Part of an ongoing article series on Indonesia’s regional elections 2024.

Introduction

Indonesia has had a busy political year with the presidential and legislative elections last February, as well as the upcoming regional head elections (Pemilihan Kepala Daerah – Pilkada) on 27 November 2024. The next round of voting will determine who gets to become governors, regents and mayors in all parts of Indonesia.

A key discourse in this Pilkada is whether Indonesians would vote for fresh faces or retain the ruling class in their respective regions, which have manifested in all sorts of political dynasties or oligarchs.

At the national level, former president Joko “Jokowi” Widodo is seen to be maintaining a degree of influence across the nation. President Prabowo Subianto was voted into office with Jokowi’s scion, Gibran Rakabuming Raka, in his ticket. Despite repeated denials by Jokowi, Gibran’s mere presence is a testament to his father’s enduring presence.

Jokowi’s influence may face some delicate opposition from his former platform, Partai Demokrasi Indonesia Perjuangan (PDI-P). The party has wrested the largest number of seats in the House of Representatives (DPR) in the past three legislative elections, though the number seems to be on a declining trend over the years.

Still, the PDI-P is the only force substantial enough to provide counter to Prabowo’s big tent coalition in the DPR. The question now is if the PDI-P would become an outright opposition or assume a more ambiguous stance like what it did under Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono’s administration. Regardless, in key and closely contested regions, the PDI-P can be seen as clearly challenging candidates affiliated with Jokowi.

The dynamics of Pilkada are also highly driven by the recent Constitutional Court’s (MK) ruling that lowers the threshold for parties to nominate candidates, allowing them to do so without forming a coalition.

Against this backdrop, this article attempts to offer the political mapping ahead of Pilkada in five key regions. West, East and Central Javas are selected as the top three most populated regions. North Sumatera is next, owing to its position as the most populated province outside of Java. Jakarta, while being the sixth most populated province nation-wide, is also chosen due to its special circumstances and unique political dynamics.

As will be shown below, these two aforementioned factors (Jokowi’s influence and MK’s ruling) have a big influence in the formation of political constellations that have determined the way each regional contest is playing out.

West Java: The Land of (Political) Giants

As the biggest province with the highest number of voters, West Java is currently dominated by Golongan Karya (Golkar) with 4.2 million votes, closely tailed by Gerakan Indonesia Raya (Gerindra) with 4.1 million votes and Partai Keadilan Sejahtera (PKS) with 3.5 million votes in the last legislative election.

For the upcoming Pilkada, Golkar and Gerindra joined forces – along with other parties including Partai Demokrat (the Democratic Party), Partai Amanat Nasional (PAN) and Partai Solidaritas Indonesia (PSI) – to nominate Dedi Mulyadi as a gubernatorial candidate. Dedi was Purwakarta regent for 10 years (2008-2018) and a Golkar lawmaker from 2019 to 2023, before hopping to Gerindra last year.

The PKS, on the other hand, established a coalition with Partai Nasional Demokrat (NasDem) and Partai Persatuan Pembangunan (PPP) to nominate Ahmad Syaikhu, who is running with Ilham Habibie as his deputy. Ilham is the son of the late president B.J. Habibie.

The other two gubernatorial candidates are Acep Adang Ruhiyat (supported by Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa [PKB]) and Jeje Wiradinata (backed by the PDI-P).

The latest poll indicated that Dedi is in the pole position (67.7%) to claim the gubernatorial post thanks to his popularity among voters. There is a wide gap between Dedi and other candidates, with Syaikhu-Ilham being the only other pair that have a two-digit electability score (10%) in the poll. All other candidates are even further behind.

East Java: A Contest Between Three Heroines

The incumbent East Java Governor Khofifah Indar Parawansa is favored to maintain her seats amidst the challenge by two other female candidates: Tri Risma Harini (a PDI-P politician, former Surabaya mayor and former minister of social affairs) and Luluk Hamidah (a PKB politician and former lawmaker).

Khofifah will be supported by 15 parties, parliament and non-parliament ones, that are dominantly part of Prabowo’s Koalisi Indonesia Maju (the Onward Indonesia Coalition – KIM). On the other hand, both the PDI-P and the PKB are confident to field their own respective candidates after securing the top two positions in Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Daerah (Regional Representative Council) following the last legislative election.

Recent polls show that Khofifah is in the pole position and has a huge opportunity to win in one round as she garnered 65.8% in electability score, leaving Risma (25.5%) and Luluk (1%) far behind.

Central Java: War of the Generals

Central Java has emerged as a battleground between Gen. (ret.) Andika Perkasa and Insp. Gen. (ret.) Ahmad Luthfi, with the two coming from the military and police backgrounds, respectively.

Like in the other two provinces, Central Java also demonstrates clearly how the PDI-P (which won 5 million votes in the region’s last legislative election) is challenging a big coalition (15 political parties, amounting to 13 million votes) that fields its own candidate.

In the last presidential election, despite Central Java being the party’s bastion, this did not stop non-PDI-P candidate (Prabowo) from winning the province’s total vote against the party’s own candidate Ganjar Pranowo. This was thanks to Jokowi’s influence overshadowing and undermining Ganjar’s political campaign.

There is a worry that a similar pattern will also repeat in the upcoming Pilkada.

After all, Central Java is also Jokowi’s basis: He had been a mayor of Surakarta before, a seat that was later occupied by Gibran for three years (2021-2024). Jokowi also performed strongly in this province during the 2014 and 2019 presidential elections, a further testament to his grasp over Central Java.

For the upcoming Pilkada, Andika is paired with Hendrar Prihadi, former mayor of Semarang (Central Java’s capital). Meanwhile, Luthfi runs with Taj Yasin Maimoen as his deputy, the son of popular cleric Maimoen Zubair and Ganjar’s deputy governor of Central Java from 2018 to 2023. In the previous Pilkada, Ganjar-Yasin won 3.8 million votes.

The majority of polls in September put Luthfi in the pole position, while another conducted in October put Andika slightly ahead of Luthfi (a gap of 2%). Nevertheless, the latter poll also indicated that the number of swing voters is still huge (80%), which means the election will be closely contested.

