Introduction

Over the past few years, many politicians, activists, preachers, academicians, influencers, “opinion leaders” and cyber troopers in Malaysia have been active in drumming up Muslim insecurity and the narrative of “Islam under threat”. Such a threat arguably comes from non-Muslims, liberal Muslims, the LGBT community, migrant workers and as anything perceived as “un-Islamic”. Sometimes, labels such as penjajah (colonizers), pendatang (outsiders), kafir (infidels) and musuh Islam (enemies of Islam) have been used to describe these threats as well.

Such right-wing activists have used various social media platforms to manufacture perceptions and mobilize sentiments. Even though sometimes the factual basis of their argument is questionable, the narratives of “Islam under threat” and “Malay being sidelined” are widely circulated online and even reported and debated in mainstream media.

Such sentiments partly contributed to the solid electoral gains of Perikatan Nasional (PN) in recent elections, thanks to its positioning as a coalition that can “unify and defend Malay Muslims”. These gains were often attributed to the “green wave”, which is often equated with some kind of Islamization. However, as we understand it, it is more the culmination of a right-wing majoritarian moment composed of Malay nationalist and Islamist forces.

This article argues that efforts to understand the green wave must not overlook the social media dimension.

The Right-Wing Playbook

It is impossible for the researcher to get an “objective” view of why voters vote a certain way, as those are complex decision-making processes. In our observation, however, the green wave needs not just to be about voting patterns, but rather politics as experienced by Malaysian voters through social media.

It was reported that 74% of Malaysians get their news from social media, which is even higher than Indonesia, India and the United States,. Such development occur in parallel with certain urbanization trends, like high smartphone ownership (96.7%); long working and commuting hours (especially for the working class and those in the rider economy) that increases social media immersion; and gated and high-rise living communities that often limits one’s exposure to political content mostly via our screens.

Hence, social media necessarily becomes the primary medium where sequestered Malaysian voters experience politics. That means they also experience the wave of hate propaganda, half-truths and downright misinformation that comes with it. There is no understanding of the green wave without an honest reckoning of these elements.

In many ways, we witness a relatively common right-wing playbook in Malaysia – political entrepreneurs claiming that the elites ignore ordinary people’s voices and that minority groups are threatening the majority’s (heterosexual, working-class Malay Muslims) rights. As in the United States, India and Brazil, these appeals have cross-cutting appeal as they wrap the anti-liberal, anti-minority and anti-establishment discourse as one, with the moral critique appealing more to conservative middle-class religiosity. Meanwhile, the elite-shunning discourse appeals to those who perceive themselves marginalized in their “own country”.

Therefore, it is useful to think of Malaysia’s green wave as more of a kind of majoritarianism: majoritarian groups urging the majority to vote and support the parties that could protect the majority. To make this political “movement” work, efforts to manufacture Malay-Muslim insecurity must first bear fruit. Such is evident in right-wing online activism in recent time.

The Jom Ziarah incident could serve as a case study, in which pro-PN influencers, conservative preachers, right-wing activists and right-wing news portals accuse the interfaith program involving Muslims visiting a church as an event with a “Christianization agenda”. What this incident reveals is a pattern of “viralling” that strings together many right-wing political entrepreneurs, who circulate similar accusations in different formats (be it short videos, posters or text messages) across various platforms – Facebook, Twitter, Instagram, TikTok, online portals and WhatsApp groups. It is a kind of synergy that involves mainstream PN politicians and ostensibly “non-partisan”, albeit right-wing, social influencers. Within days, the Ministry of Youth and Sports shelved the program. Such an incident is not an isolated case; it has repeatedly happened in recent years. The government’s capitulation not only accords PN with political points, but also creates the kind of in-group/out-group rigid boundaries that are necessary to sustain the undertones of Malay-Muslim majoritarianism – that the threat is coming from the non-believers.

Most commentators focus on PN’s TikTok campaign during GE15 but we argue that such social media activism to manufacture Malay-Muslim insecurity has been ongoing since as far back as 2018, with many different right-wing actors in play.

This article will highlight two groups who often spearhead these campaigns of insecurity. The first is Ikatan Muslimin Malaysia (ISMA) and ISMA-linked social media accounts in mainstreaming right-wing discourses. The second is PN, especially Parti Islam Se-Malaysia’s (PAS) social media campaigns in the recent elections.

ISMA

ISMA, a right-wing Islamist organization known by scholars as non-violent extremists for their extreme xenophobia, is a key purveyor of these insecurity and hate-filled discourses. ISMA activists often employ a strategy of spreading fake information to stir racial and religious sentiments. For example, during the first Pakatan Harapan (PH) administration in 2019, former ISMA President Aminuddin Yahaya claimed that there was a stamp collection with photos of churches – claiming it was a “Christianisation” agenda and an attempt to “bully Islam”. In fact, this stamp collection of various worship places was released in 2016, before PH came into power. Such an incident is not an isolated case; Aminuddin Yahaya has been constantly active on his social media accounts in exposing events and individuals that he thinks pose a threat to Islam in Malaysia.

ISMA also use a variety of proxies so that their more aggressive, exclusivist campaigns can be separated from the group’s other “dakwah” activities. Gerakan Pengundi Sedar (Voter Awareness Movement – GPS) is one of the most active ISMA-linked social media accounts. During GE14, ISMA launched GPS, a campaign that urged Muslims to vote for calon Muslim berwibawa (credible Muslim candidates) who uphold the Malay-Muslim agenda. In the aftermath of GE14, GPS became an active Facebook fan page and later also a TikTok page which constantly posts so-called “un-Islamic” incidents and propagates the perception that “Islam is under threat”. It also calls for “the Malay unity” to fight against “the enemies of Islam”.

For example, amidst the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (ICERD) controversy in 2018, a GPS Facebook post pointed out the dangers of ICERD ratification on Malay rights. Various individuals, groups and media outlets linked to ISMA have also actively propagated similar messages online and mobilized Malay-Muslims to join the anti-ICERD rally on 8 December 2018.

ISMA’s deep involvement is unsurprising, as Aminuddin Yahaya was the chairperson of two coalitions of NGOs that were leading the anti-ICERD protest. Whereas political parties such as PAS and the now-in-government United Malays National Organization (UMNO) lent their support to the rally, they were happy to let NGOs like ISMA be the face to make the movement look more “spontaneous” and “organic”.

