Part of an ongoing article series on Indonesia’s regional elections 2024.

Introduction

The high cost of local elections prompted President Prabowo Subianto to revive the discourse on indirect local elections. In his speech at the Golkar Party’s anniversary, Prabowo proposed that local parliaments should elect regional heads instead of being directly elected by voters.

Political party leaders, political elites and members of the Regional Representatives Council (DPD) followed suit by welcoming the discourse on regional head elections by the local parliaments.

Despite the costly nature of organizing direct local elections, the system remains the best option for Indonesian voters seeking to ensure subnational leadership circulation.

The high cost associated with local elections is insufficient to justify switching from a direct to an indirect election system. Instead, the state and political parties should invest more to improve the quality of the organizing and outcomes of direct elections.

The Costs of Regional Elections

Cynicism regarding the recently concluded local elections is justified for an array of reasons. The president’s and national-level political forces’ interference, misuse of state resources, state apparatuses’ intervention, the poor performance of election management and supervisory bodies, low turnout rates, and increasing dynastic politics prevalence are some valid reasons to be dissatisfied with this year’s local elections.

Another reason is the costly nature associated with organizing local elections. This is not merely related to legitimate expenses, which include – but are not limited to – printing ballots, paying honorariums to polling station officials and campaign-related expenses.

The government, for example, allocated Rp37.4 trillion (approximately US$2.335 billion) to organize the 2024 Simultaneous Regional Head Elections (Pemilihan Kepala Daerah Serentak – Pilkada).

In addition to campaign expenses, candidates must also pay witness fees at polling stations, conduct electoral surveys and file disputes over election results to the Constitutional Court (MK). This last includes the cost of paying lawyers and bringing witnesses to Jakarta to testify before the MK.

Pilkada become considerably more expensive when “stealth expenses” are factored into the five-yearly ritual.

Political “dowries” (mahar politik) to secure party endorsements is one such example of, as is the money required to engage in vote buying (i.e., money politics).

It was found that a mayoral or regent candidate would need to spend Rp20-30 billion (approximately US$1.25 million to 1.87 million). A gubernatorial candidate could spend up to Rp100 billion (approximately US$6,244 million) to compete in a regional election.

The various costs mentioned so far have only addressed material costs. There are also non-material costs, such as the potential for bloody conflicts during the election period. A supporter of one candidate in Sampang (East Java), for example, died after being seriously injured in a mob attack due to a dispute between supporters of different candidates.

Candidates who win elections often have to return their “investment” through illegal means, ranging from corruption and extortion to granting licenses that abuse their authority as powerholders. The Corruption Eradication Commission recorded that 167 regional heads were implicated in corruption cases between 2004 and 2024.

The complexity and high cost of regional elections become more problematic when the positive impacts of decentralization on regional economic development are still questionable.

Although political factors are not the only causes that hinder regional economic development, local capture of public resources is one of the key mechanisms that impede the achievement of this goal. Local capture is facilitated, among others, through direct regional elections.

Prabowo’s Premature Response

The proposal to change the direct election system to an indirect one is not new.

The discourse of electing regional heads by local parliaments almost materialized in 2014 when the House of Representatives passed Law No. 24/2014 on Pilkada.

Then president Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono’s (SBY) administration initiated the law at the end of his second term. The high cost of organizing local elections and rampant money politics were cited as the primary reasons why SBY’s administration proposed to change the local election system.

However, public pressure at that time forced SBY – who was very concerned about his image as a democrat – to issue a Government Regulation in lieu of Law (Peraturan Pemerintah Pengganti Undang-Undang)that annulled the article on indirect local elections and restored the direct Pilkada system.

Past proposals to change the local election system from direct to indirect always overlook the mother of all problems in today’s Indonesian democracy: Political parties that are disconnected from society and are not democratic and transparent in their decision-making processes.

Political parties often nominate candidates in local elections that are not aligned with the wishes and interests of the voters. They often select candidates based on popularity, electability and financial strength (in the Indonesian language, colloquially known as the tiga “tas”: popularitas, elektabilitas, isi tas).

Furthermore, the previous high candidacy threshold only benefited candidates who could buy endorsements from political parties. The implication is that, in many regions, there was only one pair of candidates competing against an empty ballot box.

Finally, individuals with a background in dynasty politics dominate political party structures at the subnational level and can easily nominate their family members in Pilkada. Consequently, regeneration within political parties has stagnated, and community members who are capable and genuinely concerned for the wellbeing of the local community only have a slim chance of being nominated through political parties.

Candidacy as an independent also does not fully overcome these problems. The requirements for independent candidates in local elections are extremely demanding. Candidates must gather validated support from 6.5-10% of the total number of voters (depending on the number of voters in the region). These voters must be spread across more than 50% of the districts/cities or subdistricts in that subnational unit.

The stringent candidacy requirements have discouraged candidates who wish to run as non-political party candidates.

Therefore, it is unsurprising that political costs in subnational elections can reach billions of rupiah. Candidates who seek to compete in local elections must spend a considerable amount of money since the early stage of their candidacy. Because these candidates are not well-rooted in the community, they must spend more to market themselves. Finally, because they are not confident that voters will vote for them, many rely on vote buying to secure the voters’ support.

The Costs of Eliminating Direct Local Elections

When Indonesia adopted a direct regional election system in 2004, the main reason was rampant money politics in local parliaments during local elections. It was no secret at the time that regional head candidates could buy the votes of political party representatives in local parliaments. The adoption of direct elections initially aimed to eliminate this practice and give voters the power to choose their local leaders.

Reversing this change will bring back a similar corrupt practice without addressing the root of the problems in Indonesia’s contemporary setting.

Furthermore, without direct elections, it is inconceivable that promising regional heads would emerge and become influential actors in the national political landscape.

Direct elections have become one of the channels to produce potential candidates for national leadership. In the 2024 presidential election, two of the three presidential candidates – Anies Baswedan and Ganjar Pranowo – were former governors elected through direct elections.

One should also remember that president Joko “Jokowi” Widodo launched his political career as the mayor of Surakarta and, subsequently, the governor of Jakarta, elected through direct local elections.

Local elections have also produced other national-caliber leaders such as Tri Rismaharini (former Minister of Social Affairs), Abdullah Azwar Anas (former Minister of Administrative Reform and Bureaucratic Reform), and Bima Arya Sugiarto (current Deputy Minister of Home Affairs).

Direct local elections have also incentivized regional heads to experiment with local public policies urgently needed by the people, which could then be adopted at the national level.

Besides, the adoption of the universal healthcare policy at the national level started with healthcare policies introduced at the subnational level by politicians who sought to win the electorate’s support. It was a success story of how direct local elections can lead to innovative and progressive social welfare programs.

Most importantly, direct local elections provide an avenue for the citizens to foster democratic culture and values. If bloody horizontal conflicts occurred frequently in the early days of direct regional elections, the quantity and scale of post-election violence today have dropped significantly.

This decline indicates that competing political elites and their supporters prefer to resolve post-election disputes through legitimate as well as democratic channels. Besides, it shows that they have also refrained from violent means of conflict resolution, which suggests that the society continues to evolve by adopting democratic values.

Conclusion

Although imperfect and costly, the direct election system is still the best option for voters to force regional heads to be more responsive to public interests and replace regional heads with poor performance.

This system also offers the best opportunity for the voters to stop dynastic politics. Therefore, abolishing the direct local election system is not the appropriate response to address the cost issues of organizing this democratic process.

Voters’ and political elites’ trust in the elections management body and the direct election process can be improved by promoting transparency in all aspects as well as stages of direct election organization.

One strategy for achieving this goal is to use digital technologies in the direct election process. The use of digital technologies can also help lower the cost of conducting direct elections.

The various stealth costs associated with direct elections can also be minimized by forcing political parties to become more transparent and democratic in their candidate nomination processes.

Political parties should be forced to nominate party cadres who have proven their active membership and role in a political party and society over a period of time. The nomination process by political parties should also start from the grassroots level, where party nominations are done through a multitiered convention process.

If the high cost of local elections is being used to justify the abolition of the direct election system, the same argument could be used to abolish legislative and presidential elections in the future. Should this happen, it will be the final nail in the coffin of Indonesian democracy.

Introduction

The Malaysian Standard for Halal Food MS 1500 provides guidance on the preparation and handling of halal food. The standard consists of eight clauses that must be complied by organizations that plan on obtaining halal certification from the Department of Islamic Development Malaysia.

In Malaysia, more businesses are working to get certified halal due to the rising demand for halal products. Currently, 9,520 businesses in Malaysia have been certified as halal. As a Muslim-majority country, this increase is ostensibly due to an increasing preference and accessibility to halal-certified products. This preference, thus, provides impetus for more organizations to seek halal certification. Muslims have also been shown to firmly believe in the importance of halal food ingredients in preserving their health and faith. Globally, this trend is envisaged to similarly increase in light of the expanding Muslim population, and the globalization of halal standards.

In riding this trend, the Malaysian government intends for the country to be a global centre for halal products. To achieve this,  halal service providers must ensure that “halal toyyiban” goods and services are offered. This would mean that both domestic and international businesses in Malaysia and outside are eligible for halal certification. According to the Malaysian Standard on Halal Food MS 1500, the following candidates are qualified to apply for halal certification:

1. Manufacturer or producer

2. Distributor or dealer

3. Sub-contract manufacturers

4. Repackaging

5. Food premises

6. Slaughterhouse

Not only may MS 1500 certification benefit the company, but it can also benefit stakeholders and customers. Examples of benefits include a) penetration to the largest market share in the food sector because Malaysia’s halal logo is highly respected and well received by Muslim countries; b) Malaysia’s halal certification system gives confidence to businesses, customers, suppliers and other stakeholders that a product is halal and Shariah compliant; c) the standard entails specific technical requirements in the preparation of a product that is halal and Shariah compliant, d) the standard holistically looks at other factors such as managing human resources. This may assist in increasing staff morale and commitment; e) providing businesses a competitive advantage, and f) consequently increasing profits.