Moreover, a recent video on Prabowo promoting Luthfi-Yasin also added controversy to the mix, indicating that Prabowo’s voice matters and that he is not above influencing the political contest, especially one that will be fiercely fought. It also indicates Jokowi’s rather heavy-handed measure to deny the PDI-P a win in its own bastion.

North Sumatra: The Son-in-law vs. the Incumbent

The gubernatorial contest in North Sumatera will feature two pairs: Bobby Nasution-Surya and Edy Rahmayadi-Hasan Basri Sagala. Bobbby is Jokowi’s son-in-law, while Edy is the incumbent.

Bobby-Surya is supported by seven political parties, including Golkar, Gerindra, NasDem, the PAN, Demokrat, the PKS and Partai Bulan Bintang (PBB). Bobby is currently serving as the mayor of Medan (North Sumatera’s capital) for the 2021-2024 period.

The second pair, Edy-Hasan, is backed by six political parties, including the PDI-P, Partai Hati Nurani Rakyat (Hanura), Partai Buruh (the Labour Party) as well as non-parliamentarian Partai Kebangkitan Nusantara (PKN), Partai Gelombang Rakyat Indonesia (Gelora) and Partai Ummat (Ummah Party). Edy only entered the politics of North Sumatra in 2018 – previously, he served as the Commander of Army Strategic Command.

The PDI-P backed Bobby’s mayoral bid in 2021 when Jokowi and the party were still in-sync. Nevertheless, as this relationship deteriorates, the PDI-P now implements the “no-Jokowi” strategy in numerous contests, including in North Sumatera. The party is now backing Edy.

In a twist, Gerindra, which backed Edy’s gubernatorial bid previously, has now switched sides and supported Bobby.

Jakarta: The Absence of a Favourite

Former governor Anies Baswedan was leading the polls prior to the registration deadline for gubernatorial candidates. As a figure of resistance to Prabowo’s administration, Anies was regarded as a serious contender in Jakarta’s gubernatorial election. He was also closely associated with the PKS, which won the highest vote in the province’s legislative election.

These did not save him, however, as the PKS withdrew support and joined Prabowo’s camp.

Nonetheless, the PDI-P showed signs that it was ready to back Anies’ candidacy. This did not materialize either, with the PDI-P switching support to Pramono Anung in the last minute. Pramono is Megawati’s right-hand man and he is paired with popular actor Rano Karno, who also served as the governor of Banten from 2015 to 2017.

Furthermore, Pramono was a cabinet secretary in Jokowi’s administration and was among the hundreds of figures who showed up at Prabowo’s home while the president-elect was finalizing his list of ministers, deputy ministers and heads of state institutions. While some assumed that Pramono’s visit signaled Prabowo’s support for his gubernatorial campaign, Pramono has dismissed the rumors.

Meanwhile, KIM parties have nominated Ridwan Kamil, a Golkar politician and highly popular former West Java governor (2018-2023) as their candidate. Although Prabowo’s supporters have rallied behind Ridwan and his running mate, PKS executive Suswono, there is no urgency for Prabowo to support a specific candidate in this contest.

This is because Prabowo will gain regardless of who wins. Even if Pramono-Rano win Jakarta’s top job, Pramono could serve as a strategic bridge between Prabowo and the PDI-P chairwoman Megawati, who has kept the party’s stance towards Prabowo’s administration ambiguous.

Different pollsters have expressed differing opinions on electability. The latest poll by the LSI showed Pramono ahead of Ridwan with a notable margin (around 4%). The third and independent pair of candidates, Dharma Pongrekun-Kun Wardana, trailed far behind with only 6.6% of support.

Even though Jakarta will cease to be the capital of Indonesia soon, the office of its governor is still one of the most important and sought-after ones in the upcoming Pilkada. Jakarta may remain as Indonesia’s hub for business, finance and trade, but its future governor will be tasked with navigating the city in its post-capital years.

Conclusion

Pilkada is significant as future development of the regions will be determined by the victors. More importantly, Pilkada in the most populated areas has the potential to influence national political dynamics, while also determining the future of tens, if not hundreds, of millions of lives.

For example, the outcome of Pilkada in West, East and Central Javas will shape the candidates’ future political trajectories, regardless of whether they win or lose. Party constellation has also changed thanks to the two factors mentioned above – it will be interesting to observe how the inter-party dynamics will change in the future as well.

Furthermore,  the Jokowi-PDI-P schism remains as intense and as visible in Pilkada contests in various regions. At the same time, we should not discount the interest of individual candidates to advance their own goals and perhaps a desire to be free from this fettering political dynamic. Pilkada is the last piece of puzzle in this long political year. Prabowo has won and assembled his lieutenants–the outcomes of Pilkada in various regions will complete the picture of Indonesia’s political trajectory at least in the next five years.

The Discrepancy between the Public and the Politicians

With the 2024 general election on the horizon, DPR members are getting busy preparing for another run of political campaigns in their respective constituencies. This puts a major stall on the legislative process, as many of the members are absent from the discussion on UU ITE.

Thus far, Commission I has decided to only revise six out of 56 UU ITE articles in total and considered a few more additions, signaling a less enthusiastic approach. There is a possibility that the UU ITE revision would be completed faster than the PDPA process, however. The intention to move hastily also reveals another reason as to why the discussion for the revision has been taking place behind closed doors.

There is a strong force in the DPR opposing the demands of the civil society coalition for a comprehensive change in UU ITE as they believe this is the momentum to rearrange the most vital law to counter cybercrimes in Indonesia. The coalition – which consists of human rights defender groups, journalist associations, digital activists and a few more – push for the DPR to examine the act thoroughly, not only to address the criminal part of the act which is the main discussion point these days.

The public demands for UU ITE to be scrutinized thoroughly is a step in the right direction: the fact is, the draft bill that is currently being amended does not take into account the recently passed Penal Code.

In 2022, the House and the government agreed on revising the Penal Code that has been in place since the early days of independence. Even though there have been uncountable rejections throughout the process of revising the Penal Code, eventually the new Penal Code was promulgated on the second day of 2023.

