea.

In other words, it has reinforced the Philippines’ contention that the actions of China in the South China Sea are “Illegal, Coercive, Aggressive and Deceptive.”

As a strategy to promote this ruling, President Ferdinand Marcos signed Executive Order 57 on 25 March 2024, to deal with issues that impact the country’s national security, sovereignty, sovereign rights and maritime jurisdiction over its extensive maritime zones. The Philippines continues to present the merits of the 2016 Arbitral Ruling in all public forums and implement exhaustive efforts to maintain its full adherence to the rule of law.

Efforts to Counter Maritime Aggression

The Philippines’ strategic alignment with the United States, Japan and Australia is a clear response to China’s intrusion. Under the auspices of the US Indo-Pacific Strategy, the Philippines can coalesce international support to maintain its position vis-à-vis China’s activities in the South China Sea.

There is strength in number. The leaders of the United States, Japan, India and Australia have collectively declared their concern about the situation in the East and South China Seas,  the “coercive and intimidating maneuvres” by China in the latter.

Even with such support in place, the Philippines must adopt a two-fold strategy to deal with China’s recurring activities within its EEZ.

The first strategy is to allow the United States and other foreign vessels to join the regular resupply mission to the BRP Sierra Madre, a tank-landing vessel under the Philippine Navy. If the Philippines’ resupply vessels are accompanied by foreign vessels, this may deter the Chinese maritime militia from carrying out its ramming techniques. Thus, the resupply missions can be peaceful and may be completed without any incident.

The second strategy is to allow active-duty Filipino Americans in the United States’ armed forces to join the resupply mission on board Philippine vessels.

The Philippines is one of several countries that recognize dual citizenship, with more than 15,000 Filipino Americans actively serving in the United States Navy, some of whom have achieved ranks of leadership at all levels. 

Many Filipino American officers are known as “mustangs,” naval service members who have worked through their career path from the bottom to the top. This is an honor that is difficult to attain and those mustangs are valuable repositories of knowledge as well as experience wherever they go.

The Philippines may put a request to the United States to allow Filipino-American naval officers to participate in regular resupply missions to the BRP Sierra Madre and in the patrolling of territorial waters in the South China Sea. The presence of Filipino Americans inside the Philippine vessels would help boost confidence among the Philippine Coast Guard and the Philippine Navy officers.

Conclusion

Chinese aggression within the Philippines’ EEZ has increased dramatically in the second half of this year. These actions have resulted in increased tensions between the two, thus threatening regional stability. Furthermore, despite a joint China-Philippine arrangement, which focuses on refraining from aggression during resupply missions to BRP Sierra Madre, China has not adhered to its commitments. This has called into question the viability of any diplomatic agreements with China.

The time has come for the Philippines to adopt more creative ways to deter China. The two-pronged strategy of including American vessels and Filipino American naval officers for regular resupply missions may offer a boost to maritime stability.

Filipino officials need to go beyond just diplomatic efforts to address the tensions in the South China Sea. These two creative solutions, which constitute peaceful strategies, may lead to better maritime security and regional stability in the long term.

Introduction

Since the Xi Jinping presidency started, China has undertaken major domestic monetary and fiscal reforms to maintain China’s centrality to the region’s economy. The Middle Kingdom may have faced an economic downturn lately, but its government has taken proactive steps to ameliorate the situation.

The latest pronouncements by the Chinese government regarding its economy are meant to strategica

China’s Economic Reform and Regional Opportunities

The 26 September 2024 session of the Political Bureau of the Communist Party of China Central Committee stressed the importance of such executive measures as cutting the reserve requirement ratio (RRR) and altering the mortgage rate. The Bureau deemed these necessary to stimula

Such policy shifts are a realistic response to the regional context, opening opportunities for Southeast Asian countries such as Indonesia to deepen their engagement with China’s economy and seek out cooperative benefits.

The announcement that China will inject approximately 1 trillion yuan into the financial market and reduce the reserve requirement ratio by 0.5% underlines China’s intention to enhance liquidity and promote growth in the economy.

In a way, such measures aimed to reinforce the soundness of China’s financial markets and reassure its regional allies that Beijing remains committed to stabilize its economy irrespective of external and internal hea

The effect of the policy was immediate and broad, as seen by the Shanghai Composite Index increasing by 4.59%, the Shenzhen Component Index increasing by 9.17% and the technology-biased ChiNext surging 17.25% after the National Day holiday reopening.

Joint trading volumes reached new heights, totaling 3.45 trillion yuan on the Shanghai and Shenzhen exchanges, surpassing the former high of 2.6 trillion yuan. This demonstrates the effectiveness of China’s regulatory reforms to restore investor confidence and increase economic activities.

Many in China must feel optimistic about the Chinese real estate market and for good reason. Beijing’s attempts to solve problems within the sector, which constitutes an essential part of China’s economy, include cutting the opening down payment for new residential mortgages from 25% to 15%.

These mortgages, which are expected to relieve loan burdens to around 50 million households and bring older mortgage rates up to the current standard, are predicted to save the country large amounts of resources, approximately 150 billion yuan annually. The significance of such crucial measures is also to help reverse the continuing decline of the real estate market within China.

By bringing back the property market, it has been reported that the primary goal the Beijing government seeks to achieve is enhancing the domestic economy. Most significantly, it creates the conditions for more effective regional economic integration since a strong economy in China is a powerful engine of growth for co-development with others in the region.

Complex Interdependence

Southeast Asia stands to gain considerably if China undergoes an economic revival. The revival of the A-share market has seen an increase in demand from foreign investors, which is likely to result in many investments in the Southeast Asian markets.

