Introduction

“… Women’s and girls’ active participation in society, as educated and empowered individuals, as teachers, mentors, role models, journalists, faith leaders, healers, and community leaders [,] builds resilience to the influence and spread of violent extremism.”

Kenya-based women’s rights activist Sureya Roble made the above remark in 2015 during the first ever open briefing on the role of women in countering terrorism and violent extremism, held by the UN Security Council Counter-Terrorism Committee.

The significance of women in Preventing/Countering Violent Extremism (P/CVE) has indeed been increasingly recognized worldwide, in parallel with the rising number of women as actors in terrorist plots.

Nonetheless, discourses pertaining to women in P/CVE tend to emphasize one particular role of women: mothers. Due to their arguably fundamental roles in keeping family members away from the influence of violent extremism, labels like “emotional leaders” and “early detection system” are often attributed to mothers, which is often entwined with their marital status as wives.

This ultimately drives many countries to put mothers at the centre of conversations about women and P/CVE, despite the multiple roles women and mothers play in daily life.

Indonesia is no exception to the rule. More attention has been drawn towards women’s role in P/CVE, especially following high-profile terrorist plots by female perpetrators. The urgency to enforce P/CVE measures has put mothers under the spotlight.

Indonesia’s National Counter-Terrorism Agency (BNPT) has reaffirmed such importance, echoing the notion of mothers as “frontliners” and “central bastions” in protecting their children and husbands from being radicalized.

The same notion has also permeated academic discussion. A study regarding mothers in families affiliated with the East Indonesia Mujahideen (MIT) finds that women’s agency in the cycle of violent extremism, particularly through their maternal roles, could manifest through their roles as cycle endorsers or as cycle breakers. Another paper corroborates this, emphasizing the “dual roles” that women – particularly stay-at-home mothers – play in preventing radicalism domestically and socially.

However, it is pertinent that such views be properly scrutinized.

The Risks of Over-Emphasizing Mothers’ Roles

In the realm of P/CVE, mothers stand on the thin line between the private and the public domains – between their own domestic life and the national, “hard” security concerns. 

The common argument is that, as mothers and wives, women possess a strategic role to prevent violent extremism or break the cycle of violent extremism among family members. In a bigger context, their role in this is considered an integral part of ensuring national security.

While this argument cannot be completely refuted, Indonesia should be careful not to put too much emphasis on mothers as the agents of P/CVE to avoid the “instrumentalization” of mothers.

When the notion of motherhood is instrumentalized by the state for its own political objectives, grave consequences are likely to be inflicted on the concerned mothers when they fail to successfully accomplish their duties.

Over-emphasizing the roles of mothers in P/CVE generates the simplistic logic that “good mothers do not produce radicals”, therefore stigmatizing women whose family members are radicalized. Unfair labels such as “bad mothers” could thus emerged, exposing such individuals to even more social alienation and exclusion. Worse, they may also be branded as “radicals” despite their non-involvement in any radical activities.

Indonesia has also seen cases where family members of radicalized individuals are being exiled by their surrounding communities due to the stigma imposed on them.

For example, the wife of Fazri Pahlawan (also known as Abu Zee Ghuroba) – the terrorist who stabbed Minister Wiranto in 2019 – has opened up about how her husband’s radical activities have led to the marginalization and expulsion of her family. This has resulted in a variety of consequences, such as difficulty for her children to get accepted into schools.

Such impacts might be exacerbated if mothers and wives are further instrumentalized by the state, for instance, through official policy frameworks. In that scenario, the radicalization of their husbands or children can be interpreted as their “failure” in being the frontline “agents” of P/CVE measure.

Consequently, women from lower socio-economic statuses and cultural backgrounds, who are typically vulnerable to such stigma, face an elevated risk due to an inadequate safety net to back them up when they are forcibly evicted from their community. On top of that, they are also disregarded by the state for not being a “beneficial instrument”.  

Furthermore, drawing upon the concern that the centrality of motherhood in P/CVE could potentially transfer the responsibility of the state to mothers, this shift of responsibility is a problematic notion in itself.

Most mothers are already grappling with domestic labour in their own homes. Such activity tends to be devalued because women are essentialized as “natural carers” who perform “a labour of love”. Expecting them to carry out P/CVE duties means putting additional burden on top of their underappreciated conventional domestic labour.

This is crucial in the context of Indonesia, where the idea of women and their presumed strategic position in P/CVE (as mothers and wives) is often assumed to be something “natural”. Such a notion puts an unfair emphasis on mothers’ maternal instincts and strong emotional faculty as crucial elements in preventing violent extremism within the institution of family.

This essentialist view overlooks the complexities of mothers – and women in general – in P/CVE. Consequently, it could shift Indonesia’s collective responsibility of P/CVE under its “whole-of-government” and “whole-of-society” approaches to the sole responsibility of mothers at the forefront.

It is wrong to assume that all mothers are well-equipped with the skills and resources to implement P/CVE measures. Besides, it is equally wrong to expect that all women and mothers conform to their essentialized characteristics to begin with. Just because the patriarchal society they are part of expects them to be loving wives and mothers does not mean all women want to and can embrace such roles.

The lines between “empowering” and “burdening” women are thus obscure in this issue, similar to those between “embracing” and “instrumentalizing”. Overstating the strategic roles of mothers as P/CVE agents without an in-depth scrutiny of such expectations and holistic support will only lead to the latter – burdening and instrumentalizing women.

Navigating Women’s Roles in Indonesia’s P/CVE Strategy

There is an imperative to embrace and empower mothers instead of merely perceiving women as P/CVE agents or “frontliners”. The state needs to reaffirm that mothers are a part of its “whole-of-society” approach who team up with other components of society and synergize with the “whole-of-government” strategy in implementing P/CVE measures.

Mothers also need sufficient support to undertake their responsibilities as P/CVE agents.

Initiatives such as MotherSchools have been enacted by Women without Borders, in collaboration with local community leaders and the women’s wings of Muhammadiyah and Nahdlatul Ulama, in regions prone to radicalization.

The program aims to educate and train mothers to “translate their unique potential into action” by protecting their children from violent extremism. In MotherSchools, mothers are taught about the signs that their children might have been radicalized and how to approach their children in such a situation.

Besides, pengajian or study circles that invite women, especially mothers, and incorporate P/CVE elements have also become more frequent across Indonesia, as exemplified by the Yogyakarta-based Assyuhada religious group.

Such initiatives are important to be supported by the government, which has run its own P/CVE programs via BNPT’s regional Counter-Terrorism Communication Forum (FKPT).

The provision of social and/or economic protection and assistance for women should also be carried out. This should target not only those already affected (such as the innocent wives of convicted terrorists), but also be applied in preventive contexts – which might concern larger structural issues such as education, employment and women empowerment.

Nevertheless, the Indonesian government must also amplify its P/CVE engagement with women beyond their specific roles as mothers and wives. The government should seek to maintain productive collaboration with women-led civil society organizations and their pertinent networks including, but not limited to, Asian Muslim Action Network (AMAN) Indonesia and the Working Group on Women and P/CVE (WGWC). Simultaneously, it is also important to enforce gender mainstreaming measures in strategic security sectors such as BNPT itself.

Conclusion

By pursuing women’s active and substantive participation in the “public” domain of P/CVE, Indonesia would benefit from more strategic approaches in addressing female extremists. This ranges from comprehending their motives to managing gender-sensitive deradicalization programs.

On top of that, the efforts to support women’s contribution towards P/CVE in the “private” domain, or through their “traditional” roles as mothers and wives, could also be improved as previously discussed. To decouple women’s contribution in P/CVE and their traditional roles altogether risks dismissing their distinctive potentials. However, overstating those potentials without adequate support also risks putting women in susceptible positions. Hence, the Indonesian government needs to find a good balance to navigate women’s involvement in its P/CVE strategy.

Introduction

After over 20 years in power, the Justice and Development Party (AKP) was defeated by Republican People’s Party (CHP) in Turkey’s local elections on 31 March 2024. The CHP has the potential to lead Turkey towards a more democratic, secular and pluralistic country, which contrasts with AKP’s past performance.

This defeat represents a significant setback for President Recep Tayyip Erdogan who has led the AKP for over two decades. He told AKP executives that this election result represents not only an electoral defeat but also a loss of the party’s soul.

Although CHP and the Goodness Party (İyi Parti) achieved significant victories and took control of several major cities in the local elections, they continue to be part of the opposition parties as AKP obtained majority of votes in the parliamentary and presidential elections in 2023.

Many former AKP supporters either refrained from voting or switched to opposition parties as a form of protest against the deteriorating conditions in Turkey. The primary problem is the failing economy, with inflation reaching 68.5%. Moreover, increasing gender discrimination and inequality have made Turkish women worried about their future.

Fresh Air for Turkish Women

Turkish women have faced continuous discrimination and oppression from social, structural and institutional actors. Throughout history, issues related to women’s rights have been cynically exploited and utilized as a tactic to shape political discourse in Turkey, with gender-based violence increasing over time.

There were 315 documented cases of women murdered by men and 248 who died under suspicious circumstances throughout 2023 alone. In most cases, the perpetrators were men with close relationships to the victims, such as husbands, ex-husbands, boyfriends, brothers and even fathers.