As the government’s proposal to revise UU ITE was only submitted in 2021, the fact that there is a new Penal Code in 2023 suggests that the government should have redrafted the UU ITE bill so that the discussion in the DPR’s Working Group could be in line with the new Penal Code.

In fact, during the meeting to accept the Surat Keputusan Bersama (Joint Decree Letter – Surpres) to be the bill, Rizki Natakusumah, a Commission I member from Partai Demokrat, raised the issue that the Surpres should have been reconsidered by the government. His idea was also supported by Christina Aryani, who stated that the new Penal Code rendered the Surpres irrelevant.

Nevertheless, the Working Group chairman decided to move on with the current Surpres and any necessary changes to the bill will be taking place during the revision process. Yet, it has not been smooth-sailing ever since.

Complexities in the Legal Aspect

Every single entity in the UU ITE Working Group, including DPR members and some representatives from the government, should bear in their mind that they must not go against legal stipulations in other laws and acts before they attempt to revise UU ITE. This is a tricky business as the Surpres of the UU ITE bill arrived in the DPR before the validation of the Penal Code Act took place in 2023.

In other words, by right they should have redrafted the bill to reflect the parameters of the new Penal Code that explicitly invalidate numerous articles from the existing UU ITE, such as articles 27 (1) & (2), 28 (2), 30, 31 (1) & (2), 36, 45 (1) & (2), 45A (2), 46, 47, and 51 (2).

Even more complicated is the fact the new Penal Code will only come into effect on 2 January 2026. That means the lawmakers should consider the possibility of the absence of law before 2026 if those aforementioned articles are to be accepted to be taken out of the bill.

Commission I members of the Working Group did not participate in the legislation of the new Penal Code last year, which was handled by Commission III. They seemed annoyed when their opinion and authority were not respected by the Commission III members who removed those articles from the existing UU ITE without Commission I’s blessing. Even worse, Commission I members were not consulted by their counterparts in Commission III when the discussion of the Penal Code was addressing criminal acts in the digital space.

In practice, Commission I is of the opinion that several aspects of the Penal Code about cybercrimes are not definitively adequate. For instance, Article 27 (1) UU ITE which regulates the restriction of pornographic content circulation in public was replaced by a similar arrangement in Article 407 Penal Code.

Nevertheless, the latter is considered not sufficient by the Working Group members as it does not explicitly forbid the act to “transmit” such content. Article 407 only mentions “broadcast” which is different from “transmit” from Commission I’s perspective. Meanwhile, the Explanation Part of Article 247 of the Penal Code explains that the act of “broadcast” encompasses “transmit”.

Eventually, the Working Group agreed to redraft Article 27 (1) of UU ITE to accommodate the term “transmit” from which possible excessive punishment could arise in the future as the two regulations – Article 27 (1) UU ITE and Article 407 Penal Code – might be taken as a cumulative charge. 

The same pattern of confusion also takes place in Article 27 (3) regarding defamation and slander. The existing act forbids anyone to abuse someone’s dignity in the public space through unproven accusations in the forms of digital information/documents.

This article has been misused even by those in government. Journalists and concerned citizens alike have been sent to jail for reporting sensitive issues or cases. Apparently, this controversial article has been addressed and regulated in the Penal Code, which renders its inclusion in UU ITE somewhat redundant. However, the Working Group decided to incorporate this element still, citing that the Penal Code does not specifically address defamation in the digital space.

The pattern of repeated articles in the Penal Code and UU ITE creates the problem of redundancy which will only breed more situations of legal uncertainty in the future. The possible emergence of problematic multi-interpretation was one of the reasons why the government wanted to revise UU ITE in the first place, but this entire episode shows that little has changed.

All in all, this concern of redundancy could be alleviated if the closing part of the UU ITE contains transitional provisions. At the closing pages of UU ITE, the lawmakers could provide a particular provision that all of the articles above will not be effective once the Penal Code comes into effect on the second day of the year 2026. If this is the case, one should not be worried about the possibility of law redundancy as UU ITE will be overruled by the Penal Code in the future.

The big question now is this: does the Working Group have the courage to produce a law that will only be relevant for less than three years?

Conclusion

With the amendment process taking place behind closed doors, it has been a challenging task to seek a piece of good news from this entire process. The revision process can be a cause of concern for observers of cyber law in Indonesia as this not only relates to how criminal acts in the digital space are being managed, but also how democracy prevails in the future.

One should not be surprised as to why it remains difficult to guarantee freedom in the digital space in Indonesia. Today’s lawmakers are in favor of a big state approach when it comes to managing activities in the digital space.

One bright side from this whole conundrum is the fact that the lawmakers endeavor to ensure children’s digital protection is through stricter rules on digital platforms.

Aside from that, further debates on how criminal acts in the digital realm are regulated, in their context with the Penal Code, will inevitably occur post-amendment which is likely to be finalized circa August 2023.

The anticipated outcome indicates that the struggle to reform Indonesia’s cybersecurity is a long and winding road. There are disagreements from legal perspectives, especially when it comes to the attempt on striking the balance between freedom and restriction in the digital space. That attempt is hardly attainable as the cyberspace is full with noise and chaotic in nature. If that were to be the baseline, UU ITE should not be considered an omnibus law that was intended to be the government’s silver bullet solution to all problems in the digital space. Other lex spesialis acts on cyberspace should be considered.

Introduction

Indonesia enters another stage of cyber governance when the country’s authorities opened talks with Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat (House of Representatives – DPR) to amend Undang-Undang Informasi dan Transaksi Elektronik (Electronic Information and Transaction Act – UU ITE) earlier this year.

UU ITE has been fraught with controversies ever since its introduction in 2008 and its first amendment in 2016 did not manage to abate these. The controversies mainly relate to the government’s effort to stifle the freedom of speech and expression in the digital space, inviting backlash from civil societies, private sectors, academicians and international actors.

The government has responded to this by issuing Surat Keputusan Bersama (Joint Decree Letter – Surpres) on the Guidance of Implementation Criteria for UU ITE by the Minister of Communication and Information, Attorney General, and Head of Indonesian Police on June 23^rd 2021.