GPS also constantly urges Muslims not to vote for kafir. One GPS Facebook posts criticized both PH and Barisan Nasional (BN) for fielding a non-Muslim in a Muslim-majority seat during the 2021 Melaka State Election (a criticism the page repeated often). Despite its negative connotations, the page habitually uses the term kafir to refer to non-Muslims.

This group parallels the effort of an ISMA-linked political party, Barisan Jemaah Islamiah Se-Malaysia (BERJASA), which calls for “Vote Muslim First” in its campaigns. During GE15, BERJASA is part of Gerakan Tanah Air (GTA), which upholds the idea of a Malay-Muslim-dominated political coalition by fielding zero non-Muslim candidates. This shows that being a far-right group, ISMA holds a much more exclusivist stand as compared to Bersatu, PAS and UMNO, which are still willing to work with other non-Malay parties such as the Malaysian Chinese Association (MCA), MIC (Malaysian Indian Congress) and Gerakan.

TV Pertiwi is another ISMA’s media outlet – it has an online portal with social media accounts on various platforms. TV Pertiwi is located in the same premise as ISMA in Bangi, while TV Pertiwi’s chairperson, Norzila Baharin is also the vice chief of ISMA’s women wing. This online portal has been constantly perpetuating perceptions that minority groups such as ethnic Chinese, liberals and LGBTs are taking over the political power in Malaysia. In August this year, its official TikTok account was removed because it repeatedly violated the platform’s community guidelines while its website was rendered inaccessible from certain providers.

Earlier in the year during the 2023 State Elections campaign, at least two TikTok short video clips produced by TV Pertiwi were widely spread across social media platforms by pro-PN activists and influencers.One of them accused the potential seat re-delineation of reducing the power of ethnic Malay and turning Malays into a minority on their land. Another one exposed the perceived drastic increase in the number of Chinese migrants and tourists, which might turn Malaysia “from a Malay land to a Chinese land”. These videos all had thousands of shares.

Such narratives are common among ISMA activists as they have focused on reports of Chinese influx and settlement, using them to warn that Malaysia could be the next Palestine or Xinjiang. In doing so, they effectively masked their Sinophobia using an imported language of settler colonialism that enjoys strong resonance locally due to local support of the Palestinian cause.

Another controversial video that was widely circulated to attack PH’s inability to “defend Islam” is an allegation that more than 200 religious schools are being closed down in Selangor. ISMA-friendly Samudera and PAS-owned Harakahdaily are amongst the online portals sharing such news, later being made into video clips circulated on TikTok by various right-wing activists, such as Izzat Johari.

PAS

In recent elections, PN, especially PAS, had used a network of party activists, influencers and preachers to spread similar messages of “Islam under threat” across various social media platforms, especially on TikTok. To be fair, PAS’ election campaign messages came in different forms and contents to target different audiences. Nevertheless, race and religion are central to their campaign. Whereas – perhaps with the exception of Ustaz Hadi Awang – PAS preachers and influencers do not always deploy fiery rhetoric, there are signs of radical rhetoric where the “enemies of Islam” discourse has intensified in their messaging. Many of these rhetoric also borrowed from ISMA’s talking points, which are usually on the far-right domain whereby non-Muslim Malaysian are often portrayed as colonial collaborators, or that there are conspiracies to “sinicize” and “secularize” Malaysia.

Like above-mentioned ISMA’s anti-kafir stands, some PAS TikTok influencers and pages urged Muslims not to vote for kafir, further popularising a term with exclusivist connotations. In a popular TikTok clip during the GE15 election campaign (with 587.1k views), the winner of Malaysia Ameerah Influencer Award (PAS’ young women wing) Puteri Syahira urged Muslims not to choose kafir as their leaders.

During the 2023 State Election campaign period, a TikTok video by SiswaPN (university student wing of PN) stated that “Apa hukum tidak mengundi? Kita tak undi, jadi menang kafir harbi lebih mudah merosakkan agama kita…” (What’s the downside of not voting? The kafir harbi [non-believers who should be fought] will destroy our religion).

As we observed in a pro-PAS WhatsApp group, there were many videos being circulated to stimulate siege mentality among Malay-Muslims that kafir, pendatang or penjajah would take over the country if the Chinese-majority Democratic Action Party (DAP) continues to be in power.

Pro-PAS preachers play an important role in mainstreaming PAS majoritarian messages. Preachers such as Ustaz Abdullah Khairy, Ustaz Azhar Idrus and Ustazah Asma Harun all have huge followings on social media, with more than 1 million followers on TikTok. They frequently give talks at various religious functions. Many also run various business enterprises, from restaurants to fashions, from pilgrimage tours to religious counselling. Such a combination of religious credentials, business networks and social media followings allows them to exercise influence among the broader Muslim public, especially those who are pious but not necessarily PAS members. Their preaching contents mainly focus on religious messages and moral advice. Nevertheless, occasionally, and especially during the election periods, they are not shy about their political inclinations – directly or indirectly urging their followers to vote for political parties and candidates who can “defend Islam”. Some preachers are widely known for being affiliated to PAS, such as Ustaz Azhar Idrus and Ustaz Ahmad Dusuki. Others downplay or conceal their connections yet subtly endorse the party, such as Ustaz Khairy Abdullah and Ustazah Asma Harun.

During the GE15 campaign period, a TikTok video entitled “Going to vote? Listen to what they say first!” went viral, with more than 400k likes and 73k shares. Although the original post is no longer available now, the video is still available on TikTok. The video featured speeches of three popular preachers – Ustaz Wadi Anuar, Ustaz Azhar Idrus and Ustaz Khairi Abdullah. In sum, they alleged that “Islam is being bullied” and there are “enemies of Islam”, thus Muslims should vote for the party that can uphold Islam.

To reach out to broader young Malay voters, some pro-PN influencers also use elements of popular cultural and fun contents to mainstream right-wing messages. One of them is DD Chronicle, who has more than 781.3k followers on TikTok. On his TikTok, he makes many parody sketches and cover songs, subtly urging Malay Muslims to vote PN. One of his viral songs, a cover of Siti Nurhaliza’s Nirmala with amended lyrics, received more than 100k likes and 22k shares. The lyrics of the song captures the scaremongering tactics, with the influencer singing “the Malays will end up being squatters (menumpang) in their own land…tuan (owners) only in name”.

