Introduction

In late October 2024, rumours circulated in Bangkok’s diplomatic circle that Thailand would hand over the remaining 48 Uyghurs in a Thai prison and Immigration Detention Centers to China in February 2025. Despite strong objections from the international community and human rights groups, this was seen as a “gift” from Thailand to China to commemorate the 50^th anniversary of diplomatic relations.

Former prime minister Thaksin Shinawatra was the brain behind this idea. As the father of the current prime minister and the nominal head of a powerful political machine dominating Thailand’s political scene for more than two decades, nobody stood in his way. Reasons as to why the previous government led by General Prayuth Chan-ocha did not deport the Uyghurs did not seem to matter.

If anything, Prayuth was in a better position to do so. Being the chief of the junta behind the 2014 coup that ousted Thaksin’s sister – Yingluck – from power, his government was at first isolated by the West, particularly the United States. The isolation pushed Thailand closer to China, leading to, among others, an important submarine deal.

What Happened to the Detainees?

The Prayut administration did not know what they were waiting for, but they played that waiting game and kept the Uyghurs in Thai detention centres. They knew that a deportation would invite the wrath of the international community, potentially isolating Thailand further.

Adding to the drama was a jailbreak (some said it was assisted by officials) at the Songkhla detention centre in November 2017, where 25 Uyghurs escaped from to make their way to Malaysia. The Malaysian government later resettled them in Turkey. Beijing raised a stink, but bilateral ties normalised quickly because China needed Malaysia’s support for its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). Besides, no Malaysian leader was about to compromise his standing in the Muslim world.

Thailand, on the other hand, was not exactly a champion of anything.

The 40 Uyghur who were sent back to China on 27 February 2024 by the Thai government were part of some 220 men, women and children who were caught on the Thailand-Malaysia border in March 2014 as they were about to cross into Malaysia (scores of others were arrested in separate occasions around the same time period).

Shortly afterwards, about 170 women and children were resettled in Turkey, but around 100 men were transferred to the Chinese authorities a week later.

Worse, the following month (17 August 2015) saw suspected Uyghur terrorists bomb the Erawan Shrine in the heart of Bangkok, killing 20 and injuring 125. The shrine is popular among Chinese visitors, who made up the majority of the dead and wounded.

The remaining 50 or so Uyghurs were charged with illegal entry and served their jail time; afterward, they remained in Thailand’s detention centres under no clear justification other than the lack of political will to take decisive actions on the leaders’ part. Some had passed away due to illness, while five were serving prison time for attacking security guards as they were escaping detention.

Between the United States and China

China never let up with their demand for Thailand to deport the rest. To avoid further headaches, Thai law enforcement was told not to detain any Uyghur coming through the country. They were told to direct any incoming Uyghurs to Malaysia.

Thaksin came afterwards with his quirky ambition to be some sort of a statesman and perhaps the first among equals – in the eye of China. He and his long-time associate, Foreign Minister Maris Sangiampongsa, were tone-deaf to the international community from the start to the last minute, even as US Senator Marco Rubio was going through a Senate hearing to confirm his appointment as the US Secretary of State.

“Thailand is a very strong US partner, a strong historical ally,” Rubio said during his Senate hearing on 15 January 2025. “That is an area where I think diplomacy could really achieve results because of how important that relationship is and how close it is.” Or so he thought.

Rubio, a leading critic of Beijing, co-sponsored the 2021 Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act, which bans imports from Xinjiang unless free of forced labour. His stance on human rights in China has subjected him to Chinese sanctions since 2020.

It appeared that the Thailand government did not care about what Rubio had to say. Even if they did, it probably would not matter, as Thaksin was already set on his effort to please the Chinese.

On 14 March 2025, Rubio hit back and announced “visa restrictions on current and former officials from the Government of Thailand responsible for, or complicit in, the forced return of 40 Uyghurs from Thailand on February 27.”

One day before the US order on visa restrictions, the European Parliament condemned the deportation and “urges Thailand to halt any further forced returns to countries where people’s lives are at risk.”

The resolution also urged Thailand to reform its lèse majesté law (Article 112) and called on the European Commission to “leverage free trade agreement negotiations to press Thailand to reform the country’s lese-majesty law, release political prisoners, halt the deportation of Uyghur refugees, and to ratify all core International Labour Organization (ILO) conventions.”

China was quick to hit back but directed its comment to Washington. “On the one hand, the US engages in indiscriminate deportations of illegal immigrants, yet, on the other, it points fingers at and smears other countries’ legitimate law enforcement cooperation, imposes sanctions, and pressures others,” said China’s Foreign Ministry spokeswoman, Mao Ning, describing the United States’ actions as “typical bullying”.

While the fear among human rights activists that the remaining Uyghurs would be deported to China did not subside, it was not until January 2025 that everybody sensed something was not right; a group of Thai government officials visited the Uyghur detainees and politely asked them if they would like to return to China voluntarily. They were asked to sign the deportation paper, which they rejected outright.

Words of the meeting got out and the activists as well as opposition parties responded in full force, demanding an explanation from the government. Some of the detainees staged a hunger strike to protest what they saw as a ploy to get them to agree on the deportation.

The situation had gone quiet and the Uyghurs ended their hunger strike. Then, on 27 February 2025, it was rumoured that the Immigration Police were preparing to deport the Uyghur detainees. Reporters and activists went to the detention centre in Bangkok where they were held, but as the vehicles pulled out of the station, reporters were blocked. The rest was history.

Dumbstruck by Rubio’s harsh responses, Thailand insisted that the deportation was voluntary despite evidence to the contrary.

Raised Questions

A trip was organised for a group of journalists to tag along with Thai ministers to Xinjiang to visit the returnees. Observers said it was a sham, but the government insisted that it was not.

According to photos released by the government, the deportees were united with their relatives – but their immediate family members were sent to Turkey by Thai authorities over a decade ago.

Critics and activists came out in full force, particularly the Malay Muslims in the southernmost provinces who had looked up to Justice Minister Thawee Sodsong and considered him to be one of their own, especially as one of the leaders of a political party from the region. They had hoped that he would stand up against the deportation of the Uyghur detainees.

Asmadee Bueheng, a writer from Pattani, said that for Thai and Malay activists, deportation was about human rights. However, for local Islamic leaders, it was about Muslims being mistreated.

Moreover, many Thais wrongly assumed that the government, being democratically elected, would be more sympathetic to the voices of human rights activists. They felt let down, especially those who had given the government the benefit of the doubt for changing their words on military and constitutional reforms.

Concluding Thoughts

For the time being, officials in Bangkok are putting on a brave face, playing down Washington’s sanctions on government officials. However, it was nothing less than a major embarrassment, considering the fact that the two countries are treaty allies. This is not to mention the fact that Washington was quick to point out to Bangkok the repeated offers to resettle the Uyghur.

The United States has in the past imposed sanctions on Thailand, suspending military aid after coups. This marked the first time that the sanction targeted government officials, although the United States has not identified these individuals. How this will affect the bilateral ties between these so-called longstanding allies, on the other hand, remains to be seen. However, there is no indication that the sanction will slow down Thaksin and his quest to steer Thailand in the direction that serves his personal and political ambitions.

Background

The return of Donald Trump to the White House may cause new tensions geopolitically, which will not spare Southeast Asia.

Indonesia has also been under the spotlight since Prabowo Subianto took over the reins as Indonesia’s president. As the biggest democracy in the region, the country aspires to become a significant power in Asia.

Nevertheless, it faces a complex, crucial challenge with regards to how and what strategy Prabowo’s foreign policy will adopt to navigate the competition between China and the United States.

Indeed, Prabowo may likely contrast former President Joko “Jokowi” Widodo’s more passive approach to foreign policy. Prabowo seems determined to consolidate Indonesia’s place on the global stage and solidify its role as an emerging power in the region.

Such a vision will encourage Prabowo to focus on national security, e.g., Indonesia’s role in the South China Sea as well as China’s activity vis-à-vis the Taiwan question.

Nevertheless, Indonesia’s economic dependence on China imposes crucial constraints that Prabowo will need help to manage.

Trump’s return means that the US administration may pursue policies that erode Prabowo’s ability to keep Indonesia neutral within the parameters of its bebas (free) and aktif (active) foreign policy. This may eventually press Prabowo to make that hard choice between closer alignment with the United States or China.

Dynamic Engagement

Prabowo’s foreign policy views have shown signs of dynamic engagement with the two superpowers. Prabowo visited China in the second week of November 2024, where he met with President Xi Jinping and signed MoUs on cooperation in multiple sectors, particularly infrastructure, trade, and energy.

A key takeaway of the visit was the promise of increased investment in the blue economy. The agreement will not only regulate the role of fishing vessels but also the production and sale of marine products. Perhaps more importantly, the visit concluded with a commitment by China to support Prabowo’s free meal program, a key point in his campaign.

These are positive signals denoting Indonesia’s intent to maintain good relations with China despite growing regional tensions.

His second strategic destination of balanced engagement was the United States. The trip was an opportunity to recalibrate Indonesia’s position with the United States and explore future possibilities for economic and security cooperation with Washington.

Indeed, the visit facilitated Indonesia’s attempt at diversifying its economic portfolio, potentially inviting US investors to participate in sectors such as semiconductors and technology. The response was also positive; President Biden declared the importance of Indonesia and establishing new collaborations.

Nevertheless, how Trump will engage with Indonesia is another question. Politically, Prabowo’s move to open a dialogue with both superpowers separately shows his attempt at keeping a more politically-friendly approach in exercising the bebas dan aktif foreign policy.

In larger context, Jakarta has given signals that it is also open to breaking free from the United States’ economic influence. Through his foreign minister, Prabowo has indicated Indonesia’s interest in becoming a member of BRICS, a move that signifies his willingness to be somewhat independent from the Western-centric global order.