However, due to the inadequate legal status of such a letter, the government still has to work with the DPR to revise the existing act to serve society with a better legal ground, especially in the cybersecurity sector. Such is the only way to stop further controversies.

Despite this, more complexities arise as soon as the DPR opened the discussion with the government to amend UU ITE. These are signified by a closed-door amendment process, a complicated legal drafting and a wide gap between public aspiration and facts on the ground.

Background

UU ITE is Indonesia’s first ever cyber law, introduced in 2008. Commission I of the DPR is assigned to cover issues in information, communication, broadcasting and internet affairs, alongside its other focus on security, military and intelligence issues. In this way, Commission I has been working as the parliamentary partner for the Ministry of Communication and Information to develop Indonesia’s digital governance as a whole, including the electronic information and transaction that have been the key chunk of UU ITE.

Fast forward to 2016, the act was revised for the first time. Changes were made in the segments on criminal acts and their punishment, the introduction of the right to be forgotten, the recognition of electronic information and document as legal evidence before the court, and cyber law enforcement.

The initial irregularity in UU ITE could be detected as early as when it was first formulated in the DPR, when Commission I took a bit too much of Commission XI’s responsibilities to govern financial matters and Commission III’s assignment to regulate criminal acts in general.

Commission XI, another chamber of the Indonesian House, is authorized to work with numerous Indonesian financial, banking, and monetary institutions which makes it more relevant to handle the transaction aspect of UU ITE. On the other hand, Commission III has the duty to ensure the supremacy of law in Indonesia, including how the Penal Code is supposed to be the legal foundation of this cyber law, parts of which UU ITE is supposed to administer as well.

Therefore, the ideal combination of groups to handle the initial drafting of UU ITE was supposed to be the three commissions mentioned above, to ensure that the three major areas of the law – namely cyber, transaction and criminal laws – are addressed accordingly. However, this step was not taken by DPR’s leadership board who preferred to allocate the law-making process to a single unit, Commission I.

Another way to examine whether UU ITE is viable and coherent is to separate those major areas into separate acts, with each specializing in specific aspects encompassed by UU ITE (lex spesialis).

The DPR’s inability to legislate properly is a significant concern for the future of lawmaking in Indonesia, not only in the sphere of cyberspace but also other issues not related to the digital space.

Since its implementation, UU ITE has seen hundreds of people being sent to jail. Names such as Muhammad Arsyad, Ervani, Anindya Shabrina, Deni Erliana, Zaki Amali and – the most popular of all – Baiq Nuril were among such individuals sent to jail.

Most of them were brought to the court by power holders in the name of defamation when the suspects were trying to reveal the ugly truth to the public or try to self-defend. The legal grounds provided by UU ITE undoubtedly accommodate the reports filed to proceed to the investigation stage. In fact, the conviction rate of those cases is notably high, at 88%.

SafeNet, a digital rights defender organization, recorded that 2022 had been the most terrible year of UU ITE controversies in the last nine years, with 97 cases of criminalization against those who express themselves. That number tripled from 30 cases in 2021.

As mentioned, the government produced the JDL to reduce the number of cases in 2021, whereby law enforcers were guided not to easily take criminal cases on the basis of UU ITE. However, that hope only turned into smoke as UU ITE cases flagrantly increased by 80% after the JDL came into effect.

The problem did not only lie with the fact that law enforcers did not understand the JDL. The legal status of the JDL has also been questioned by the public as it only applies to the executive branch while the court may not take the JDL substance into their judiciary consideration.

All of these have pressured the government to revise UU ITE. Nevertheless, the way that it is being carried out currently has only invited more headaches.

Closed Doors in the House

On 16 December 2021, the government formally submitted Surat Presiden (President’s Letter) containing a proposal for UU ITE revision to the DPR, but the legislative branch only accepted the proposal more than a year later on 13 February 2023.

The reason for that massive delay was the prolonged legislation process of the Personal Data Protection Act (PDPA) that was only completed in the closing days of 2022. Furthermore, the DPR commissions are not allowed to handle more than one at once, which in this case was Commission I which was formulating the PDPA. Another reason for the delay was merely politics, which is only clear to the leadership board of the DPR.

An act with lots of controversies such as UU ITE has a big political appeal for the government and members of the legislative body. There is an argument to be made that the controversial UU ITE could draw more attention to various political campaigns as the nation nears the general election in 2024.

On the contrary, mismanaging such a hot topic could create waves of backlash. The latter scenario, unfortunately, is what has been taking place over the last five months, with the head of Commission I, who is also the chairman of the UU ITE Working Group, decided to continue the process closed-door, away from public ears and eyes. His reasoning was that too many sensitive matters were being discussed in the meeting, leaving them with a decision no decision but to close the doors.

The private sector and civil society coalition have registered their rejection against this decision as they want to know that their aspiration is being heard and addressed properly in the Working Group. They do not want the elected representatives to repeat the same mistake they made back in 2016.

To be continued in Part Two.

Synopsis

The Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) was founded during a period of extreme global and regional uncertainty. Communist subversives in every Southeast Asian nation and the Indo-China War prove to be substantial hurdles to economic development that these post-colonial countries desperately attempt to achieve. Hence, in its infancy, ASEAN was designed in order to assist the countries in addressing regional turmoil and potential flashpoints among them.

Despite this noble agenda, ASEAN Member States (AMS) frequently hit a brick wall when it comes to understanding the concept of security. Cooperation in this sector appeared to be too delicate for countries that had only embarked on an early stage of nation- and state-building post-independence, which required strict commitment attention to other necessities. Worse, unresolved bilateral conflicts among them and the interference of global powers in the region prolonged the endeavour to achieve ASEAN’s objectives as stated in the Bangkok Declaration.

When its leaders met in Bali to sign the 1976 Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC), ASEAN finally saw its first opportunity to address regional security challenges following a number of attempts by various internal actors. In TAC, the norm of resilience becomes one of the most significant standards for assessing security matters without becoming entangled in a strict and formal military alliance under the ASEAN flag.