This is especially pertinent for countries like Indonesia, which has received Chinese FDI in the development of critical infrastructure. For instance, China’s intent to improve regional connectivity – which was demonstrated with projects like the China-Laos Railway – offers prospects for other investments that would enhance Indonesia’s trade and integration in the region.

China’s development of the town of Mohan – an important border site is situated in Yunnan province (a vital connecting point between China and Southeast Asia), underscores China’s pledge to promote regional economic development and joint progress. This development aptly exemplifies China’s openness to enhance economic relations with the rest of Southeast Asia.

Moreover, with its dominating position in the foreign trade, China has also emerged as an integral component in the regional economic system. The total volume of the foreign goods trade reached US$5.88 trillion in 2023, which means it accounted for 12.4% of the total global trade.

China has managed to retain its position as the most dominant trading nation in the world for the seventh year in a row and this only goes to reinforce its standing in terms of regional trade. Furthermore, with a service trade volume of US$933.1 billion, Southeast Asian countries have the capacity to gain economic benefits by engaging in a deeper trade relationship with China.

These figures show that there is still a need for countries such as Indonesia to engage themselves passively with China’s developmental strategies, such as the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), which has the potential to increase trade volumes and create new markets.

The increasing economic ties of China with Southeast Asia may be understood in the context of the complex interdependence theory, which states that as states become more interlinked economically, socially and politically, the probability of conflict decreases

This model helps us comprehend why it may be in the interest of some Southeast Asian countries like Indonesia to become more integrated with the Chinese economic model, which would, in return, enable the creation of a more constructive and harmonious regional context. By implementing an interdependence model, regional economies can avert risks of instability and promote joint growth, which ensures that all parties benefit.

Challenges

Nonetheless, developing more active economic engagement with China is not without problems. Greater economic engagement means that any policy shift or economic activities derived from China will have implications across the region.

For Indonesia, which is a major recipient of Chinese investment in key sectors such as infrastructure, manufacturing and real estate, this dependency poses hazards as variations in Chinese investments tend to import volatility to the local market and economies.

China has taken steps such as issuing extremely long-period treasury bonds as well as special local government bonds to help stabilize shocks to its financial and real estate markets. These measures indicate that China understands that its activities affect the economy of the region; Southeast Asian countries can rest assured that China is mindful of its potential pitfalls.

However, while the increased flow of Chinese capital into Southeast Asia is critical for meeting the financial needs of development projects, it can also imbalance the markets and stifle efforts to improve local capacity.

Therefore, Indonesian authorities are required to manage foreign investments, including foreign capital coming from China, to ensure that these investments are aimed at achieving sustainable development goals that will benefit its domestic economy.

Recent crises such as the crash in Indonesia’s textile industry – due to massive capital inflow and import of textile products from China – exemplify this concern. Such cases further underscore the need for Indonesia to erect some rules and regulations that could shield local industries.

Constructing a legal regime that encourages cooperative ventures and technological transfer would allow Indonesia’s enterprises to utilize Chinese capital in a more efficient manner, resulting in development without surrendering control of essential sectors and assets.

Strategic options for ASEAN and Indonesia

To deal with the economic resurrection of China, Indonesia and its ASEAN peers should take a more aggressive stance, allowing for deepened economic cooperation while diversifying their economic relations.

With shifts from primary commodity export reliance to developing core sectors such as manufacturing, technology and services, Indonesia could skillfully integrate itself within regional supply chains with China at the center.

For instance, rather than chiefly importing finished goods, Indonesia could aid in China’s production networks by establishing its own electronics and automotive components industries. Predominantly, this strategy would assist Indonesia’s economy by retaining more foreign earnings but majoring in the core activities of such industries.

However, to avoid being “swamped” by imported goods, Indonesia does require a framework of policies to aid domestic industries, especially in their formative stages including trade standards and promotion of sectors where it has a comparative advantage. Such strategy could attract more foreign investment into Indonesia and improve the country’s economic position. 

Central to this strategy is financial regulation and financial stability. Indonesian policymakers must concentrate on building sound financial institutions and laws that will adequately absorb the sudden influx of Chinese capital while reducing risks associated with volatile capital inflows.

Reinforcing its financial control and risk management policies will allow Indonesia to withstand almost any impact even after internal changes in Chinese policies.

There is a great need for ASEAN to pursue better economic integration with China. When bargaining with Beijing, especially in regards to the BRI, ASEAN ought to seek to remain true to the ASEAN centrality and encourage a more even distribution of Chinese investments around the ASEAN countries.

However, such commonality of purpose is not easy due to the very diverse political and economic structures within ASEAN. For example, Malaysia’s engagement with the BRI projects has demonstrated the extent to which such investment can be politicized which hampers ASEAN’s effort to voice out as a single entity.

To ensure ASEAN centrality vis-à-vis these complexities, the bloc could seek to focus on developing broad parameters, which would enable them to promote common interests within the region. This would guarantee a united regional position on engagement with China while ensuring that individual member countries are allowed the leeway to pursue bilateral deals that suit thei

ASEAN Member States can leverage regional projects that foster infrastructure development, technological advancement and agricultural growth in a manner that is sustainable for the region. Such a position would enable these countries to engage China in a manner that is beneficial to them, alleviating excessive dependency on Chinese capital and promoting a coherent as well as cohesive regional economy in the process.

Conclusion

To sum up, as a result of recent changes in the strategies of the Chinese authorities, Southeast Asia and Indonesia have been presented with a new opportunity to enhance their economic relations with China while fostering their own economic advancement.

The region’s response should be neither too cautious nor too aggressive in order to augment its integration with China while improving its strategic stance. Since China’s economy is now poised to expand steadily, there is an opportunity for ASEAN to establish itself as a regional bulwark that focuses on regional economic progress and stability.