Introduction

On 19 November 2022, Malaysia conducted its 15^th General Elections (GE15) after a protracted political turmoil since the downfall of the Pakatan Harapan (PH) government in early 2020. Much hope was placed in GE15 to be a way out of the political impasse that has plagued the country.

A brief look at the political developments since the previous election (GE14) is necessary to understand today’s context.

GE14 and Malaysia’s Political Crisis

In GE14, which was conducted in May 2018, Malaysia’s longest ruling coalition Barisan Nasional (BN) was defeated for the first time in post-independence history. The breakthrough was made possible through cooperation between progressive politicians and conservative authoritarian diaspora (i.e., BN’s defectors) within PH, which was also supported by Partai Warisan (the Heritage Party), an ally in Sabah.

Following BN’s defeat, its leading party, the United Malays National Organisation (UMNO), regrouped with Parti Islam Se-Malaysia (PAS) and established Muafakat Nasional (National Concord – MN) in 2019. MN was supposed to function as an umbrella under which both parties operationalize their political cooperation.

Throughout 2019, MN espoused an ethno-religious populist appeal and won a series of by-elections in Peninsular Malaysia to the extent that the conservative party in PH, Parti Pribumi Bersatu Malaysia (Bersatu), was forced to rethink its position in the new government.

The growing popularity of MN successfully back-peddled a number of PH’s progressive policies, including the state declarations on International Conventional of the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (ICERD) and Rome Statute, thus signifying authoritarian innovation amidst Malaysia’s democratic reform.

Subsequently, Bersatu orchestrated an autocoup dubbed “Sheraton Move”, which was supported by MN and allies in Sabah and Sarawak. This coalition is known as Perikatan Nasional (PN). Its government was subsequently formed on 1 March 2020 through the presentation of its support at the National Palace.

Although mid-term governmental change is not new in Malaysia, it was the first at the national level with its impact immediate. Bursa Malaysia (Malaysia’s stock exchange) tanked with billions of ringgit in losses and consolidated a period of political uncertainties, which has continued years after.

PH’s Anwar Ibrahim attempted to topple the then premier Muhyiddin Yassin using similar tactics in late 2020, with the support from BN’s leaders. Muhyiddin retaliated by advising the Yang di-Pertuan Agong (King) to declare a state of emergency in January 2021, which suspended parliamentary sittings indefinitely and thus saved his administration.

It should be noted that Muhyiddin, since his ascension in March 2020, had always avoided parliamentary sittings and the tabling of vote of no confidence against his premiership.

In late June 2021, Muhyiddin lost his royal backings, largely due to his administration’s poor management of the Covid-19 pandemic and its implications. Several additional issues, particularly the re-convening of the parliament and the revocation of Emergency Ordinances, also strained the relationship between his government and the National Palace.

Muhyiddin was forced to relinquish his post in August 2021 after UMNO President Zahid Hamidi publicly withdrew the party’s support for the former. About a week later, UMNO Vice President Ismail Sabri was appointed by the Agong as Malaysia’s 9^th prime minister, though the PN still formed part of administration with BN at the tip of the spear, in keeping Harapan at bay.

It can be argued that Zahid’s endeavor to topple both governments in 2021 and 2022 as well as to force an election is generally due to his pending court cases. Arguably, this is why Zahid continued to pressure Ismail to call for a fresh election, despite UMNO’s reigning position under the latter. The accidental prime minister only managed to withstand the pressure from Zahid for about a year, before buckling under the weight and dissolved the parliament in October 2022. GE15 was thus afoot.   

GE15 and the Subsequent Developments 

The Agong seemed to have agreed (albeit cautiously) with Ismail’s advice, which originated from Zahid, that the election is the way out for the current political turmoil. However, Zahid had strong political motive to call the election. The state elections in Melaka and Johor, held in late 2021 and March 2022 respectively, showed that a low voter turnout could successfully usher BN back to power with two-third majority in state legislative assembly. The low turnout was due to outstation voters not returning to the states to cast their ballot, largely because the fear of Covid-19 remained in place. Zahid was confident that BN would be able to repeat the results in GE15 to the extent that he did not want the coalition to work with other parties. 

Zahid’s vision proved wrong. As projected by many experts, there is no clear winner in GE15. PH emerged as the largest bloc in parliament with 82 seats, but fell short by 30 seats to have simple majority (50% plus one) to form a government, as required by the Malaysian constitution.

Nevertheless, Anwar announced that he held a simple majority with “111-112 seats” and wished to see the Agong to prove his claim. Strangely, Muhyiddin, whose PN coalition won 73 seats, also claimed that he commanded a majority. This situation of “claiming majority” is reminiscent and a continuation of what happened during regime changes in March 2020 and August 2021.