Specifically, the outcomes of both trips indicate that Prabowo is sidestepping the pressure to closely align with either of the two, as well as assuming a nuanced neutrality to maximize Indonesia’s geopolitical flexibility.

Running Up That Hill

Indonesia has based its philosophy of non-alignment on a vision that mirrored the political conception of Mohammad Hatta. Historically, one can see how this vision manifested clearly during the presidency of Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, with his “one million friends and zero enemies” foreign policy.

However, maintaining neutrality will become more intricate today. That is because, after Trump’s victory, his administration may step up pressure on Southeast Asian nations to align with Washington’s China containment strategy, seeking not only greater economic cooperation but also military support.

From a geopolitical perspective, developments in the South China Sea increase the complexity of maintaining a neutral position. The geopolitical tension stems from China’s attempt to expand its military influence across the zone, which includes areas of territory disputed by other countries like the Philippines. Indonesia, which claims an exclusive economic zone in the South China Sea, is particularly vulnerable to Chinese incursions.

A recent furore erupted when Prabowo, during his visit to China, seemingly agreed to China’s interpretation of the nine-dash line, a move that landed him as a subject of criticism over alleged foreign policy inexperience. While this has continued to put certain quaters on edge, it has also been interpreted as a step to managing the tension with China.

For Prabowo, therefore, the challenge will be in finding a balance between national security and the economic benefits of partnering with Beijing.

Yet this will be an increasingly uphill task in the near future. Trump’s administration may compel Prabowo to put pressure on China, potentially jeopardizing Indonesia’s own relations with the Middle Kingdom.

On the other hand, Indonesia cannot do this easily; China is arguably Indonesia’s most essential economic partner. Indeed, it can also be argued that this dependence on China may have become a potential vulnerability for Indonesia.

The Taiwan Question

Another critical issue that needs further examination is Taiwan, with which Indonesia has recently increased diplomatic engagement. This move could exacerbate tensions between Washington and Beijing, with the former putting pressure on Jakarta to take a more pro-stability stance in the Taiwan Straits.

In addition, Taiwan is strategically important for Indonesia. It is also home to a large Indonesian community, the second largest destination after Malaysia for its migrant workers. Indonesians number around 300,000 in Taiwan today.

Interestingly, the last presidential election saw almost 70% of Indonesian workers vote for Prabowo, driven by promises of reforms that would increase their protection as migrant workers.

Moreover, Indonesia is also a gem from the perspective of Taiwan’s. Indonesia is of its target countries for the New Southbound Policy, which sees Indonesia playing a vital role.

While closer relationship between the two is much desired by both sides, it might invite consternation from Beijing.

It remains to be seen if the Taiwan question could destabilize Indonesia’s relationship with China. One thing is certain: Prabowo needs to navigate this potential landmine tactfully.

Conclusion

Probowo has seen the rise of polarization in the international context and how foreign policy decisions could directly affect internal stability. He also understands that his political legitimacy is rooted in economic stability and the perception that Indonesia can prosper without outside interference.

A too-direct alliance with one of the two superpowers could disrupt the balance in Indonesia’s policy of non-interference. However, more studies should be undertaken to investigate how the public would perceive such a move by Prabowo’s administration. Finally, Trump’s return to the White House could also force Prabowo to make decisions that are unpopular with Indonesians. Yet, if the strategy is based on political autonomy and directed towards all without enemies, Indonesia could emerge as a new international player with Prabowo as a critical regional leader.

Introduction

China’s maritime coercion directed against the Philippines reached a peak in 2024, with ships and boats from China harassing Philippine civilian vessels between July and September 2024.

Such reports of aggressive and dangerous conduct on China’s side have been increasing at an alarming rate. Since February 2023, the Philippines has accused China of unsafe behavior on at least 12 occasions, often within its exclusive economic zone (EEZ).

To illustrate this, there were two separate “ramming” incidents that had taken place between the ships of the Chinese and Philippine coast guards. One of such incidents caused severe damage to the hull of one of the latter’s vessels in waters near Sabina Atoll, well within the Philippines’ EEZ.

A spokesperson of the Philippine National Maritime Council stated that China’s illegal actions do not contribute to confidence-building measures that are necessary to achieve mutual respect and preserve a rules-based international order.

Despite both sides agreeing in July 2024 to avoid confrontations during resupply missions to Philippine troops at a disputed shoal, recent events have called into question China’s sincerity. A month later, two Chinese planes released flares in the path of a Philippine military aircraft over the Scarborough Shoal, thus contradicting the agreement.

Geopolitical Concerns and Chinese Maritime Aggression

Southeast Asia is beset by a host of maritime security threats, including illegal, unreported and unregulated (IUU) fishing, piracy, sea robbery, illegal trafficking in arms, people, and drugs, as well as environmental crimes.

Institutions responding to these issues have proliferated, both inside and outside the purview of ASEAN. Indeed, the region is considered the “center of intensifying geopolitical competition with multiple potential flashpoints.”

Within Southeast Asia, the Philippines is a major maritime trading hub. Its territorial waters abound with enormous natural resources, beautiful beaches, minerals and hydrocarbon deposits. The protection of merchant, fishing and tourism vessels has thus created the need for constant monitoring of the maritime area. 

Given the tremendous maritime traffic, the Philippine Navy and the Philippine Coast Guard are tasked with dealing with IUU fishing, piracy, armed robbery, the trafficking of drugs and people, as well as the transport of illegal goods by sea.

With such hefty tasks at hand, the intrusion of Chinese vessels has thus added another problem to the mix.

However, it is a mistake to perceive this problem solely from the Philippines’ perspective, as China’s maritime activities can never be extricated from its broader strategic competition with the United States in the Indo-Pacific region.

On the United States’ part, it has political and moral obligations to maintain its position in areas threatened by Chinese incursions, including in the South China Sea, the East China Sea and the Yellow Sea.

Among others, these include: 1) keeping the regional balance of power favorable to the United States and its allies; 2) safeguarding US-led security architecture in the Western Pacific, and; 3) upholding its commitments to Japan and the Philippines.

The United States has undertaken various actions to attain these goals, which comprise activities such as: 1) transferring military personnel, equipment and supplies to bases at sites occupied in the South China Sea, and; 2) upholding the July 2016 tribunal award in the South China Sea arbitration case of the Philippines and China.

The Academic Perspective

It should be noted that China’s maritime strategy is derived from serious academic works on naval study and the alignment of military doctrine with national defense modernization, as written by Lidong Wang in “Theory of National Maritime Interest.”

These studies are done by the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Academy of Military Science and the PLA National Defense University, which focus on the use of armed force, tactics, and military theories.

Many sea power theorists center their assessments on China’s continental power and its rising international status. Interestingly, some, like James Holmes and Toshi Yoshihara, found the commonalities between China’s strategy in the South China Sea and the United States’ in the Caribbean Sea.

These studies offer adequate knowledge regarding China’s increasing naval capability as well as the implications of China as a sea power—China’s intrusion into the Philippines’ waters being one manifestation of such.

Accordingly, a narrative has emerged into how the state should pursue its maritime policies. Such studies suggest the expansion of naval influence, the acquisition of deterrent sea power and the focus on the protection of sea lines of communication, according to Wenmu Zhang in Discussion of China’s Sea Power.

As shown, extensive research has been pursued pertaining to Chinese maritime power development.

In 2009, Chinese academics such as Wu Shicun, Xu Liping, Zhang Jie and Zhong Feiteng promoted their ideas on China’s international roles, diplomatic relations with the United States and China’s prominence in Southeast Asia. Their research centered on raising possible policy approaches to resolve debates and foster collaboration in the region.

Other studies also cover non-dispute-related maritime issues. Scholars of these areas posit that the information environment is strategic to China’s energy and logistic supply. Examples include studies on the “Malacca Dilemma” and the “String of Pearls,” which are associated with China’s energy imports and sea control.

Efforts to Safeguard Territorial Integrity

The Philippines has undertaken steps to safeguard its territorial integrity by emphasizing the importance of international law and through engagement with ASEAN.

While leveraging on international law is important, the Philippines still needs to continuously highlight in international forums about China’s violations of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), especially considering both the Philippines and China are parties to UNCLOS.

For example, the Philippines needs to highlight the outcome of the 2016 South China Sea Arbitration that found China’s claim as incompatible. The arbitration resulted in several key decision points.

Firstly, China’s claims to historic rights and resources have no legal basis. Secondly, none of China’s claimed land features in the Spratly Islands are islands capable of generating a 200-nm EEZ. Thirdly, China violated the Philippines’ sovereign rights on several layers: 1) interfering with the latter’s oil exploration activities; 2) prohibiting its fishing vessels from operating; 3) failing to prevent Chinese fishing vessels from operating and; 4) conducting land reclamation in areas where the Philippines enjoys sovereign rights to explore for and exploit natural resources. Lastly, China violated its marine environmental protection obligations under UNCLOS by causing “severe harm to the coral reef environment” with its land reclamation activities and harvesting of endangered species.

Despite this, China has lodged its non-participation and non-acceptance of this ruling.

The impact of the 2016 arbitral ruling is threefold. First, the arbitration denies the effectivity of China’s maritime security strategy in the South China Sea. Second, it denies China’s historic rights claim. Third, it gives independent states recourse to the merits of UNCLOS in the face of China’s sea power in the South China Sea.

In other words, it has reinforced the Philippines’ contention that the actions of China in the South China Sea are “Illegal, Coercive, Aggressive and Deceptive.”

As a strategy to promote this ruling, President Ferdinand Marcos signed Executive Order 57 on 25 March 2024, to deal with issues that impact the country’s national security, sovereignty, sovereign rights and maritime jurisdiction over its extensive maritime zones. The Philippines continues to present the merits of the 2016 Arbitral Ruling in all public forums and implement exhaustive efforts to maintain its full adherence to the rule of law.