There are indicators to suggest that women’s rights have deteriorated in recent years under AKP’s rule, which have led to protests. Notably, since 2019, the party’s anti-genderism act has become increasingly prominent.

This is further evidenced by AKP’s co-optation of radical anti-gender groups that opposed the Istanbul Convention (IC) – which promotes the protection of women from violence – and successfully pressured Erdogan to withdraw Turkey from this important agreement. They argue that IC’s ideology is an imposition of a Western construct that distorts Islamic values.

Other indicators include the abolition of gender-sensitive policies, the annulment of the law on family protection and domestic violence, the legalization of underage marriage as well as the proposal to establish gender-segregated universities.

Difficulties for women living in Turkey are not only experienced by civilians, but also women participating in politics. When AKP won the 2019 local elections, only four female candidates were elected as mayors, whereas only 29 of the 920 regional head seats were filled by women.

However, CHP’s recent victory provides new optimism for women in Turkey, with female candidates winning mayoral seats in 11 provinces (10 from CHP). Cumulatively, women won in 64 out of Turkey’s 922 districts, with the majority of them being opposition party candidates.

The Gender Factor

The longevity of AKP’s rule is due to their strategic approach in attracting women’s votes through the clever use of welfare initiatives, underscoring the party’s expertise in utilizing gender dynamics for political gain. The party recognizes the significant influence of women – especially those from low-income backgrounds – and has actively leveraged this constituency to maintain its political dominance. By providing various social benefits and direct assistance to women, AKP has cultivated a strong dependency, ensuring their continued support.

However, the shift to AKP’s political rival in the recent elections was quite palpable. AKP had the biggest proportion of female voters until the 2018 election, with a turnout rate of 36.8%. Nevertheless, this percentage decreased to 33.8% in a survey conducted in 2020. This is inversely proportional to the results of the CHP vote in the same survey, with an  increase in women’s votes to 23.9%. Furthermore, another survey in 2023 showed that the percentage of AKP’s female supporters had declined to 28.9%.

Some factors that may have contributed to AKP’s declining appeal must be considered.

Gender realignment – or the shift of female voting patterns spurred by modernization, cultural shifts and economic condition – is one possible factor. While Turkish women are traditionally more conservative than men (resulting in their support to center-right parties such as AKP), this shifted in the recent elections, with women supporting more liberal-minded parties. AKP’s rule which constricted women’s freedom could have instigated female voters to weigh more about their rights and access to opportunities.

Housewives’ role must not be dismissed either. Together, they make up a group with significant political weight that also influenced the outcome of the recent elections. They were the largest socio-economic group that supported AKP in 2018 (making up 45.1% of its supporters), though they began to sway to other parties in the 2020 survey (dipping to 41.9%).

Up for Grabs

With AKP losing its appeal to women, a new opportunity opened up to opposition parties to secure the support of female voters through pro-women policies and agenda.

Opposition groups, including CHP and İyi Parti, have expressed support for gender equality and women’s rights. These parties have committed to increasing women’s political involvement, improving access to education and career opportunities. After years of restrictive AKP rule, these obviously presented a bigger opportunity for women not only to have more security in political, economic and social dimensions.

The largest opposition party, CHP, has also vowed to ratify IC, which the AKP administration withdrew from previously, indicating a strong commitment to combating gender-based violence.

The opposition hopes to appeal to women’s rising dissatisfaction with AKP programs and policies by portraying themselves as supporters of gender equality. The 2024 local elections give a significant opportunity for Turkey’s opposition parties to demonstrate their ability to meet women’s pressing demands and concerns.

As the implications of the local elections on Turkey’s political terrain begin to unfurl, it is probable that opposition parties will start to push for reforms. This triumph undoubtedly marks the beginning of the fight for gender equality in Turkey, rather than its ultimate conclusion. The shift in women’s voting patterns is a genuine movement, serving as a means of expressing discontent they have endured during Erdogan’s rule.

The achievement of women’s representation in different cities will also serve as a catalyst for more transformations in other areas, thus promoting a more extensive and universally acknowledged participation of women. The future of Turkish women will be partly determined by the acts and policies of elected female mayors.

Conclusion

Prolonged gender-based discrimination, violence, anti-women issues and deteriorating economic conditions have destabilized AKP’s footing and lost its support from Turkish female voters, who were a significant pillar in the party’s voting base. As a result, they switched their political allegiance and voted for opposition parties. As explained above, gender realignment and the power of the housewives must also be considered as two significant factors that influenced the outcome of the recent local elections. While this is seen as a promising development for women’s rights and gender equality, a long and winding road is charted ahead for the victors who must prioritize performance over politicking.

Introduction

In general, Indonesia’s female legislative candidates (caleg) faced a steep challenge to be elected to the House of Representatives (DPR) in the country’s Pemilihan Umum (general election – Pemilu) this year. Their main competition did not just come from male candidates – who continue to dominate the seats in the legislative body – but also fellow female candidates backed by oligarchs or political dynasties.

This is because women’s representation remains an issue. Law Number 12 2003 decrees that each political party must ensure that 30% of its contesting candidates are women in order to ensure more women can get elected.

If we look at the statistics, the number of female calegwho contested in Pemilu 2024 had indeed exceeded the 30% quota as determined by the Law. Nationally, the figure stood at 3,676 out of 9,917 total caleg (37.07%).

Despite this encouraging trend, most political parties failed to nominate enough women in their nomination list to meet the minimum quota of 30% in all 84 electoral districts. This shows that women continue to be underrepresented in a majority of electoral districts.  

This concern was what encouraged activists to fight for 30% representation of women in each district. Alas, the last election only saw 127 successful female caleg, far from the pined 30% quota (at 21.9%)

Achieving such feat had been difficult in the past. Back in Pemilu 2019, only 118 women were elected to DPR’s 575 total seats, amounting to a mere 20.5%. This paltry figure was already an increase from Pemilu 2014, whereby only 97 out of the total 560 seats were won by female candidates (17.3%).

The Role of Political Parties

Political parties play a crucial role in ushering female caleg to legislative seats – each has the responsibility to prepare and nominate female calegin elections.

However, parties have different approaches towards such regulation, driven primarily by differing political interest and capacity to meet the requirement. It means that the success rate for these candidates varies from one party to the next.

This is exemplified by the success of an Islamic political party in nominating successful female candidates. There is a running assumption that Islamic parties is very much patriarchal, providing more advantage and space for men than women.

In Pemilu 2024, the Islamic-leaning Partai Keadilan Sejahtera (PKS) is the only political party that succeeded in filling up 30% of its nomination list with female candidates in all electoral districts, as mandated by the Law.

No other party achieved a similar height, which goes to show that political parties are yet to be sufficiently dedicated in nominating and, eventually, realizing the minimum women’s representation in the legislative body. Furthermore, it further accentuates the significance of parties as the first “gatekeeper” that women must deal with in order to be elected.

Worse, there are signs that the parties’ nomination system is driven by the dynamics of political pragmatism – ties to oligarchs and political dynasties rather than political ideologies. It has been argued before that accumulation of power, instead of gender perspective, is the driving force behind parties’ decision to field female candidates. These go to show that women’s representation continues to be a footnote, a marginal objective in the bigger pursuit of other political interest.

Increasing Women’s Representation

Still, the fact remains: Pemilu 2024 saw a small increase of elected female representative from Pemilu 2019. With 127 out of 580 seats (21.9%) won by women, a history was made – this is the highest number of elected women in the country’s DPR. The figure has actually increased in the last three elections. In 2014, the number of female candidates elected was 97 and later increased to 118 in 2019.

This is a notable achievement, considering a sobering fact that lies deeper.

Based on our observations, as many as 17 political parties participating in Pemilu 2024 did not meet the 30% quota requirement for female caleg in all electoral districts as mandated by the Law. Among these are the biggest and oldest parties such as Partai Demokrasi Indonesia Perjuangan (PDIP), Golongan Karya (Golkar), Gerakan Indonesia Raya (Gerindra) and Demokrat.

However, if we scrutinize the female caleg closer, a new reality soon emerges. What is interesting is that some of these successful candidates are relatives of prominent party elites, bosses of big corporates or higher-ups in other notable offices.

These include names such as Atalia Praratya (wife of the former Governor of West Java, Ridwan Kamil), Futri Zulya Savitri (daughter of PAN Chairman Zulkifli Hasan), Pinka Hapsari (daughter DPR Speaker Puan Maharani), Novita Hardini (wife of the Regent of Trenggalek Mochamad Nur Arifin), Meitri Citra Wardani (daughter of the founder of Tenang Jaya Sejahtera [TJS] Group Tulus Widodo), Lita Machfud Arifin (wife of former East Java Regional Police Chief Machfud Arifin), Rahmawati Herdiana (daughter of former and current Bandar Lampung mayor, Herman HN and Eva Dwiana), and Shanty Alda Nathalia (Director of PT. Smart Marsindo).

We are not trying to cast a generalization by arguing that all elected female representatives hail from oligarchy or political dynasties. Some did get elected using a more populist approach in the last election. However, the peculiar success of these names demonstrates a potential linkage between their affluent, powerful backgrounds and electoral victory.