This time, however, the Agong seemed more careful. Here, our attention must shift to the election result in the state of Perak.

A political deadlock was simultaneously happening in Perak. PN won most seats (26), but failed to achieve a simple majority. PH and BN, however, decided to ally and were thus able to form the Perak state government. This coalition highlighted the formation of a post-electoral pact (in this case between the two) for the first time in Perak and Malaysia in general.

Amidst this backdrop, the Agong granted audience to both Anwar and Muhyiddin on 22 November 2022 and encouraged both to cooperate with each other to form a unity government. This was due to the fact that none controlled a majority in the parliament. A unity government could also serve as a form of national consensus to bring about political stability – which was the primary objective of GE15. Muhyiddin declined the advice and was arguably unyielding, as he contended that he had the majority.

Behind the scenes, it was widely believed that Muhyiddin had secured the support from individual BN Members of Parliament (MPs) and from Gabungan Parti Sarawak (GPS). However, this would have contradicted the recently gazetted Anti-Hopping Law (AHL) and constitutional amendments which required en bloc party support for one side. Individual MPs’ shifting of alliances in 2020 and in 2021 was widely recognized as the main factor for political instability in the country. The AHL is specifically designed to curb such practices in the future. Thus, the Agong’s refusal to appoint Muhyiddin through the support of individual MPs, rather than through collective decision of respective parties, is highly commendable.

To prevent further impasse, the Agong advised BN and GPS, the third and the fourth largest blocs in parliament, to choose a side – either PH or PN. The matter was of high importance as it became the primary issue discussed within the Council of Rulers held in the same week.

Finally, with the support from BN and GPS, and the endorsement from the Agong through consensus achieved in the Council, Anwar was appointed to lead the unity government and thus became the 10^th prime minister of Malaysia.

Will the Anwar Administration Survive?

Will the current machinations (e.g., Anti-Hopping Law, constitutional amendments, etc.) and innovations (i.e., post-electoral coalitional government, unity government, etc.) bring back political stability to Malaysia?

Less than two weeks after the appointment of Anwar, ex-BN member Shahidan Kassim, which is now PN’s MP representing Arau, claimed that plans are being designed to topple unity government. After all, there is a loophole in the AHL – MPs can still change their allegiances, but it must be done collectively (en bloc), involving the whole party.

Other PN MPs have also continued to aggressively discredit the unity government on grounds of integrity (particularly with the appointment of Zahid as one of Deputy Prime Ministers) and on ethno-religious appeals.

Whether the newly minted government would survive depends on two factors. First, it depends on the government’s performance to respond to economic challenges. As with other developing countries, the mandate to govern and continue to govern does not necessarily come from electoral results, but also from economic performances and symbolic representation. The economic performance of Mahathir Mohamad’s second government (2018 – 2020) was acceptable, but his administration was too calculative in providing subsidies to the poor, which had been well patronized under Najib’s administration (2009 – 2018).

“The people did not feel the favours of having governmental change,” according to PKR’s leader Shamsul Iskandar Md. Akin. He added that “democracy did not deliver” in reflecting the failure of PH’s first stint in Putrajaya. Thus, when MN leaders drummed up ethno-religious issue, it went well to the hearts and minds of the people particularly among the poor and the Malays – the biggest supporters for PN in GE15.

Therefore, if Anwar administration can properly respond to socioeconomics challenges and addressing hate speech, while introducing effective policies and achieving impactful results, he would be able to maintain support at all levels (from the Palace to the poor) to continue to govern for a full electoral term.

Secondly, it depends on the extent that the due process of law is upheld, particularly in the appointment and the change of the head of government. In a parliamentary system that maintains the position of traditional rulers, a rule is established to separate the constitutional monarchy and the parliamentary democracy. The powers of the constitutional monarch are limited and largely symbolic though the monarch still have some rights. As per Walter Bagehot, they are “to be consulted, to encourage and to warn.” Thus, as long as the due process of the law is respected in upholding the sanctity of constitutional monarchy, supremacy of the constitution and the sovereignty of the parliamentary democracy, then any transition of power and leadership change can be conducted properly as well as transparently.  Such will be much more acceptable to the people and horizontally to the parliament and the court.  That is the reason why the tabling for a vote of confidence on Anwar’s administration is a must.  

A Series on Political Islam and GE15 – Part 3: The Malay-Muslim Politics and Malaysia’s GE15

The Four Arenas of Contestation

There are four arenas of contestation in 2018’s GE14 which will serve as our analytical basis for the upcoming GE15. These are Peninsular Malay (peninsular districts with more than 50% Malay population), the Northeast states (i.e. Kelantan and Terengganu), East Malaysia (Sabah and Sarawak) and Peninsular Diverse (peninsular districts with less than 50% Malay population).