Efforts to Counter Maritime Aggression

The Philippines’ strategic alignment with the United States, Japan and Australia is a clear response to China’s intrusion. Under the auspices of the US Indo-Pacific Strategy, the Philippines can coalesce international support to maintain its position vis-à-vis China’s activities in the South China Sea.

There is strength in number. The leaders of the United States, Japan, India and Australia have collectively declared their concern about the situation in the East and South China Seas,  the “coercive and intimidating maneuvres” by China in the latter.

Even with such support in place, the Philippines must adopt a two-fold strategy to deal with China’s recurring activities within its EEZ.

The first strategy is to allow the United States and other foreign vessels to join the regular resupply mission to the BRP Sierra Madre, a tank-landing vessel under the Philippine Navy. If the Philippines’ resupply vessels are accompanied by foreign vessels, this may deter the Chinese maritime militia from carrying out its ramming techniques. Thus, the resupply missions can be peaceful and may be completed without any incident.

The second strategy is to allow active-duty Filipino Americans in the United States’ armed forces to join the resupply mission on board Philippine vessels.

The Philippines is one of several countries that recognize dual citizenship, with more than 15,000 Filipino Americans actively serving in the United States Navy, some of whom have achieved ranks of leadership at all levels. 

Many Filipino American officers are known as “mustangs,” naval service members who have worked through their career path from the bottom to the top. This is an honor that is difficult to attain and those mustangs are valuable repositories of knowledge as well as experience wherever they go.

The Philippines may put a request to the United States to allow Filipino-American naval officers to participate in regular resupply missions to the BRP Sierra Madre and in the patrolling of territorial waters in the South China Sea. The presence of Filipino Americans inside the Philippine vessels would help boost confidence among the Philippine Coast Guard and the Philippine Navy officers.

Conclusion

Chinese aggression within the Philippines’ EEZ has increased dramatically in the second half of this year. These actions have resulted in increased tensions between the two, thus threatening regional stability. Furthermore, despite a joint China-Philippine arrangement, which focuses on refraining from aggression during resupply missions to BRP Sierra Madre, China has not adhered to its commitments. This has called into question the viability of any diplomatic agreements with China.

The time has come for the Philippines to adopt more creative ways to deter China. The two-pronged strategy of including American vessels and Filipino American naval officers for regular resupply missions may offer a boost to maritime stability.

Filipino officials need to go beyond just diplomatic efforts to address the tensions in the South China Sea. These two creative solutions, which constitute peaceful strategies, may lead to better maritime security and regional stability in the long term.

Introduction

Since the Xi Jinping presidency started, China has undertaken major domestic monetary and fiscal reforms to maintain China’s centrality to the region’s economy. The Middle Kingdom may have faced an economic downturn lately, but its government has taken proactive steps to ameliorate the situation.

The latest pronouncements by the Chinese government regarding its economy are meant to strategically signal its resilience while also restoring market confidence from those in Southeast Asia and beyond.

China’s Economic Reform and Regional Opportunities

The 26 September 2024 session of the Political Bureau of the Communist Party of China Central Committee stressed the importance of such executive measures as cutting the reserve requirement ratio (RRR) and altering the mortgage rate. The Bureau deemed these necessary to stimulate the property sector and improve the financial outlook.

Such policy shifts are a realistic response to the regional context, opening opportunities for Southeast Asian countries such as Indonesia to deepen their engagement with China’s economy and seek out cooperative benefits.

The announcement that China will inject approximately 1 trillion yuan into the financial market and reduce the reserve requirement ratio by 0.5% underlines China’s intention to enhance liquidity and promote growth in the economy.

In a way, such measures aimed to reinforce the soundness of China’s financial markets and reassure its regional allies that Beijing remains committed to stabilize its economy irrespective of external and internal headwinds.

The effect of the policy was immediate and broad, as seen by the Shanghai Composite Index increasing by 4.59%, the Shenzhen Component Index increasing by 9.17% and the technology-biased ChiNext surging 17.25% after the National Day holiday reopening.

Joint trading volumes reached new heights, totaling 3.45 trillion yuan on the Shanghai and Shenzhen exchanges, surpassing the former high of 2.6 trillion yuan. This demonstrates the effectiveness of China’s regulatory reforms to restore investor confidence and increase economic activities.

Many in China must feel optimistic about the Chinese real estate market and for good reason. Beijing’s attempts to solve problems within the sector, which constitutes an essential part of China’s economy, include cutting the opening down payment for new residential mortgages from 25% to 15%.

These mortgages, which are expected to relieve loan burdens to around 50 million households and bring older mortgage rates up to the current standard, are predicted to save the country large amounts of resources, approximately 150 billion yuan annually. The significance of such crucial measures is also to help reverse the continuing decline of the real estate market within China.

By bringing back the property market, it has been reported that the primary goal the Beijing government seeks to achieve is enhancing the domestic economy. Most significantly, it creates the conditions for more effective regional economic integration since a strong economy in China is a powerful engine of growth for co-development with others in the region.

Complex Interdependence

Southeast Asia stands to gain considerably if China undergoes an economic revival. The revival of the A-share market has seen an increase in demand from foreign investors, which is likely to result in many investments in the Southeast Asian markets.

This is especially pertinent for countries like Indonesia, which has received Chinese FDI in the development of critical infrastructure. For instance, China’s intent to improve regional connectivity – which was demonstrated with projects like the China-Laos Railway – offers prospects for other investments that would enhance Indonesia’s trade and integration in the region.

China’s development of the town of Mohan – an important border site is situated in Yunnan province (a vital connecting point between China and Southeast Asia), underscores China’s pledge to promote regional economic development and joint progress. This development aptly exemplifies China’s openness to enhance economic relations with the rest of Southeast Asia.

Moreover, with its dominating position in the foreign trade, China has also emerged as an integral component in the regional economic system. The total volume of the foreign goods trade reached US$5.88 trillion in 2023, which means it accounted for 12.4% of the total global trade.

China has managed to retain its position as the most dominant trading nation in the world for the seventh year in a row and this only goes to reinforce its standing in terms of regional trade. Furthermore, with a service trade volume of US$933.1 billion, Southeast Asian countries have the capacity to gain economic benefits by engaging in a deeper trade relationship with China.

These figures show that there is still a need for countries such as Indonesia to engage themselves passively with China’s developmental strategies, such as the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), which has the potential to increase trade volumes and create new markets.

The increasing economic ties of China with Southeast Asia may be understood in the context of the complex interdependence theory, which states that as states become more interlinked economically, socially and politically, the probability of conflict decreases because it is too costly.

This model helps us comprehend why it may be in the interest of some Southeast Asian countries like Indonesia to become more integrated with the Chinese economic model, which would, in return, enable the creation of a more constructive and harmonious regional context. By implementing an interdependence model, regional economies can avert risks of instability and promote joint growth, which ensures that all parties benefit.

Challenges

Nonetheless, developing more active economic engagement with China is not without problems. Greater economic engagement means that any policy shift or economic activities derived from China will have implications across the region.

For Indonesia, which is a major recipient of Chinese investment in key sectors such as infrastructure, manufacturing and real estate, this dependency poses hazards as variations in Chinese investments tend to import volatility to the local market and economies.

China has taken steps such as issuing extremely long-period treasury bonds as well as special local government bonds to help stabilize shocks to its financial and real estate markets. These measures indicate that China understands that its activities affect the economy of the region; Southeast Asian countries can rest assured that China is mindful of its potential pitfalls.

However, while the increased flow of Chinese capital into Southeast Asia is critical for meeting the financial needs of development projects, it can also imbalance the markets and stifle efforts to improve local capacity.

Therefore, Indonesian authorities are required to manage foreign investments, including foreign capital coming from China, to ensure that these investments are aimed at achieving sustainable development goals that will benefit its domestic economy.

Recent crises such as the crash in Indonesia’s textile industry – due to massive capital inflow and import of textile products from China – exemplify this concern. Such cases further underscore the need for Indonesia to erect some rules and regulations that could shield local industries.

Constructing a legal regime that encourages cooperative ventures and technological transfer would allow Indonesia’s enterprises to utilize Chinese capital in a more efficient manner, resulting in development without surrendering control of essential sectors and assets.

Strategic options for ASEAN and Indonesia

To deal with the economic resurrection of China, Indonesia and its ASEAN peers should take a more aggressive stance, allowing for deepened economic cooperation while diversifying their economic relations.

With shifts from primary commodity export reliance to developing core sectors such as manufacturing, technology and services, Indonesia could skillfully integrate itself within regional supply chains with China at the center.

For instance, rather than chiefly importing finished goods, Indonesia could aid in China’s production networks by establishing its own electronics and automotive components industries. Predominantly, this strategy would assist Indonesia’s economy by retaining more foreign earnings but majoring in the core activities of such industries.

However, to avoid being “swamped” by imported goods, Indonesia does require a framework of policies to aid domestic industries, especially in their formative stages including trade standards and promotion of sectors where it has a comparative advantage. Such strategy could attract more foreign investment into Indonesia and improve the country’s economic position. 

Central to this strategy is financial regulation and financial stability. Indonesian policymakers must concentrate on building sound financial institutions and laws that will adequately absorb the sudden influx of Chinese capital while reducing risks associated with volatile capital inflows.

Reinforcing its financial control and risk management policies will allow Indonesia to withstand almost any impact even after internal changes in Chinese policies.

There is a great need for ASEAN to pursue better economic integration with China. When bargaining with Beijing, especially in regards to the BRI, ASEAN ought to seek to remain true to the ASEAN centrality and encourage a more even distribution of Chinese investments around the ASEAN countries.