In these discourses, one witnesses a negative campaign strategy, whereby calls to vote (see Hadi Awang’s exhortation that voting is mandatory and Muhammad Sanusi’s warning of Malaysia being “colonised”) are paired with existential stakes. These political entrepreneurs constantly evoke apocalyptic scenario for Islam and Muslims if PN loses the election (which did not happen, although proving a negative is almost impossible). The real concern for Malaysian democracy is that such ostensible subscription to electoral norms is part of a dark participation, whereby uncivil activities that ranges from misinformation to hate campaigns and to cyberbullying only erodes long-term trust and functioning of democratic institutions.

Conclusion

Even as the post GE-14 political landscape witnessed the fragmentation of Malay-Muslim political allegiances, we might be seeing a consolidation of a range of right-wing actors and electoral support under a broader banner of Malay-Muslim majoritarianism. The creation of this banner cannot be divorced by a strong online counter-public revolving around the theme of Malay insecurity, with viralling networks amplifying right-wing majoritarian voices and mainstreaming populist ideals and fringe theories. The campaign capitalizes on the existence of algorithmic enclaves; a critical mass of conspiracy theories circulated even by urbane, middle-class internet users and; the amplification of crisis discourses whereby a slew of right-wing political entrepreneurs (no matter their political allegiances) will keep bouncing off on the same “anti-minorities” content to create waves of discontent. With hate speech and misinformation mainstreamed at such volume, efforts aimed at preserving free speech without regulation and “fact-checking” without proactive measures seem increasingly out-of-sync with present challenges.

Introduction

The ‘Green Wave’ has been used to describe the significant electoral gains made by Perikatan Nasional (PN, The National Alliance) in Malaysia’s 15^th General Elections in November 2022 and the recent state elections in August 2023. It is an elusive term, not least due to the political motives behind its employment. In this article, we will argue that the Green Wave does not suggest a product of Islamisation per se, but, rather, the culmination of a right-wing majoritarian moment composed of Malay nationalist and Islamist forces.

Differentiating Majoritarianism and Islamisation

At this point, it is worth revisiting some of the differences between right-wing Malay Muslim majoritarianism as a political force and Islamisation as a socio-cultural process. To be sure, both are multifaceted processes intersecting in many ways. Discerning such differences helps avoid the trap of thinking that more Islamisation alone will, by default, lead to a larger ‘green wave’. We argue that there are four differences.

First, the making of this right-wing Malay Muslim majoritarianism cannot be separated from the broader right-wing turn of the Pan-Malaysian Islamic Party (PAS). Whereas PAS had its radical phase in the 1980s, the current more exclusivist PAS is actually a turn away from its ‘Islam for all’ phase when it was with the Pakatan Rakyat (PR, People’s Alliance) coalition. A number of precipitating events led to such a shift, including the death of the influential figure of Tok Guru Nik Aziz and the exodus of the so-called ‘Erdogan’ faction that formed the party of Amanah.

Second, while signalling growing religious observance, the increasing demand for a halal economy is still a relatively inclusive process. For example, many non-Malays and non-Muslims are key pushers of the halal market. The right-wing majoritarian turn only happened in recent years with campaigns like ‘Buy Muslims First’, which has a latent exclusivist element with its non-Muslim boycotting undertones. What these right-wing actors seek is not just the moral purification of the economy but also Muslim dominance in it. This emphasis on dominance extends to political campaigns championing Muslim candidates only in Muslim-majority areas, and Muslim votes for ‘Islam-friendly’ Muslim candidates only. Such developments further challenge Malaysia’s political status quo, which is accustomed to ethnic-based parties but never to the total exclusion of minority representation.

Third, the Islamisation experienced in Malaysia does not solely follow the Arabisation route that entails significant deculturalisation from local aesthetics and customs. In recent years, self-identified champions of Islam, including PAS, have adorned traditional Malay attire more, and have made the tanjak (the traditional Malay headgear) a symbol of Malay-Muslim identity. Further boosting the popularity of the tanjak is the popular film Mat Kilau, which has a clear exclusivist message in an ethnoreligious garb (see below). Unlike what some more laudatory accounts of syncretic religion say, the integration of religion with local cultures need not always produce moderation. However, the meaning of Malay culture is always in contestation. A recent event called Keretapi Sarong has shown that its celebration can unite people from all walks of life instead of being another vessel for ethnocultural nativism.

Fourth, even as calls for pan-Muslim solidarity were often made, Malaysia’s right-wing majoritarianism has sometimes sidestepped the usual bogeyman of the Chinese-dominated Democratic Action Party (DAP, also a euphemism for anti-Chinese rhetoric), sexual minorities, and the liberals. In several instances, the disdain of PN-linked or PN-supporting right-wing actors was also directed at the Rohingyas and traders of Arab origins. This arguably shows that nativism is more pronounced than Islamism in driving right-wing mobilisation.

Our point is not that decades of conservative Islamisation has not played a role in sustaining such a political economy that makes fostering organic and tolerant multiculturalism a challenging task. But this right-wing turn in Malay nationalist and Islamist sentiments is a product of complicated origins. Factors of class, religiosity, and race are all within this potent mix.

The ‘Pull’ of the Green Wave

Within this context, the term ‘Green Wave’ is helpful for us to understand how Malay-Muslim majoritarianism operates as a socio-political force. The ‘wave’ metaphor is particularly useful because it shows how this political force, sustained by actors within and outside of PN, swept or papered over a fragmented and uneven Malay Muslim constituency. In other words, the wave has both a pulling and pooling effect. It attracts votes but also aggregates them across a spectrum of Malay voters.

The ‘pulling’ stems from the fact that the ‘Islam under threat’ discourse propagated by many right-wing actors has resonance with a variety of majoritarian insecurity sentiments. For those who experience a situation of post-Covid economic precarity, the message signals non-Muslim domination of the economy (using the ‘non-Muslim’ signifier helps sidestep the near-half non-Malaysian equity ownership that is often wrongly attributed to the Malaysian Chinese). Right-wing activists also smartly tapped into the economic insecurity among Malay youth, working class and urban poor communities.

For those more prone to moral panics, the inclusion of the secular DAP and its liberal supporters in government means the risk of Malaysia becoming more liberal and secular socially. For those lamenting that a group of secular, immoral, and detached elites have dominated the upper echelons of society, the reduction of Malay-Muslim political representation following the collapse of the United Malays National Organisation (UMNO)-dominated government means further obstacles to the ascendancy of a new and arguably more pious Malay urban middle-class.