This book argues that Indonesia served as a norm shaper in ASEAN through the formulation of regional resilience based on its domestic experience. This book employs Finnemore and Sikkink’s norm cycle theory to explain how the resilience norm evolves from one stage to the next.

The book can be purchased here.

Introduction

In January this year, Indonesia’s President Joko “Jokowi” Widodo and Singapore’s Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong met to formalize three agreements at once. These are the Extradition Treaty (ET), the Flight Information Region (FIR) and the Defense Cooperation Agreement (DCA).

In each of these agreements, only one country would be favored (i.e., one country would get the shorter end of the stick). Notably, though signed individually, the three agreements should not be deemed as separate issues. The DCA and the FIR are seen to be beneficial to Singapore while Indonesia should find the ET a valuable gain. In light of this lopsidedness, a closer look at these agreements reveals how they would prove costly to Indonesia’s strategic interests and sovereignty.

Ironically, similar reasons were cited in 2007 for the failure of the Indonesian government and Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat (House of Representatives – DPR) to ratify the DCA agreement. This led to the agreement to be put on hold (or cancelled). However, on 28 November 2022, the same DCA agreement was once again tabled for scrutiny by the Ministry of Defense, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Law and DPR. This time, it looks like both the government and DPR would ink the agreement as the majority parliamentary seats are dominated by the governing regime. This article examines why Indonesia will be the losing party once these agreements are ratified.

Why the ET is Valuable to Indonesia

Indonesia needs an ET with Singapore since many heavyweight criminals have escaped to Singapore to evade court proceedings. Fugitives such as Harun Masiku, Djoko Tjandra, Nazaruddin, Nunun Nurbaeti, Gayus Tambunan, Eddy Sindoro and Paulus Tannos are among those who have sought sanctuary in Singapore as they wait for an opportunity to return unpunished.

Aside from corruption cases, the treaty also covers numerous kinds of crime including money laundering, bribery, banking, narcotics, terrorism, and terrorism financing. The retroactive feature of the agreement enables law enforcement in both countries to apprehend perpetrators who committed the crime as far back as 18 years ago. The reality is that there have been more Indonesian criminals who fled to Singapore than vice versa. Additionally, it is important for Indonesia to bring these criminals responsible for causing a loss of billions if not trillions of Rupiah to the country. Through the ET, it is hoped that Indonesia can retrieve these stolen funds back into its national treasury. Collectively, the ratification of the ET would be more advantageous to Indonesia than Singapore.

Questions Surrounding the FIR

The FIR represents Indonesia’s desire to take over aviation control over its airspace from Singapore. It is known that Indonesia’s airspace above the Riau Islands and parts of Sumatra is controlled by Singapore. Such foreign control is common practice internationally after assessments by the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO). 

The FIR agreement signed by Indonesia and Singapore will partially turn over the control of Singapore’s FIR to Jakarta’s, specifically the space over 37,000 feet. In other words, the space between 0 – 36,999 feet is still under Singapore’s FIR control. The service cost of flights flying within Singapore’s aviation control will be paid to Indonesia too as compensation for flying over Indonesia’s territory. This payment mechanism, which replaces the previous one signed in 1995, will benefit Indonesia according to the Indonesian government.

However, those advantages seem to diminish if the agreement is examined closely. Currently, most civil flights from which service costs can be generated usually operate between 35,000 – 36,000 feet. In other words, there is not much point in having control of the sky over 37,000 feet because planes have to maintain fuel efficiency as well as avoid traffic, hazard, bad weather and turbulence which can only be achieved at the aforementioned altitude range. Additionally, the fee Singapore pays to Indonesia for operating at this altitude will be lower compared to the fee the latter would be entitled to if the airspace is under the direct control of Indonesia.

Additionally, the agreement also demands Indonesian airplanes on disaster relief operation to report to the Civil Aviation Authority of Singapore if they fly within Singapore’s FIR. Worse still, the FIR agreement will remain in place for 25 years and contains no clause for termination.

According to the chief of Badan Keamanan Laut Republik Indonesia (Coast Guard – Bakamla), the FIR agreement will impede maritime security operations as Bakamla’s fleets usually patrol with the assistance of air support, including drones. As operations in the airspace must be reported, Singapore will be in the know of all kinds of activity in the airspace by Indonesian units. A similar situation is highly likely for Indonesian military forces.

Despite these disadvantages, the Indonesian government has accepted these conditions. This is because the FIR agreement is considered a successful implementation of the 2009 Aviation Act. The Act instructs the government to take over control of its aviation service within 15 years after it is passed (i.e. latest by 2024). Before the term expires, the government has the right to delegate control to other countries based on any previous agreements. This has been presented to the domestic audience as a success story of Jokowi’s administration to regulate air transportation, especially with the end of his term looming on the horizon. The government’s portrayal of the FIR as a success can be argued to be irrelevant as Singapore will continue to exert influence and control over Indonesia’s airspace, for both civil and military aviation. Several have expressed that the FIR is more than aviation safety since the sovereignty aspect of the agreement is also quite palpable. Notably, unlike the other two agreements, the FIR agreement will not need parliamentary ratification. This is because the Indonesian government considers it merely as an aviation safety agreement that is sufficiently regulated by Peraturan President (Presidential Regulation, Perpres).

Problematic Package

In 2007, the Singaporean government questioned the Indonesian government’s determination to ratify the ET and the DCA (plus Implementing Arrangements [IA] of military training area) following a deadlock between the Indonesian government and DPR. Several DPR members wanted to ratify the ET but not the DCA as the latter was considered an infringement on Indonesia’s sovereignty.

Subsequently, Indonesia requested Singapore “to make substantive changes to the IAs after the main agreements had been signed.” Such request was considered a lack of commitment from Indonesia as Singapore subsequently regarded that “future negotiations with Indonesia, or with any other country for that matter, difficult if not impossible because there would be no finality even after an agreement had been reached.”

