When Oligarchs and Political Dynasties Hinder Women’s Representation

Female demonstrators campaigning for women’s representation in the DPR. Credit: Antara Foto.

Introduction

In general, Indonesia’s female legislative candidates (caleg) faced a steep challenge to be elected to the House of Representatives (DPR) in the country’s Pemilihan Umum (general election – Pemilu) this year. Their main competition did not just come from male candidates – who continue to dominate the seats in the legislative body – but also fellow female candidates backed by oligarchs or political dynasties.

This is because women’s representation remains an issue. Law Number 12 2003 decrees that each political party must ensure that 30% of its contesting candidates are women in order to ensure more women can get elected.

If we look at the statistics, the number of female calegwho contested in Pemilu 2024 had indeed exceeded the 30% quota as determined by the Law. Nationally, the figure stood at 3,676 out of 9,917 total caleg (37.07%).

Despite this encouraging trend, most political parties failed to nominate enough women in their nomination list to meet the minimum quota of 30% in all 84 electoral districts. This shows that women continue to be underrepresented in a majority of electoral districts.  

This concern was what encouraged activists to fight for 30% representation of women in each district. Alas, the last election only saw 127 successful female caleg, far from the pined 30% quota (at 21.9%)

Achieving such feat had been difficult in the past. Back in Pemilu 2019, only 118 women were elected to DPR’s 575 total seats, amounting to a mere 20.5%. This paltry figure was already an increase from Pemilu 2014, whereby only 97 out of the total 560 seats were won by female candidates (17.3%).

The Role of Political Parties

Political parties play a crucial role in ushering female caleg to legislative seats – each has the responsibility to prepare and nominate female calegin elections.

However, parties have different approaches towards such regulation, driven primarily by differing political interest and capacity to meet the requirement. It means that the success rate for these candidates varies from one party to the next.

This is exemplified by the success of an Islamic political party in nominating successful female candidates. There is a running assumption that Islamic parties is very much patriarchal, providing more advantage and space for men than women.

In Pemilu 2024, the Islamic-leaning Partai Keadilan Sejahtera (PKS) is the only political party that succeeded in filling up 30% of its nomination list with female candidates in all electoral districts, as mandated by the Law.

No other party achieved a similar height, which goes to show that political parties are yet to be sufficiently dedicated in nominating and, eventually, realizing the minimum women’s representation in the legislative body. Furthermore, it further accentuates the significance of parties as the first “gatekeeper” that women must deal with in order to be elected.

Worse, there are signs that the parties’ nomination system is driven by the dynamics of political pragmatism – ties to oligarchs and political dynasties rather than political ideologies. It has been argued before that accumulation of power, instead of gender perspective, is the driving force behind parties’ decision to field female candidates. These go to show that women’s representation continues to be a footnote, a marginal objective in the bigger pursuit of other political interest.

Increasing Women’s Representation

Still, the fact remains: Pemilu 2024 saw a small increase of elected female representative from Pemilu 2019. With 127 out of 580 seats (21.9%) won by women, a history was made – this is the highest number of elected women in the country’s DPR. The figure has actually increased in the last three elections. In 2014, the number of female candidates elected was 97 and later increased to 118 in 2019.

This is a notable achievement, considering a sobering fact that lies deeper.

Based on our observations, as many as 17 political parties participating in Pemilu 2024 did not meet the 30% quota requirement for female caleg in all electoral districts as mandated by the Law. Among these are the biggest and oldest parties such as Partai Demokrasi Indonesia Perjuangan (PDIP), Golongan Karya (Golkar), Gerakan Indonesia Raya (Gerindra) and Demokrat.

However, if we scrutinize the female caleg closer, a new reality soon emerges. What is interesting is that some of these successful candidates are relatives of prominent party elites, bosses of big corporates or higher-ups in other notable offices.

These include names such as Atalia Praratya (wife of the former Governor of West Java, Ridwan Kamil), Futri Zulya Savitri (daughter of PAN Chairman Zulkifli Hasan), Pinka Hapsari (daughter DPR Speaker Puan Maharani), Novita Hardini (wife of the Regent of Trenggalek Mochamad Nur Arifin), Meitri Citra Wardani (daughter of the founder of Tenang Jaya Sejahtera [TJS] Group Tulus Widodo), Lita Machfud Arifin (wife of former East Java Regional Police Chief Machfud Arifin), Rahmawati Herdiana (daughter of former and current Bandar Lampung mayor, Herman HN and Eva Dwiana), and Shanty Alda Nathalia (Director of PT. Smart Marsindo).