It is important to note that while there are material conditions that facilitate these sentiments, these insecurities are not directly reflective of a complicated reality where the Malay empowerment agenda is still ongoing and has enjoyed some success. For example, according to a paper, by 2020, Bumiputeras (the majority of whom are Malays) account for “66% of all employed Malaysians, but 68% of professionals”. A potted landscape where neither celebratory nor conspiratorial version of the Malay empowerment story is entirely accurate means there is a need for political entrepreneurs to manufacture such insecurities (especially on social media), something we will discuss in a separate article.

Green Wave as the ‘Pooling’ of Malay-Muslim Votes

Given the cacophony of interests that can potentially respond to this ‘Islam under threat’ master narrative, the true achievement of the Green Wave lies in its pooling effect: those responding to the messaging (not all have come from PN actors) deciding to vote for PN in swathes instead of choosing UMNO or simply abstaining.

This convergence is bolstered by three factors. First, PN enjoys the advantage of being a well-coordinated electoral alliance between a Malay nationalist (Bersatu) and Islamist party (conversely, UMNO, despite cosying up to PAS before the 14^th General Elections, decided to go for a three-way fight arrangement). Seat allocation, the most contentious issue for any electoral coalition gunning for the same constituency, does not appear to be an issue, despite some quarrels between Bersatu and PAS. In the elections, the coalition was also nimble enough to allow the use of the PAS logo in Kelantan and Terengganu while keeping to the PN logo in other states.

Second, PN’s effective use of culture war issues, which is euphemistically called 3R issues in Malaysia (race, religion, and royalty), has a pooling effect, too. Through advancing anti-liberal, anti-minority (especially gender and sexual minorities), anti-pluralist takes on social issues, culture war issues bridge the Islamist-nationalist divide to create a larger conservative majoritarian bloc that enables the ‘Green Wave’ to happen. The saliency of culture war issues in energising conservative majoritarian mobilisation can be seen from the fact that it not only works in places where religion is still a potent force like India and Turkey, but also in a highly secularised setting such as China.

One example of a culture war issue is the uproar against a Ministry of Youth and Sports-supported programme under the Pakatan Harapan-Barisan Nasional (PH-BN) unity government that allegedly brought Muslims to visit churches, which led to a police investigation and the Ministry ultimately abandoning the programme. PN figures have accused it of being a Christianisation agenda, a wild accusation former Prime Minister Muhyiddin Yassin also reportedly made during the elections. But pushbacks also came from the wider public too, including influencers and populist preachers who ended up legitimising PN’s anti-multicultural stances without directly endorsing the parties.

Another cultural moment is the release of the aforementioned Mat Kilau, which emerged as the highest-grossing film in Malaysian history. Despite its problematic ethnic stereotyping and historical revisionism, the right-wing-produced film gained mass appeal as a silat action epic (a popular genre in its own right). Its jingoistic tones also fulfil an anti-colonial fantasy that began as a bourgeoisie discourse but has since trickled down to everyday political discourses. The film’s depiction of Mat Kilau as simultaneously a Malay nationalist and Islamic heroic figure is vital to this pooling effect. Unsurprisingly, the film was quickly capitalised by politicians who sought to unite the Malay votes on their end. The downside is that, like the film, the Green Wave’s call for Malay-Muslim unity is built on this divisive rhetoric on the need to confront the ‘enemies’ of Islam.

Third, the pooling effect also came from the ‘Sanusi’ effect, referring to the PAS Menteri Besar of Kedah Sanusi Md Nor, who has gained immense popularity as a straight-talking ‘man-of-the-people’ populist, much like former Philippine President Rodrigo Duterte. Sanusi was so popular to the point that Kedah was the only state that had a higher turnout during the recent state elections; a testament to Sanusi’s mobilising capacity.

Whereas his abrasive style does not earn him universal admiration, he does exert a pooling effect, in that, like former US President Donald Trump, he manages to clinch cross-class support from the Malay-Muslim vote base. The confrontation with the elites gave him the populist credentials; but being an Islamist party leader who outlawed gambling shops in his state and demanded Penang’s return to Kedah to reverse a colonial legacy earned him lots of fans amongst the Malay middle-classes too, given a substantial part of this demography yearns for a more ‘Islamic’ government and an abject removal of any traces of (secular) colonialism. Indeed, PN was so convinced of Sanusi’s popularity amongst the Malay ground that they appointed him the national election director (with many calling him panglima perang, war general) for the state elections. He was also featured heavily in early campaigns in the more urbanised Selangor (see this video that was watched 150,000 times), until he became a liability for allegedly insulting the Sultan of Selangor.

The Future of the ‘Green Wave’?

Understanding its pulling and pooling effects helps us locate the ‘Green Wave’ in a particular historical moment in Malaysia’s changing political scene. The pull factors speak to a situation of high economic, cultural, and political uncertainties; a situation that is not without global parallels. On a sociological level, what helps channel these anxieties in the direction of ethnoreligious majoritarianism is a confluence of multiple factors. Malaysian society is more connected and exposed than ever thanks to social media; more ‘Islamised’ than ever due to decades of Islamisation; and freer than ever to go against the elites and the establishment due to the opening of the democratic space (which also means non-majoritarian opinions can easily be drowned or bullied out of existence in the name of majority rule). The pool factor reflects a potential reconsolidation of the Malay votes following the gradual decline and potential “death” of UMNO since 2008, a countereffect of the West Malaysian non-Malay votes concentrating in PH. The longevity of this wave, to our minds, depends on the interplay between these pull and pool factors. The former relates to the structural, institutional, and even regulatory conditions that sustain right-wing discourses in its toxic identitarian terms; the latter hinges on PN’s continued internal coherence and electoral prowess.

Introduction

Temerloh is a small town and a semi-urban parliamentary seat in Pahang. United Malays National Organisation (UMNO), Parti Islam Se-Malaysia (PAS) and Parti Amanah Negara (Amanah) have respectively won the seat in the previous three general elections, making this Malay-majority mixed area a competitive seat and an indicator of Malay voting preference.

The contest in Temerloh is a microcosm of national politics, reflecting the evolving landscape of coalition politics and voting patterns in Malaysia.

In the 13^th General Election (GE13) of 2013, PAS, which contested under the Pakatan Rakyat (PR) banner, wrested the seat from UMNO with the backing of its own supporters and non-Malay voters. In the 14^th General Election (GE14) of 2018, Amanah won the seat under the banner of Pakatan Harapan (PH) with the support of overwhelmingly non-Malays and a significant number of anti-UMNO Malay voters, which Parti Pribumi Bersatu Malaysia (Bersatu) played an important role in persuading.