Ensuring Product Quality via Halal Certification

In addition to being essential for obtaining halal certification, the application of MS 1500 standards aids in the production of high-quality goods through eight requirements.

1) Management Responsibilities

Management must ensure its employees’ competency with relevant training in preparing halal products. This would guarantee that halal products can be prepared by fulfilling the relevant food control and halal criteria. In other words, both management and employees play significant roles in the production of halal products. Additionally, the management must ensure that the records of halal food production and administration are kept up to date. This enables control over production and early error detection.

2) Facility Premises

The development and upkeep of facility premises are necessary for an efficient halal production process. The risk of product contamination can be eliminated with a well-planned and executed production process flow. Additionally, the production of halal products places a high priority on cleanliness. This is to prevent the introduction of contaminants such as dirt and dung to raw materials and halal products produced on the property.

3) Machinery, Processing Equipment, and Utensils

Porcine and porcine-derived materials must not be utilised in any part of the production including the machineries, processing equipment, and utensils. Additionally,  machineries, processing equipment, and utensils must be cleaned and maintained on a regular basis.

4) Cleanliness, Sanitation and Food Safety 

Reinforcing the importance of cleanliness, MS 1500 requires the implementation and thorough upkeep of good personal hygiene, clothes, equipment, premises, food processing, and storage. Furthermore, halal food processing and distribution must adhere to on-site hygiene standards based on several guidelines, including Veterinary Hygiene Practices (VHP), Good Manufacturing Practices (GMP), and Good Hygiene Practices (GHP).

5) Halal Food Processing

For the manufacture of halal food, only halal ingredients are permitted. Ingredients that are deemed halal can be derived from plants, microbes, minerals, chemicals, solutions, and genetically modified organisms (GMOs). The use of halal ingredients would, thus, prevent the introduction of harmful contaminants. Additionally, all products must be prepared, distributed, and served in accordance to MS 1500.

6) Storage, Transportation, Exhibition, Sale and Serving of Halal Products 

Every halal product that is sold, served, transported, displayed, or stored must have a halal label. To prevent spoiling, products should also be kept in appropriate locations. For instance, storing products in fridges. It is also important to ensure that these products be delivered to the sales location. Accordingly, the transport vehicle needs to be deemed appropriate for carrying halal food, and meet all hygienic and sanitation requirements.

7) Packaging and Labeling  

In addition to being Shariah compliant, the packaging of products need to conducted in a hygienic environment. Furthermore, halal products cannot be given names that could confuse consumers by using terms such as “ham”, “bak kut teh”, “bacon”, and “beer.” The product name, net content, trademark, manufacturer, importer, and distributor names and addresses, identification code number, manufacturer number, and expiration date must all be included on the packaging.  

8) Legal requirements

Legal standards, including those already in effect in Malaysia and/or other nations, must be adhered to in the production of halal products. These would include those from law enforcement, regulators, and legal institutions.

Challenges of Implementing MS 1500: A Case Study of a Malaysian Halal Food Product Company

Based on the author’s empirical research, challenges in implementing MS 1500 are highlighted in this section. This research was conducted on a leading Malaysian producer of halal food located in Klang Valley.

1) The Need for Employees to be Constantly Highly Motivated

All employees are required to ensure compliance with MS 1500 in its halal food production process. This is particular pertinent at the assembly line where employees must ensure that machinery and equipment are in good working order. Additionally, employees in the assembly line are key in ensuring that the food production process is free of contaminants. This requires employees at this area to competently identify and address contaminated food and spillages. Here lies two issues: a) to keep employees motivated to remain committed and attentive when performing their duties, and b) the need to monitor employees in the assembly line to deal with contamination effectively. One way to keep employees committed and attentive, the management of this company prioritises the provision of adequate downtime to employees.

2) Stringent MS 1500

The eight requirements of MS 1500 are highly detailed, technical and intricate. Management and employees must fully comprehend each of the eight requirements in order to execute MS 1500 competently. Acting as a conduit between management and line employees, the company is supported by middle managers and executives. They are provided training to perform tasks associated with managing halal operations. These middle managers and executives would have regular meetings with management and stakeholders to address issues raised in the production process.

3) The Need for High Standard of Hygiene

As part of ensuring halal products in adherence to MS 1500, the upkeep of high standards of hygiene must be ensured in operational areas. A key part of instilling this would be employees deployed in these areas as they would be a primary source of potential contamination. Therefore, processes must be established to ensure that employees’ hygiene is maintained before entering these areas and during the production process. The company in this research has to ensure the provision of adequate facilities and equipment to facilitate employees maintenance of hygiene such as proper wash areas and areas for employees to don their appropriate clothing and equipment.

4) Unwarranted Doubts over Halal Production Process

Though the company in this research is the top manufacturer of halal food in Malaysia, it is still subjected to slander. This would arise from allegations such as raw materials used are not halal or that its halal status is questionable. Unfortunately, defamation is easy to propagate among consumers and the general public particularly with social media. This would thus impact sales of the company’s products. To address such slanders, the company has resorted to publicly display the halal certificate of raw materials used in its production. Additionally, the company provides refutations of all slanders on its website and on both online and offline platforms.

5) Managing a Rising Demand

Conversely, a rising demand for the company’s products, ironically, also present an issue. There is currently a growing demand for the company’s products to changes in lifestyle in Malaysia. To deal with the increasing demands at work, Malaysian youths are becoming more dependent on fully or partially prepared meals. Additionally, the company has to deal with a different level of complexity as it provides a wide range of halal food products. Therefore, the company had to increase its manufacturing facilities and to adopt new technologies to satisfy the rising demand. Management of this company would, thus, have to ensure that the new infrastructure and new technologies adhere to the rigorous MS 1500.

Conclusion

Quality halal products that satisfy the demands of today’s consumers can be produced through the implementation of the rigorous Malaysian Standard on Halal Food MS 1500. In addition to ensuring quality, effective implementation of MS 1500 provides other benefits such as increasing Muslim consumer’s confidence of halal product. Despite these benefits, implementing MS 1500 is not without its challenges. These challenges include the difficulty in complying to the requirements of MS 1500 and managing consumers perception to the authenticity of the halal products offered. Nevertheless, these challenges can be addressed as highlighted in the aforementioned case study.

While there are definitive benefits for companies to implement MS 1500, it is not without challenges. Halal certification can boost consumer confidence in the calibre of the product produced in addition to confirming that it is halal. Therefore, in order to survive in the difficult economic climate of today, entrepreneurs should work to achieve halal certification, as it can significantly add value to the organization.

Sponsored Content

Introduction

In this edition of Sponsored Content, stratsea’s editorial team spoke to co-founder and CEO of Klean Dato’ Nick Boden. Klean is one of the strong players in Malaysia’s sustainability scene, focusing on a digital container deposit system that has gained traction in recent times.

Klean has pioneered a unique, all-hands-on-deck approach to recycling that is sustainable on all fronts. Sustainable in the sense that people are empowered to do their part for a greener tomorrow and sustainable in that it has built a circular economy that now runs on autopilot.

The start-up symbolizes the importance of a community-based outlook to addressing pertinent problems in our world today. 

Janz Technologies, a Malaysian tech firm, developed Klean with the SDGs and the ESG agenda in mind.

Against this backdrop, how can the SDGs and the ESG agenda form the backbone of a business model? How can a start-up hit as many SDG and ESG goals as possible? What impact is it trying to achieve?

These were some of the questions that guided Dato’ Nick in the early days of Klean. “It’s all about bringing technology to the people and making it of value,” quips Dato’ Nick. 

Klean’s model for recycling follows a dual strategy of educating the public and rewarding them in return, which is not a new concept.

If you are a Malaysian in their 30s or above, you may remember recycling old newspapers in exchange for some loose change. This practice is similar to recycling milk or Coca-Cola bottles in the United Kingdom and South Africa, respectively.

Because plastic on its own generally holds little value, rapid developments in technology have simply incentivized recyclable items like plastic, making recycling a more rewardable and worthwhile exercise.

We can look towards the container deposit return scheme (DRS) or Pfandsystem in Germany, which is the world’s “highest-performing drink container recycling system” with a record 98% return rate of single-use containers.

Germany’s DRS covers PET plastic, aluminium and tinplate cans. Refunds range from €0.25 for single-use containers, €0.08 to €0.50 for refillables, and €0.75 or €1.50 for half crates and full crates, respectively.

Technology, Incentive and Accessibility 

The German example was a precursor to the circular economy that Klean has built in the Klang Valley. The foundation of its recycling ecosystem – the first of its kind in Malaysia – is a digital container deposit system that utilizes AI technology and an app to recycle, reward, and report on the ESG data it generates. In the process, it not only supports government policymaking but also the SDG and ESG agendas of corporations.

Klean’s portfolio consists of three types of reverse vending machines (RVMs). Its Maxi Prime RVM utilizes AI container recognition to accept or reject aluminium cans and PET bottles. The Food Container RVM has an AI chute to recover and clean uncrushed food containers, while its e-waste machine has a semi-manual collection system.

With technology under its belt, the next step was to recycle value, keeping the average Malaysian in mind.

If you have lived in Malaysia long enough, you would know that we have a big takeaway food culture with lots of roadside selling and food deliveries, particularly during the holy month of Ramadhan. “Shall we Grab?” is quite literally the norm of everyday conversations.

We (unashamedly) also have a tonne of public holidays and fuel subsidies are almost always a focal point of the government’s yearly budget. Not to mention the penetration of smartphone users across the public, from the B40s to the middle class to those at the top echelons of the income groups. 

How can these habits be used to not only encourage people to recycle but also educate them on what being green and sustainable actually entails? 

“We thought of approaching things from the right psychological perspective,” says Dato’ Nick. “Collaborations are imperative to not only add value to plastics and incentivize ‘people power’, but also help build the ecosystem that is essential to bring about a complete shift in attitudes when it comes to recycling.” 

Klean allows you to choose what you think your plastic is worth based on its points and rewards system. Recyclers earn 10 points for each container deposited, which, in turn, rewards them with up to 20 times the value they would otherwise receive at an over-the-counter recycling facility. 