The coupling of the ET and DCA agreements has also proved problematic for Indonesia. Singapore had occasionally assisted Indonesia with extraditions such as the cases of La Nyalla Mattalitti (former Indonesia’s football association chairman) and Hartawan Aluwi (businessman convicted of white-collar crimes) in 2017. Their cases highlighted extradition was possible without the ET agreement being ratified by DPR albeit out of goodwill.

However, an extradition request by Indonesia in 2017 was rejected despite appeals. The Singaporean authority rejected the notion on the basis that the ET was still pending as DPR had not ratified it whereas “Singapore is ready to proceed with both agreements (the ET and the DCA) once Indonesia is ready to do so.”

In international law, it is unheard of to treat treaty documents between two countries as inseparable. But it would be in the political interests of both Indonesia and Singapore to consider these agreements as a package. Such packaging, however, could create complications in downstream ratification. Having to ratify one good deal and two bad deals, for example, would be difficult for parliament of each country to pass through.

Nevertheless, the decision to package the agreements together was made by both countries. Both countries deem the outcome of such packaging as appropriately servicing their respective national interests. The ET is clearly counted a gain for Indonesia while the FIR can be framed by the Indonesian government as beneficial despite questions surrounding its value. It is possible for Indonesia to gain the most advantage were it not for the DCA, which constitutes the third aspect of the package. As the next section explores, the loophole in the DCA seems to be neglected by the Indonesian government.

The DCA – A Loss to Indonesia?

The Indonesian Air Force claimed that Singapore is the second top violator of the Indonesian airspace after Australia. This is understandable as Singapore only has limited aerial area in which its air force can operate. The downside of this is that the Indonesian authority cannot do anything about inevitable offenses by Singaporean air force.

In general, DCA usually regulates the general cooperation points between two parties. In this Indonesia-Singapore DCA, both countries have agreed to conduct several joint exercises, intelligence information sharing, regular bilateral strategic dialogues and other personnel development activities. The activities would enable the Singaporean military to utilize its counterpart’s vast operational areas.

From Singapore’s perspective, this DCA could legalize what it has been doing and expand what it can do to neighboring aerial areas. Conversely, Indonesia views this DCA as an opportunity to regulate and pressure Singapore to respect Indonesia’s airspace. Nevertheless, it is worth the wait to see whether Singapore would really respect the agreement. The area of military practice that Singapore demands is as follows:

Referring to the map, Alpha-1, Alpha-2 and Bravo are busy areas where civilian ships sail through the Malacca Strait and where local fishermen operate. These areas are also where the underwater wires are installed and offshore platforms are located, not to mention their proximity to the natural conservation regions such as Marine Geopark Natuna dan Anambas Conservation Area (areas designated as Alpha-1, Alpha-2 and Bravo in the map above).

As these important activities surround the areas that Singapore wishes to control, it may be a disservice for Indonesia to give up such vulnerable locations for military training that uses live ammunitions. It would be worse if the use of guided missiles by Singapore’s military is allowed with Indonesia authority’s consent or otherwise.

Both countries may also be giving up valuable information to each other albeit potentially one-sided. Such information includes the underwater contours in these areas which could be mapped for submarine routes. Notably, the DCA explicitly prohibits the divulging of such sensitive information to others.

From the author’s knowledge, negative sentiments on the DCA arose as there remains the perception among Indonesian military that the Singaporean military continues to claim the Indonesian territory for their operation areas even though the 1996-2001 agreement between the two had expired. During this period, even Indonesia’s fighter jets inside Indonesian airspace were pushed away by Singapore with the latter insisting that its measures were regulated legally under the bilateral agreement.

All that Indonesia could do to minimize its loss is to create a tight IA on which the whole technical operation will be based. As explained by the Indonesian government during the ratification process, Indonesia and Singapore military will set the IA to ensure details of the agreement are regulated. Experts argued that the IA should at least include: 1) the scope of the cooperation; 2) the limit of the authority given up to Singapore; 3) the specific geographical areas used for Singapore’s military exercises; 4) the protection of confidential information from this agreement; 5) budgeting of activities conducted by both parties; 6) dispute settlement if problems arise in the future and; 7) host’s consent if the user invites other external parties.  

These points are meant to prevent potential negative implications of the agreement, such as preventing environmental damages, affecting fishermen’s activities, the use of dangerous weapons and the entry of unwanted parties. Unfortunately, the IA will only be negotiated closed door. There are no formal regulations in Indonesia forcing the Ministry of Defense and Indonesian Military to discuss its terms with DPR. Hence, any weak negotiation points will not be revealed publicly until the factual destructions and damages take place in the future.

Moreover, the DCA between Indonesia and Singapore might ring a bell for Beijing as this agreement could be perceived as the West’s attempt to balance China’s rise through Singapore. If the Singaporean military invites other countries to conduct joint exercises in the designated area of Indonesia’s territory, those external parties could tread across and around the nine-dash-line. Such military activities might be considered a direct threat by Beijing to its territorial claim. The geopolitical implications of the DCA have to be anticipated by Indonesia too as the country has positioned itself not to pick any side in the Indo-Pacific power competition.  

Even though Singapore and China initiated a closer defense agreement in 2019, recent Singapore’s condemnation to Russia’s invasion to Ukraine might reveal Singapore’s geopolitical leaning. However, more studies should be conducted to assess the wider strategic implication that Singapore will have with Indonesia in the context of Indo-Pacific political contestation through the DCA.

The DCA was ratified in DPR on 6 December 2022 and it revealed the weakness of the Indonesian government. Minister of Defence Prabowo Subianto, who is popular for his strong nationalism and die-hard stance to protect national sovereignty, seems resigned to accept the DCA. In the end, the DCA is packaged simply as an opportunity for Indonesia to develop good relations with Singapore. However, the issue around the DCA is also considered a stage for Prabowo to exercise his strong “presidential” capacity before an international audience. It is true that the DCA explicitly states that both countries could have military activities around their area equitably, but having considered the tiny aerial territory that Singapore has compared to extensive Indonesia’s air, Indonesia obviously has more to give than Singapore does.

Conclusion

Indonesia will suffer a great loss if this package of agreements comes into force, though it is only a matter of time before this happens. While the DCA has been approved officially by the DPR, the ET will follow as it has been scheduled in mid-December this year.