If we are only considering those hailing from political dynasties, the analysis gets more interesting. Almost half of all elected female candidates have ties to political dynasties (58 out of 127, or 45.7%). This substantial figure cannot be overlooked and further stresses the linkage between one’s upbringing and success in winning a seat.   

Those who ran with the backing of oligarchs or political dynasties certainly have more advantages compared to other aspirants, often referred to as “seat warmers” in Indonesian colloquialism. These include access to patronage, potentially greater funds and, as will be explored below, higher opportunities to grab top slots or “beautiful numbers” in the ballot.

For these female caleg, access to political and financial resources could very much translate into a higher opportunity to be elected. However, this also means that the political contest is tilted in favor of those with such background, to the detriment of female caleg from other backgrounds. In other words, while women are already underrepresented in the parties’ nomination list, female calegwith politically advantageous ties further narrow down the opportunities for other female caleg to be elected.

This, in turn, indicates a deeper nuance to the whole phenomenon of “female caleg”, whom we must not lump together into a sort of monolithic group. Not all female caleg play on the same level playing field, with those from certain backgrounds can draw greater resources to win elections. On top of that, regardless whether they have such an advantage or not, they still have to compete against male caleg, some of which also come from powerful backgrounds.

Top Slots, Beautiful Numbers

Indonesia’s election adopts the open-list proportional system which allows voters to directly vote for their favored candidates, though this has been a subject of criticism. In this system, those who get the top slots (e.g., “1”, “2” and “3”) or easy-to-remember (beautiful) numbers in the ballot have greater chance to be elected because voters are drawn towards these. For example, a simulation of Pemilu 2024 predicted that 370 or 64.1% of total contested seats (580) would be won by number “1” candidates in the ballot.

With political parties favoring female calegfrom political dynasties, there is a possibility that these calegmay be given top or beautiful ballot numbers. The names mentioned above exemplify this.

Atalia Praratya, whose candidate number was “4”, ran under Golkar, which party number was also “4” in the ballot. Both Novita Hardini and Shanty Alda Nathalia ran under PDIP (“3”); both placed third in the ballot. Meanwhile, Lita Machfud Arifin and Rahmati Herdiana were both number “2” in their respective party list. Last but not least, Futri Zulya Savitri, Pinka Hapsari and Meitri Citra Wardani all received the top slot.

Considering all of them were successful in their respective electoral district, it is no wonder that calegin general vie for top or beautiful numbers in the ballot. How female calegcan secure these numbers vary.

For example, Minister of Trade Zulkifli Hasan, had blatantly demonstrated his support to daughter Futri Zulya Savitri, who successfully ran with candidate number “1”. It can be surmised that his position as Chairman of PAN had a big influence on this.

Others had to lobby and gain the favors of oligarchs and party elites. Incumbents usually obtain number “1”, but highly popular candidates have the bargaining power to be accorded one of the attractive numbers.

The 30% quota for women is based upon the agenda to attain equality for women. However, as this section shows, the arena is not equal in the first place – those with advantageous connections can easily grab parties’ favor and thus secure a more attractive candidate number in the ballot.

Conclusion

This piece aims to demonstrate that the noble agenda to achieve a minimum women’s representation in the DPR is still a distant dream. While Indonesia has achieved history by electing the highest number of female representatives to the DPR, this was achieved not for the pure interest of attaining gender equality in the country’s highest legislative body.

The most important actors in the equation, i.e., the political parties, still act out of political interest instead of gender equality as an ideology. Because of this, they are thus exposed to pressures from oligarchs and political dynasties who also wish to have their favored candidates elected. Caleg who successfully ran with attractive numbers, as exemplified above, is an indication of this influence. Looking ahead, a question is worth considering. Which is more important, achieving the 30% quota for women or electing excellent, quality female representatives?

Introduction

Women have been involved in the rehabilitation of terrorist inmates for years in Indonesia. This piece will zoom in on the profile of four such women, whose missions are to the break the chains of extremism and guide ex-inmates back into a normal life.

Nurani Ruhendi

In the heart of Nusakambangan Island’s Super Maximum Security Prison, Nurani Ruhendi, a 31 year old deradicalization activist, recently completed a challenging assignment.

Tasked with the responsibility of guiding inmates through an intricate process of rehabilitation, Nurani, fondly known as Rani, does not complain about her challenging duty. On the contrary, she expresses satisfaction and joy when recounting her experiences.

The term “inmates” in this piece refers specifically to those jailed for terrorism acts.

For Rani, interacting with inmates is not merely a routine task, but a mood booster. Rani is entrusted with the unique responsibility of visiting and mentoring these inmates within the prison walls.

When Rani first assumed this role at the age of 26, she realized that this was not ordinary mentoring. She actively engages in the deradicalization process inside the prison, beginning as early as the inmates’ arrival to the Nusakambangan facility after sentencing.

Rani oversees and mentors around 50 terrorism inmates across 11 correctional facilities in Jakarta, Yogyakarta and Central Java, out of a total of 104 facilities in 25 Provinces. Despite the challenges, Rani embraces her responsibilities with enthusiasm, easily overcoming any fatigue.

Terrorism inmates are often reserved initially, resisting engagement with prison staff, including Rani and her team. To these inmates, the staff is perceived as the extension of the Indonesian government, which is considered as thaghut in radical Islamist worldview.

Deradicalization is indeed a lengthy process. Rejection from inmates must be handled delicately, processed with a heart-to-heart approach, in an attempt to convince them that they do need help.

“When there is a former inmate who was once resistant, and we guide them slowly until they firmly pledge allegiance to the Republic of Indonesia, commit and express gratitude for the facilitated mindset shift, it feels incredibly rewarding as if all of our hard work has paid off,” said Rani.

Natalia Aga

Natalia Aga, a 32-year-old with a background in psychology, shares a similar commitment with Rani. Her role involves providing guidance to inmates while they are still inside prisons. Understanding their needs is key to Natalia’s mission to win their hearts and minds.

Inmates often harbor certain unfavorable views towards women, a challenge that Natalia acknowledges. Establishing personal connections is vital and it means giving extra effort due to communication limitations posed by different point of views.

Despite the demanding workload and the negative energy pervasive within the prison, Natalia and her colleagues strive to overcome these hurdles, viewing them as challenges to fulfilling their mission of providing guidance.

“Work rhythms are quite intense, we must be ready to go and meet with inmates at any moment. This prison cannot be described as having positive vibes—on the contrary, it exudes significant negative energy that affects our mood. But this becomes a challenge for us to overcome so that we can carry out our mission of providing guidance,” explains Natalia.

Aysha

In the heart of the prison system, where many work tirelessly to rehabilitate inmates within prison walls, Aysha stands apart. Her mission extends beyond confinement, as she is tasked to guide former inmates as they transition back into society. Aysha’s journey begins after these individuals pledge allegiance to the Republic of Indonesia, securing their parole.

Her responsibilities involve coordinating with various governmental bodies to ensure an inmate’s administrative and documentation requirements are in order, including proofs of their citizenship and identity. These are pre-requisite before an inmate could apply for parole.

She is also in charge of the reintegration process of former inmates. This includes reaching out to their families. This is a crucial step in the post-prison life as their successful reintegration into society hinges on the support they receive.

Aysha firmly believes that these individuals are victims of manipulation by terrorist group, succumbing to indoctrination that exploits religion as a tool. Many fell into the trap, willing to sacrifice themselves in acts of bombing, stabbing, shooting and other forms of violence. However, Aysha remains dedicated to helping them realize that the state is extending a helping hand to empower them once more.

Her altruistic intentions, however, face hurdles. Some parolees shut their doors, refusing assistance for various reasons. Others choose not to opt for parole, maintaining their radical stance. Even in the face of rejection, the government remains vigilant, keeping a watchful eye on these individuals.

Despite encountering resistance, Aysha is motivated to win over those shrouded in the fog of extremism. She views them not as irredeemable, but as human beings who have fallen victim to the indoctrination of extremist ideologies propagated by terrorist networks.

A touching incident in Central Java serves as a testament to Aysha’s determination. Initially resistant, an individual eventually opened up to dialogue and engagement.

In Aysha’s words, “There were several cases in Central Java, they initially resisted because they were still radicalized. That is okay, we should not force them. But we continued to approach them until they finally opened the door and talked to us, eventually participating in our activities.”

Aysha’s commitment sheds light on the complexity of post-terrorism inmates’ reintegration, demonstrating that compassion and persistence can gradually dismantle the walls built by extremist ideologies.

Dyah Ayu Kartika

Dyah Ayu Kartika, a terrorism researcher, underscores the pivotal role women play in the deradicalization process. Kartika emphasizes that, “Especially for female terrorist inmates, an initial approach by female officers proves instrumental. This strategy lays the groundwork before subsequent sessions where they engage with male facilitators.”

By prioritizing female engagement early in the deradicalization journey, it not only fosters a more empathetic connection but also sets the stage for more comprehensive sessions with diverse speakers. These subsequent sessions cover a spectrum of subjects, including religion, personality development and skills enhancement, many of which are conducted by male facilitators.