It has employed the “top down” approach, partnering with private sector giants like DHL, Affin Bank and Telekom Malaysia to provide the start-up with the tools they need to move down the food chain and create the impact they were after. 

For instance, a pilot with Permodalan Nasional Berhad valued 50 containers deposited at RM10 worth of unit trust at Amanah Saham Bumiputera, with up to 40% of those who participated being new customers.

Similarly, a collaboration with Keretapi Tanah Melayu Berhad resulted in 15% off a train trip to Penang over the Deepavali long weekend, which was originally priced at RM70. Instead of valuing 20 containers at RM0.10, Klean provided 1,000 times the value at a RM10 discount on the train ticket. 

With technology and incentivization mastered, Klean then needed to ensure that its RVMs were accessible to the public. The machines needed to be strategically located in areas that had a natural footfall – such as petrol stations, shopping malls and universities – to tap into the existing journeys of Malaysians. 

Klean’s modus operandi is simple and effective; recycling need not require extra effort or great lengths of time. Recycling is part and parcel of the way of life. In other words, the goal is not scalability in terms of recycling as many plastics or wastes as possible. Rather, it is behavioural change towards recycling and waste reduction that lasts. 

It Is All about Impact

It should also be mentioned that Klean’s RVMs are designed not for profit but for circularity. Klean runs recycling as a service in return for individuals or companies paying a monthly fee over a 12, 24, or 36-month period and software upgrades to its machine-learning AI. 

This also includes back-end upgrades for ease of data capture and sharing. The Klean dashboard captures data and then feeds it into the wider scope of sustainability in Malaysia.

Klean produces detailed ESG data, down to the type and number of containers and recyclers, as well as demographic data on recyclers, popular recycling times, and locations. This data is shared with key stakeholders like the government and its partners in the private sector, who could then use it to improve their own circular economy and sustainability options. 

Klean’s statistics are a testament to the impact it has had on public participation. To date, Klean has a total of 70 machines, recovered two million containers, reduced 100,000 metric tonnes of CO₂ emissions and generated RM500,000 in rewards—all with the support of 100,000 recyclers on the Klean Recycling App. 

Ultimately, Klean’s ecosystem is built on inclusion. What is perhaps the most striking element is its amalgamation of the “S” in ESG into the overall SDGs—a mix of the social and sustainable. 

Dato’ Nick believes that there are social opportunities around sustainability that can be further tapped into. For instance, the feel-good factor of helping a foreign worker, a Myanmar refugee, or a B40 family living in a Program Perumahan Rakyat (People’s Housing Program) flat. 

“If you can generate real value for people, such as food and transport vouchers, you would be helping to take pressure off families. So, our approach is simple: Ask people what their stressors are and have them dictate our solutions to sustainability.” 

The Future Is Bright

As the first-to-market, and the ones who have built the entire system, Klean has the “founders’ advantage”. They are the inventors, technologists, manufacturers and reporters. However, they do not want to be, nor should they be, the only ones in the game—sustainability requires cooperation rather than working in silos. 

Dato’ Nick’s advice for future start-up players in the green economy is to look at their sustainability return on investment, a new metric that should not involve breaking even or earning a profit.

He also believes that bridging existing gaps in the market lies in linking psychosocial behaviour with impact and asking existential questions. For example, how can we empower the masses and help them scale up while building a sustainable business model in the process?

Indeed, the logic follows that you give a man a fish, and you feed him for a day; teach a man to fish, and you feed him for a lifetime. 

For its part, 2025 will see Klean continue to educate consumers. An upcoming project includes solving the tong sampah or rubbish bin problem that has not quite been solved or managed effectively.

This has led to the development of the Klean Bag, a mesh bag that is sustainably designed and uniquely coded for recyclers to scan and recycle their containers and be credited with points in exchange. 

Introduction

I was anxiously waiting in a virtual lobby, deep, soothing breaths punctuating my carefully rehearsed lines. The camera flicked on—suddenly, the interviewer’s greeting launched our meeting into motion.

This was not my first interview, nor was it my first virtual one either. It took place during my second week of pantang (confinement), the centuries-old Malay postpartum ritual that expects a new mother to rest and recover. 

When I became pregnant for the first time, I knew nothing could prepare me for the true realities of motherhood. Pregnancy books, Reddit forums, YouTube tutorials—I had consumed them all. 

In spite of this, I still found myself unprepared. The many late nights, the gargantuan to-do list necessary to keep a little human alive and the constant negotiations with my husband about who does what—my introduction to motherhood was challenging to say the least.

At the same time, I was still trying to signal to myself (and admittedly those around me) that I was still me: still ambitious and capable of having it all. Agreeing to a promotion interview two weeks postpartum was not just a career move but also an attempt to regain some sense of self.

But now, 3.5 years into my motherhood journey, I am finding the very notion of “having it all” just as extreme as having to choose between raising a family and a thriving career. 

Of #GirlBosses and #Tradwives

This desire to “have it all” is symptomatic of social media rendering everything, no matter the topic, as an over-the-top performance rather than an accurate depiction of reality. 

In this attention economy, motherhood – and to a larger extent portrayals of the modern woman – is reduced to a mere label that never takes into account the messy nuances of actual lived experience. 

Take, for example, the millennial concept of the “Girl Boss”. While the Girl Boss era is largely said to have seen its demise, there was a time many millennial women (myself included) sought to achieve this coveted status. It was an alluring ideal—who would not want to #slay in the corporate arena whilst building a seven-figure bank account and do so without relying on a man?

But while the Girl Boss’s selfies in Singapore Airlines first-class cabin are enviable, I cannot help but think of the hard reality of achieving this level of success and question the immense personal price tag that such a lifestyle affords.

On the flip side, the rise of the “tradwife” is said to be a direct counter to the “bossbabe” narrative. Where a bossbabe strives for the absolute pinnacle of her ambitions, a tradwife seemingly wants nothing more than to fulfil her husband’s wants and desires, take care of the home all whilst raising happy, healthy children.

Those that oppose this movement argue that it fetishizes a woman’s complete and total subservience to a man. However, a question then rises: If a woman, out of her own free will, willingly chooses to put her family’s needs above her own, why is this act deemed less empowering than if she were to pursue her ambitions outside the family home?

This again demonstrates how problematic such over-the-top social media performances of gender roles can be. 

Personally for me, while I do think there could be no occupation more noble than taking care of my family, I do not believe it can only come at the expense of my personal goals and dreams outside of being a wife and mother. 

I also feel that these largely Western ideas fall short within a Malaysian context, where family structures and domestic help are more common. While having such a robust support system in place certainly makes “having it all” more attainable, it does not make it any less challenging. 

Motherhood IRL

The prevalence of such extreme narratives on social media and the wider media in general has also impacted the perception of modern motherhood.

While there are many who strive to share a more balanced and normalized perspective, the dominating narrative to any discourse around motherhood – and parenting more broadly – seems to be overwhelmingly negative.

Current conversations often highlight the more challenging aspects of motherhood. Oftentimes, modern motherhood is depicted as an exhausting, thankless job whereby the mother in question derives absolutely no joy and is just miserable. 

While I do wonder if the current negative sentiment towards having kids is a direct result of the complex cultural climate we are living in, I cannot help but question my own role in perpetuating these negative stereotypes.

I think back to when I had just returned from maternity leave. I was chatting with a newly married colleague when she asked if she should have kids, to which I jokingly responded, “No, absolutely not”.

Having experienced motherhood for myself, however, I realized that the many challenges that come with raising a child is only half the picture. Though my household is a far cry from Maria Von Trapp and her kids, it is not all doom and gloom either. 

Permission to Pivot

I did not get that job promotion. Although I was disappointed, there was a part of me that felt immense relief. 

Perhaps it was because I had freed myself of the self-imposed expectation of having it all. But by not getting that promotion, it was as if I had given myself permission to take a back seat on my career and focus on raising my child instead. 

I was content with this slower pace and finding a rhythm that worked for me. But it was in these quiet moments that I gained the mental space to reassess and through introspection, a new ambition had quietly taken hold.

Witnessing the startling speed with which my daughter changed from a cute, squishy blob to a sassy strong-spirited toddler, I gained a completely new appreciation of time and just how quickly things change. 

This new perspective made me realize that although I still had ambitions to further my career, I simply did not want to miss out on my child growing up either. But this meant building something of my own, which was ironic seeing as how I had never harboured any entrepreneurial dreams before becoming a mother.

But it was not just the perceived flexibility that came with such endeavours, although that was certainly appealing. It was about creating something that could coexist and thrive with my newfound motherhood.

For the first time, I was not chasing some external definition of having it all. I was redefining what that actually meant for myself. 

Balance: Making it Make Sense (for Me)

Living in Kuala Lumpur, I have the good fortune of having family support and the capacity to hire paid help. While I do not take these luxuries for granted, there is still somewhat of a balancing act that is required. 

For me, this means navigating the ebb and flow of control, a response that is usually elicited by a well-meaning elder who insists on doing things their way. However, by the same token, being very conscious of not wanting to overburden my family, who are already giving so much of their time.

The other irony in all of this is that, even though having help relieves the physical load of childcare, it does not eliminate the emotional burden.

On days when I am cooped up in my study chasing a deadline and my daughter calls out from the other side wanting to play, the mom-guilt hits especially hard. I question whether in pursuing a future that will grow alongside my role as mother, I was missing out on the precious and fleeting moments of the present. 

But it is in grappling with these internal battles that I realized that having it all was not about seeking more help as I hustled harder: It was becoming more about prioritizing what truly mattered. For me, what truly matters is setting a good example for my daughter and showing that you could have it all –just not all at once. 

Final Thoughts

Three years from that interview, I am still learning to embrace motherhood in all its beautiful, messy glory. There are challenging days and there are days I feel so grateful to be the actual centre of my little person’s universe.

I used to think that having all the help and support meant I could push harder, do more, and be more. But what motherhood has so acutely crystallized is that the smaller wins each and every day count for something too.

But what is perhaps the greatest lesson I have learned since becoming a mother is that there really is no one-size-fits-all approach. Beyond the carefully curated extremes on social media, creating my own path forward is the most powerful example I can set for my daughter.