Notably, Malay-Muslim politics are most prominent in Peninsular Malay and Northeast areas. Although there are also several Muslim constituencies in East Malaysia, their political sentiments are mostly based on state or regional nationalism rather than ethno-religious nationalism.

In GE15, 222 parliamentary seats in Dewan Rakyat (Lower House) are up for grabs, with the polling day set for 19 November 2022. A simple majority of 112 (50% plus one) is needed for any parties or coalition(s) to form the next government.   

Out of the 222 seats, the Malay-Muslim seats in Peninsular Malaysia only comprise of 117 constituencies (53% of the total; 95 seats in Peninsular Malay and 22 seats in the Northeast). This becomes a predicament to any Malay-based parties or coalition(s), apart from deep-seated divisions among the Malay-Muslim vote, lately.

Historically, Barisan Nasional (National Front – BN) leaders were successful at winning elections through gerrymandering and malapportionment. This continued even with the removal of  constitutional restrictions to have a more balance number of voters among constituencies in the 1970s. Consequently, rural constituencies (mostly comprised of Malay-Muslims, Sabahans and Sarawakians) were generally given more weightage and seats during electoral redelination exercises.

These steps were successful in retaining BN’s two-third majority in the parliament throughout 1970s and 1980s. Due to this, rural constituencies were considered as political safe deposit boxes for BN. Moreover, BN had managed to secure many constituencies in the other regions throughout this period with its middle ground “syncretic” politics.

Beginning in the 1980s, Parti Islam Se-Malaysia (Pan-Malaysian Islamic Party – PAS), the main competitor to United Malays National Organisation (UMNO) over the Malay electorate, had turned more Islamic and fundamentalist than its nationalist past. The Mahathir-led BN in this decade responded by coopting Islamist Anwar Ibrahim to spearhead BN’s version of Islam, hypothetically based on moderation.

Simultaneously, BN skillfully provoked Democratic Action Party (DAP), its main contender for the non-Muslim electorate in the Peninsular Malaysia, to gravitate more towards the Chinese Malaysian population at the expense of its image to the Malay-Muslims. This was done by questioning the DAP’s “Malaysian Malaysia” ideology.

Fast forward to the 1990s, Mahathir announced an integrationist political vision for Malaysia’s future (popularly known as “Vision 2020”) with the creation of “Bangsa Malaysia” (Malaysian nation) as its upmost agenda. This forward-looking stance, apart from political stability and economic development, enabled BN to garner large support from the non-Muslim electorate.

However, when PAS started gaining traction back in the Northeast in this decade, the number of constituencies in that region were sustained to check PAS’s advances, despite the significant increase in the number of voters there. On the contrary, more seats were created in the Peninsular Diverse in 1990s and early 2000s, while more parliamentary seats were provided to East Malaysia following the BN electoral support and its projection.

Thus, despite the remarkable coordination of the opposition during GE10 in 1999 – with massive Malay frustration against the government – BN was still able to maintain its two-third majority thanks largely to the support of non-Muslim voters throughout the country.

Nevertheless, the weak governance of Abdullah Badawi (Mahathir’s successor) and Islam Hadhari ideology had gradually made BN less popular among the urban voters and the non-Malays, which gave way for the Opposition to make advances in the Peninsular Diverse and Peninsular Malay regions since 2008.

BN lost its two-third majority in the parliament 2008’s GE12 and in GE13 the then-Opposition Pakatan Rakyat (the People’s Alliance) won the popular vote albeit unsuccessful in unseating BN. Several regional states have fallen to the Opposition in this period, mostly in the more urban regions of the West Coast of the Peninsular, despite BN’s reigning popularity in the Peninsular Malay region and East Malaysia. The BN split in 2015 and opposition coordination with the BN defectors in the Peninsular and Sabah, however, had enabled the Opposition to make the historic breakthrough in GE14.

The 2022 Election

In the coming 2022 election, most of the Malay-Muslim seats in the Peninsular will be contested by four main coalitions – the Zahid Hamidi-Ismail Sabri’s BN, Muhyiddin Yassin-Abdul Hadi Awang’s Perikatan Nasional (National Alliance – PN), Anwar Ibrahim-led Pakatan Harapan (Alliance of Hope) and Mahathir’s Gerakan Tanah Air (Homeland Movement – GTA). This means there will be at least a four-corner fight in every constituency.