However, such commonality of purpose is not easy due to the very diverse political and economic structures within ASEAN. For example, Malaysia’s engagement with the BRI projects has demonstrated the extent to which such investment can be politicized which hampers ASEAN’s effort to voice out as a single entity.

To ensure ASEAN centrality vis-à-vis these complexities, the bloc could seek to focus on developing broad parameters, which would enable them to promote common interests within the region. This would guarantee a united regional position on engagement with China while ensuring that individual member countries are allowed the leeway to pursue bilateral deals that suit their domestic variables.

ASEAN Member States can leverage regional projects that foster infrastructure development, technological advancement and agricultural growth in a manner that is sustainable for the region. Such a position would enable these countries to engage China in a manner that is beneficial to them, alleviating excessive dependency on Chinese capital and promoting a coherent as well as cohesive regional economy in the process.

Conclusion

To sum up, as a result of recent changes in the strategies of the Chinese authorities, Southeast Asia and Indonesia have been presented with a new opportunity to enhance their economic relations with China while fostering their own economic advancement.

The region’s response should be neither too cautious nor too aggressive in order to augment its integration with China while improving its strategic stance. Since China’s economy is now poised to expand steadily, there is an opportunity for ASEAN to establish itself as a regional bulwark that focuses on regional economic progress and stability.

Introduction

President Ferdinand “Bongbong” Marcos Jr. of the Philippines plays a crucial role in the intricate geopolitical dynamics of Southeast Asia.

The administration’s strategic realignment towards strengthening ties with the United States represents a notable change in regional politics, especially in light of the escalating rivalry between the United States and China.

The reconfiguration is driven by the wider involvement of the United States in the area, as demonstrated by initiatives like the AUKUS security agreement involving Australia, the United Kingdom and the United States.

Although the Philippines is not directly participating in AUKUS, the agreement highlights the potential advantages that Manila could gain from military and strategic collaboration, particularly considering its ongoing maritime conflicts with Beijing.

The bolstered US military presence in the area, backed by agreements such as AUKUS, acts as a deterrent to China’s aggressive territorial assertions, particularly in the South China Sea. The sea in question serves as a focal point in the diplomatic relations between the Philippines and China, thus making the support of the United States vital to Manila’s strategy of deterrence.

Marcos Jr. aims to utilize the advantageous position of the Philippines to optimize its diplomatic and security advantages, by aligning more closely with US interests in order to strengthen its regional position.

Not So Easy

Nevertheless, the possibility of Donald Trump returning to the presidency in the United States brings about a sense of uncertainty regarding the changing security condition.

During Trump’s previous term, there were notable changes towards isolationism, evident in his decision to withdraw from international agreements and his skepticism towards long-established alliances.

An exemplary instance was his choice to withdraw from the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), a decision that was widely perceived as a withdrawal from the United States’ involvement in shaping regional economic frameworks and countering China’s increasing influence in the Asia-Pacific region.

Moreover, Trump’s lack of clear commitment to NATO and his confrontational requests for member nations to augment their defense expenditures demonstrated a more general unwillingness to participate in collaborative endeavors. The President’s decision to withdraw from the Paris Climate Agreement has further strengthened this pattern, indicating a potential scaling back of US participation in international obligations, which may be reinstated if he assumes office again.

The potential consequences of a Trump presidency have significant implications for the Philippines. Trump’s policies of isolationism may result in a decrease in the United States’ defense obligations, including those pertaining to the South China Sea.

This region holds significant importance for the Philippines, not only because of its ongoing territorial conflicts with China but also as a crucial passageway for global commerce.

If there is any uncertainty in the support provided by the United States, Marcos Jr. may need to adjust his foreign policy. This could involve seeking new alliances or enhancing the country’s military capabilities within its own borders to make up for the perceived withdrawal of US support.

If Trump’s isolationist approaches are reinstated, Marcos Jr.’s foreign policy strategy, which currently depends heavily on US support, could be at risk. The Philippines could be vulnerable if the United States reduces or withdraws its military presence, particularly in light of its recent assertive position against China.

This revelation may be interpreted within the country as a setback to Marcos Jr.’s plan to strengthen the Philippines’ global reputation and improve its security, which could potentially result in political instability domestically.

Internally, the political dynamics within the Philippines are highly responsive to changes in foreign policy. Marcos Jr.’s predecessor, Rodrigo Duterte, had developed stronger relations with China, moving away from the traditionally pro-US foreign policy path of the Philippines.

Duterte’s adoption of a pro-China policy was a strategic move aimed at expanding the Philippines’ diplomatic ties and decreasing its dependence on the United States.

If Marcos Jr.’s strategy, which is aligned with the United States, is unsuccessful in obtaining the expected support due to changes in US policy under a potential Trump administration, it may result in a revival of pro-China sentiment within the country, potentially led by Duterte or his political allies.

This has the potential to stimulate opposition movements and shape public opinion, resulting in a substantial transformation of the political environment. These changes have the potential to undermine Marcos Jr.’s legislative agenda and impact the electoral prospects of both him and his political allies.

Therefore, it is emphasized that there is a requirement for a well-rounded and adaptable foreign policy that can respond to changes in the global landscape while protecting the interests of the nation.

It Is All about Hedging

For Marcos Jr., effectively managing the delicate balance of international alliances, regional tensions and domestic political pressures is of utmost importance. Ineffectively handling these aspects could potentially lead to the Philippines becoming isolated on the global stage and undermine trust and confidence within the country, which would have negative consequences for the overall stability and effectiveness of the administration.

Aligning with the United States and taking a more assertive position on China signify substantial shifts from the previous administration’s approach. Trump’s return could disrupt this strategic positioning, making Marcos Jr. susceptible to domestic scrutiny and political obstacles.

The relationship between the Philippines’ foreign policy and its domestic political landscape is a constantly changing and flexible process, shaped by worldwide political patterns, regional security issues and internal political considerations. Essentially, Marcos Jr.’s foreign policy maneuver is a risky strategy with both positive and negative consequences.

Although there are advantages to aligning with the United States, relying too heavily on this partnership – considering the unpredictable nature of US politics – could result in significant challenges both domestically and internationally.

To successfully navigate this intricate terrain, it is essential to employ a sophisticated and flexible foreign policy strategy that can effectively protect the interests of the Philippines, irrespective of any changes in its relationships with major global powers.

The ASEAN Conundrum

In addition to the domestic and bilateral challenges discussed, an alignment with the United States places the Philippines in a precarious position within ASEAN.

Historically, the grouping has pursued a strategy of hedging—balancing relationships between major powers to avoid overt partiality and to maintain regional stability and autonomy. This strategy has allowed ASEAN Member States (AMS) to leverage relationships with both the United States and China, gaining benefits from each without becoming overly reliant on either.

However, putting all eggs on the US basket risks straining the Philippines’ relations with ASEAN. This shift could be perceived by other AMS as a departure from ASEAN’s traditional collective stance of neutrality and non-confrontation.

Such a perception might lead to diplomatic friction, as other AMS may be concerned about the implications of the Philippines’ US alignment for their own security and regional dynamics.

Moreover, ASEAN’s cautious approach to China contrasts sharply with the more confrontational stance that the Philippines is adopting under Marcos Jr. This divergence could isolate the Philippines within ASEAN and potentially reducing its influence in regional forums. In an organization that operates by consensus, the lack of alignment with the broader group could diminish the Philippines’ ability to shape regional policies and initiatives.

This potential isolation within ASEAN could compound the vulnerabilities Marcos Jr. faces due to potential shifts in the United States’ policy. If the superpower were to retract its military and strategic commitments in the region, the Philippines would find itself doubly disadvantaged—lacking both the robust backing of the United States and the supportive buffer traditionally provided by ASEAN.

Such a scenario could necessitate a recalibration of Marcos Jr.’s foreign policy to realign more closely with ASEAN’s principles of hedging and neutrality, or to seek strengthened bilateral relationships within the group.

Conclusion

Therefore, while Marcos Jr.’s alignment with the United States offers potential security benefits, it also introduces complexities into the Philippines’ regional relationships, particularly with ASEAN.

Balancing these relationships will require a nuanced approach to diplomacy that respects ASEAN’s collective ethos while safeguarding the Philippines’ national interests. Navigating this delicate balance is essential to ensure that the Philippines remains a proactive and respected member of the regional community, capable of influencing outcomes and advancing its national agenda in a rapidly evolving geopolitical landscape.

Introduction

In a significant stride towards bolstering regional security, government representatives from both China and Indonesia convened in Beijing to chart a path of cooperation in combating terrorism.

The meeting, held in March 2024, saw Wang Xiaohong, China’s Minister of Public Security, engage Mohammed Rycko Amelza Dahniel, the Head of Badan Nasional Penanggulangan Terorisme (Indonesia’s National Counter Terrorism Agency – BNPT).

The primary agenda of the gathering was to fortify collaborative mechanisms and capabilities in counterterrorism efforts. Both sides expressed a mutual commitment to intensify coordination and communication on international counterterrorism issues, while also enhancing practical cooperation in law enforcement. Wang Xiaohong reiterated China’s readiness to align with Indonesia in implementing crucial agreements reached by their leaders, underscoring the robust momentum in their bilateral relations.

Not the First Time

This recent engagement builds on a history of cooperative endeavors. In 2014, the inauguration of counterterrorism cooperation was marked by the signing of a memorandum of understanding (MoU) between BNPT and China’s Ministry of Public Security in Beijing.

Several initiatives were undertaken to enhance collaboration in the following years. Two crucial meetings must be taken into account: the International Meeting on Counter-Terrorism in Bali in 2016 and the Sub-Regional Meeting on Foreign Terrorist Fighters and Cross Border Terrorism in Manado in 2017. These meetings aimed at addressing regional terrorism threats, including those in Marawi, South Philippines, which shook the region during this period.