In the 15^th General Election (GE15) this year, the Perikatan Nasional (PN) coalition, represented by a PAS candidate, captured Temerloh with a substantial majority of more than 5,000 votes. With the campaign slogan “PAS for all”, PAS won the seat with significant non-Malay support in 2013. In contrast, by propagating “Malay Muslim unity”, the party recaptured the seat with overwhelming Malay Muslim votes in 2022.

Fieldwork in Temerloh during the election campaign period showed that there were indications PN could win that seat and many other Malay-majority seats in Peninsular Malaysia. Assuming that most non-Malays will vote for PH, a PH supporter told the author that the coalition would be able to retain the seat if it can command 20% of total Malay votes. However, he was cautiously optimistic, noting that: 1) Bersatu is no longer with PH; 2) PAS has robust grassroots machinery and; 3) some locals perceive Hasbie Muda, Amanah’s candidate, as an outsider.

In contrast, PAS candidate Salamiah Mohd Nor is a local teacher who has been working on the ground. She noted that many locals were unhappy with the UMNO candidate and that there was a split within the UMNO division. She also pointed out that both Amanah’s and Partai Pejuang Tanah Air’s (Pejuang) candidates were outsiders. Acknowledging Pejuang’s candidate Aminuddin Yahya is a national right-wing figure and an Islamist activist, she doubted he could split PAS’s vote base. Indeed, Salamiah won the Temerloh seat handsomely, while Aminuddin Yahya lost his deposit.

Many observers were shocked by PN’s success in securing 73 parliamentary seats, 43 of which alone belong to PAS, making the Islamist party the biggest winner of GE15. In addition, PN had wrested Perlis, rolled over other Malay states and made further inroad into Selangor, Perak, Melaka and Penang.

As indicated earlier, multiple factors contribute to the rise of PN, especially PAS, which some viewed as the “green tsunami.” Since its establishment, PAS has been flexible and pragmatic in its political partnership yet holds firm to its ideology. In GE15, PAS’ success can be attributed to its tapping into anti-UMNO and anti-corruption sentiments, robust support from the grassroots, ideological indoctrination as well as various short-term and long-term factors.

Factors Contributing to PAS’ Success

PN combines Islamist and Malay nationalist elements by drawing from PAS’ and Bersatu’s strength, both of which are attractive to many Malay Muslim voters. In GE15, PN ran a solid and effective campaign with a catchy slogan “PN, the Best” and a motto of “Prihatin, Bersih and Stabil” (Caring, Clean and Stable) that many voters related to.

The choice of such a motto was a strategic one. Prihatin highlights Muhyiddin Yassin’s fatherly image as Abah (Father) which he developed during his premiership. Despite various criticisms, Muhyiddin has quite successfully positioned himself as the prime minister who led Malaysia through the Covid-19 pandemic.

Tapping into PH and civil societies’ anti-corruption campaigns, Bersih indicates PN as a cleaner alternative to corrupted UMNO. Stabil, on the other hand, emulates BN’s slogan and addresses the hope of many Malaysians for political stability.

PN’s campaign messages are clear and direct, highlighting UMNO’s tarnished image and Democratic Action Party’s (DAP) problematic reputation among Malay Muslims. PN also ran effective social media campaigns on platforms such as TikTok, Facebook and WhatsApp. On TikTok, PN generated two types of content targeting different segments of young voters. The first aimed to consolidate the support of Islamist-minded youths with direct or indirect hate messages toward “un-Islamic” groups. The second persuaded ordinary youths with fun and easy-going content.

PN and PAS successfully tapped in to the wave of anti-corruption movement (such as Rasuah Busters by Sinar Harian) and Undi18 campaign. Similarly, many PH and PH-leaning non-governmental organizations NGOs) focused on the anti-corruption campaign, hoping that unhappy voters would support PH. Yet, they did not expect many anti-corruption Malay voters to choose PN and PAS as an alternative to BN-UMNO.

PH also spent much time attacking UMNO and corruption, yet was defensive when dealing with PN’s attacks on religious and racialized fronts. Meanwhile, PN strategically positioned itself as a party that is “clean” and able to safeguard the interest of Malay Muslims – PN urged voters to reject both corrupted UMNO and “DAP-led” PH. PAS also deployed Islamic idioms to convey anti-corruption messages while portraying PAS as the best choice for anti-corruption Muslim voters.

Youth Voters and the Underestimation of PAS

There was a huge increase of voter in GE15 due to the automatic voter registration process and the reduced voting age to 18. Many progressive-minded activists campaigned for Undi18, falsely anticipating youth voters to be more moderate if not progressive. Yet, the election results indicated that many first-time Malay youth voters voted for PN.

A recent Merdeka Center’s survey on Muslim youth has shown the retaining of religious conservatism among Muslim youths, allowing PN to mobilise youth support easily. Hence, while institutional reforms are essential, such initiatives as Undi18 should be accompanied by the cultivation of progressive, if not moderate, social and political values – otherwise, the conservatives or extremists might take advantage of such reforms.

Many urban liberals and non-Muslims perceive PAS as a regional, village and backward party. Such perceptions do not capture PAS recent dynamic. PAS has a strong presence across many states and its leaders are smart in making strategic decisions while holding firm to its ideology. With established religious scholars as its backbone, PAS has no lack of celebrity preachers, Islamist professionals and grassroots members who have been fighting for the party’s causes.

PAS has also penetrated many neighbourhood mosques, religious schools, Islamic studies sessions and university campuses. It runs activities such as Islamic-themed concerts, motor-racing clubs and archery clubs to attract Muslim youth. Furthermore, PAS strategically places candidates to contest in the right seats. For example, a female professional in urban Kapar, a female teacher in semi-urban Temerloh and a local religious preacher in semi-urban Permatang Pauh. All of them have a strong local presence and have been working on the ground. Needless to say that all of them won the seats they contested for. Such a local touch and long-term engagement contribute to PAS’s success.

Conservative and Populist Turn

Last but not least, the conservative and populist turns among Malay Muslims over these few years have also provided fertile ground for the rise of PAS. Since the dominance of UMNO started to wane in 2008, there has been growing visibility of various right-wing religious groups, nationalist organizations, preachers, academicians and opinion leaders who are vocal in defending Malay Muslim rights.