Introduction

Education is a gateway to discover the world, going far beyond merely acing exams. It is about understanding the complex realities that shape our existence. In Malaysia, education is an evolving landscape, constantly adapting in pursuit of better outcomes. A variety of roadmaps and blueprints have been laid out to prepare Malaysians for the challenges of the world. One pressing challenge today is the role of religion in society.

In Malaysia, where Islam is the official religion, its influence pervades many aspects of life. The government actively supports Islamic institutions, mosques, and religious education, weaving Islamic teachings into the national curriculum. The relationship between Islam and education often reflects the priorities of the government of the day, influencing how Islam is communicated to the public. This dynamic serves as a reminder of the powerful role education plays in shaping not just intellectual capabilities, but also cultural and spiritual awareness of future generations.

History of Islam in Malaysia’s Educational System

The history of Islam in the Malay Peninsula dates to around the 12th century. Early Islamic education centred in mosques and later evolved into pondok schools. These institutions prioritized religious studies, Quranic teachings, and the Arabic language, laying a foundation for Islamic scholarly traditions in the region. As Malaysia advanced, the government aimed to modernize the education system while preserving Islamic values. During Mahathir Mohamad’s first administration, he emphasized the integration of Islamic values to cultivate a national identity rooted in Islamic teachings. This vision led to the expansion and establishment of Islamic schools and institutions.

Anwar Ibrahim, serving as the education minister from 1986 to 1991, was instrumental in implementing this transformative agenda. His efforts focused on curriculum reform, ensuring that Islamic studies became a core component of education. Through these transformative steps, Malaysia continues to honour its Islamic roots while striving for a progressive, inclusive future in education.

The establishment of Islamic universities in Malaysia represents a significant step toward integrating modern academia with Islamic teachings. Among these institutions, the International Islamic University Malaysia (IIUM), founded in 1983 with Anwar as the second president (1988-1999), stands out. IIUM’s mission is to merge Islamic wisdom with contemporary knowledge, crafting an educational framework that embodies both Malaysia’s Islamic identity and its commitment to global relevance. The university offers diverse programs in fields such as law, engineering, and medicine, each infused with an Islamic perspective to ensure a well-rounded educational experience.

In 1998, the political landscape took a significant turn when Anwar Ibrahim was dismissed from his roles in Umno and as deputy prime minister. Despite this political upheaval, the Islamization agenda continued unabated. Abdullah Badawi, who served as prime minister from 2003 to 2009, made substantial changes to the education system by introducing J-QAF. This curriculum aimed to enhance Islamic education in public schools by focusing on Jawi script, Quranic studies, Arabic language, and Fardhu Ain. Najib Razak, Badawi’s successor, continued to prioritize Islamic education by increasing budget allocations, ensuring that the Islamization agenda remained at the forefront of national education policy.

When Pakatan Harapan emerged victorious in the 2018 general elections, it marked another shift, particularly with the introduction of Jawi in Bahasa Malaysia textbooks for Standard Four students. This move caused a major debate over so-called Islamic elements in the national curriculum, despite Jawi as a script being more about Malay culture. The return of Anwar Ibrahim to power in 2022 has brought about new educational initiatives, such as the introduction of a module on “Imam al-Nawawi 40 Hadith.” This module is now part of the curriculum for Muslim students at various levels, emphasizing moral and ethical teachings derived from the Hadiths—sayings or deeds of the Prophet. These shifts indicate an enduring focus on integrating Islamic values within the educational system, mirroring broader societal trends and political necessities.

In Malaysia, different political parties vie for influence by portraying their commitment to Islam in various ways. Historically, two dominant parties, Umno and PAS, have been leading players in the country’s Malay-Islamic political landscape. However, since around 2015, new parties like Amanah and Bersatu have joined the fray, broadening the competition to appeal to the same voter base. Each of these parties, and their respective coalitions, strives to demonstrate their dedication to Islamic principles, including by shaping national education policies.

Anwar Ibrahim’s ascent to prime minister marked a pivotal moment. His political journey is deeply rooted in his time as a Muslim activist, dating back to his university days. Notably, he led the Malaysian Islamic Youth Movement, known as ABIM (Angkatan Belia Islam Malaysia). Anwar’s decision to join Umno in 1981 initially disappointed some ABIM members and leaders. Despite this, his eventual rise to prime minister under Pakatan Harapan has rekindled hopes. His current position signals a potential shift in the political rewards and strategies of his supporters, particularly those who remained active within Islamic movements.

ABIM’s Significance in Shaping Malaysia’s Educational Landscape

ABIM has been a driving force in shaping Malaysia’s educational landscape by integrating Islamic principles into teachings. Founded in the 1970s, ABIM focuses on promoting Islamic education while fostering a comprehensive understanding of these teachings among Malaysian youth. It blends religious teachings with contemporary educational practices to create well-rounded individuals. The alignment between politics and education under Anwar’s administration strengthened the impact of ABIM’s initiatives.

Concurrently, IIUM has been experiencing notable leadership changes reflecting its commitment to Islamic educational values. With the end of the previous rector’s tenure, Prof. Emeritus Datuk Dr. Osman Bakar took on the role as of September 23, 2024. The position of rector is a political appointment, as that of vice-chancellors in other public universities in Malaysia. Prof. Osman Bakar brings a wealth of experience as a renowned scholar in Islamic philosophy and shares a long-standing personal connection with Anwar, stemming from their school days at the Malay College Kuala Kangsar. Osman Bakar’s alignment with Anwar Ibrahim through ABIM further reflects their shared vision for a holistic Islamic education, aiming to integrate Islamic principles deeply into the academic fabric of IIUM. Under Prof. Osman Bakar’s leadership, IIUM is also witnessing the inclusion of other ABIM-affiliated scholars in deputy rector positions, further ensuring the institution’s adherence to its educational ethos.

Moreover, Zulkifli Hassan, another key figure from ABIM, was appointed as the Deputy Minister in the Prime Minister’s Department (Religious Affairs) in December 2023. His prior experience as IIUM’s Deputy Rector for Student Development and Community Engagement underscored his commitment to the university’s Islamic educational goals as well. Malaysia’s current Minister of Education, Fadhlina Sidek, is also the daughter of Siddiq Fadzil, the third president of ABIM right after Anwar. These strategic appointments having ties with ABIM reflect broader efforts to embed progressive Islamic ethics within Malaysia’s educational framework.

The spotlight on IIUM arises from its role as both an academic institution and a symbolic battleground for different interpretations of Islamic values in Malaysia. IIUM was also infamous in the early 2000s for alleged links to terrorism during the so-called Global War on Terror. Founded in the 1980s with the vision of integrating religious and modern sciences, IIUM has long been a centre of ideological diversity. Historically, some student movements within IIUM, such as We Unite for Islam (Wufi), have had affiliations with PAS, a major Islamic political party in Malaysia. This has led to conversations about the university’s role in shaping political tendencies, as seen in the presidency of its Student Union (IIUMSU), which has frequently been led by Wufi-affiliated leaders. The election in 2022 of a president from outside Wufi, albeit narrowly, highlights the changing dynamics within the student body.

The emergence of leaders from ABIM, particularly in IIUM’s higher management, introduces a new dimension to the university’s cultural and educational atmosphere. Students’ support for PAS may not necessarily clash with the leadership’s ABIM affiliations, as both groups place importance on Islamic values, though with different emphases. Interviews with Wufi members have shown a commitment to upholding Islamic principles while also recognizing the evolving influence and relevance of their movement. A member’s remark underscores the complexity: “As a Muslim, for me any agenda or behaviour that leads to goodness and to empowering the understanding of Islam must be supported even if they are in opposite circles in the political stage. However, if the agenda brought is an agenda due to political interests, then it must be rejected because this institution is for all regardless of political ideological differences.”

IIUM encapsulates the interplay among Malaysian Islamists, serving as a reflection of the broader societal quest for direction and identity. As the university’s new management shoulders the responsibility of steering IIUM towards fulfilling its founding mission—integrating knowledge with a modern, progressive outlook—it holds the potential to shape a generation of Muslims pivotal to Malaysia’s future. The 2022 general election results underscore a clear demand among Malay voters on Islam’s role as a cornerstone of their identity.  The ongoing debate centres on the vision that should underpin this enigma: should it align with Anwar’s vision of Islam within the Madani framework, or should it lean towards a more traditional and conservative interpretation championed by his political rivals? The educational landscape in Malaysia has become a battleground for these ideological contests, often caught in the crossfire of political agendas. While political socialization within schools and universities is inevitable, given their role in shaping young minds, it’s imperative to maintain educational neutrality. Students should be equipped with values like compassion, respect, and tolerance, which are at the heart of Anwar’s Madani framework, without being subjected to the sway of partisan indoctrination. By nurturing an environment where these universal values thrive, IIUM can contribute significantly to cultivating informed and balanced individuals who can navigate modern-day Malaysia while honouring their cultural and religious heritage.

Part of an ongoing article series on renewable energy / climate crisis in Southeast Asia.

Introduction

The newly inaugurated President Prabowo Subianto embraces the global trend towards a greener world with renewable energy. Latest observations suggest he acknowledges that a government committed to green policies will win the global competition in the long run.

However, Indonesia faces a tough reality—81% of the country’s electricity demand is met by fossil fuels. Last year, coal contributed 62% of energy generation.

His predecessor, former president Joko “Jokowi” Widodo, laid the foundation for Prabowo’s energy agenda. This includes international deals for funding – such as the Just Energy Transition Plan (JETP) and the Net Zero Community of Asia – as well as regulations that support Prabowo’s administration.

Prabowo made a rather rapid move in his first week in office. He set a two-week deadline for his energy minister to reform energy subsidies and decreed the creation of a contingency plan for revenue lost from fossil fuels by setting a new revenue target of Rp3 trillion (US$190 million) from the carbon market.

Although this number is small, it indicates the government’s commitment to earning revenues from the green economy in the long run.

Solving the energy transition enigma without compromising his promise of an 8% economic growth is the game being played.