Kartika also emphasizes that there are currently no specific programs dedicated to female inmates. Consequently, they often resort to improvisation in various aspects, particularly in terms of support following their pledge of loyalty to the Republic of Indonesia.

“The declaration of loyalty to the state thus needs to be followed up by sustained and carefully planned programs,” Kartika adds in a paper, because resources to help female inmates are even scarcer than those available to men.

This approach not only recognizes the unique needs of female inmates, but also highlights the importance of a holistic and gender-sensitive methodology in the ongoing fight against terrorism. In their quiet battles, they redefine narratives, proving that within echoes of despair, the symphony of redemption prevails. National Counterterrorism Agency spokesperson, Prof. Dr. Irfan Idris, emphasizes crucial aspects relating to women’s role in counter-terrorism efforts. “Efforts by women to prevent radicalism are often overlooked, despite their visible and discreet contributions, particularly in areas susceptible to terrorism.”

Introduction

On 28 March, 2021, a husband-wife duo, believed to be members of Jemaah Ansharut Daulah (JAD), conducted  a suicide bomb attack at a church in Makassar, South Sulawesi. This attack not only signifies a continuation of suicide bombings targeted at churches in Indonesia, but also the exploitation of kinship linkages by Islamic State (IS) affiliated groups such as JAD in terror attacks. In 2016, there were two attacks on churches by lone perpetrators, a JAD member and a lone-wolf, respectively. In 2018, suicide bombings were simultaneously conducted on three churches in Surabaya by a family of six including the wife and children. JAD was again responsible for these bombings as well as attacks on the Surabaya Police Headquarters and an apartment complex in Sidoarjo that occurred shortly after. These attacks were the first time in Southeast Asia where entire family units, including women and young children were used in terror attacks.

More Brazen Attacks by Women in the Near Future?

While continuing to exploit familial ties, JAD appears to be advocating for women’s active participation in amaliyah (battlefield operations) as evidenced by the attacks in Makassar and Jakarta.  Women were inspired to perpetrate attacks via social media exposure and interactions with other radicalized women. Though Bahrun Naim was the first Indonesian senior IS recruiter (now deceased) to advocate for women’s participation, there were already prior discussions among women to participate in terror attacks.

The adoption of this strategy may just be utilitarian in nature owing to a number of advantages in using female operatives (expanded below) that are being capitalized by some JAD cells. This may also be a continuation of Bahrun Naim’s legacy who advocated for women’s participation and increased willingness among women to take part in more active roles in JAD networks.

Since the Surabaya bombings, there were at least one plot and three attacks by married couples affiliated with JAD, namely: the pressure-cooker bomb attack on the Indramayu Police Headquarters in West Java (2018); the plot to attack several police stations in Sibolga (2019); the Jolo church bombing in the Philippines (2019); and the attack on Security Minister Wiranto in Serang, Banten (2019).

Attacks by women have also become more brazen as evident in the recent lone-wolf attack on the Jakarta police headquarters three days after the Makassar bombing. The perpertrator was a 25-year old woman, believed to be linked to JAD, who was supposedly armed with an airsoft rifle. This lone-wolf attack also suggests that Indonesian women can operate independently from men. Not only does this indicate an increase in autonomy for female operatives but also an increase in the terror threat in Indonesia.

Marriages of Convenience as ‘Enablers’ for Attacks?

Notably, the Makassar attack also suggests the reliance on marriages of convenience for Indonesian women to gain approval to be actively involved in operations. In this case, the perpetrators were a young couple in their mid-20s, who had been married for only six months. Previously, in 2016, Dian Yulia Novi married IS-member, Nur Sholihin, to fulfill an IS fatwa which demanded that a woman sought the approval of a male (husband or father) to engage in a suicide operation. Though her suicide bombing attempt was thwarted, her marriage to Nur Sholihin was a marriage of convenience that enabled her to actively participate in this plot. While marriages of convenience are not always a prerequisite, as seen in the Jakarta case where the attacker was a lone, unmarried woman, in some cases, it would act as an ‘enabler’ to facilitate attacks perpetrated by women.

The Makassar bombing also highlights the prevalence of kinship and close ties in terrorism in Indonesia. The young couple were connected with  a cell affiliated to the JAD Makassar network. A member of this network, Rizaldy, had not only presided over the couple’s wedding but had familial ties with Andi Baso, a key recruiter and facilitator of the 2019 Jolo Cathedral bombings. The perpetrators of the Jolo attack were another married couple who were related to Andi Baso and Rizaldy. The couple, Rullie Rian Zeke and Ulfah Handayani Saleh, were Andi Baso’s in-laws while Rizaldy and Ulfah were siblings. Therefore, it is highly likely that Rizaldy played a crucial role in the selection of churches as a target and was instrumental in radicalizing the couple for the Makassar attack. Interestingly, this JAD network which has been dismantled by the authorities also comprised of four siblings of another family.

Though not related by blood, the Makassar couple and Rizaldy shared close ties as they were part of a radical study group in Vila Mutiara that was led by a radical preacher, Ustaz Basri. Prior to his death in 2018, Ustaz Basri together with members of the study group including Rizaldy pledged allegiance to IS. Therefore, it is likely that the couple’s radicalization began with Ustaz Basri. This is similar to the Surabaya case where the perpetrators were students of pro-IS  preacher Khalid Abu Bakar Besleme and were also part of a JAD study group.

Continued use of Women and Autonomous Cells in Future JAD Attacks

It is highly likely that JAD will continue to heed Bahrun Naim’s call of using women in terror attacks and exploit familial ties in future attacks. There are obvious advantages in doing so:

1)  Women are still less likely to arouse suspicion as compared to men. This enables them to penetrate target locations with ease as evident in the recent Jakarta police headquarters attack. They are also able to conceal weapons and explosives effectively under their clothing as seen in the Surabaya case where the female attackers concealed the explosives under their abaya.

2)  Attacks perpetrated by women tend to receive more public attention as women are not traditionally associated with violence. Common public and societal conceptions still tend to relate violent acts, including terrorism with masculinity as opposed to feminity.

Additionally, the exploitation of family networks will continue to hamper  counterterrorism efforts. The atmosphere of secrecy, trust and loyalty within family networks will reduce the chances of defection and detection and decrease the likelihood of information being divulged. Defection becomes harder as withdrawal from a cell would be tantamount to an act of familial disloyalty. Recruitment within families would also be easier due to a sense of shared collective identity among members.

The Surabaya and Makassar cases highlight the continued reliance of JAD networks to recruit  couples and families using closed-door study groups, and to facilitate marriages of convenience. These attacks also indicate JAD’s continued employment of localized autonomous cells for attacks. The reliance on such cells entails smaller-scale attacks as compared to larger-scale ones that are centrally directed. This is an inevitable consequence of the large number of arrests that have crippled JAD’s central leadership. JAD has, thus, adopted a more decentralised organizational structure involving numerous cells that are disconnected and operate independently of each other.

Due to such decentralization, the internet will be instrumental in facilitating attacks by these cells. This is noteworthy as 1) recruitment and coordination can be conducted online using encrypted platforms, 2) knowledge sharing such as bomb-making is made easier by the usage of online platforms which could also drive more lone-wolf attacks, and 3) the heavy reliance on the internet particularly by millennials provides the group with a vast pool of individuals to recruit from. Based on the Makassar and Jakarta attacks, JAD is likely to continue targeting youths in their mid-20s who have a significant online presence.

Introduction

Malaysia is not immune to the dangers of violent extremist groups. This is due to two factors, namely, 1) its geographical location which is surrounded by conflict prone areas such as Southern Thailand, Southern Philippines, and Indonesia that have seen the formation of extremist groups such as Jamaah Islamiyah (JI)and Abu Sayyaf, and 2) Malaysia is a Muslim-majority country which is at risk of violent, misguided propaganda from  religious extremist groups such as Daesh, Kumpulan Mujahidin Malaysia (KMM), Jemaah Islamiyah, and Al-Ma’unah resonating with its citizens. Consequently, the threats of Islamist-based extremist groups loom greater in comparison to other forms of extremism. This does not mean that threats from these other forms are non-existent in Malaysia. Noteworthily, violent extremism was also traditionally perpetuated by Malaysian men. However, as also seen regionally, Malaysian women can no longer be deemed harmless nor immune to it.

Malaysian Women’s Expanding Roles in Violent Extremism

Although extremism is often linked with men and the traits of masculinity such as dominance and physical strength, women are becoming more susceptible to extremist ideologies, albeit in different ways. There are now more Malaysian women being directly tasked to conduct terrorism in Malaysia than simply supporting their spouses in conducting attacks. Examples include the case of Kak Nor who was arrested for plotting a terror attack on voters at a polling station in Puchong and a female Indian National member of a Sikh secessionist group planning attacks on local politicians. It might, thus, be argued that there is an evolution of Malaysian women’s involvement in extremism, from previously playing passive roles to more active roles.