Using football terms, in hindsight, if the package of agreements was concluded in 2007, the final result of the diplomatic negotiation match between Indonesia and Singapore would be 1-1. Indonesia could get one point out of the ET and Singapore could gain one from the DCA. However, the 2022 agreements would only deliver a defeat to Indonesia as the country would only get a single point from the ET while its counterpart scores points from the DCA and the FIR.

Introduction

One of the most pertinent questions in Indonesia today is whether data controllers can securely store users’ personal data. This is evident from past data breaches, which have yet to be resolved definitively. These cases, among others, include Tokopedia, Lion Air Group, e-Hac, and the Social Security Agency for Health (BPJS Kesehatan). Unfortunately, the government’s responses have been lacklustre with none of the government bodies involved in cybersecurity wanting to claim responsibility and have resorted to finger-pointing. In Indonesia, these bodies include the Ministry of Communication and Information, Cyber Police, and National Cyber Security Body. These together with negative public sentiments towards rising living costs have further declined trust towards the government.  

Against this backdrop, a new actor arose and casted a strong spotlight on the elites. A hacker (or a group of hackers?) with the handle “Björka” gained prominence by not only gaining access to troves of personal data, but also revealed sensitive information that further instilled shock and awe among the public. These included doxing several ministers, revealing the president’s confidential letters and stealing data from critical government agencies such as the Election Commission and the State Electricity Company. 

Regardless of the government’s denial and the authenticity of the data Björka stole, the hacker has successfully unmasked the government’s ineptitude to address a cybersecurity crisis.

Twisted Chain of Executive Command

The Head of the National Cyber Security Body explained that Björka’s attacks were still categorized as low-level offences. However, simultaneously,  President Joko “Jokowi” Widodo convened several bodies such as the Ministry of Communication and Information, the National Police, the National Cyber Security Body, and the Intelligence to bring Björka to justice. Such convening by the president goes against Björka’s hacktivism to be classified as a low-level offence. Additionally, the gravity of this offence led to the creation of a task force.

However, the creation of this task force is perceived to simply be a public relations exercise. To date, the Minister of Communication and Information Johnny G Plate and Coordinating Minister of Political, Legal, and Security Affairs Mahfud MD have yet to explain how this task force operated. Additionally, the DPR has not received any details on how exactly the government will be addressing the Björka conundrum. With such uncertainties, this conundrum would remain unresolved just like past data breaches. Such a hands-off approach is unfavourable for users.  

Noticeably, since the inception of the task force, President Jokowi has remained silent on the issue. Instead, enquiries and developments on this issue is to be addressed by his ministers. This is not the first time the president has done so. This was previously seen when the country was tackling illegal fishing in its waters. Particularly for enquiries on the destruction of captured foreign fishing boats, then Minister of Maritime and Fisheries Affairs Susi Pudjiastuti was left to address the issue. What could truly be behind such silence when clear, unified responses are needed?

As investigation into the case progressed, the police arrested a 21-year Madiun youth on suspicions of being Björka’s assistant on a Telegram channel named Björkanism. This move initially confused the public as the youth resided in a village and did not possess a laptop. At the time of writing, he has been released to his family though still deemed a suspect. It was later discovered that he was a fan of Björka, admitted to reposting three of Björka’s public messages and sold the admin rights of the telegram channel to Björka for US$ 100. According to investigation, the sale of the channel proceeded after the real Björka contacted the youth. In response to the youth’s arrest, Björka told his followers that the Indonesian government had wrongly arrested the youth. To further suggest the government’s incompentence, he claimed that the government’s attempt to identify him was based on being misinformed by DarkTracer, a darkweb intelligence platform.

Bumbling on such serious issues affects the credibility of the Indonesian government, particularly as the country prepares for the G20 Summit later this year. Losing credibility on the international stage is detrimental to Indonesia as the country seeks to promote the country’s portfolio internationally. Previous efforts such as the president’s recent visits to the Ukrainian and Russian leaders become undone by the country’s digital insecurity.  In light of its digital insecurity, the Indonesian government has a huge homework to develop its cybersecurity capabilities which are critical to its digital economy framework.

Lessons Learnt

Björka exposes the very weakness of the Indonesian government, especially in addressing the rising issue of digital insecurity. While other actors conducted anti-government demonstrations or walked out of the Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat (DPR) Plenary Meeting, Björka operates in the shadows. Nothing is known about Björka yet he has captured the public’s attention, indirectly assisted by the government’s lack of effective responses. Recently, Björka has even posted political messages against the government.

It is likely that such actions be repeated especially by those seeking a change in Indonesia. These actions highlight that demonstrations and street protests are not the only means to catch the government’s attention. This assumption holds true if the situation remains status quo. Not helping the situation is that the pace of this learning process is swift and the government does not have past experiences to leverage on. Additionally, it would be unwise to solely depend on the Personal Data Protection Act that was recently passed. Sole reliance on this Act is akin to using a small water gun to extinguish a raging forest fire.

The importance of human resources in building an effective cybersecurity system has been highlighted by a police expert. This may be overlooked as the general understanding that digitalization is mainly about technological advancement. Having a strong cybersecurity technology without capable individuals is not a desirable outcome. Based on the recent hacking, the Indonesian government has yet to develop capabilities in both technology and people. The rapid development of such capabilities, coupled with an effective crisis communication strategy, would go a long way to soothe the public’s anxiety.

A final lesson is that every single data controller has to independently protect its stored data in order to maintain its own credibility and reliability. Björka has indirectly demonstrated the need to be aware of personal data breaches that could be a precursor to criminal actions against them. Björka has shown that data could be used for blackmail and instigate terror among the public. That means that people will have to learn to judge which data controllers are reliable before engaging their services. Through such learning, private corporations and government bodies would no longer arbitrarily manage stored data. In other words, development of cybersecurity in Indonesia could be a  bottom-up process post-Björka.

Introduction

In this digital era, data has become a commodity that states and businesses utilise. Data shapes strategies in the production of relevant and quality services or products. Moreover, they are also instrumental to steer current and future directions of consumer behaviour.  In other words, data acts as a compass for global actors of any scale and facilitates formulation of the tactics to achieve their goals.