We are not trying to cast a generalization by arguing that all elected female representatives hail from oligarchy or political dynasties. Some did get elected using a more populist approach in the last election. However, the peculiar success of these names demonstrates a potential linkage between their affluent, powerful backgrounds and electoral victory.

If we are only considering those hailing from political dynasties, the analysis gets more interesting. Almost half of all elected female candidates have ties to political dynasties (58 out of 127, or 45.7%). This substantial figure cannot be overlooked and further stresses the linkage between one’s upbringing and success in winning a seat.   

Those who ran with the backing of oligarchs or political dynasties certainly have more advantages compared to other aspirants, often referred to as “seat warmers” in Indonesian colloquialism. These include access to patronage, potentially greater funds and, as will be explored below, higher opportunities to grab top slots or “beautiful numbers” in the ballot.

For these female caleg, access to political and financial resources could very much translate into a higher opportunity to be elected. However, this also means that the political contest is tilted in favor of those with such background, to the detriment of female caleg from other backgrounds. In other words, while women are already underrepresented in the parties’ nomination list, female calegwith politically advantageous ties further narrow down the opportunities for other female caleg to be elected.

This, in turn, indicates a deeper nuance to the whole phenomenon of “female caleg”, whom we must not lump together into a sort of monolithic group. Not all female caleg play on the same level playing field, with those from certain backgrounds can draw greater resources to win elections. On top of that, regardless whether they have such an advantage or not, they still have to compete against male caleg, some of which also come from powerful backgrounds.

Top Slots, Beautiful Numbers

Indonesia’s election adopts the open-list proportional system which allows voters to directly vote for their favored candidates, though this has been a subject of criticism. In this system, those who get the top slots (e.g., “1”, “2” and “3”) or easy-to-remember (beautiful) numbers in the ballot have greater chance to be elected because voters are drawn towards these. For example, a simulation of Pemilu 2024 predicted that 370 or 64.1% of total contested seats (580) would be won by number “1” candidates in the ballot.

With political parties favoring female calegfrom political dynasties, there is a possibility that these calegmay be given top or beautiful ballot numbers. The names mentioned above exemplify this.

Atalia Praratya, whose candidate number was “4”, ran under Golkar, which party number was also “4” in the ballot. Both Novita Hardini and Shanty Alda Nathalia ran under PDIP (“3”); both placed third in the ballot. Meanwhile, Lita Machfud Arifin and Rahmati Herdiana were both number “2” in their respective party list. Last but not least, Futri Zulya Savitri, Pinka Hapsari and Meitri Citra Wardani all received the top slot.

Considering all of them were successful in their respective electoral district, it is no wonder that calegin general vie for top or beautiful numbers in the ballot. How female calegcan secure these numbers vary.

For example, Minister of Trade Zulkifli Hasan, had blatantly demonstrated his support to daughter Futri Zulya Savitri, who successfully ran with candidate number “1”. It can be surmised that his position as Chairman of PAN had a big influence on this.

Others had to lobby and gain the favors of oligarchs and party elites. Incumbents usually obtain number “1”, but highly popular candidates have the bargaining power to be accorded one of the attractive numbers.

The 30% quota for women is based upon the agenda to attain equality for women. However, as this section shows, the arena is not equal in the first place – those with advantageous connections can easily grab parties’ favor and thus secure a more attractive candidate number in the ballot.

Conclusion

This piece aims to demonstrate that the noble agenda to achieve a minimum women’s representation in the DPR is still a distant dream. While Indonesia has achieved history by electing the highest number of female representatives to the DPR, this was achieved not for the pure interest of attaining gender equality in the country’s highest legislative body.

The most important actors in the equation, i.e., the political parties, still act out of political interest instead of gender equality as an ideology. Because of this, they are thus exposed to pressures from oligarchs and political dynasties who also wish to have their favored candidates elected. Caleg who successfully ran with attractive numbers, as exemplified above, is an indication of this influence. Looking ahead, a question is worth considering. Which is more important, achieving the 30% quota for women or electing excellent, quality female representatives?


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Author

  • M. Anas Mahfudhi is the Executive Director of Political Research and Democracy Center, Jakarta. He is also a Postgraduate Alumni from University of Indonesia.