In these meetings, Indonesia had also proposed strengthening cooperation with China in exchanging information and data on terrorism, deradicalization efforts, and combating terrorist financing through cyber-technology.

In 2017, the Workshop on Counter-Terrorism between China and Its Neighboring Countries further provided a platform for exchanging information. Indonesia was represented by officials from the Ministries of Law and Human Rights as well as Foreign Affairs.

Additionally, in the same year, the 6^th Meeting of the Bilateral Dialogue Between the State Councilor of China and the Coordinating Minister for Political, Legal, and Security Affairs of Indonesia also discussed cooperation plans on counterterrorism under the auspices of the Indonesia-China Comprehensive Strategic Partnership Action.

In late 2023, the two countries further reinforced their counterterrorism collaboration through the signing of an MoU on strategic partnership aimed at promoting regional peace and security. It was emphasized that China sees Indonesia as a country with a  positive track record in counterterrorism that has also been recognized by several countries as well as the United Nations.

Challenges

Amid the strides in cooperative counter-terrorism efforts between China and Indonesia, several significant challenges loom large.

While the cooperative efforts between the two nations have progressed, a potential mismatch arises between China’s and Indonesia’s respective definitions of terrorism. The definition and parameters of terrorism on China’s side are further complicated by its treatment of the Uyghurs.

The primary challenge stems from counterterrorism being utilized as a narrative to obscure China’s harsh policies towards the Uyghur minority in Xinjiang.

Despite its commitment in counterterrorism efforts, China’s approach to handling the Uyghurs presents a multifaceted narrative. Reports have surfaced suggesting that China’s efforts may serve as a veneer to obscure its controversial policies towards these minority groups.

Beijing has faced substantial criticism for its treatment of Uyghur Muslims, including allegations of extensive human rights violations such as mass detentions, surveillance and forced labor. While China portrays these actions as counterterrorism measures aimed at combating extremism, international observers interpret them predominantly as human rights abuses.

Of particular concern are reports indicating that China orchestrates meticulously curated subsidized tours for Indonesian scholars, religious leaders, journalists and other influential figures. These tours purportedly offer a carefully tailored glimpse into specific facets of China’s management of ethnic and religious minorities, presenting a narrative that aligns closely with the Chinese government’s agenda. Participants of these tours reportedly receive remuneration for their time and involvement, raising questions about the authenticity and impartiality of their observations.

The alleged aim of these tours appears to be twofold: to showcase a favorable image of China’s approach to handling its minority populations and to cultivate support and positive perceptions among influential individuals in Indonesia. By carefully controlling the narrative and selectively presenting aspects of its policies and practices, China seeks to shape external perceptions and garner support for its actions, particularly in regions where concerns over human rights and religious freedoms resonate deeply.

However, the existence of these paid tours adds a layer of complexity to the cooperative efforts between China and Indonesia in combating terrorism. While both nations share common interests in addressing security threats and promoting stability, the divergent perspectives on the treatment of ethnic and religious minorities highlight the challenges inherent in navigating diplomatic relations.

For Indonesia, a predominantly Muslim nation, navigating cooperation with China in counterterrorism while concurrently addressing concerns over human rights and religious freedoms poses a nuanced diplomatic challenge. The juxtaposition of these divergent perspectives underscores the complexity of defining terrorism within the context of China’s policies and actions, complicating such collaborative efforts.

Secondly, the South China Sea dispute stands as a significant obstacle to a more effective cooperation between China and Indonesia. The contentious territorial disputes in the South China Sea have long been a source of tension between China and various Southeast Asian nations, including Indonesia, which asserts its sovereignty over parts of the region. China’s expansive claims and assertive actions, such as maritime patrols and the construction of artificial islands, have exacerbated these tensions, fueling concerns over regional stability and maritime security.

The escalating tensions in the South China Sea create a complex backdrop of geopolitical mistrust that could potentially impede bilateral cooperation on counterterrorism initiatives. As both nations strive to address shared security challenges and combat terrorism effectively, the mistrust and suspicion engendered by the South China Sea dispute may hinder the exchange of crucial intelligence, coordination on security measures and the implementation of joint initiatives aimed at countering terrorist threats in the region.

The fear of intelligence data being exploited for ulterior motives adds another layer of complexity to the cooperation between China and Indonesia in counterterrorism efforts. Indonesia may be apprehensive about sharing sensitive intelligence with China, fearing that it could be utilized to further China’s strategic interests, including its aggressive actions in the South China Sea.

Recent incidents, such as the reported cyber-theft of strategic data from ASEAN and its member states, underscore these concerns. Chinese government-linked hackers were purported to have stolen gigabytes of data, including email correspondence, from the ASEAN Secretariat and contacts in member states in 2022. While the exact nature of the stolen information remains undisclosed, it has been suggested that it may have included strategic data related to the South China Sea disputes.

This revelation raises legitimate concerns about the potential misuse of intelligence-sharing mechanisms for geopolitical purposes. For Indonesia, the prospect of sharing any sensitive information with China, including counterterrorism purposes, becomes fraught with uncertainty and risk. There is a justified fear that intelligence data provided to China could be exploited to advance its maritime ambitions and assertive actions in the South China Sea, rather than solely focusing on combating terrorism.

The concerns regarding intelligence sharing with China extend beyond the South China Sea. China’s state-sponsored hackers are known to be highly active in the Southeast Asian region, targeting government and military entities in pursuit of strategic objectives.

Government and military units in Southeast Asian countries have become common targets for China’s hackers in recent years. In the second half of 2022 alone, there was a 20% increase in China-linked cyberattacks against Southeast Asian countries compared to the same period in 2021. These cyber intrusion campaigns are believed to serve the strategic interests of the Chinese government, including gathering intelligence on projects related to the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI).

Conclusion

Amid the complex challenges in China-Indonesia counterterrorism cooperation, proactive steps are crucial. Firstly, prioritizing transparency and mutual trust in intelligence-sharing mechanisms is essential, with clear protocols needed to address Indonesia’s concerns about potential misuse of shared intelligence.

Additionally, to enhance cooperation, China and Indonesia must address complexities surrounding the treatment of ethnic and religious minorities, particularly the Uyghur population in Xinjiang. Transparent dialogue is key to resolving disparities in their definitions of terrorism and minority treatment, with China urged to acknowledge and address international concerns regarding its policies in Xinjiang.

Refraining from using counterterrorism to justify harsh measures against the Uyghurs, prioritizing respect for fundamental rights and exploring alternative approaches, are imperative. Indonesia, while embarking on counterterrorism efforts with China, must still uphold its commitment to human rights, advocating for minority rights domestically and internationally.

Second, resolving underlying tensions, especially the South China Sea dispute, is vital for seamless cooperation. Diplomatic dialogue and confidence-building measures can mitigate mistrust, reaffirming commitments to international law and regional stability.

Bolstering cybersecurity cooperation to counter state-sponsored cyber activities is also imperative, collectively addressing cyber threats to safeguard critical infrastructure and information.

In conclusion, concerted efforts in transparency, trust-building and cybersecurity cooperation are crucial for effective counter-terrorism collaboration, advancing peace and security in the region.

Introduction

The rise of China has prompted the Middle Kingdom to challenge the United States’ supremacy on a number of dimensions, be it geopolitical influence, trade and investment, as well as the cyberspace.

Unfortunately, in the process, this has also put China at odds with other countries, complicating their intertwined and interdependent bilateral relations.

As exemplified by South Korea and the Philippines, their pursuit of fulfilling respective national interest has made them an ample target of China’s cyber operations. Their stories serve as a warning flag for other countries, particularly those that are still bent on state-building objective.

As a multidimensional partner to China, Indonesia could learn a few lessons from the experience of the two aforementioned countries.

China Cyber Operations in South Korea and the Philippines

In March 2017, South Korea’s Lotte Group became a target of administration investigation, business boycotts and cyber-attacks by China owing to its land being used as a site for Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD). A virus was planted on Lotte’s China branch website which successfully suspended its operation for several days. The cyber-attack could be considered as part of retaliatory attacks that cost Lotte’s supermarket a 95% loss in 2017.

It may seem trivial to blame Lotte’s financial loss solely on this cyber-attack, considering other business- and financial-related factors were also at play. However, it shows the extent to which China is ready to pursue its interest and shape the environment to be favorable to its vision.

This is reminiscent of the term “doghouse diplomacy”, referring to a state’s exercise of aggravated act towards disobedient party in order to reap profitable circumstances or gains. It also indicates a reversal of the touted best bilateral period between China and South Korea in modern history, which lasted from 2013 to 2016.

The Philippines faced a similar conundrum recently. A cyber-attack against a government institution was detected earlier in 2023 and findings by Palo Alto Network, a US-based cybersecurity firm, attributed the attack to Stately Taurus group from China.

The government of Philippines was hardly able to muster an appropriate response as the Department of Information and Communication Technology was only manned by 35 personnel. Budgetary restraint has hindered the country to build a sufficient measure to respond and counteract against such cyber-attacks.

Geopolitical factor also comes into play. Since coming into power, President Ferdinand “Bongbong” Marcos Jr. has pursued policies aimed at safeguarding the Philippines’ land and resources. This has necessitated some realignments in its relationship with the United States. For example, bilateral talks in November 2022 produced a few initiatives to further foster the alliance. Besides, a $7.5 million additional financial assistance was conferred to enable the Philippines Coast Guard acquire more patrol ships. In addition, a development grant under USAID helps the Philippines to embark on nature conservation and sustainable fishing agendas, with targeted area around the South China Sea.

Manila does not stop with just the United States. For example, the Philippines partnered with Australia for a joint patrol in the South China Sea in November 2023.

These steps, unfortunately, have caused discomfort among some in China’s security establishment. The aforementioned cyber-attack on a government body is also believed to be part and parcel of China’s displeasure. This should not have come as a surprise. After years of former President Duterte’s China-leaning foreign policy, the new administration suddenly took steps that signals its moving away from China’s orbit.