During the first PH administration, right-wing groups such as Ikatan Muslimin Malaysia (ISMA) actively exploited Malay Muslim insecurity and pumped-up intolerant stance towards various religious, ethnic and sexual minorities. They have continuously accused “Chinese DAP”, kafirs (infidels), communists, liberals, lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender and related communities (LGBT+) were taking over the country. ISMA also filed lawsuits to challenge the presence of vernacular schools, promoted the “Buy Muslim First” campaign, protested against the ratification of International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (ICERD) and Rome Statute, and objected non-Muslims from using the term “Allah.”

Such right-wing movements have pushed PAS further to the right and taken a racialized exclusivist position. At the same time, moderate Islamists and progressive Muslims have not done enough to counter right-wing attacks and promote alternative discourses. After PAS joined the PN government, some PH’s Muslim supporters have been continuously trolling PAS for not being able to implement Islamic policies such as blanket ban of alcohol and the implementation of Hudud laws. Such trolls amplify the Islamist and conservative voices, ultimately benefiting PAS grounds.

In 2022, Studio Kembara, which ISMA activists run, produced the hit nationalist film Mat Kilau. The film’s key messages are urging Malay Muslims to be united against foreigners, emphasising the role of Islam in Malay identity and indicating that non-Muslims are not suitable to lead Muslim-majority societies. Such populist sentiments also fed into the core campaign strategy employed by PAS and PN throughout GE15 – propagating Malay unity to “reclaim” the country from “external” and “un-Islamic” influences.

A posting on the PAS’s official Facebook page urged Malay Muslims to learn lessons from the film Mat Kilau – it accused PH of undermining the Malay Muslim agenda and suggested that PN was the best choice in defending Malay Muslim rights. There was also a TikTok video with a message “Those who vote for PH, should rewatch Mat Kilau.” While ISMA activists produced Mat Kilau, PAS was the biggest beneficiary of the film’s popularity in the GE15. In other words, while far-right groups such as ISMA failed to gain electoral support, their activism has shaped socio-political discourses and provided fertile ground for the rise of PAS.

Conclusion

In contrast to the slogan of “PAS for all” when it was with PR, the party had recently taken a more exclusivist position with an emphasis on “Islamic leadership” and “Malay unity.” Perhaps analysts should not see PAS as merely an Islamist party; instead, it is a party that combines both elements of Islamism and Malay nationalism, hence a “Malay-Islamist” party.

With its recent partnerships with Malay nationalist party (UMNO via Muafakat Nasional [MN]) and now with Bersatu (via PN), PAS has attracted sizeable Islamist and Malay nationalist voters, as well as some ordinary Malay voters who are angry with UMNO but do not trust the perceived “DAP-led” PH. While PAS’s long-term ideological indoctrination and grassroots building are crucial, the rise of PAS as the biggest party in parliament today does not necessarily mean that more Malaysian Muslims are supporting PAS’s Islamist agenda. Instead, it reflects how PAS and other right-wing groups have successfully propagated the sentiments of “Malay Muslim insecurity.” Hence, the challenge ahead is not only about the growth of Islamism, but also the rise of right-wing Malay Muslim majoritarianism. Of course, these two trends are not mutually exclusive; instead, they complement each other. To overcome such challenges, institutional reforms must come together with the reforms of social and political values among Malaysian, especially the youth.

A Series on Political Islam and GE15 – Part 1: Islamists vs Islamists in GE15

Introduction

In Malaysia’s 15^th general election (GE15), the political Islam landscape is becoming more complex and fluid. Many candidates with Islamist backgrounds are competing with each other in multiple constituencies.

In the last few decades, much attention has been on the “Islamization race” between Parti Islam Se-Malaysia (Malaysian Islamic Party – PAS) and United Malays National Organisation (UMNO). However, with the entry of Parti Amanah Negara (National Trust Party – Amanah), a splinter party of PAS, in the last GE, the focus shifted to how PAS and Amanah competed to gain the support of pious Muslim voters. In this election, multi-cornered fights between coalitions are expected.

Notably, each coalition includes Islamist representation – PAS in Perikatan Nasional (National Alliance – PN) led by Muhyiddin Yassin, Amanah in Pakatan Harapan (Alliance of Hope – PH) led by Anwar Ibrahim and Barisan Jemaah Islamiah Se-Malaysia (Pan-Malaysian Islamic Front – Berjasa) in Gerakan Tanah Air (Homeland Movement – GTA), led by Mahathir Mohammad.

The Islamists in the above-mentioned coalitions claim to oppose the corrupted UMNO yet differ in their political strategies and social attitudes. Overall, the Islamists in PH are relatively moderate and willing to work with non-Muslims; the Islamists in PN are more conservative and advocate for “Malay Muslim leadership”, and; the Islamists in GTA take a hardline position and exclude non-Muslims in the alliance. Comparatively speaking, while UMNO appears to have the least Islamist element, it also fields candidates with Islamic backgrounds, such as its youth chief Asyraf Wajdi and a Salafi preacher, Fathul Bari.

Collectively, this sets the scene for Islamists versus Islamists in GE15. To provide context to this competition, this article focuses on five political parties with significant Islamist presence (PAS, Amanah, Parti Bahtera Sejahtera [Prosperous Ark Party – Bahtera], Berjasa and Partai Keadilan Rakyat [People’s Justice Party – PKR]) and three politically-active Islamist organizations (Angkatan Belia Islam Malaysia [Muslim Youth Movement of Malaysia –  ABIM], Pertubuhan IKRAM Malaysia [IKRAM] and Ikatan Muslimin Malaysia [Malaysian Muslim Solidarity – ISMA). By looking at these parties and organizations, it would demonstrate their complex and entangled relationships, including competitions and collaborations between them.

PAS

Being the oldest Islamist party, PAS has undergone numerous changes in its strategy over the decades. For example, PAS leaders appeared to be more moderate and inclusive when the party was in Pakatan Rakyat (the People’s Pact – PR) together with PKR and Democratic Action Party (DAP), touting “PAS for all”. However, the party took a more exclusivist position with an emphasis on “Islamic leadership” and “Malay unity” upon its departure from PR. Instead of working with multi-ethnic parties, PAS preferred to cooperate with Malay nationalist parties in the name of “Muslim unity”. Recent statements by its president Hadi Awang have also become increasingly right-leaning such as blaming non-Muslims as the root cause of corruption in Malaysia.

For GE15, PAS seems to take a pragmatic approach but that does not mean it has abandoned its conservative stance. As PAS leaders were unsuccessful in fostering cooperation between UMNO and Parti Pribumi Bersatu Malaysia (Malaysian United Indigenous Party – Bersatu), the party chose to form an electoral alliance with Bersatu and Gerakan under PN. By working with multi-ethnic Gerakan, it is indicative of PAS’ pragmatism and willingness to work with non-Muslims.