Previously, conservative extremist groups such as Al-Qaeda restrict and confine women to private spheres. However, groups such as Daesh have moved beyond mobilising women as supporters as seen in the two prior examples. However, it would be more accurate to deem this phenomenon as an expansion of women’s roles as women continue to support the spread of extremist ideologies through their traditional gender roles such as raising their children using extremist group’s values and being life partners with extremists. In other words, women’s roles are becoming more multifaceted. As such, women’s involvements in extremist groups also introduce several feminine traits into these groups especially in recruiting new members and supporters. This is evident from the romanticisation of jihad by Daesh recruiters as in the case of “The Green Bird of Jannah” and “Diary of Muhajiran” in which these online blogs were written by Malaysian and Indonesian females. These blogs recounted their personal journeys and experiences as wives of fighters who were often portrayed in appealing ways to women. These online mini-diaries and autobiographies which strategically emphasize female narratives were part of extremist groups’ tactics to attract more women to join their cause.

Lack of Women Voices in Countering Violent Extremism in Malaysia

In February 2020, Malaysia has appointed the first woman to helm the position of principal assistant director of the Special Branch’s Counter-Terrorism Division. Normah Ishak’s appointment seems like a promising start for the inclusion of gender perspectives in Malaysia’s effort to tackle violent extremism. However, Malaysia is still behind in terms of having a consolidated CVE policy vis-à-vis legislation, rehabilitation and deradicalization programmes, and educational activities. Although this allows flexibility for the authority to thwart attacks, it also leads to two implementation issues.

First is the lack of clear leadership. Violent extremism is a security issue that cuts across geographical and social boundaries. Therefore, concerted efforts from various stakeholders in CVE are required. For example, as educational institutions are breeding grounds for the spread of extremist ideologies in Malaysia, thus, CVE efforts require coordination between security agencies such as the Royal Malaysian Police with the Ministry of Education/Higher Education and relevant religious authorities. Similarly, the Ministry of Women, Family and Community Development should also be involved in CVE efforts considering that the involvement of women in extremist groups is becoming more pronounced.  Despite the need for coordination between different agencies, there has yet to be clear leadership on the implementation of CVE.

The second issue is the top-down approach that Malaysia employs as part of its CVE initiative. This stems from the great power given to the National Security Council through the National Security Council Act (NSCA). This widens the gender gap in the implementation of CVE as Malaysia’s top security personnel including the high level political leadership in the NSC are mainly men and the exclusion of prominent women voices is glaring. Civil society especially women’s movement has called the government to ensure the inclusion of women’s voices in their CVE efforts. This is especially crucial considering the current roles women play in violent extremism which has expanded beyond the private sphere. The threat of women’s active roles need to be taken seriously by the authorities as they may pose greater danger to the society due to the dual roles they play in supporting and perpetrating violent extremism.

The Need to Ensure the Inclusion of Women in CVE

In the same light that women are playing more active roles in violent extremism, their roles in CVE efforts are also pertinent. There is, thus, a need for the Malaysian government to proactively include gender perspectives in designing and implementing a robust CVE policy. This can be achieved by engaging the relevant government agencies such as the Ministry of Women, Family and Community Development, academics, and civil society organizations to develop CVE modules that address women’s needs to ensure that female perspectives are taken into account in every phase of CVE implementation.  The role of women in the community should also not be taken lightly as they can contribute meaningfully to raise awareness of radicalization through monitoring and education. Women often form close-knitted communities which enable them to detect early signs of radicalization around them as well as to provide the necessary support for affected families. Therefore, the inclusion of women groups in CVE efforts should be ensured by the government.

To assist them in such endeavours, women should be given access to training and education that will enable them to develop new skills that can be used to earn an income. This is crucial considering that women are often financially and socially dependent on the male members of their families and therefore, lack the power to make decisions. Contributing financially to their families could trigger a power rebalance enabling them to have a say in decision making.

Lastly, gender perspectives are needed in the process of deradicalization and reintegration of former female members of extremist groups. As women’s circumstances in joining extremist groups often differ from men, deradicalization and reintegration programmes need to be gender-sensitive  to break the cycle of violence For this reason, the authorities have to refrain from stereotyping women as victims and start recognising their active roles in extremist groups We also must identify the gendered aspects of women involvement in violent extremism to develop effective intervention via targeted CVE policies such as increasing the number of female security personnel in CVE and to have sex aggregated data in security risk assessments.

Introduction

Amidst COVID-19, there is a disturbing increase in the number domestic violence globally. In Indonesia, findings from a 2020 survey by the National Commission on the Elimination of Violence against Women (Komnas Perempuan) indicates a similar trend. As governments prioritized stemming viral spread, such trends suggest an emerging crisis as states transit into a ‘new normal’. Though this emerging crisis was avoidable, it is never too late for states to address it now. To do so, specifically in Indonesia, would require an understanding of how COVID-19 have heightened the occurrences of domestic violence and how there needs to be further emphasis on victims of domestic violence and the community.

Stresses of COVID-19 in Indonesia

A major impact of COVID-19 is that longer hours are now spent at homes. This is attributed to social restrictions such as lockdowns and loss of employment. Unfortunately for some Indonesians, this also places them at risk of losing their homes. Wading further into the unfamiliar, Indonesians are left to figure out how to maintain a sense of normalcy, for example, by working from home while ensuring their children continue with their education, albeit online. Additionally, COVID-19 increases physical isolation of nuclear families. This becomes an added issue as Indonesia is a collectivist society and where religion is important in daily lives. Therefore, not only would Indonesians lose support and care from their extended families but also their religious support network. Collectively, these factors can increase the level of anxiety than pre-COVID conditions.

During this pandemic, Indonesian females tended to experience higher levels of anxiety than their male counterparts. Though there have yet to be detailed studies, the 2020 survey by Komnas Perempuan may provide insights into this phenomenon.

Briefly, respondents of this study claimed to have experienced higher household workloads and were more prone to domestic violence. The study reported numerous forms of violence experienced, with physical and sexual violence being the most frequently experienced followed by psychological violence and economic abuse. Women who were particularly vulnerable to such violence were those from households earning less than IDR 5 million monthly and working in the informal sector, aged between 31-40, caring for more than three children, and living in any of the top 10 provinces with the highest number of COVID-19 infections. Particularly troubling is that less than 10% of the female respondents reported their cases to the authority or sought help during the pandemic. A majority of those who chose to remain quiet were women who minimally possessed a tertiary level qualification. Additionally, 69% of the respondents claimed to not know how to access legal or other forms of assistance.

Despite being well-educated and the ease of access to information, the continued occurrence of domestic violence in Indonesia is ostensibly due to an imbalance of power and control in relationships. Adherence to patriarchy, which is still prevalent in Indonesia, is an important predictor of such violence. Even if Indonesian women were to seek assistance from those close to them, many are reluctant to intervene for fear of intruding into a private matter or their belief that it is still within men’s right to do so. The situation is worsening as victims are forced to spend more time with their perpetrators during COVID-19 thus further limiting their escape strategies.

Indonesia’s response to domestic violence against women is also still far from ideal. Though in need of a comprehensive legislation, the Eradication of Sexual Violence Bill is once again delayed. Proposed in 2016, this bill not only sought to prevent sexual violence but also accords more rights to victims. Without this bill, current investigations on such violence are centred solely on punitive measures for the perpetrator. Though these measures may bring some relieve to victims, whatever relieve could come undone as female victims may have to contend with the victim-blaming culture in Indonesia.

Empowering Victims and the Community

Indonesia cannot simply wait for the Eradication of Sexual Violence Bill to be passed. While waiting for the passing of this bill, the government must work closely with Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) on two factors. The first is to adopt an educational approach to empower both victims and the community. Particularly during COVID-19, female victims must be empowered to speak up. This could either be via reporting their abusers to the authorities or seeking assistance to stop the violence. Through time, victims should eventually realise the need to avoid justifying the abuse meted at them.

Education is also pertinent in addressing victim-blaming culture in Indonesia. Victims should not have to endure such biased judgements while coming to terms with their trauma. One method involves including the notion of consent, at the very latest, in university curriculum. Doing so may culminate in reducing unwarranted comments, online and in real life. Additionally, the community should also be taught to recognize signs of domestic violence. Fortunately, these signs include verbal cues which are pertinent especially during times of increased physical isolation such as during COVID-19. And rather than the community reporting on behalf of the victim, it would be ideal for them to assist victims find the courage to do so themselves.

Akin to frontliners, the community should be shown resources for them to direct victims to. It would, thus, be beneficial to have a single, central platform that is accessible via numerous means including on newer mediums such as social media. This is crucial as more time is spent online, particularly during times such as COVID-19. Collectively by doing so, not only does it shift some responsibility to the community, the community are not overburdened by it.

Towards a Centralized Assistance Platform

To initiate the development of such assistance platform, it is crucial to identify “hotspots” of domestic violence in Indonesia. This not only enables a more targeted awareness campaign in such areas, it also enables optimization of resources. For instance, shelters can be set up in these areas to offer assistance to victims seeking refuge. Additionally, by establishing a network of such shelters in Indonesia, victims who are not from these areas can be directed to the nearest shelter.

This centralized platform should also assist the community not only by providing information that can be easily understood, but also by getting them to talk about domestic violence. One way to facilitate this is through outreach on relevant mediums such as social media campaigns. This could culminate into developing a protective safety net for victims that is also not intimidating. Other essential information includes assisting the community to develop these shelters themselves and enabling trusted individuals to provide short-term care for victims who have decided to seek refuge at shelters, if required. The benefits of such organically-developed shelters are the sense of community ownership, increases accessibility for victims and reduced bureaucracy. Moreover, providing short-term care serves as humble, yet powerful motivators for victims to take a strong stance against such violence.