Lessons Learned for Indonesia

There are some valuable takeaways for Indonesia.

Firstly, the Philippines’ case shows the importance of capable human resource in the field of cybersecurity. Officials of the targeted government body were reportedly unable to respond to the threat properly.

Indonesia has taken the right step forward by establishing a national cyber agency called Badan Siber dan Sandi Nasional (National Cyber and Crypto Agency – BSSN). Whether BSSN would prove as an effective bulwark against cyber-attacks remains to be seen.

A formal infrastructure is not a cure-all solution, considering Indonesia’s digital protection ecosystem continues to be substandard. There have been some remedies to ameliorate this, such as the relatively new Personal Data Protection Act Number 27 2022, which stipulates the creation of a new data protection authority and calls for a structured, transparent and reliable data regime in commercial purpose.

Still in its transition process today, the Act will come into force in October 2024, a full two years after it was passed. Last year, the Ministry of Communication and Informatics (Kominfo) also announced that the government has drafted a derivative regulation that will administer the Act’s scope and aims in more details. The ball is now in the executive branch’s court to realize this vision of a more secure digital ecosystem in Indonesia.

Next, interagency cooperation, such as between BSSN and Kominfo, remains convoluted. As evidenced from a data breach case in July 2021, both agencies tended to be reactive in their response, failing to cut off the root of the problem in the country’s frequent personal data leak cases.

Further complicating the picture is the presence of two bodies tasked to carry out cyber-intelligence activities. While BSSN’s oversees the public sphere, Badan Intelijen Strategis (Strategic Intelligence Agency) operates foreign and military cyber-intelligence under the auspices of the Indonesian Armed Forces.

Meanwhile, both agencies are separate from Badan Intelijen Negara (State Intelligence Agency – BIN), an independent body that carries out general intelligence operations on behalf of the state.

Any effort to improve interagency cooperation must be cognizant of the jurisdictional maze controlled by either of these agencies. Since overlap is a risk, ensuring a clear standard of operation and procedure as well as data sharing mechanism are crucial. Clear boundaries between the two would also assist the prospective data protection authority to identify and remove gaps as well as executing its task efficiently.

Will all of these issues, it might be too tall an order to expect BSSN to safeguard our data and systems in Indonesia, especially if multiple cyber incidents occur simultaneously. Therefore, there is an importance to enable the private sector, civil societies and the grassroots to learn the most basic cybersecurity and cyber-hygiene skills. Local universities could serve as an important partner to advocate for and administer such agenda. 

Linked to that is the importance to tweak the ICT curriculum in schools and universities, which must now incorporate some elements of cybersecurity. This will prepare young Indonesians to better equip themselves against potential cyber incidents.

In an era where cyber-attacks can be used as a bargaining chip in a geopolitical game, Indonesia must uphold its guiding foreign policy principle of bebas aktif (free and active). This principle continues to bestow Indonesia with a large strategic room to manoeuvre the uncertain geopolitical landscape, allowing Indonesia to avoid being overdependent on a single partner.

As indicated above, a previous alignment (the Philippines) or a golden bilateral relationship era with China (South Korea) did not spare the two countries from being targeted by China’s cyber activities. These should serve as a warning alarm to other middle powers such as Indonesia, that must undertake a selective alignment process to balance its approach to different powers in today’s geopolitical flux.

For example, Indonesia should consider enhancing its cooperation with partners in the Mexico, Indonesia, the Republic of Korea, Turkey and Australia (MIKTA) grouping. The last of these three countries are open for collaboration with others in the regulation of the cyberspace. It is thus to these three countries that Indonesia could potentially turn in order to elevate its cyber capacity through close consultations and exchange of best practices.

Introduction

This year has been yet another vital period for China-Indonesia relations, where cooperation in various sectors intensified.

Four areas shall be considered: increased engagement frequency, multilateralism, trade and investments, and the South China Sea.

Frequent Engagements

Both sides have been actively busy meeting each other since the beginning of the year.

In February, Chinese State Councilor and Foreign Minister Qin Gang met his Indonesian counterparts Retno Marsudi at the 4th Joint Commission for Bilateral Cooperation (JCBJ) and discussed cooperation in trade, investment, health sector and people-to-people exchange. In the same month, Qin Gang also went to Jakarta to meet with President Joko “Jokowi” Widodo, where the latter invited the former to invest in Indonesia’s new capital city.

Two months later, Qin also hosted Indonesia’s Coordinating Minister of Maritime Affairs and Investment Luhut Binsar Pandjaitan in Beijing. The two discussed ways to strengthen trade and investment between the two countries.

In the same month, Luhut co-hosted the Meeting of China-Indonesia High-level Dialogue and Cooperation Mechanism, where he met with Director of the Office of the Central Commission for Foreign Affairs Wang Yi. 

In July, Jokowi met with Chinese President Xi Jinping in Chengdu for talks about joint projects that include Indonesia’s new capital as well as cooperation in health, research and technology, and other regional issues. During the visit, Jokowi also met with Chinese firms to discuss possible investments in Indonesia, especially in the petrochemical and renewable energy.

Jokowi then hosted Chinese Premier Li Qiang in September – which was the latter’s first visit to an Asian country – to discuss ways to expand trade and investment between Indonesia and China. In that meeting, an investment worth US$21.7 billion was committed by China. Six new agreements were also signed – these are in the areas of e-commerce, industrial cooperation, support for enterprises, agriculture, science and technology, as well as fisheries. Soon after, Indonesian Vice President Ma’ruf Amin visited the Chinese premier in  Nanning to discuss ways to strengthen bilateral ties between their countries, especially in the sectors of renewable energy and halal industry.

In the same month, Indonesia’s Coordinating Ministry for Maritime Affairs and Investment also had a first of its kind high-level dialogue between Indonesian and Chinese officials on cooperation on energy transitions. The meeting, which was co-hosted by the Ministry, brought together representatives from both countries’ institutions, industry leaders and CSOs to exchange views on China’s role in Indonesia’s energy transition programs.

October 2023 was the commemoration of the 10^th anniversary of the Belt and Road Initiatives (BRI). During the meeting, China expressed its willingness to cooperate with Indonesia on several sectors, including digital economy, photovoltaics, new energy vehicles, as well as the import of agricultural and fishery products. It was also mentioned that the two countries would deepen the integration of industrial chains and supply chains, as well as jointly promote the establishment of a “regional comprehensive economic corridor”.

Apart from 10 Memoranda of Understanding (MoU) being signed, it was also during this meeting that the two countries established the 2022-2026 Plan of Action for Strengthening the Comprehensive Strategic Partnership, aimed to strengthen the ties between Jakarta and Beijing. In addition, both also agreed to establish the 2+2 Dialogue Mechanism for Foreign Ministers and Defense Ministers, which is expected to expand high-level channels for strategic communication and dialogue platforms for political, defense and security cooperation.

It is crucial to note that the 2+2 Dialogue Mechanism was a follow up of a meeting between Indonesian Minister of Defense, Prabowo Subianto, and Chinese Minister of Defense Li Shangfu in June, where they discussed cooperation in defense sector.

In a separate meeting with Li in Beijing, Jokowi also asked China to pour its investment to help build Indonesia’s new capital. Before Jokowi’s departure for Beijing, acting Chief Investment Minister Erick Thohir also said that Indonesia also aimed to seek China’s assistance for renewable energy and infrastructure projects.

In essence, the frequency of bilateral engagement between the two is considered highly unusual, even more frequent than China’s engagements with other ASEAN countries. This is quite remarkable considering Indonesia’s position as ASEAN Chair at the time. It would be interesting to conduct a compare Indonesia’s increased engagement with China vis-à-vis its engagement with the United States throughout the same period.

Despite this, it can be seen that the multiple visits are a manifestation of the pragmatic nature of this bilateral relationship, especially with economic and investment considerations forming parts of its foundation. Missing from the broader scope is the critical aspects such as the environmental and societal impacts of Chinese investments as well as the issue of labor rights.

Moves towards Multilateralism

Beyond frequent bilateral meetings, in 2023 we also saw the growing move towards multilateralism.

The most crucial one was Indonesia’s participation in the 2023 Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa (BRICS) Summit. While the idea of Indonesia joining the BRICS was raised many years ago with the support of China, in July 2023, Indonesia finally accepted the invitation to participate in the Summit, held a month later. Despite this, during the Summit, Jokowi and his entourage did not issue many statements, seemingly trying to avoid media attention on the delegation’s presence at the event. As we argued elsewhere, Indonesia does not yet see any pragmatic reason for joining the group.

In addition, a trilateral dialogue between Indonesia, Russia, and China was conducted on the sidelines of the ASEAN Summit a few months ago. The trilateral dialogue discussed collaboration plans based on mutual concerns about the current great power divide. Furthermore, the three countries also agreed to coordinate towards achieving economic stability in the Global South as well as strengthening security architecture in the ASEAN and wider Asia-Pacific region.

While the continuity of the Russia-Indonesia-China Trilateral Meeting has been the topic of much discussion, a new window of opportunity appears to be opening for the tripartite relationship. While there has been some speculation about a tripartite bloc, it is unlikely to happen anytime soon.

Trade and Investments

While China remains a top trading partner for Indonesia, concerns have emerged that the ongoing slowdown of Chinese economy and the decline of its domestic property market is likely to have considerable impact for Indonesian commodities. In this case, efforts to diversify Indonesian export destinations for commodities is important.

For example, in recent years, Indonesia’s export market for crude palm oil (CPO) and coal has been focused on China. Nonetheless, the decline in Chinese demand can be felt in 2022, as evidenced by the decrease in CPO export by 18.4% and coal by 55.7%. In this case, exploring new destinations can be a step forward accompanied by increasing the value add of commodities to increase its revenue.