However, the deep-seated elite division and hyper-fragmentation of limited number of Malay-Muslim constituencies in Peninsular Malaysia naturally pushed the parties, including the religious conservative elements in PN (particularly Parti Pribumi Bersatu Malaysia [Malaysian United Indigenous Party – Besatu]) and GTA (particularly Parti Pejuang Tanah Air [Homeland Fighters’ Party – Pejuang]), to be more inclusive not only to Sabahans and Sarawakians but also to non-Muslims.

Its implication can be seen in the recently launched coalition manifestos, which are not distinct from one another. These manifestos are largely focused on elevating the material well-being of the population through good governance and upholding the tenets of the constitution, albeit in varying degrees.

The PN manifesto, for example, while highlighting the importance of the position of Islam as the official religion of the federation, does not intend to change the status quo by introducing more Islamization, hudud bill, or transforming Malaysia into an Islamic state as per PAS’ politics in 1980s and 1990s. This is despite PAS being one of the components of the PN coalition.

Additionally, lessons from Mahathir’s syncretic politics, coordination with non-Muslim parties as well as the importance of Sabah and Sarawak votes seem to have provisionally downplayed the Malay-Muslim politics among PN, GTA and BN, all of which are Malay-dominated coalitions.

The GTA coalition is arguably the weakest contender, with the only possibility of winning around three or less constituencies, particularly in Kedah. Without any support from a larger and more established coalition, GTA has a feeble grip on society and must rely solely on the personae of its candidates such as Mahathir in Langkawi and his son Mukhriz in Jerlun.

In Northeast’s Terengganu, fierce fighting is expected particularly among PN and BN candidates, with a possibility for PH to capture a few seats. The electoral contests in Terengganu are always heated, whereby the state government and Dewan Undangan Negeri (State Legislative Assembly – DUN) change hands many times between PAS and BN since the 1955 election.

As both parties are equally strong and well-rooted in Terengganu, addressing critical issues are important to help fence-sitters make their decisions. In GE14, for example, Najib Razak’s corruption scandals saw the state swung to PAS, which it lost to BN in GE13.

This time around, both PN and BN are wracked with major issues but UMNO is seen to have more potential to improve its number of seats in the state despite PAS’ association with Bersatu. On the same reasoning, PAS (through PN) is seen to have the advantage of being the largest winner in Kelantan, albeit with less popular vote and the potential for BN to wrest some seats.

For the 95 constituencies in the Peninsular Malay regions, BN is expected to improve its share of seats (42.1% in GE14), potentially closing the gap with PH (which secured 54.7% of the seats in GE14). Meanwhile, PN is anticipated to win several seats particularly in constituencies where the Malay-Muslims are the supermajority.

Nonetheless, several factors would shape the overall results of the coming election. These are the voter turnout, the sentiment of new and young voters, and candidates’ credibility.

For example, low voter turnout would be a boon to BN. This is because BN’s opposition are mostly out-stationed voters. The voting trend of new and young voters, which consist of around 25% of the total registered voters, is still uncharted as many did not turn out to vote in the recently held Melaka and Johor state elections.

Simultaneously, due to the constant party-hopping and changes of alliances since early 2020, party-identification among voters has been significantly reduced while voters gravitate towards candidates’ credibility and personae instead. In the other words, Malaysia’s GE15 is expected to be less in ideological battle like in GE 14, but more on contestants’ performance, though those from stronger parties would have an added advantage.    

Anwar Ibrahim, for instance, is contesting in a risky constituency in Tambun (Perak), which is an unavoidable move for PH in more Malay-Muslim seat in his coalition bid to Putrajaya. BN is betting for the popular Khairy Jamaluddin in Sungai Buloh, an urban Malay-Muslim constituency of Selangor, in their effort to steal several seats in the PH stronghold.

Conclusion

In conclusion, the current situation of political fragmentation in Malaysia has affected the Malay-Muslim politics the most, indicatively with the less salient rhetoric of ketuanan Melayu (Malay supremacy) even among the right-wing coalitions like the GTA and the PN. In contrast, coalitions are projecting a more inclusive vision of Malaysia’s political integration, moderation and inter-ethnic accommodation. This is because all the main Malay-Muslim parties are now, provisionally, gunning for Putrajaya, whereby the support from non-Muslims and the people of Sabah and Sarawak is more than crucial.

Part 1: Islamists vs Islamists in GE15

Part 2: Expected Acceptance and Rejection Factors for PAS and UMNO in Peninsula Malaysia in the 15th General Election

Part 4:The Sustainability of the Next Islamic Initiative in Malaysia

Part 5: Mediatised Religion in Malaysia: Islamization by Trolling?