Challenge to Subsidy Reform

Although the new administration is still adjusting and fine-tuning, its energy policy is straightforward. The administration has identified two priorities: reforming subsidies and increasing the use of biofuel. The end goal is to achieve energy security.

Subsidy reform is not a new policy agenda, with President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono setting the scene almost two decades ago. However, due to its sensitivity, it has always been considered a “hot potato” issue that can either boost or harm a president’s popularity.

Subsidy reform is required because the subsidy does not effectively help the poor. The government has identified that 20–30% of the subsidy does not benefit the intended low-income group.

Following Prabowo’s direction, Minister of Energy Bahlil Lahadalia suggests two policy options: 1) direct cash transfer (Bantuan Langsung Tunai – BLT) to low-income households and; 2) a mixed approach combining traditional commodity-based subsidies with targeted cash transfers.

These suggestions are not new. The BLT has been around for a long time, yet the problem persists. The challenge lies in the data accuracy of BLT beneficiaries and efficiency in disbursing the money.

In addition, corrupt practices affecting the BLT program are also rampant, particularly in the lower rungs of governance. For instance, a village chief in Sampang, East Java, embezzled US$22,000 from the BLT fund in 2023.

Furthermore, according to the Deposit Insurance Agency, only 49% of adult Indonesians have bank accounts, while the rest are still unbanked. Disbursing the BLT fund properly becomes a challenge, as recipients may not have a bank account and must rely on cash distribution, which is susceptible to corrupt practices.

The government’s policies thus lack details and no further details are provided.

A question emerged: Why did Prabowo set a two-week deadline within the first month of his presidency?

The answer is simple. Prabowo needed to adjust and reallocate the state budget as soon as possible. This rationale aligns with the need to reallocate funds from energy subsidies to support economic programs to achieve the 8% GDP growth target and fund the free lunch program that costs US$28 billion annually.

Biomass and Biofuel

As mentioned above, the end goal remains energy security. This government aims to achieve this by pursuing biomass co-firing and biofuel as options to reduce the country’s dependence on fossil fuels. The Biomass co-firing strategy aligns well with Indonesia’s agricultural industry, as it absorbs biomass such as empty fruit bunches, rice husks and wood pellets to generate energy.

Biomass and biofuel are Prabowo’s mainstays in energy transition and energy. Two reasons explain this. Firstly, he is averse to letting Indonesia be dependent on energy imports. Secondly, with Indonesia’s vast potential to produce biomass and biofuel domestically, Indonesia might create its own giant-sized renewable energy industry.

In addition, the agenda came about on the heels of the previous government’s discovery of 8 trillion cubic feet of natural gas in the South Andaman. This lucrative discovery is a strategic opportunity for Prabowo’s administration to seize and bolster its ambition for energy sufficiency and security.

Other Steps

One of his earliest actions was to remove various regulations that hindered the gas exploration process, cutting from 320 to 140 permits. Furthermore, the appointment of Simon Aloysius Mantiri as the new CEO of the state-owned oil and gas company Pertamina indicates that Prabowo aims for total control and loyalty from Pertamina to execute his energy agenda.

Prabowo has also aimed to boost the production of cooking oil and push down LPG imports. These actions align with the goal of reducing reliance on energy imports. To pursue this, for example, the government has announced plans to double the production of cooking oil from 1.7 million to 3 million tons per year.

Another ambition is to increase the share of palm oil-based fuel in diesel from 35% to 50%. The government aims to roll out palm-based B40 biodiesel by January 2025 and pursues the long-term goal of using B100 in the future.

These strategies could help Indonesia meet its energy sufficiency and security agenda. However, we should remember that these come with environmental risks. For example, some of these strategies depend on the production of palm oil, which cultivation may not necessarily align with the SDG and ESG agendas. Worse, the government set these targets above without alerting the private sector to take sustainable palm oil cultivation seriously.

Prabowo’s energy ambitions are progressive with high targets, adopting strategies that combine public and private collaboration.

His leadership style is also obvious in his appointment of individuals to key posts. His nomination of Hashim Djojohadikusumo – his brother and a prominent business leader, as the special envoy for environment and energy – as well as Simon – a cadre of Prabowo’s party – as Pertamina CEO speak volumes. Prabowo obviously prefers to station trusted men in strategic posts.

The appointment of Hasjim and Simon invited public criticism and scrutiny. Despite their position as trustworthy allies, we cannot ignore the fact that Prabowo may prioritize obtaining liquid capital for the state. This is why he needs people whom he trusts politically and who can attract investment.

Moreover, it is also in line with Prof. Mari Elka Pangestu’s argument at the Conference on Indonesian Foreign Policy 2024, who argued that to get the 2045 target, Indonesia needs a minimum of 6-8% growth annually and investment.

Conclusion

All in all, a point that is yet to be discussed is Prabowo’s ambition to chart his own footprints and legacy on environment and energy. His end goal is not to attain energy sufficiency and security, but also achieve an 8% economic growth at the same time. These are impossible to reach in five years’ time, or one presidential period in Indonesia. Definitely, Prabowo would seek a re-election in 2029 to achieve these and other goals.

Thus, as mentioned above, energy policy is a “hot potato” issue in Indonesian politics. His energy policy in the first five years would likely be populist and politically beneficial for him. After all, Prabowo is unlikely to adopt any unpopular policy.

Part of an ongoing article series on Indonesia’s regional elections 2024.

Introduction

Indonesia’s Pemilihan Kepala Daerah Serentak 2024 (2024 Simultaneous Regional Head Elections – Pilkada) was meant to be a demonstration of Indonesia’s decentralization and commitment to classic democratic values.

Pilkada was indeed touted as the crown jewel of the post-1998 reformation era, especially with regard to local governance, a pluralistic hierarchy of leadership and the representation of the various interests of Indonesia’s sprawling archipelago.

Yet, this past Pilkada has exposed a worrying decline of democratic norms. What was meant to be an instrument for the people to exercise their political rights ended up being an avenue for power accumulation, dynastic clientelism and oligarchic hegemony.

Power Accumulation

To demonstrate this, let us turn our attention to President Prabowo Subianto’s oversized coalition Koalisi Indonesia Maju (the Onward Indonesia Coalition – KIM).

KIM was formed during the 2024 presidential election from political parties supporting Prabowo’s bid to run for the presidential office. The coalition consists of Gerakan Indonesia Raya (Gerindra), Partai Amanat Nasional, Golongan Karya, Partai Demokrat and other parties that did not make it to the House of Representatives.

KIM further inflated and became KIM Plus when several more parties – including Partai Nasional Demokrat, Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa, Partai Keadilan Sejahtera and non-parliamentarian Partai Persatuan Pembangunan (PPP) – joined its rank for Pilkada.

Such an oversized coalition underscores ambition to implement political hegemony across Indonesia.

KIM Plus has a wider support base, politicizing local elections into nothing more than extensions of national politics. This centralization of power has rendered Indonesia’s political landscape more homogenized and centralized, thereby undermining the independence and plurality of local governing institutions.

Furthermore, it also threatens the diversity and creativity that have long been the hallmarks of Indonesia’s democratic and decentralized framework, as it marginalizes local voices and stifles innovation in governance.

In this year’s Pilkada, KIM Plus candidates won in 60% of the areas contested. This presents a concern, as regional elections, which were originally intended as a pathway for local self-determination, instead became an opportunity for political elites in Jakarta to entrench their power.

Allegations of active interference – “cawe-cawe” in former president Joko “Jokowi” Widodo’s parlance – began circulating in the days leading up to the elections. Reports collected until October 2024 show that gubernatorial candidates Ridwan Kamil-Suswono (Jakarta), Andra Soni-Dimyati (Banten) and Ahmad Luthfi-Taj Yasin (Central Java) were explicitly endorsed by both Jokowi and Prabowo.

A letter signed by Prabowo, for example, requesting Jakarta voters to support Ridwan Kamil, was published a few days before the election during masa tenang (cooling-off period), a time when campaigning is prohibited.

The move was later clarified by a Gerindra executive as a reasonable campaign strategy, despite major legal and ethical concerns involved. This is despite the Indonesian Election Law (UU No. 10/2016) prohibiting government personnel from campaigning while in office unless on official leave.

Such action, thus, blurs the lines between Prabowo the president and Prabowo the political actor. It violates the concept of neutrality and opens the door for further tampering in future elections.

The General Election Supervisory Agency (Badan Pengawas Pemilu – Bawaslu) has rejected claims of tampering due to a “lack of evidence”. Unfortunately, however, Bawaslu’s inaction has stoked popular mistrust.

Critics contend that Bawaslu’s position could result from political pressure, a lack of institutional autonomy or even an effort to keep appearances of stability against mounting public mistrust. This begs the question about the susceptibility of ostensibly objective bodies to outside influence, especially in a political environment progressively controlled by centralized power.

What made the process even less credible was the deep involvement of Jokowi in Pilkada. Though he is out of the office, Jokowi reportedly encouraged Prabowo to endorse candidates linked to his political dynasty, such as Luthfi-Yasin in Central Java.

The strategic alignment between Jokowi and Prabowo represents an alarming consolidation of power in the hands of Jakarta’s political elites, forming a political system that favors their interests and disregards the needs and aspirations of the regions.

Moreover, this dynamic undermines power decentralization that has allowed diverse regions to determine their development path, creating a homogenized political make-up in which power radiates out from the center (i.e. Jakarta).

The backstep to centralistic governance is particularly harmful to Indonesia’s democracy, given its experience with decentralization in post-reformasi era and given the country’s vast diversity.

Indonesia is a pluralistic country with differences in geography, culture, economy and regional needs. This diversity helps democracy thrive, fostering a marketplace of ideas and competition, as well as ensuring that policies are tailored to the needs of local communities. Moreover, regional autonomy has allowed local leaders to create solutions tailored to their goals.

Such a political space could potentially diminish after this Pilkada, as its results (i.e. KIM Plus’ victory in 60% of areas contested) could pave the way for a forced uniformity for the regions. The regions’ unique aspirations may be drowned out by the political interests of the Jakarta elites, who may seek to profit from their power accumulation or win future political contestations.