One key consideration of this platform is to confer anonymity to victims and the network of shelters. While it may help victims make the first move in seeking assistance, ensuring that shelters are kept anonymous provides an additional sense of security to victims. Such anonymity will safeguard these premises from unwanted visits by perpetrators of domestic violence and minimise negative perceptions while community awareness campaigns on victim-blaming are on-going.

Women and Children in Terrorism: A Four-Part Analysis (Part 1: Case Study of Indonesia)

Introduction

For decades, the Indonesian authorities had identified the involvement of Indonesian women in terrorism. In the era of Jama’ah Islamiyah (JI), terrorists’ wives have been viewed as loyal supporters for the organization starting from their migration to Afghanistan to their expansion into Southeast Asia.

Figures 1 and 2 reproduced from IPAC Report No. 68

Rational Choices of Women who Joined Religious Terrorism

Terrorists acknowledge the dominant role of women in the organization because women have the capability to transmit and develop psycho-social norms among family members. Children tended to imitate their mothers’ behaviours, especially in initiating a conversation about jihadism, Islam and politics, and even watching extremist videos together. That belief then impacts the ideological perspectives of the children.

Harmon and Holmes-Eber highlighted a sceptic viewpoint within the society that justified the general feminine impressions of women compared to men. This proclamation influences the motivation of terrorist groups to recruit women as mediators in operational and tactical actions. The public views women as victims rather than as perpetrators. Thus, they ignore the gender expectation and self-image of women enabling them to escape attention from authorities. This is the reason why terrorists then exploit them in certain select roles such as messengers, recruiters, and suicide bombers.

Previous research about gender and terrorism revealed the four types of motivations of women who joined a terrorist movement. First, they joined a terrorist group as a way of supporting their husbands who played an important role in these groups. Marriage alliances, including in Indonesia, were the most strategic way to impart the fundamental ideology to family members. The bonding also forced women to demonstrate their proactive efforts in developing extremist values among the family members. Umm Zahra and Umm Umar, two ISIS brides whom ISIS fighters married with, revealed a related motivation. Even if their husbands were killed in battle, they felt proud of their husband’s accomplishments, and never spoke a word of grief or sadness. Such wives were also glorified by the community. The wife of a shaheed (martyr) will be honoured among the community and will be taken care of by ISIS through assistance such as monthly financial support for the widows and their children.

The second motivation is the bonding among women fighters through friendships. Similar to their male counterparts, female terrorists were also encouraged by the social connections they had developed among their peers, including the group-level effects. For instance, women consider relationship matters as important motivators to engage in terrorism. These relationships entail the acquaintances between male and female jihadists which form the groups’ social networks. Furthermore, for women, friendship is critical as it enables them to share a common interest and to forge interpersonal bonds, among others. They could develop this connection through social interactions on campus, or as relatives of activists, and even their co-involvement in crimes. Other factors that also influence the relationship between individuals include socio-demographic variables of education, employment, history of domestic violence, mental illness or substance abuse.

Furthermore, the author examined that self-actualization against saturated feeling and grievance was also a significant motivation for women to join violent extremist groups. This sensation emerged as they attempt to find a way out of socio-economic inequality; psycho-social issues related to unfortunate life experiences like the loss of a loved one, patriarchal authority, domestic violence, or the dishonour of being raped. Social media also confounded this unease and even provoked women to personally select the most extreme option, including joining youth radical groups, which promise an answer for their turmoils. In Indonesia, Siska Nur Azizah and Dita Siska Milenina were two women who were instigated to be ISIS supporters fighting against thogut. They also admitted that their learning about Islam were gathered from social media, encrypted messaging platforms and internet prior to their pledging allegiance to support ISIS.

Lastly, a strong desire for female emancipation also becomes a critical motivation for women who strongly envisioned themselves as terrorist fighters or terror groups supporters. Katharina Kneip discovered that the attraction came from their seeking independence from parental control and Western oppression. As also seen in Indonesia, they also expected honour, respect, and power from the ISIS community and likely pursued equality with men as agents of fundamentalist Islam by revealing their pledge to ISIS. Some women idolized certain figures in their extremist community and made efforts to imitate them because they were attracted by images created on various social media platforms.

Tactical Contributions of Women to Terrorist Groups

The author investigated three prominent roles of female terrorists: instrumental support, operational support and organizational support. Instrumental support consisted of roles that offer tangible items and/or services including funds, fighters, materials, and shelter. Operational support included the skills to prepare and execute an attack including the bomb-making. Also, organizational support referred to the provision of socio-cognitive and interpersonal aspects for network expansion, recruitment, propaganda and also spreading the exchange of ideas and access to information.

Instrumental Support

First, take the case of Jumiatun alias Umi Delima, the wife of Santoso who was a prominent former leader of Mujahidin Indonesia Timur – MIT Poso network, which shows how women become an important figure in assisting their husband’s work. Not only was Jumiatun involved in operations but also financing including accommodating money transfers between the Philippine-based Abu Sayyaf Group and Indonesian-based entities. Another example is the case of Rosmawati alias Umi Yazid and Agustiningsih, who was convicted of terrorist financing crime because of her involvement in the fund-raising activities for operations and logistics.

Operational Support

The cases of two former domestic workers working overseas, Dian Yulia Novi and Ika Puspitasari exemplify this form of support. Both Dian Yulia Novi and Ika Puspitasari alias Tasnima Salsabila were convicted for their failed attempts to conduct suicide bombings in Jakarta and Bali, respectively. Interestingly, not only were both acting on behalf of pro-ISIS elements, their husbands played important roles in instigating their participation in such attacks. Dian was likely acting in support of Jamaah Ansharut Daulah (JAD), which her husband Solikin was a member of, while Ika was imprisoned for her support of Katibah al-Iman. Besides providing operational support, Ika also offered instrumental support by assisting a terrorist cell led by Abu Jundi, in purchasing weapons, ammunition and explosive materials. It was discovered that she sent her salary worth US$ 615 to Abu Jundi’s account through her husband’s, Zainal Akar, account.

Organizational Support

In 2017, Indonesian women were found to actively supported ISIS through Yayasan Infaq Dakwah Center (IDC), established in 2009, and through a public fund-raising movement called Gerakan Sehari Seribu (GASHIBU). The modus operandi of fund-raising was via social media campaigns such as on Facebook, private forums on Telegram and WhatsApp. Both programs were aimed at ensuring the well-being of the wives and widows of terrorist prisoners by supplying financial compensation for their family’s health insurance, educational scholarships, etc. The focus on women and children enabled these groups to build emotional connections with them which perhaps ease the transmission of extremist values to the next generation.

In addition to the roles of women involved in a terrorist group, developing organizational support is essential in expanding the network, particularly in relation with children. The Surabaya bombing incident was another mark of family-involved violent extremism which is becoming a trend in the Southeast Asia region. There is an imminent risk of transmitting radical ideology from parents to their children. They believed that this parenting style aligned with their commitment and loyalty to the adopted ideology. Also, they were enchanted by after-life rewards that could see them reuniting in paradise. Unfortunately, children might consider this to be usual family practices because they trust their parents as guardians, and they tend to imitate their parents’ behaviour in shaping their family’s ideological preference. For example, Saifurrasul, 13 years old male who died in Syria in 2016, was the son of Brekele or Saiful Anam, who is currently imprisoned for his contribution in a series of terrorist acts in and around Poso.

What’s Next?

Women provide a unique avenue for terrorist organizations to invigorate their efforts through their significant roles in terrorism and terrorism-financing purposes.

It is, thus, essential that the Indonesian government consider four strategy adjustments to better address this issue. (1) The government, especially the national security forces, should address any biased perspectives of viewing women as victims rather than perpetrators. This should include finetuning investigations of female terrorists by considering their potential convictions for terrorism-financing. (2) Instead of developing policies only in the areas of law and financial regulation, the sociological aspects and non-discrimination of women and children who have been exploited by terrorists must be considered. Though challenging, such exploitations could be uncovered through structured intervention programmes. (3) Encrypted messaging and social media platforms increase access for terrorist recruitment of women and children. Therefore, it is imperative for the government and the private sector to collaborate to improve countermeasures related to vulnerable groups, including those working as female migrant workers. These collaborations should entail securing online communications and social media channels including new payment technologies, e-commerce platforms, and online parcel deliveries to further stem the risk of emerging terrorism and terrorist financing. (4) There should also be greater monitoring efforts of migrant Indonesian workers working overseas including their transnational and domestic movability, and their financial profiles.