However, PAS continues to espouse conservative narratives. On its social media campaign, PAS has attacked both Barisan Nasional (National Front – BN) and PH. On one hand, it criticizes UMNO for corruption and, on the other, it accuses PH of supporting the “liberals”, the “communists” and the lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender (LGBT) group. By doing so, it positions itself as a clean party and “defender of Islam”, appealing to anti-corruption conservative voters.

Amanah

PKR, DAP and Amanah are the backbone of multi-ethnic PH. By promoting the idea of a “compassionate Islam”, Amanah positions itself as a moderate and inclusive Islamist party. However, in recent years, there has been a lack of youth and female representations in the party leadership.

Based on the author’s observations, Amanah leaders have also been less effective in promoting progressive Islamic discourses and expanding its grassroots base. During the PH administration, the party has been accused of being a “DAP puppet” and “unable to defend Islam”, an accusation that the party leaders failed to address.

After PH downfall as government, some of Amanah’s leaders and supporters have been continuously trolling PAS for not being able to implement Islamic policies such as blanket ban of alcohol and the implementation of Hudud laws. To attack PAS, Amanah machinery used race-baiting narratives peddled by right-wing and conservative elements on the “Timah” issue, a whisky brand in Malaysia. For example, Malaysia Dateline – a portal closely linked to Amanah – published an article claiming that the name Timah was a derivative of Prophet Muhammad’s daughter Fatimah and questioning PAS’ silence on the issue.

Despite going on the offensive against PAS, the party is encountering infighting for the upcoming GE15. Tensions are further escalated when several grassroot leaders have expressed unhappiness after perceiving that the party were at the losing end in GE15 seat negotiations with DAP and Muda. Such an environment has led several former Amanah leaders to contest under PKR (Husam Musa in Pasir MAS) and DAP (Ahmad Tarmizi) in GE15. One positive development for the party in GE15 is the fielding of more youth and female candidates such as Razak Ridzuan and  Aiman Athirah Sabu.

Bahtera

Besides former PAS leaders, leaders and activists of various Islamist organizations, especially IKRAM (formerly Jamaah Islah Malaysia – JIM), played an essential role in forming Amanah. Key Amanah leaders closely-linked to IKRAM include the former Minister of Religious Affairs Mujahid Yusof Rawa, the former Health Minister Dzulkefly Ahmad, Amanah’s Vice President Hasanuddin Mohd Yunus and the former JIM chairperson Saari Sungib.

In the last election, many IKRAM members actively campaigned for Amanah candidates. In the lead-up to GE15, however, the tension between IKRAM activists and ex-PAS members in Amanah has surfaced. Based on the author’s research, this tension stemmed from IKRAM activists perceiving to have been sidelined in Amanah, while ex-PAS members in the party believed some IKRAM activists were out of touch with the grassroots.

Such tension has led a few disgruntled former young IKRAM activists to form another new party, Bahtera. However, as the party has not unsuccessfully registered itself in GE15, its activists will run as independent candidates in five parliament seats. It is important to note that IKRAM leadership does not endorse the establishment of Bahtera and that the party’s activists, formerly from IKRAM, downplay their relationship with IKRAM. Currently, Bahtera activists are also running another youth movement called Gelora whose name is simlar to Partai Gelora Indonesia, a splinter of Partai Keadilan Sejahtera (Prosperous Justice Party – PKS), an Islamist party in Indonesia. This similarity in names may highlight how Islamist parties in Malaysia and Indonesia take references with each other.

Berjasa and ISMA

Another small Islamist party in Malaysia is Berjasa, which takes a more exclusive and hardline stand than PAS. Berjasa is a splinter party of PAS and now linked to ISMA, an Islamist organization. During the GE13, Berjasa disagreed with the cooperation between PAS and DAP under PR. Therefore, it contested in several Malay-majority urban seats to provide a “more Islamic” option.

However, in GE14, after PAS left PR, Berjasa worked with PAS as an electoral pact under Gagasan Sejahtera (Ideas of Prosperity). Under the slogan “Vote Muslim First”, Berjasa has always proposed that Malay voters support “credible Muslim candidates” and reject candidates who were non-Muslim and Muslims perceived to be “liberal.”

In GE15, Berjasa is part of Mahathir-led GTA (together with Pejuang, the National Indian Muslim Alliance Party [Iman] and Parti Bumiputera Perkasa Malaysia [Malaysia Mighty Bumiputera Party – Putra]), a Muslim-only political coalition. Berjasa has often lost its deposits in past elections and it hopes that by working with Mahathir, the party might gain more votes to expand its influence. Some Berjasa leaders have proposed that PN and GTA cooperate in the election to consolidate anti-corruption and conservative Malay votes. However, such an attempt was unsuccessful.

PKR and ABIM

Unlike the four aforementioned Muslim-majority parties, PKR is a multi-ethnic centrist party with members of various ethnic, religious and ideological backgrounds. However, moderate Islamists, especially those with ABIM and IKRAM backgrounds, have played an essential role in the party’s leadership since its establishment.

Urban pious middle-class Muslims are one of the PKR’s key vote bases. In GE15, PKR candidates include at least five ABIM activists and nine IKRAM-linked figures. ABIM candidates include: 1) Anwar Ibrahim, former ABIM president; 2) Fadhlina Sidek, a female ABIM leader and; 3) Jufitri Joha, former ABIM vice president.

Meanwhile, IKRAM-linked candidates include: 1) Hassan Basri, former deputy president of IKRAM; 2) Fuziah Salleh, former JIM’s women chief; 3) Rodziah Ismail, a Selangor State Executive Council member; 4) Maszlee Malik, former education minister during the PH administration and; 5) Nik Omar, the eldest son of well-respected Nik Aziz, the former PAS spiritual leader.

When PH was in power, its rivals and right-wing groups accused the coalition of being “unable to uphold Islam.” Thus, by including Nik Omar and other Islamist figures, PKR attempts to demonstrate its Islamic credentials to convince pious Muslim voters that PH can safeguard their interests.

Same Ideology but Different Outcomes

Though Islamists, ABIM, IKRAM and ISMA are not monolithic. These three tarbiyah and dakwah organizations have, in different ways, been influenced by the ideology of the Muslim Brotherhood. This explains their shared conservative views on numerous religious, moral and gender issues. They also hold similar positions on certain international issues, such as Palestinian, Uyghur and Rohingya rights.