Among the types of data, personal data is one of the most valuable. Personal data is the unique, accumulated information of a user, either recorded digitally or manually. Personal data encompasses the subject’s personal identity, home address, medical record, digital behaviour and other identifiable information.

In this era, Indonesians are not immune from personal data insecurity that might transpire from data theft by malicious actors or bad data management by data-collecting bodies. Several recent, notable cases of such issues have impacted major organizations including the Social Security Agency for Health (BPJS Kesehatan), Tokopedia, and e-Hac. This digital era is thus a double-edged sword, granting users access while also exposing them to risks. This dilemma has pushed the Indonesian government to initiate the creation of the Personal Data Protection Act. This Act is to ensure there is an adequate legal ground for relevant public bodies to properly conduct data protection measures. Two things the government should juggle: the protection of personal data as a human rights necessity and the creation of legal certainty for businesses.

Numerous domestic and international parties have submitted their views regarding how the Act should be developed. These parties included EU Commission, Meta, American Chambers of Commerce, coalitions of social and professional organizations, and academics. One aspiration is for this Act to regulate the public and private sectors fairly. This is understandable considering the public data retainers are storing the majority of Indonesians’ personal data such as their identity card numbers, home addresses, phone numbers, and tax registrations. Indonesia’s vast population has also invited many businesses, regardless of their sectors or scales, to operate in the Indonesian market. Many of these businesses are now reliant on public data to buttress their business models and increase productivity.

An independent Personal Data Protection Body should be created to ensure fair play. Though this ideal, it is a major point of contention between the DPR and the government during the debate. A majority of parliament members accept the idea of an independent body, but the government insists that such body should function under the aegis of the Executive. This contention is critical as it influences other aspects of regulation such as dispute resolutions and sanctions. The peak of this disagreement took place just when Indonesia became affected by the Covid-19 pandemic in early 2020. Consequently, further discussions were put on hold until two years later.

Progress in Restarted Talks Between the Government and DPR

The recent, multiple occurrences of personal data leakage and hacking cases, the increased use of digital services during the Covid-19 pandemic, and the approaching G20 hosted by Indonesia have pushed the government and the DPR to restart talks. This time, talks involved a heightened involvement from the Minister of Communication and Information, Johnny Gerard Plate, and the DPR chairwoman, Puan Maharani.

Current discussions between the government and the DPR have made significant progress. They agreed to omit the term “independent” or “autonomous” from the Personal Data Protection Body’s description. This is unlike any other regulation on public independent bodies in the country. Moreover, the Personal Data Protection Body is going to be formed and authorised by the President, who will also appoint the head of the Body. Thus far, only the general functions and job scopes of the Body have been approved by both sides.

However, the question of fairness persists. How could this Body ensure fairness between the public personal data controllers and private ones while safeguarding users’ interest? In other words, when managing future issues, would the Body be assertive only to those in the private sector and being hesitant to act against those in the public sector?

This concern continues to persist as this Body is being operationalised. The Personal Data Protection Body would now function under a particular Ministry and not under the President’s Office (despite obtaining authorisation from the latter), as regulated by the State Ministerial Act No. 39 Year 2008. Hence, it is still Executive in nature. Therefore, in any future occurrences of data abuse or mismanagement would lead to heightened public distrust particularly when the objectivity of the Body is questionable.

Issue of Fairness only tip of the Iceberg

Unfortunately, there are other concerns with the Act.

Dispute resolution is one example. With the Personal Data Protection Body being an Executive body, it cannot conduct an adequate dispute resolution (non-litigation adjudication) between the data subject (users) and the data controller. In current agreement on the Act, the role of the Body is to “facilitate” instead of “resolve” any dispute related to personal data protection. Resolution of any dispute will be by the court, which might have limited knowledge about the technical aspect of personal data protection. Though expert witnesses may be included in court processes, technical experts should be the ones presiding and passing judgements on cases. Ideally, this responsibly should be meted by the Body.  

Another is the role of the public prosecutor in dealing with personal data protection abuse/mismanagement allegations against the public personal data controller. As disputes would be brought to trial, public prosecutors will be called upon to process each case. Here is the issue: who should they defend in court? Should they defend data subjects, who are Indonesian citizens, and challenge the Executive body (which they are part of), or the opposite? Eventually, the Act only mandates the Personal Data Protection Body to submit requests to public prosecutors for legal assistance. The conundrum is that the Act is vague on requiring prosecutors to accept such requests. Therefore, decisions to accept could be politically influenced.

As the Personal Data Protection Body’s important features will be decided by the President, the DPR has seemingly tightened numerous technical aspects of the Act. For example, personal data controllers must respond to data subject’s request for personal data process delay, termination, update, access, or correction within 72 hours. Even the European Union General Data Protection Regulation (EU GDPR), which has been the benchmark for a similar act in Indonesia, permits personal data controllers to respond to such a request within a month.

This arrangement will invite negative sentiments from business actors that are burdened with such obligation. Responding to such a request is not an easy task since the requested data are stored by several different data processors. However, this burden could be lessened in the near future as technology develops. Therefore, for technical matters, it is ideal to rely on the Body’s regulation or any other sub-regulation under the Act to make sure the effective adaptability of the regulation to the development of technical technologies pertaining personal data management.

Conclusion

It is inevitable for Indonesia to implement the Personal Data Protection Act. However, whether or not the Act is adequate to answer recent occurrences of mismanagement and abuses remains to be seen. It is, understandably, a new regulation that has never existed before in the country. Personal data regulations in other countries, which are used as a benchmark for Indonesia’s own act, do not necessarily accommodate the needs and cultural sensitivities in Indonesia. Regardless, Indonesia as a nation should embrace how the digital revolution will continuously affect the lives of the people, even if the upcoming Personal Data Protection Act is yet to be an adequate safeguard against data-related woes. Indonesia is now at a crossroads of its digital journey with numerous foreseeable issues. Ideally, such issues be addressed prior to the implementation of this Act.