Part 2: Striving for Peace in the Philippines amidst Increased Combat-readiness and Continued Recruitment of Women and Children

Part 3: The Invisible Women and Children of Malaysia: The Vulnerability of Stateless Persons to Terrorism and Violent Extremism

Part 4: The Shape of Contemporary Conflict in Southeast Asia: How Violent Extremism has Changed Our Women and Children

Women and Children in Terrorism: A Four-Part Analysis (Part 2: Philippines-ISIS in East Asia and the CPP-NPA Communist-terrorist Network)

Introduction

After the retreat of the IS-Maute forces from the Marawi Siege, there is an estimated number of 165 women who are supporters of ISIS East Asia in the surrounding areas of Lanao del Sur and Lanao del Norte. Based on personal fieldnotes, these women have an average of 6 to 7 children. Most of these women focused on providing safe haven to the ISIS Foreign Terrorist Fighters (FTF) composed mostly of Malaysian and Indonesian nationals. Given the refusal of the Indonesian Government to accept women and children of ISIS FTF, these families are expected to make the Philippines their permanent residence.

Increasing Combat-readiness of Female Extremists

The specific skill sets of the ISIS East Asia female combatants have now incorporated Improvised Explosive Device (IED) assembly and conducting suicide bombing activities. In recent suicide bombings in the town of Jolo, Sulu province, female members had assumed significant lead roles in carrying out suicide roles. These women decided to take on more than the usual combat support roles. In most cases, female terrorists are heavily involved in the procurement of weapons and ammunition.

Female combatants also help in the procurement, recruitment, training and the handling of terrorism financing tasks. They, too, conduct intelligence gathering, transporting supplies and arms, logistics, food, resistance, and offering nursing services for the wounded. Despite their participation in combat, they are not expected to be rewarded with authority or political power over the male combatants.

For female combatants of terror groups operating in the Philippines, their skills entail identifying safe havens for fighters and the provision of food, medicines and clothing. Child soldiers, on the other hand, help provide surveillance activities of the police and military units in the area. The nondescript tandem of female terrorists accompanied either by their own babies or other child soldiers is an effective strategy to avoid detection by local authorities.

More recently, Jevilyn Cullamat, the 22-year-old communist-terrorist daughter of a CPP-NPA-NDF-linked Filipino lawmaker was killed in an encounter between government troops and New People’s Army rebels in Surigao del Sur. According to the 3rd Special Forces “Arrowhead” Battalion of the Philippine Army, Jevilyn Cullamat served as an armed medic of the New People’s Army. By recruiting family members, terrorist groups can avoid detection and capture by limiting contact with outsiders and increasing the costs of defection for individual members. Family members also provide an additional source of labour; women and children contribute to terrorist groups through support roles, such as providing food or medical care and maintaining camps, as well as direct participation in attacks.

Women occupy strong political and social roles within their respective terrorist groups. They actively take part in strategic supporting roles that are necessary for warfare. Due to their dedication to daily and mundane tasks, they are highly regarded by other members. These women recruit their sisters and close cousins, their respective husbands, and their own children. For many of these women, the terrorist groups provided a space where they could share their political ideas, a fundamental right that was previously denied to them by their families and communities. These female leaders organized meetings between terrorist women’s groups and meetings between the leaders of terrorist groups contributing to their collective empowerment. Their decision to join terrorist groups can be seen as a way of seeking protection for their families and improving their chances in life. Since these women are given false hopes by terrorist organizations during the recruitment phase and false dreams of a better life, they were pushed to join these terrorist organizations without really fully understanding what they are getting into.

In countries and communities wherein girls and women seek a place of importance or significance, some fall into the trap of being part of what we call the “Sisterhood of Destruction.” Increasingly, more girls and women become masterminds, and not merely accessories to crimes and acts of terror, in the Philippines.

Continued Recruitment of Child Soldiers into Extremism

Children are more vulnerable than adults when a nation faces on-going warfare because family, society, and law cannot fully provide adequate legal and physical protection for children.  This is despite the presence of a UN convention catered to children. The UN Convention on the Rights of the Child of 1989 seeks “…to ensure that persons who have not attained the age of fifteen years do not take a direct part in hostilities.”

As of 2020, a former ASG member disclosed to the authors that there is an estimated 150 child soldiers in the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) comprising several battalions prepared to go to war at any time.

The Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) had actively recruited individuals from 15 years of age and above and providing these minors improvised explosive devices (IEDs) and high-powered guns. During the Marawi siege, however, the ASG and ISIS were discovered to have recruited and radicalized child soldiers as young as 6 to 8 years old. Even the youngest child combatants, both girls and boys, served in some of the world’s most destructive war zones. They were utilized as frontline soldiers, spies, cooks, messengers, and porters. Children were instrumental, small and easily unnoticed in suicide bombings and in other surprise attacks.

In the last three years alone, between 2016 to 2019, the Communist Party of the Philippines took pride in being able to recruit over 8,000 students for their underground movement, a former communist rebel stated during a Senate hearing on alleged military red-tagging last November 3, 2020. Jeffrey Celiz, alias “Ka Eric,” told senators that a CPP-NPA-NDF document seized from the National Democratic Front (NDF) consultant Vic Ladlad revealed that majority of the over 8,000 youth recruits came from senior high schools, which pertained to 16 or 17-year-old targets for recruitment and radicalization by the CPP-NPA-NDF communist-terrorist network.

The commonplace perception about child soldiers was that those most likely to be recruited were:

(1) economically poor;

(2) separated from their families;

(3) displaced from their homes;

(4) living in a combat zone; and

(5) with limited access to education.

Globally, while it may be true that the predominant recruitment of child soldiers takes place in areas where there is little or no government presence at all, in the Philippines, the insidiously pervasive nature of the CPP-NPA terrorist network has led to the phenomena of mass recruitment among children and youth leaders from good and God-fearing families enrolled in elite schools and not just public academic institutions.

“90 percent of the cadres of the CPP-NPA-NDF come from schools. Lahat kami dun nanggaling halos (most of us were recruited from schools). We all started through a legal organization, but they are not purely legal,” said Jeffrey Celiz, a former cadre of the CPP-NPA who served the communist-terrorist movement for 27 years.

Early Intervention and Reintegration Programmes for Sustainable Peace

A successful approach in preventing and countering violent extremism (P/CVE) demands identification of early signs of radicalization and the mitigation of individual and collective grievances, structural factors and drivers that in the worst case may support or fuel violence. Key actors need to be engaged through cross-sectoral efforts to prevent and counter the spread of radicalization and recruitment in their local communities. Particular focus should be put on the role of women, youth, children, local stakeholders and civil society, including religious and community leaders.

Initiatives aimed at reintegrating individuals willing to leave violent extremism behind and return to their communities should also be enhanced and encouraged — while keeping in sight that, according to a new study, education, not employment, is the key to reducing recidivism among ex-combatants. The authors also identified several factors that are associated with a return to crime among ex-combatants: factors such as anti-social personality traits, weak family ties, lack of educational attainment, and the presence of criminal groups are highly correlated with recidivism.

The success rate of the thousands of former terrorists and former rebels’ reintegration will be key for sustainable peace in a country that has been ravaged by internal armed conflict for over five decades. Ideally, if successfully reintegrated into their local communities, former violent extremists can serve as messengers to their communities and regions, questioning the narrative that made them commit to violent extremist ideologies in the first place. It is our clarion call for government authorities to invest sufficient resources for (1) methodical convictions in terrorism financing; (2) a long-term deradicalization program for radicalized children, youth, and women; and (3) a holistic program to treat post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) for individuals and families afflicted by war and conflict.

Part 1: A More Effective Counterterrorism Strategy for Indonesian Women by Acknowledging Their Motivations and Tactical Contributions

Part 3: The Invisible Women and Children of Malaysia: The Vulnerability of Stateless Persons to Terrorism and Violent Extremism

Part 4: The Shape of Contemporary Conflict in Southeast Asia: How Violent Extremism has Changed Our Women and Children

Women and Children in Terrorism: A Four-Part Analysis (Part 3: Case Study of Malaysia)

Introduction

The complex reality and volatile nature of terrorism and violent extremism (VE) transcends borders in today’s global village. Globally connected, terrorism continues to become more sophisticated, more indiscriminate and more lethal. Since terrorist and violent extremist groups tend to flourish in marginalized areas, using local grievances to recruit young citizens in vulnerable life situations, suffering, for instance, from varying degrees of unemployment, low education and literacy levels, no sector in today’s world is at greater risk and remains severely understudied as the stateless women and children targeted for recruitment and radicalization by terrorist organizations.

Due to the historically unstable political, social, and economic conditions in Southern Philippines, further aggravated in the last five decades by the pervasive presence of the CPP-NPA communist-terrorist network that relentlessly attacks and exploits the vulnerabilities of the Muslim-majority ethnic groups or indigenous peoples (IPs), hundreds of thousands of Muslim Filipinos have sought a relatively more peaceful life for Muslims in Sabah, Malaysia — albeit not all through legal immigration. Presently, there are at least 10,000 people in West Malaysia alone who are denied nationality, with unknown numbers of stateless persons in East Malaysia, which includes Sabah. Contrary to the stateless populations in West Malaysia, the circumstances in East Malaysia, especially concerning the mixed migratory context in Sabah, is more difficult to establish and efforts to operationalize a programme had been generally considered more complex, compounded by the fact that UNHCR has not had an office in Sabah since the 1980s. Hannah Arendt saw “statelessness” as the most primary deprivation of all: the loss of a place in this world, a loss that renders opinions insignificant and actions ineffective. In becoming stateless, persons are additionally robbed of the only entity that could guarantee a set of minimum rights, rendering them extremely vulnerable to any kind of abuse and deprivation, since they have no legal status either in their own countries or abroad. Psychologically, “impotence breeds violence,” while politically, “loss of power becomes a temptation to substitute violence for power.”