On the investment side, the most crucial development took place in early October, whereby Indonesia finally inaugurated its China-backed high-speed railway between Jakarta and Bandung. The railway, named “Woosh”, was originally scheduled to launch in 2019 but was delayed due to pandemic-related challenges, land disputes and cost-overrun. The project also has other raised other concerns such as environment and labor issues. Nonetheless, despite the various issues and critics from observers, this year also witnessed the Indonesian government’s plan to extend the railway to Surabaya, with China again as a partner.

During Jokowi’s visit to the BRI Forum in October, 31 private firms and state-owned enterprises (SOEs) from Indonesia signed deals totaling US$13.7 billion with Chinese firms. According Minister of State-Owned Enterprises Erick Thohir, the number was just a portion of potential deals totaling around US$29 billion.

Earlier in September, China and Indonesia also signed four new agreements which will be launched in the Yuanhong Investment Zone in Fuzhou, the site of the Chinese part of the “Two Countries, Twin Parks” project between Indonesia and China. The agreements focused on the wholesale of Indonesian aquatic products, fishing and processing, and others.

It is crucial to note that “Two Countries, Twin Parks” is a new model of cooperation featuring two countries establishing industrial parks. China and Indonesia have included three other Industrial parks, namely the Bintan Industrial Estate, the Aviarna Industrial Estate and the Grand Batang City.

Meanwhile, Jokowi’s visit to Chengdu in July allowed him to secure billions of dollars in investment commitment from Chinese firms. One of the biggest was an US$11.5 billion commitment from one of the world’s largest glass makers, Xinyi, to build a manufacturing plant in Indonesia.

The role of international exhibition must not be downplayed. This year, major Chinese companies signed MoUs on projects located on Bintan Island and East Kalimantan in the smart city sector, which was facilitated by an exhibition in May by the Chinese Indonesian Association (INTI).

Furthermore, two business fairs held in Jakarta in February and May saw 36 deals worth around US$9 billion being sealed. Meanwhile, another fair organized in in May secured 10 projects with a total investment of 4.55 billion yuan.

Most of the investments signed by the two countries in 2023 focus on renewable energy and energy transition. In May, for instance, Indonesia inked an MoU with Chinese electric vehicle (EV) firm BYD in Shenzhen to explore the possibility of Chinese investment in Indonesia’s EV industry.

Problems with Chinese Projects

Despite all these positive steps, this year also saw several problems emanating from Chinese projects in Indonesia. A particularly scandalous one saw the eviction of some 7,500 people from the island of Rempang for the construction of an Eco-City with a giant Chinese-owned glass factory Xinyi, which is mentioned above.

Local people feel that the project threatens their livelihood as they are forced to relocated to new areas, far from their traditional fishing community. It is important to note that during the clashes between residents and police to demonstrate the project, tear gas and rubber bullets were used against protesters, which critics denounced as an excessive use of force.

Another inconvenience comes from the mining sector, whereby Chinese involvement in nickel mining has caused major environmental and labor impacts in Indonesia. Dispute among workers in Chinese projects have also been reported, with a major incident occurring in January whereby an Indonesian worker and a Chinese worker were killed during a protest at the Chinese-owned smelter in Morowali. A new report published this year shows that while Indonesian workers are treated unfairly in Chinese projects, Chinese workers also experience very poor living conditions in these projects.

Another issue was the arrest of Chinese citizens for involvement in cross-border telephone and online romance scam operation in Batam. Similar arrest was also reported in 2019, suggesting that the problem had been ongoing for years.

South China Sea

The South China Sea remains an important issue. As early as January, a tension flared up after Indonesia announced that it had approved plans to develop a large natural-gas field near the Natuna Islands and sent warship to monitor Chinese coast guard vessel in the area.

Under the Special Task Force for Upstream Oil and Gas Business Activities (SKK Migas), the country’s oil and gas regulator, the project is estimated to entail a US$3.07 billion investment. It will be operated by the British company Harbour Energy and the output will be exported mainly to Vietnam.

However, since the location of the Natuna field is in the southern section of the South China Sea, Indonesia is taking some risks and must be prepared for how China responds.

While China protested against the explorations, as the gas exploration site lies under Indonesia’s continental shelf and in its Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), Jakarta has the sovereign right to exploit all the natural resources in its water column, on the seabed and its subsoil, as dictated by the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS).

At the same time, Indonesia also attempts to balance China’s activities in the South China Sea by expanding Super Garuda Shields, a joint drill led by the Indonesian and US militaries.

While negotiations on the Code of Conduct (COC) was one of the topics discussed during the ASEAN Summit in July, its effectiveness and implementation remain to be seen.

Soft Power

Aside from the above issues, the cooperation also continued in the soft power realm.

Science and technology cooperation was a highlight. This was demonstrated recently when Indonesia was chosen as the guest of honor at the 11^th China (Mianyang) Science & Technology City International High-Tech Expo in Mianyang City, China. The event also witnessed the meeting between both countries’ representatives for potential cooperation in the field of science and technology.

Also in November, there was co-operation in innovative research in the fields of sustainable development, environmentally friendly technologies, development of the mining sector, resource recycling and development of new energy resources. This cooperation was agreed upon by China’s Central South University, GEM Co., Ltd. and Bandung Institute of Technology.

Several events also accentuated the close relationship between China and Indonesia. These include the reception celebrating the 74^th Anniversary of the Founding of the People’s Republic of China, the Mid-Autumn Festival and Indonesia’s participation at the ASEAN-China Week 2023.

Indonesia is also determined to promote the people-to-people exchange. The Ministry of Tourism and Creative Economy set up the Wonderful Indonesia Sales Mission in Shanghai and Hangzhou, aimed at increasing the number of Chinese tourists to Indonesia to 361,500.

Future Outlook

The ties between China and Indonesia are expected to grow and expand in 2024. People-to-people exchange may be increased given that Indonesia is considering granting visa-free entry to several countries including China.

However, it all depends on who is elected as the next Indonesian president. The most likelihood scenario is that whoever is elected would continue to prioritize economic ties with China.

The question is whether the new Indonesian president would recalibrate the opportunities and risks of the Sino-Indonesian relationship.

There are still a few months until the presidential election in February 2024. Indonesia’s relationship with China, however, will undoubtedly remain an important component of Jakarta’s foreign policy, with ramifications to Southeast Asia, the Indo-Pacific and the world at large, given Indonesia’s geopolitical heft and status.

Introduction

Recent news about the sinking of Chinese fishing vessel Lu Peng Yuan Yu 028 brought to the fore the hardship faced by Indonesian ship crews.

The vessel, which sank in the Indian Ocean last May, allegedly carried 39 crew members – 17 of which are Indonesians – who went missing.

The Chinese government ordered a search and rescue for the missing mariners, while its Foreign Ministry launched an “emergency mechanism for consular protection” involving embassies and consulates in Australia, Sri Lanka, the Maldives, Indonesia and the Philippines.

Seven bodies of the crews have since been found, though the whereabouts of the Indonesian crews remains uncertain. Some Indonesian politicians have asked the government to coordinate with various parties, including the Chinese government, to investigate whether or not there was a violation of law or elements of negligence and to ensure that the victims’ families get their rights as workers.

This incident, which is the latest of a series of incidents involving Indonesian ship crews in Chinese vessels, should be a wakeup call for Indonesia and China to take this issue more seriously in their relations.

Repetition upon Repetition

Indonesia’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs has successfully conducted two repatriations of crew members during the pandemic.

In November 2020, 157 crew members who were stuck on Chinese ships were repatriated through a handover process in the middle of the North Sulawesi Sea. Two among those were already dead. In December of the same year, the Ministry received six crew members from a Chinese ship in Batam waters, one of which was dead.

The number of dead crew members is certainly a concern, even as the Indonesian Institute for Destructive Fishing Watch (DFW) reported that there is an increasing number of Indonesians being forced to work on Chinese vessels.

Some of these workers were duped into fake agreements or arrangements, initially promised a work opportunity elsewhere but ended up being forced to work on Chinese vessels. These workers also experience poor and degrading treatments, such being forced to work for more than 18 hours a day, subjected to violence and served fish bait and distilled water from the sea as daily consumption. Sick crews often suffer for 30-45 days before succumbing to death, during which period they were also forced to work.

Corpses are thrown into the sea on the pretext of preventing disease transmission, an activity labeled as “sea burial”. In one case, some Indonesian crews attempted to persuade the ship’s captain to have the corpse “stored” in the fridge before a proper burial on land could be conducted. This idea was rejected by the ship’s captain.

Recruiters often try to cover up the fact of the death. For example, in 2019, PT. Karunia Bahari Samudera contacted the family of a dead crew and gave them a letter in Chinese from the captain of the ship and Rp50 million for insurance coverage. Nonetheless, the company asked the family to claim the insurance on the condition that they give approval for the body to be thrown into the sea. PT. Karunia Bahari Samudera also asked family to sign a statement letter not to sue the company, the ship owner and the ship’s captain.

The same thing happened to Ari, who passed away on 31 March 2020. PT. Karunia Bahari Samudera only informed his family of his death on 9 April 2020 and the family gave their approval for a sea burial four days later. However, to make it appear as though the family had given approval, the letter was backdated to March 31.

Although there are many companies supplying crew members to China, only a few carry official permits from the government as placement companies for Indonesian migrant workers. The Indonesian police has investigated and arrested officials from some of these companies.  

In some cases, there is actually a chance to save these crew members if only the Ministry of Foreign Affairs could respond quickly. As a matter of fact, the Ministry often only informs the family after the bodies were thrown into the sea. One example is Riswan who died on board Han Rong 368 on 29 July 2020 with a swollen body covered with freckles and grayish-white discharge from his mouth. The Ministry visited Riswan’s family in Sulawesi only after his body was thrown into the sea and presented four approval letters for sea burials, cremation, autopsy and repatriation of Riswan’s corpse. None was signed by his family.