However, these three organizations have different views on domestic politics, multicultural engagement and democratic participation. As of today, ABIM and IKRAM are pro-PH, endorsing multiculturalism and cooperating with non-Muslims. In line with such positions, ABIM recently promoted the agenda of “cosmopolitan Islam” while IKRAM endorses the vision of “compassionate Islam”. In contrast, ISMA is anti-PH, advocating the closure of vernacular schools and viewing non-Muslim politicians as a threat to the Malay agenda. The current slogan of ISMA is Melayu Sepakat, Islam Berdaulat (Malay Unity, Islamic Sovereignty) and its support towards Muslim-only GTA reflects its ultra-nationalist and Islamist stand.

Notably, these three groups are both civil society actors and political players. As civil groups, both IKRAM and ABIM have developed close relationships with non-Muslims in various social movements such as Bersih 2.0, the electoral reform group. Currently, IKRAM is also a key player in Gabungan Bertindak Malaysia (Malaysian Action Coalition – GBM), a multi-ethnic NGO coalition, and has supported the campaign of Manifesto Rakyat (People’s Manifesto). It also actively participates in Rasuah Buster, an anti-corruption campaign led by Sinar Harian, a Malay daily.

During this election, ABIM and IKRAM initiate a cross-religion declaration by various religious leaders and NGOs, to call for institutional and political reforms. In contrast, ISMA takes an exclusivist position in socio-political participation.

During the PH administration, ISMA played an active role in popularising perceptions of Malay insecurity and Islam being under threat. In the last election, ISMA launched Gerakan Pengundi Sedar (Voter Awareness Movement – GPS), a campaign that urged Muslims to vote for calon Muslim berwibawa (credible Muslim candidates) who uphold the Malay-Muslim agenda. In the aftermath of GE14, GPS has become an active Facebook fan page that posts messages almost daily “revealing” incidents which prove that “Islam is under threat”. 

During the Johor and Melaka state elections, GPS criticised BN for fielding non-Malay candidates in Malay-majority constituencies. This shows that being a far-right group, ISMA holds a much more exclusivist stand as compared to PAS and UMNO which are both currently against DAP yet still willing to work with other non-Malay parties such as Malaysian Chinese Association (MCA), MIC (Malaysian Indian Congress) and Gerakan. In this election, GPS continues its efforts in “revealing” and attacking candidates who are perceived as “anti-Islam”, “liberal” and “pro-LGBT”. While ISMA and its activists have relative success in shaping opinions, ISMA-linked Berjasa does not perform well in elections.

In terms of political participation, ABIM and IKRAM members are more successful in their political careers. Most of ABIM politically-active members are with PKR such as Anwar Ibrahim, Fadhlina Sidek and Shamsul Iskandar, while others such as Asyraf Wajdi and Saifuddin Abdullar are in UMNO and Bersatu respectively.

For IKRAM members who are contesting in elections, PKR and Amanah are their preferred choices. Interestingly, there are also three candidates with IKRAM backgrounds in Mahathir-led Pejuang – IKRAM’s former women chief Che Asmah Ibrahim, Hidayah (a preaching unit under IKRAM) former Chairperson Nicholas Sylvester and former Deputy Finance Minister Amiruddin Hamzah.

In this election, most ISMA activists run as Berjasa candidates by using the logo of Pejuang, as the GTA coalition has not yet secured official registration. The list of Berjasa candidates includes its president and a former Seremban ISMA chief Zamani Ibrahim, its deputy president and the former chairman of Studio Kembara (which produced the hit film Mat Kilau) Rosli Ramli, ex-Hulu Langat ISMA chief Annuar Salleh and ex-Seberang Perai ISMA chief Hamidi Abu Hassan.

However, instead of joining Berjasa, another outspoken ISMA activist Aminuddin Yahaya joined GTA as part of the Malay Muslim civil societies coalition called Gagasan Bangsa (Ideas of the Nation). He was most recently the president of Malay-Islamist pressure group Pertubuhan-Pertubuhan Pembela Islam (Defenders of Islam – PEMBELA) and was the president of ISMA.

Combining both conservative Islamism and exclusivist Malay nationalism, Aminuddin Yahya is a right-wing figure has made numerous controversial statements, racist remarks and hate speeches. He was one of the key leaders of the December 2018 rally opposing the ratification of the United Nations’ International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (ICERD). He has also filed a lawsuit to challenge against vernacular schools in Malaysia. In his election manifestation, he outlines his aims of struggles which include the establishment of an Islamic State,  promoting Buy Muslim First campaign, protesting against the ratification of ICERD and Rome Statute, defending Malay reserve lands, and objecting non-Muslim from using the term “Allah”.

Currently, he is appointed as GTA’s Pahang chairperson and national deputy chairperson. He is also the GTA parliamentary candidate for Temerloh, marking his first political debut in national politics. He will face a four-corner fight, including UMNO’s Mohd Sharkar, PAS’s Ustazah Salamiah and Amanah’s youth chief Hasbie Muda. Hence, we witness a competition between three Islamist parties or figures– PAS, Amanah and Aminuddin Yahaya in Temerloh.

Conclusion

Most Islamists in Malaysia recognize that they could not win the election alone due to the country’s first-past-the-poll electoral system, multireligious demography and diverse political realities. Therefore, they engage with various social and political players, as well as infiltrate both state and non-state spheres to expand their influence.

Many Islamists do not only focus on electoral success but also place efforts to shape social values, lead political opinions and influence government policies. Some join the government to implement various policies of Islamisation, while others remain as civil society actors to preach and “defend” Islam. Some of them engage with non-Muslims, and others work with Malay nationalists, resulting in diverse manifestations of Islamism in Malaysia. Some have been more inclusive in their outlooks, while others have chosen to take a more hardline and exclusive position. Indeed, Islamists are not monolithic – with different political and social participation, they have undergone various transformations although do not necessarily give up their ideological commitment. Given that there are various Islamist actors competing and collaborating with each other across different political parties and coalitions, whichever political coalition that wins the election, the trend of Islamisation and “halalisation” will persist, albeit its contents and outlooks might differ.

Part 2: Expected Acceptance and Rejection Factors for PAS and UMNO in Peninsula Malaysia in the 15th General Election

Part 3: The Malay-Muslim Politics and Malaysia’s GE15

Part 4:The Sustainability of the Next Islamic Initiative in Malaysia

Part 5: Mediatised Religion in Malaysia: Islamization by Trolling?