Tampering

Another popular narrative in this Pilkada is the misuse of government funds, colloquially known as politik gentong babi (pork-barrel politics).

It has been demonstrated that local leaders were mobilized to win votes for the contestants, such as what happened in Central Java. For instance, 90 village heads were gathered in a fancy hotel in Semarang, where they were reportedly lobbied to support certain candidates for the gubernatorial election.

Moreover, the Village Fund has been “weaponized” to compel village heads to obtain votes for certain candidates in exchange for its continued flow of funds, such as what happened in South Halmahera.

This is why oversized, concentrated powers such as KIM Plus could undermine democracy, as such coalitions could easily utilize state funds and resources to achieve political targets.

Social assistance programs were exploited too. In North Sumatra, where Jokowi’s son-in-law Bobby Nasution ran for governor (and won), some alleged politicization of social assistance that help him win. Similarly, in Surakarta, the KIM-supported Respati Ardi-Astrid Widayani pair allegedly distributed basic food aid during the pre-election lull.

Although Bawaslu has declared that no violation was committed in these instances, the indication of the candidates’ blatant exploitation of the social welfare programs cannot be ignored. By weaponizing public resources for political campaigns, the political elites have reduced Pilkada to contests for wealth and power, rather than a legitimate avenue for the region’s self-determination process.

Dynasties in the Region and Jakarta’s Exceptionalism

To make matters worse, dynasty politics has further entrenched oligarchic networks in Indonesia’s democracy. In this year’s Pilkada, more than 605 candidates were linked to political dynasties, double the figures from the previous two Pilkada cycles.

Those involved in dynasty politics today are local franchisees of national coalitions that exchange loyalty for access to power. This trend, as well as the acceptance of Jakarta’s political elites towards such practice, turns Pilkada into a mere appendage of the power struggle in the center which ultimately erases local autonomy.  The Bobby Nasution-Surya and Respati-Astrid pairs are some such examples.

Yet, the outcome in Jakarta presents an entirely different dynamic. The Pramono Anung-Rano Karno pair, who were backed by Partai Demokrasi Indonesia Perjuangan, managed to clinch a win against KIM Plus’ candidates Ridwan Kamil-Suswono.

Their successful campaign cleverly leaned on Rano’s cultural resonance as well as alliances with former governors Anies Baswedan and Basuki Tjahaja Purnama, which helped bridge ideological divides.

Still, Jakarta’s exceptionalism only highlights a basic truth: That Pilkada has lost its identity as a platform for grassroots politics and become an opportunity for a power grab by Jakarta’s elites.

The similarities between this year’s Pilkada and the last two presidential elections are concerning. Both relied on the misappropriation of public resources (some cases are still alleged), intervention by the sitting president and mobilization of institutions to deliver the desired political outcome.

Such strategies undermine public confidence in democratic institutions and are reminiscent of the New Order’s heavy-handed measures to maintain power. Despite the post-reformasi aspiration for democracy, Indonesia’s state today has increasingly become homogenous and centralized, while authoritarian practices are becoming more common. The absence of a pluralist system that respects differences and regional autonomy diminishes dissenting voices and alternative ideas.

Conclusion

The results of the 2024 Pilkada are nowhere near rosy for Indonesia’s democracy. With KIM Plus-backed candidates winning in 60% of the contested area, a centralized form of governance appears to be coming back to Indonesia’s political setting.

Once a trademark of the reformasi era, Pilkada has now become an avenue for political elites to consolidate their power, as the governance practices become more homogenous and centralized, thus marginalizing innovation and regional needs.

The developments surrounding Pilkada have thus threatened Indonesia’s democratic future, dampening the expectation for further democratic consolidation in the next five years. Without alternative angles and adequate representation, Indonesia is bound to have an outdated and disconnected governing system that will not serve its people.

Slowing Down the Sciences

“Science needs time to think. Science needs time to read and time to fail.”

Such is the powerful proposition made by the Slow Science Manifesto, supported by the Slow Science Academy in Germany. Considering the state of sciences and academia in ASEAN today, it is a message that intellectuals here must heed.

The concept of “slow science” is sparking a lively debate in academia, particularly in Europe and other Western nations. Slow science aims to address a fundamental issue: How can we produce meaningful, quality science in today’s fast-paced academic environment?

Ironically, this movement – despite calling for a slowdown – has gained momentum because of the perceived problems in academia recently.

The pressure to publish more papers is what proponents of slow science are concerned about. The obsession with metrics – paper counts, citation scores and institutional rankings – turns research into mere accumulating numbers rather than about the true quality and impact of the work.

This critique is mainly reflected in the works of scholars like Christian Fuchs and Isabelle Stengers.

In many fields, particularly economics and medicine, the pressure to publish frequently has led to practices like “salami slicing”, where researchers break down a single, comprehensive study into smaller, less substantial papers simply to meet publication quotas.

Similarly, in engineering and psychology, the pressure to meet publication targets has contributed to the unethical practice of “p-hacking”, where researchers manipulate data analysis to achieve desired outcomes, thus undermining the integrity of scientific work.

This problem is not just a Western one; it is unquestionably relevant in developing economies, especially ASEAN, where academic pressures can be intense.

Scientists in ASEAN are pressured to meet artificial targets and work within rigid deadlines that prioritize output over substance. For instance, in Indonesia, the “publish or perish” culture demands a specific number of publications in high-impact journals for promotions and funding.

Similarly, in Malaysia, academics must meet rigid Key Performance Indicators (KPIs) tied to publication quotas, which often result in fragmented or less meaningful studies. In Thailand, graduate students are required to publish in indexed journals just to graduate, which leads to superficial work.

All of this phenomenon creates a dilemma: how can we produce truly impactful, interdisciplinary research when the conditions for such work—time, focus, and critical thinking—are in short supply solely to meet immediate institutional demands?

At its core, slow science calls on academicians to take a step back from rushing publications and examine their professional lives carefully. This is not just about a slower pace for the sake of it; it’s about creating space for deeper thinking and better science for all.

But how does slowing down help? If universities are too focused on trying to hit big numbers and rankings, it can compromise the depth and quality of research. When we focus too much on numbers, we forget what really matters—conducting research that helps people and makes a difference.

Publish or Perish?

When scientists discover something new, they share their findings in scientific journals so others can learn from them and make even more discoveries. This helps science move forward.

However, research papers can be retracted if there are issues concerning their accuracy or ethical standards. In fact, this issue has surged in recent years. In 2023 alone, over 10,000 papers were retracted globally, setting a new record.

Recent studies show that the pressure to quickly produce data and publish research has a detrimental effect on the quality of studies, leading to more papers being retracted. Plagiarism is the second most common cause, responsible for 16% of these retractions.

Fake peer reviews are also a big problem. Normally, experts review research papers and give helpful feedback, but in the last 10 years, these issues have become much more common – increasing 10 times – eroding the integrity of this essential process.

To make it worse, some companies sell fake research papers—about 2% of all research published in 2022 came from these companies.

More science papers are being retracted because the research was not conducted right. This underscores a worrying misuse of government spending on research or studies that are not relevant.

But it is not just about wasting money. Erroneous studies can mislead other scientists into spending time and resources on ideas that do not work. This can slow down progress, harm public trust and undermine the credibility of science. Therefore, there is an imperative to address these cracks in the system.

Nourishing Science

The slow science concept borrowed its rationale from the Slow Food movement that began in Italy in the 1980s. The idea behind it was simple: Fast food, while convenient, is often stripped of nutritional value and people would be healthier if they cooked nourishing meals made from fresh ingredients.

As a movement, Slow Food started with big ideas, though it has faced challenges against fast food corporations.

People who support slow science believe that the research process today is a bit like fast food—it is undertaken quickly, yet lacking the depth and quality.

This notion has been propagated by individuals like Dr. Joël Candau, an anthropologist from Université Nice-Sophia-Antipolis, who equates “fast science” to fast food—one that focuses on accomplishing a lot quickly instead of properly.

To truly embrace the idea of slow science, we need to think beyond just research practices and consider the mindset it calls for—a focus on slowing down and fully immersing in the process.

This approach resists the pressure to “publish or perish”, a pressure that often reduces research to a numbers game, turning science into a fast-food simulacrum that is produced for consumption rather than contemplation.

Just like slow food means taking time to make food tasty and healthy, slow science means scientists should take their time with research. In other words, conducting studies that are genuinely beneficial for humanity.

Concerns for ASEAN Countries

Ethical issues, plagiarism, the “shortcut” to professorship and poor welfare for academicians are some key challenges that stem from our obsession with fast-paced science. This is because, as mentioned above, universities are pressured to produce high output as quickly as possible, in large part to climb the global rankings and attract elusive research funding.

This system may produce more papers, but it often misses the true purpose of academic research—advancing knowledge in ways that benefit society. If Indonesia wishes to build an academic system that genuinely contributes to its development, it must start by valuing depth over speed. The government must invest in fostering an environment where scientists are encouraged to think critically and freely rather than just “producing on demand”.

The conversation about “slow science” is one that academic leaders and thinkers in Southeast Asia must start. Indeed, for Indonesia and many other ASEAN Member States (AMS), there is an urgent need to speed up higher education reforms to catch up with leading global institutions elsewhere, an imperative that cannot be ignored.

The push for modernization, funding and global recognition is real, and there is no question about the necessity of speeding up these processes. However, this swift pace must not come at the cost of quality and depth in research.

The hard part is getting things to balance. AMS have to rapidly transform the quality of their educational institutions to meet global standards. However, if these changes are solely focused on speed and quantity, they risk undermining the very essence of what science should be – thoughtful questioning, deep exploration, and significant discovery.

Thus, AMS must not only reform quickly but also create environments where researchers can work with the intellectual freedom and time needed to truly innovate, reflect, and contribute to societal development in ways that are sustainable as well as impactful in the long run.

Where to from Here?

So, what is the solution? The government, representing the general public interest, bears the greatest responsibility to address the externalities of fast-paced science.

One of the first steps in reforming our higher education system is to restore the autonomy of public research universities. By autonomy, we mean the ability of universities to function without undue external interference, especially from government bodies, political influences or commercial interests.