Moreover, these workers are often paid very little. Some of the crew members did not receive a salary and some had their wages deducted – which means the contractual agreement was violated. There are also crew members who received a meagre salary of US$120 or the equivalent of Rp1.7 million for 13 months of work.

Some workers went missing. For instance, a woman from Tegal wrote an open letter to President Joko “Jokowi” Widodo after her husband, who was suspected to have been forced into labor, disappeared. By that time, her husband had worked for one year as a crew member on the Fu Yuan Yu ship. The last time they communicated, she was told that her husband had experienced inhumane treatment at work and was not allowed to go home.

Later, she received news from a crew member that her husband was transferred to another ship. After that, the trail went cold.

In other cases, crews got stranded in other countries. For example, 13 Indonesians were stuck on Somali waters for about eight months, where one died and another disappeared.

Another case involved to a crew member who worked on Luqing Yuan Yu 623. He died on board and his body was found in Somali waters. This death was allegedly due to the torture he received while working on the ship. This incident occurred in the last week of January 2020, but the news only arrived at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in May, about four months later.

The Indonesian government had tried to evacuate them but had not been successful because their location was difficult to reach.

Problems compound as their passports are confiscated by the ship captain and the Chinese fishing boat company that refused to return them to Indonesia, prompting some crews to jump off the ship. For instance, two Indonesian crew members on board the Lu Qian Yuan Yu 901 chose to throw themselves into the sea and escape the working condition.

Ways Forward

Over the years, the Indonesian government has asked the Chinese government to investigate these cases and hold shipping companies responsible. Minister of Foreign Affairs Retno Marsudi once said the cases experienced by Indonesian crew members “will be followed up strictly through a parallel legal process by both the PRC authorities and the Indonesian authorities.”

Indonesia has also summoned China to ask for clarification regarding vessels allegedly mistreating Indonesian crews, with some resulting in death.

However, in response, the Chinese government claimed to be paying special attention and was carrying out an investigation into Chinese fishing companies that employed Indonesian crew members. Time will tell if serious actions will be carried out following such investigations.

Therefore, the issue needs to be addressed in the interactions between Indonesia and China. Laws relating to the protection of crew members working on foreign ships already exist, but these need to be enforced properly by the government. In addition, the government should also look into illegal agency companies that actively recruit young people with the promise of money, only to end up enslaving them.

Indonesian authorities need to coordinate with China’s law enforcement to investigate both Indonesian and Chinese companies that employ crew members from Indonesia.

It is also crucial to coordinate over data collection on crews’ placement on Chinese vessels as a safeguard against potential problems down the lane, such as the cases presented above.

Indonesia also needs to ensure that the rights of the deceased crew members are properly channeled to their heirs and family members. They also need assistance and protection so as to not be manipulated by irresponsible agents.

Moreover, Indonesian law enforcement officials need to investigate a number of recruitment agencies who delivered the bodies of dead crew members because they are partly responsible for these human tolls. Lastly, attention is also needed on the existence of several pending issues, including returning stranded Indonesian crews, upholding their labor rights, improving workplace conditions and fostering law enforcement through mutual legal assistance.

Introduction

Prabowo’s has had a long and colorful political career after leaving the military, currently serving as Indonesia’s defense minister.

Amidst the ups and downs of his political journey, he has contested several times either as vice presidential or presidential candidate in the past three elections. He is also on track to become Gerindra’s candidate for the top office in the upcoming 2024 political contestation.

His multiple losses have not deterred him from contesting again and again, perhaps as a testament of his character as an unyielding soldier of Indonesia’s National Armed Forces.

His first taste of the contest was in 2009 as Megawati Soekarnoputri’s running mate, who was and still is the chairwoman of PDIP. He ran as presidential candidate in 2014 with Hatta Rajasa of PAN in his ticket and five years later with Sandiaga Uno. Incumbent President Joko “Jokowi” Widodo defeated him on the last two counts, but made a decision to co-opt Prabowo and Sandiaga as ministers in his current cabinet. Next year’s election will be Prabowo’s fourth.

While we have covered Anies Baswedan’s interactions and views on China in another piece, this piece aims to highlight Prabowo’s interactions with China. A minister in Jokowi’s cabinet, Prabowo is part of the system which foreign policy aligns closely with China’s interest.

If Prabowo wins next year, would his vision sustain or disrupt the close Indonesia-China relationship that has been cultivated by Jokowi?

Formal Engagements as a Minister

Prabowo is one of the Indonesian officials who frequently interacts with China, especially considering his position as defense minister. In November 2019,  for example, Prabowo met with General Wei Fenghe, his then-Chinese counterpart, at the 6^th ASEAN Plus Ministerial Meeting in Bangkok. A month after, the two held a face-to-face meeting in Beijing, where they discussed the possibilities of fostering cooperation in the defense industry sector.

In return to this, Prabowo also received a visit from the Chinese Defense Minister in Jakarta in September 2022. The escalation of the South China Sea tension was the subject of this occasion. Prabowo emphasized Indonesia’s unwavering stance to uphold its free and active foreign policy and will continue to push for peace in the region as well.

Then in November 2022, Prabowo again flew to Xi’an to meet with General Wei Fenghe. The two ministers discussed continuing cooperation in areas that were delayed by the Covid-19 pandemic, such as joint military exercises and military education.

Prabowo’s Statements on China

On the sidelines of the 2023 Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore, Prabowo took the time to hold a meeting with the new Chinese Defense Minister Li Shangfu. According to Prabowo, the Indonesia-China relations must be maintained like the ties between siblings, especially to encourage the creation of regional and global stability and peace. He also expressed his full support for optimizing the relationship between Indonesia and China to achieve a comprehensive strategic partnership.

He sought to enhance bilateral cooperation through the formation of the 2+2 Indonesia-China forum. The forum, according to Prabowo, is expected to significantly enhance comprehensive cooperation between the two countries, particularly in the field of defense and security in the future.

Engagements such as this potential forum are not an alien concept in the bilateral relations. Over the years, the Indonesia-China relations has been strengthened through the annual bilateral meeting forum known as the Defense Industry Cooperation Meeting (DICM). This has also become an avenue in which Prabowo meets with his Chinese counterparts.

The defense industry also saw dynamic activities during Prabowo’s stint as minister. During his tenure, Prabowo sought to strengthen cooperation with Chinese companies. Recently, for example, the Ministry of Defense discussed the possibility of a defense cooperation between state-owned enterprises such as PT. LEN, PT. Indonesian Aerospace and PT. Dahana with Chinese companies.

But it was obvious Prabowo’s interest goes beyond the realm of defense, which has been recorded since before his 2019 attempt at running for presidential office. In 2019, Prabowo stated that Indonesia must imitate China’s endeavor in poverty alleviation, which he considered to be a success story within a relatively short time. Interestingly, this was conveyed during one of the debates between 2019 presidential candidates.

It not a secret that Prabowo holds China in high regard. During China’s 69^th Independence Day celebration in Jakarta in 2018, he mentioned that China is an important country for Indonesia, necessitating the importance to cultivate good relations with the Middle Kingdom.

In the same month, Prabowo held a meeting with Chinese Ambassador Xiao Qian in Hambalang, Bogor. The meeting was organized as the Ambassador’s way of conveying his gratitude to Prabowo and Gerindra, who had always give warm welcome to the Chinese diplomat. This further accentuates the close relationship between Prabowo and China.

Prabowo responded by stating that anyone who sacrifices their time and energy to travel and meet the Indonesian people truly displays the virtue of sincerity, and thus must be considered a good friend. He also stated that China is a big country with big influence in the world.

These are just snippets of how high Prabowo regards China, but can also be simply interpreted as his efforts to attract China’s money and helping hand. The fact that these statements were delivered before his run in the 2019 presidential election means his approach to China as a potential president could have been a parallel to Jokowi’s own in his administration, which has attracted a lot of Chinese investment and projects over the years.

Things to Consider

The frequency of Prabowo’s interactions with China is indeed noteworthy as an indicator of his potential engagement with China. However, the frequent interaction cannot be extricated from the fact that many of these engagements were made as part of his official post as a minister in Jokowi’s cabinet, which does not make secret its positive sentiment towards China. Thus, part of Prabowo’s display of closeness with China must be viewed from the lens of Jokowi’s larger foreign policy direction.

However, it needs to be underlined that it is possible that Prabowo will remain on good terms with China if he were to clinch the top post in the 2024 presidential election. Prabowo likes to display his views and expertise in foreign policy and global affairs, and thus presidential debates and his first few months as a potential presidential will be critical to gauge his attitude towards China. Of course, a closer alignment with China, under his potential presidency, begs the question of whether he would dial down relationship with Indonesia’s traditional western partners such as the United States and Australia.

There are other factors too. The cooperation between Gerindra and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) actually exists, even though it is not as intimate as the latter’s engagement with PDIP, Jokowi’s political vehicle. Time will tell if Gerindra would play a bigger role in engaging China under Prabowo’s purported administration.

It will be interesting to see the direction of Prabowo’s foreign policy if he assumes the presidency. However, it can be argued that the next Indonesian president – whether it be Prabowo, Ganjar Pranowo or Anies Baswedan – will still maintain good relations with China, considering that China’s influence is already so entrenched in Indonesia. However, there may be a different style of strategy in navigating the bilateral relations compared to Jokowi’s own. It is also important to note that despite his experience in interacting with China, Prabowo lacks experience in discussing economic issues with China. Thus, it would be vital for a Prabowo administration, if he wins, to handpick its chief economist who can translate Prabowo’s views and objectives into sound economic relations with China, provided that the bilateral relations is already dominated by economic matters.