East Malaysia: A Prime Location for Both Terrorists and Stateless Persons from the Philippines

Based on a 2017 Manila Times report on the Marawi Siege, Foreign Terrorist Fighters (FTF) and their child soldier recruits seeking to enter southern Philippines in order to join Islamic State-affiliated groups find Sabah to be the safest route as an entry point to the porous borders of Mindanao, Philippines. According to Yohanes Sulaiman, a security analyst and lecturer at Indonesia’s Jenderal Achmad Yani University, “The porous Indonesia-Malaysia border and more importantly the stronger connection between Sabah and Mindanao since both shared some close roots as they used to be part of the Sultanate of Sulu in southern Philippines, make Sabah the easy choice.”

“There have already been a lot of movements traditionally of people between Sabah and Mindanao, and the terrorists are just utilizing that network. Remember the fact that the Malaysian government was caught completely off guard a few years ago when a bunch of people affiliated with the Sultanate of Sulu infiltrated Sabah,” Yohanes said, referring to the bloody 2013 Lahad Datu siege by Sulu militants, calling themselves the “Royal Security Forces of the Sultanate of Sulu and North Borneo” out to stake their ancestral territorial claim over part of Sabah.

Sabah, Sarawak dan Labuanor Malaysian Borneo is the part of Malaysia on the island of Borneo, the world’s third largest island. It consists of the Malaysian states of Sabah, which is closer to the Philippines than to mainland Malaysia, Sarawak in the west, and the Federal Territory of Labuan. Coming from the islands of Jolo, Sulu or the Zamboanga Peninsula, Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) terrorists from the Philippines openly boast how they can easily reach Sabah in approximately 1 hour and 45 minutes with their high-powered speedboats; with even less time required if they come from Tawi-Tawi, which is only 273 miles from Sabah. Filipino, Malaysian, and Indonesian fishermen are all accustomed to traversing the dangerous waters of the Celebes and Sulu Seas within 24 hours using regular motorboats.

One thing immediately common to members of terrorist organizations and stateless persons is how they both evade documentation in fear of detention or arrests; and how they know the best escape routes and hiding places to avoid monitoring and surveillance. Given the proximity of Sabah to Mindanao, stateless persons, many of whom are of Muslim Filipino descent, born in East Malaysia but generally with no birth certificate or any government I.D., make perfect targets for recruitment and radicalization by ISIS who offer not only a sense of “collective belonging” but also provide a means for stateless persons to earn a substantial income despite their lack of education. While no ISIS-affiliated attacks were carried out in 2019, Malaysia remains as a source of children and youth targets for ISIS recruitment, as well as a transit point and hub for kidnap-for-ransom activities perpetrated by other terrorist networks.

In Malaysia, the law does not guarantee the right to education for irregular migrant children or stateless children, and thus, they would continuously be denied this right so long as they remain in Malaysia illegally. Stateless persons residing in Malaysia, regardless of country of origin, may legally be refused or denied access to education, jobs or healthcare.

The problem of stateless persons in East Malaysia reflects the imperative for Philippines and Malaysia to work collaboratively to resolve this complex human rights issue. It was a humbling experience for Filipino researchers from Mindanao to interview face to face some of these undocumented persons of Filipino descent who preferred to remain stateless for as long as they could continue to live and work in Sabah. This bleak reality speaks volumes in terms of the intergenerational failure of the Philippine government to make a vast number of Muslim Filipinos feel that they “collectively belong” in their own homeland.

“Mabuti pa na undocumented kami dito sa Sabah kaysa umuwi sa Zamboanga sa Mindanao kay mahirap ang buhay sa Pinas pag Muslim ka, mas OK pa ang buhay ng mga tulisang NPA sa Mindanao, pero pag Muslim ka, hindi maganda ang trato ng gobyerno. Dito sa Sabah, kahit papaano, mas maganda pa rin ang buhay namin bilang mga Muslim.” (‘It’s better for me and my children to be stateless here in Sabah, than for us to go back to Zamboanga in Mindanao where Muslims are discriminated against. NPA terrorists have even more rights in the Philippines than us Muslims. Here (in Sabah), even with no legal documentation, Muslims have a better life under the Malaysian government.’) – Fatimih Husin, an illegal immigrant, and a mother of 5 undocumented children of Filipino descent.

Additionally, the total population of foreign workers in Malaysia at the end of 2017 was estimated at 2.96–3.26 million. Of these, an estimated 1.23–1.46 million are irregular foreign workers, a much lower and narrower range than the estimated 1.9–4.6million reported by other sources. The security threat assessment and analysis on how many stateless women and children in Malaysia are susceptible to VE recruitment and radicalization is complex and subject to large margins of error because data on irregular foreign workers and stateless persons based in Malaysia are relatively scarce, and much of the data that are collected are not shared among key stakeholders.

Officially, there are between one and two million undocumented or irregular migrants in Malaysia and among them, it is estimated about 44,000 children who were born from irregular migrant parents were denied schooling. In 2016, the former Home Minister of Malaysia, Ahmad Zahid Hamidi estimated that there were around 290,000 stateless children in the country. According to another intelligence source in Sabah, an advocate for stateless persons, as of 2017 there were more than 400,000 stateless children of Muslim Filipino descent, who have either undocumented or stateless parents working in the low-paying informal sector in Sabah. Being rendered stateless from birth significantly affects the intellectual development of these children which makes it much harder for them to grow up as productive and law-abiding adults. The exact number of stateless individuals remains unclear given the nature of the problem. Contrary to popular belief, many people who are stateless in Malaysia are not foreigners, refugees or “illegal migrants”; many of them were actually born in the country and have been living in Malaysia most of their lives, according to local media reports.

Way Forward: Bilateral Programmes and More Female Representations

Undocumented and stateless persons are ideal terrorist recruits for ISIS since they have no public records: no birth certificates, no passports, and no real identification cards. In this day and age wherein terrorism transcends borders, ‘statelessness’ no longer exclusively disenfranchises the stateless persons, the illegal migrants and refugees who are rendered “superfluous” — unwanted and unseen — by contemporary politics, but ordinary citizens too, whose security, civil liberties, and rights to life and property are equally exposed to the threat of domestic terrorist attacks that may be carried out by stateless actors in the near future.

On the aspect of reducing risks related to terrorism and counterterrorism, Lucia Zedner aptly points out, “Add to this the risk of marginalizing and alienating those we target and we arrive at the paradoxical situation that counterterrorism policies may make further attack more, not less, likely. So we need to consider what risks are really at stake when we seek to counter terrorist risk.”

While stateless persons, especially the undocumented women and children based in East Malaysia, are more at risk to terrorism and VE, it is nonetheless clear that ISIS has also deployed a relatively sophisticated and modestly successful recruitment strategy that targets Malaysian youth, particularly those enrolled in institutions of higher learning in Peninsular Malaysia; as well as the online recruitment of vulnerable Malaysian women seeking to take part in “female Jihad” by supporting their male relatives, educating their children in the radical ideology they have embraced, and facilitating terrorist operations. In light of these developments, the Middle East Institute also suggests that, “It is urgently necessary for the Malaysian government, university officials and others to join forces in continuing to develop and refine an array of counter-recruitment measures.”

The status of the Muslim stateless persons in Malaysia reflect the status of Muslim youth in France. According to one narrative, when the Muslims migrated to France, they battled poverty in the grim housing estates outside big cities. These youth are locked in a closed cycle of poverty, crime, and lack of opportunities. In the mid-2000s, these youth rose up to make their grievances known. They now press for a fair chance at graduating from school, having a good job, and living in peaceful communities. The cycle of poverty and rioting continues until their demands are accepted.

Bilateral programs promoted by Malaysia and the Philippines can help promote the safety of children as laid out in the Sustainable Development Agenda as a strategic precondition of global development. For example, bilateral projects to address stateless youth can specifically address Target 16.2 of the Sustainable Development Goals (United Nations General Assembly resolution 70/1), which calls for putting an end to all forms of violence against children, including the abuse and exploitation of and trafficking in children. These programs could highlight the crucial role played by children in the creation of peace, justice and robust institutions.

Any successful counterterrorism programme should address both the motivation and the operational capabilities of a terrorist organization. There is an essential need, therefore, for the Malaysian security forces to expand their capabilities to look more carefully at the role of women and children in terrorist organizations. By and large, more female experts in the field of terrorism studies and in preventing and countering violent extremism (P/CVE) need to be closely involved as leaders of interagency partners to explore options for this policy area going forward.

Part 1: A More Effective Counterterrorism Strategy for Indonesian Women by Acknowledging Their Motivations and Tactical Contributions

Part 2: Striving for Peace in the Philippines amidst Increased Combat-readiness and Continued Recruitment of Women and Children

Part 4: The Shape of Contemporary Conflict in Southeast Asia: How Violent Extremism has Changed Our Women and Children