In practical terms, this autonomy allows universities to define their own academic, research and institutional priorities. This reform is pivotal, as it holds far-reaching implications—from securing stable funding to enabling researchers to pursue long-term goals that prospectively lead to groundbreaking discoveries.

At the same time, it is essential to streamline bureaucratic processes that often impede progress. Revising centralized policies and cutting down on unnecessary administrative barriers will create a significant change.

The new Minister and Deputy Minister of Higher Education of Indonesia, Satryo Brodjonegoro and Stella Christie, can take the lead by focusing on this reform. Once universities regain their autonomy, they will be able to function as dynamic knowledge hubs, addressing national challenges deliberatively.

Furthermore, universities, research institutions and funding agencies need to improve their due diligence and hold those responsible for misconduct accountable. These steps are crucial to ensure scientists can focus on their research without unnecessary distractions – creating an environment where they can approach their work with the care and attention it deserves.

Pioneering initiatives, such as the Max Planck Society in Germany and the Wellcome Trust in the United Kingdom, could serve as valuable benchmarks for ASEAN research ecosystems. These institutions exemplify the power of good governance, strategic funding and thoughtful institutional design, enabling researchers to pursue long-term goals without the pressure of immediate results. Ultimately, it is up to the scientists themselves to engage with society’s problems – in a different kind of academic atmosphere – one that is not defined by speed but by the quality of reason. Therefore, a slower, more thoughtful academia will enable real progress in solving our most pressing social challenges.

Background

The return of Donald Trump to the White House may cause new tensions geopolitically, which will not spare Southeast Asia.

Indonesia has also been under the spotlight since Prabowo Subianto took over the reins as Indonesia’s president. As the biggest democracy in the region, the country aspires to become a significant power in Asia.

Nevertheless, it faces a complex, crucial challenge with regards to how and what strategy Prabowo’s foreign policy will adopt to navigate the competition between China and the United States.

Indeed, Prabowo may likely contrast former President Joko “Jokowi” Widodo’s more passive approach to foreign policy. Prabowo seems determined to consolidate Indonesia’s place on the global stage and solidify its role as an emerging power in the region.

Such a vision will encourage Prabowo to focus on national security, e.g., Indonesia’s role in the South China Sea as well as China’s activity vis-à-vis the Taiwan question.

Nevertheless, Indonesia’s economic dependence on China imposes crucial constraints that Prabowo will need help to manage.

Trump’s return means that the US administration may pursue policies that erode Prabowo’s ability to keep Indonesia neutral within the parameters of its bebas (free) and aktif (active) foreign policy. This may eventually press Prabowo to make that hard choice between closer alignment with the United States or China.

Dynamic Engagement

Prabowo’s foreign policy views have shown signs of dynamic engagement with the two superpowers. Prabowo visited China in the second week of November 2024, where he met with President Xi Jinping and signed MoUs on cooperation in multiple sectors, particularly infrastructure, trade, and energy.

A key takeaway of the visit was the promise of increased investment in the blue economy. The agreement will not only regulate the role of fishing vessels but also the production and sale of marine products. Perhaps more importantly, the visit concluded with a commitment by China to support Prabowo’s free meal program, a key point in his campaign.

These are positive signals denoting Indonesia’s intent to maintain good relations with China despite growing regional tensions.

His second strategic destination of balanced engagement was the United States. The trip was an opportunity to recalibrate Indonesia’s position with the United States and explore future possibilities for economic and security cooperation with Washington.

Indeed, the visit facilitated Indonesia’s attempt at diversifying its economic portfolio, potentially inviting US investors to participate in sectors such as semiconductors and technology. The response was also positive; President Biden declared the importance of Indonesia and establishing new collaborations.

Nevertheless, how Trump will engage with Indonesia is another question. Politically, Prabowo’s move to open a dialogue with both superpowers separately shows his attempt at keeping a more politically-friendly approach in exercising the bebas dan aktif foreign policy.

In larger context, Jakarta has given signals that it is also open to breaking free from the United States’ economic influence. Through his foreign minister, Prabowo has indicated Indonesia’s interest in becoming a member of BRICS, a move that signifies his willingness to be somewhat independent from the Western-centric global order.

Specifically, the outcomes of both trips indicate that Prabowo is sidestepping the pressure to closely align with either of the two, as well as assuming a nuanced neutrality to maximize Indonesia’s geopolitical flexibility.

Running Up That Hill

Indonesia has based its philosophy of non-alignment on a vision that mirrored the political conception of Mohammad Hatta. Historically, one can see how this vision manifested clearly during the presidency of Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, with his “one million friends and zero enemies” foreign policy.

However, maintaining neutrality will become more intricate today. That is because, after Trump’s victory, his administration may step up pressure on Southeast Asian nations to align with Washington’s China containment strategy, seeking not only greater economic cooperation but also military support.

From a geopolitical perspective, developments in the South China Sea increase the complexity of maintaining a neutral position. The geopolitical tension stems from China’s attempt to expand its military influence across the zone, which includes areas of territory disputed by other countries like the Philippines. Indonesia, which claims an exclusive economic zone in the South China Sea, is particularly vulnerable to Chinese incursions.

A recent furore erupted when Prabowo, during his visit to China, seemingly agreed to China’s interpretation of the nine-dash line, a move that landed him as a subject of criticism over alleged foreign policy inexperience. While this has continued to put certain quaters on edge, it has also been interpreted as a step to managing the tension with China.

For Prabowo, therefore, the challenge will be in finding a balance between national security and the economic benefits of partnering with Beijing.

Yet this will be an increasingly uphill task in the near future. Trump’s administration may compel Prabowo to put pressure on China, potentially jeopardizing Indonesia’s own relations with the Middle Kingdom.

On the other hand, Indonesia cannot do this easily; China is arguably Indonesia’s most essential economic partner. Indeed, it can also be argued that this dependence on China may have become a potential vulnerability for Indonesia.

The Taiwan Question

Another critical issue that needs further examination is Taiwan, with which Indonesia has recently increased diplomatic engagement. This move could exacerbate tensions between Washington and Beijing, with the former putting pressure on Jakarta to take a more pro-stability stance in the Taiwan Straits.

In addition, Taiwan is strategically important for Indonesia. It is also home to a large Indonesian community, the second largest destination after Malaysia for its migrant workers. Indonesians number around 300,000 in Taiwan today.

Interestingly, the last presidential election saw almost 70% of Indonesian workers vote for Prabowo, driven by promises of reforms that would increase their protection as migrant workers.

Moreover, Indonesia is also a gem from the perspective of Taiwan’s. Indonesia is of its target countries for the New Southbound Policy, which sees Indonesia playing a vital role.

While closer relationship between the two is much desired by both sides, it might invite consternation from Beijing.

It remains to be seen if the Taiwan question could destabilize Indonesia’s relationship with China. One thing is certain: Prabowo needs to navigate this potential landmine tactfully.

Conclusion

Probowo has seen the rise of polarization in the international context and how foreign policy decisions could directly affect internal stability. He also understands that his political legitimacy is rooted in economic stability and the perception that Indonesia can prosper without outside interference.

A too-direct alliance with one of the two superpowers could disrupt the balance in Indonesia’s policy of non-interference. However, more studies should be undertaken to investigate how the public would perceive such a move by Prabowo’s administration. Finally, Trump’s return to the White House could also force Prabowo to make decisions that are unpopular with Indonesians. Yet, if the strategy is based on political autonomy and directed towards all without enemies, Indonesia could emerge as a new international player with Prabowo as a critical regional leader.

Part of an ongoing article series on the impact of the Middle East conflict on Southeast Asia.

Overview

Three things drive Malaysia’s policies on the Middle East: trade and investment, the calibration of Malaysia’s position in Global South leadership, and support for the Palestinian cause.

This article will provide an overview of Malaysia’s relations with the Middle East, the ongoing war in the region as well as how it has impacted Malaysia.

Malaysia’s historical connections to the Middle East began with maritime trade and the transmission of Islamic faith and learning, which heralded people-to-people relations, especially with Egypt and Saudi Arabia.

Today, Malaysia’s foreign policy places much emphasis on the country being an open trading nation, with efforts to expand trade with Persian Gulf nations under way.

Diplomatically, Putrajaya is friendly with these Middle Eastern states, including Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Qatar and Iran. In 2023, Malaysia welcomed the Arab League’s readmission of Syria, reopened its embassy in Baghdad after a two-decade closure and established a defence attaché office for its diplomatic mission in Cairo.

Malaysia also enjoys cordial relations with both the Palestinian Authority (PA) and Hamas. It has refused to forge diplomatic relations with Israel and advocated for Palestinian self-determination.

Putrajaya’s concern, above all, is to halt bloodshed and support efforts to rebuild war-torn countries in the Middle East while advancing trade and investment initiatives with the region. Since 2007, the Malaysian Armed Forces (MAF) has deployed a battalion to United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL)’s peacekeeping mission in South Lebanon.

After withdrawing troops from the Riyadh coalition in Yemen in 2018, Malaysia retained her commitment to restoring peace in Yemen by participating in the United Nations Mission to Support the Hudaydah Agreement (UNMHA).

Despite supporting Arab governments’ reengagement with Bashar Al-Asad, Malaysia has not reopened its embassy in Damascus, instead emphasizing the need to rehabilitate life for Syrians.

The 7 October attack did not change Malaysia’s policies on the Middle East. Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim has been maintaining Putrajaya’s support for a ceasefire in Gaza and an end to Israeli occupation and Palestinian statehood in no uncertain terms.

Accepting Malaysia’s lack of clout over Israel and its most powerful ally, the United States, the prime minister has embarked on a course of unrelenting diplomatic advocacy for Palestine.

Putrajaya’s position in the periphery of Arab-Muslim political leadership somewhat limits its stances to responding, as opposed to making far-reaching unilateral decisions, in the context of geopolitical and military developments in the region.

Mindful of this reality, it is instrumental to outline the factors that facilitate either stabilization or conflict in the region, which consequently guide Malaysia’s stances.

Where goes the Palestinian cause?

Following Yahya Sinwar’s death in combat with the Israeli army in Rafah, Israel pledged to continue Israel Defense Forces’ (IDF) offensive in Gaza for years to come. Their aim since declaring war is to replace Hamas rule with a government that is more pliable to Israeli occupation of the Palestinian territories.

Without a doubt, Israel has managed to reduce the Al-Qassam Brigades’ (Hamas’ military wing) operational capabilities and decapitate both its parent organization as well as Hezbollah.

Nevertheless, it would be foolish to believe that these movements will not reorganize and rebuild capacity for as long as there is reason to resist: the Israeli occupation.

Responding to Yemen’s Houthis announcing the fifth phase of their resistance campaign in solidarity with Gaza, Sinwar had assured them that “the resistance is well and in good stead, and is prepared for a long war of attrition”, while acknowledging that the people of Gaza are “positioned between suffering, famine and pain from the Nazi genocide and valiant resistance that has been led by Al-Qassam Brigade.”

With or without Sinwar, armed resistance will persist in the occupied territories.

The West Bank is not faring much better. In March 2022, Israel launched the brutal Operation Break the Wave to crush rising armed resistance in the West Bank. A year later, Israeli systematic demolitions and settler violence caused the highest number of displaced Palestinians in a single year since the UN’s Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) began recording demolitions in 2009. Before 7 October 2023, Israeli forces and settlers killed 243 West Bank Palestinians; in the subsequent 12 months, 728 were killed, mostly by Israeli security forces.

At the United Nations General Assembly, Mahmoud Abbas demanded for Palestinian Authority (PA) control of all Palestinian territories including Gaza and the Rafah crossing. Abbas’s insistence on a PA rule points to a persistent challenge in overcoming the division between Fatah and Hamas, despite both parties having signed a National Unity treaty with 12 other Palestinian factions in Beijing in June 2024.

It is unlikely for the  PA to gain political support and ascendancy in Gaza. A September 2024 poll reveals that while the majority of Gazans no longer believe that Hamas will win the war, Palestinians still overwhelmingly demand for Abbas’ resignation. Support for the two-state solution has risen in both territories. Most importantly, Israel does not want a Palestinian state.

Diplomatic efforts

Arab leaders are running on low patience and limited by their resolve to refrain from responding militarily. The vexation is shared equally by those who have relations with Israel – Egypt, Jordan, the UAE, Bahrain and Morocco – and those who do not.

Jordanian Minister of Foreign and Expatriate Affairs, Ayman Al-Safadi, delivered a trenchant summary of the Arab-Islamic Ministerial Committee’s readiness to guarantee Israel’s security upon fulfilling the condition of Palestinian statehood, followed by an indictment of Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s determination to wage war.

Remarkably, nothing Al-Safadi stated was news – these terms for peace were committed to in the Saudi-led 2002 Arab Peace Initiative – but it was a rare instance of public takedown by a frustrated diplomat.

For Saudi Arabia and countries that do not have relations with Israel, normalization is dangled as the prize for an end to the war, occupation and for the establishment of a Palestinian state. Alas, this is not a big enough incentive for Israel to call for a ceasefire—not when it has been waiting for a chance to conduct an intensive dismantling of Hamas and Hezbollah.

Amidst a calculated exchange of fire with Israel, Iran has been conducting a flurry of diplomacy with Arab neighbors. The Iranian Foreign Minister, Seyed Abbas Araghchi, met with Saudi Crown Prince Mohammad Bin Salman and Egyptian President Abdel Fattah El-Sisi.

He also visited Jordan, Lebanon, Türkiye, Iraq, Qatar and Oman in a tour that signals active engagement with neighboring countries to secure regional support against Israel, which is bent on destroying Iran’s military and nuclear capabilities.

On top of that, citing the absence of a reason to talk to Washington unless the current crisis is resolved, Tehran has halted indirect communication with the United States via Oman.

How has Malaysia been impacted so far?

To date, the Houthi attacks on ships in the Red Sea have a limited impact on Malaysian trade. Container rates have increased and there have been shipment delays, but intra-ASEAN and China trade – which take the top two spots above Southeast Asia-European Union trade – have kept Malaysia buoyed from the primary effects of shipping disruptions in the Red Sea.

As for developments in the wider region, Malaysia refuses to recognize unilateral US sanctions on Iran but is by no means insulated from its implications.

In 2019, Malaysia was pressured to close bank accounts belonging to Iranians, causing their number to drop from 200,000 to fewer than 10,000 in Malaysia. This is a real barrier to encouraging Iranian business in and visits to Malaysia, and realistically one that cannot be fixed by diplomatic persuasion.

Meanwhile, Malaysia has always been wary of Shia influence domestically, but there is no real political threat as Sunni Islam is still very much dominant.

Unlike Iraq, Syria and Lebanon, Malaysia – incontrovertibly anti-Shia in its institutions and laws – does not face the problem of militant Shiites, so Putrajaya can afford to compartmentalize the sectarian issue in their bilateral relations with Tehran.

Again, Malaysia has the luxury of distance – geographically and culturally. Put simply, Iran’s hard power and Shiite influence has no currency in this Southeast Asian nation. As long as Malaysia navigates this issue tactfully, it should be able to pursue wider relations with Iran in the future if it so wishes.

In South Lebanon, after a year of anticipating the expansion of Israeli military offensive into Lebanon, the MAF are prepared for any eventualities, including the last resort of unilaterally withdrawing its troops from the mission and evacuating from the country, which will be very costly. Ultimately, Malaysia is expected to follow UNIFIL’s decisions.

Tracking the flow of aid to Gaza and Palestinian refugees

One of the most tangible ways for a private citizen in Malaysia to help victims of war is by donating money and goods.

The government and various NGOs have mobilized fundraisers for Middle Eastern refugees for decades. Following Israel’s military offensive on Gaza, the government launched the Humanitarian Trust Fund for the People of Palestine (AAKRP) in the amount of RM10 million. The sum was channeled to the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) on 17 November 2023. In August this year, Malaysia contributed a further RM10 million to the agency.

However, transparency is an issue that needs to be underscored, considering the Israeli blockade of Gaza and Egypt’s control over the Rafah crossing have prevented aid delivery.

The Norwegian Refugee Council recently reported that 83% of food aid does not make it into Gaza. A dismal average of 69 aid trucks per day were allowed to enter Gaza in August 2024, compared to 500 per working day in 2023, which was already inadequate to meet the needs of Gaza residents.

The Malaysian government’s coordinated coalition of charities for Palestine, Ops Ihsan, has delivered three loads of aid cargo to El-Arish, Egypt by December 2023. This initiative has also kept up the delivery of food packs into Gaza while looking into the option of shipping aid from Port Klang to Egypt. The Foreign Ministry has kept the Parliament informed about the progress of these donations.

But how much of the goods sent actually reached the besieged residents of Gaza? Besides, how much have reached those who have managed to escape to Egypt but are struggling to pay for housing, food, medical treatment and education as refugees?

At the moment, initiatives and civil society are filling in the vacuum left by the Egyptian government, which does not recognize displaced Palestinians in Egypt as refugees in a bid to preserve Palestinian presence in and hold over occupied land.

Meanwhile, research on establishing a Charities Commission for Malaysia was recently presented to the Prime Minister’s Department (Law and Institutional Reform), following the cabinet’s decision to study regulation of the charities sector.

This initiative was born out of a concern of misuse of public and private funds as well as money laundering through charity work. Beyond this, however, the successful set up and enforcement of the Charities Commission should assist charities in tracking the flow of aid and informing the public about donation delivery mechanisms.

Having this additional instrument of oversight would also provide hard data that can better inform Malaysia’s diplomatic efforts to push for ending the obstruction of aid into Gaza, particularly considering Egypt and Israel’s blame-trading on this matter.

Nevertheless, this initiative has a long way to go still; the government would do well to supply timely updates on the progress of donation drives under its patronage.

Conclusion

Prior to 7 October 2023, the Middle Eastern states were tentatively but determinedly rebuilding political stability and regional diplomacy after more than a decade of the Arab Spring uprisings and the rifts between Riyadh, Cairo, Doha, and Tehran.

The war that Hamas invited on that day only served to highlight the deep cracks in the region that was not filled by the UAE and Bahrain’s bold sidestepping of the long-held Arab paradigm of no peace with Tel Aviv until Palestine is sovereign and free.

Hamas’ incursion into Israeli territory also prompted a new stage in Palestinian resistance against Israel, who, by the looks of it, is determined to take advantage of this moment to militarily incapacitate its nemeses at any cost, for as long as the international community will allow it to.

To rehash, Malaysia’s top concerns are threefold: addressing the Palestinian humanitarian catastrophe, pushing for Palestine’s liberation from Israel and bringing Israel to justice.

As it currently stands, however, Putrajaya can claim no sway over Tel Aviv or Washington nor the political and geographic influence of Arab rulers over Palestine.

Recognizing the failure of the post-World War II international order to ensure the rights of sovereign states and protect the dispossessed, Malaysia has turned its focus towards strengthening the South-South cooperation.

Distance has spared Malaysia from the brunt of the Middle Eastern refugee crisis that has been exacerbated by Israel’s offensive in Gaza and Lebanon. Even so, Malaysians have long been supporters of the Palestinian cause and are not strangers to donation drives for the displaced in the Middle East over the past decade.

Besides exercising its diplomatic capital in regional and multilateral forums, Malaysia must play to its strengths by optimizing its humanitarian efforts, supporting Palestinian agency, and contributing legal expertise as well as testimony towards the International Court of Justice’s cases against Israel’s war crimes.

At this juncture, international humanitarian efforts cannot outpace the rising casualties of Israel’s lethal rampage, while diplomatic efforts have repeatedly failed to pressure Israel into a ceasefire, let alone withdraw from the territories it has invaded. What remains for a middle power like Malaysia is to maximize sustainable aid for the victims of war, who will need assistance for every aspect of life for years, realistically decades, until they can return to their homes or gain permanent residence in another country, or until Israel ends its occupation and Palestine is finally free.