Understanding Trump’s Tactics

In the first few weeks since his inauguration, President Donald Trump followed through on his campaign promises to impose tariffs on other countries.

Initially, his administration imposed 25% tariffs on goods from Canada and Mexico – except for energy imports from Canada at 10% – plus additional 10% tariffs on all Chinese products coming into the United States.

The media and pundits quickly signalled the return of Trump’s trade war. However, it is worth considering that Trump’s imposition of high tariffs is not an end in itself – it is part and parcel of his psychological warfare with other countries.

This was demonstrated when Trump decided to delay the tariffs on Canada and Mexico after “fruitful” discussions with both countries’ leaders. In this regard, tariffs should be understood simply as an economic tool to achieve the United States’ national interests, though critics have decried and deemed it illegal.

Trump’s co-written book The Art of the Deal gives an insight into his aggressive and assertive negotiation tactics in doing business, which he has applied to his political game as well. This negotiation style involves setting the initial terms aggressively – terms which may be bold and ambitious – to set the standard and tone of the negotiations around this reference point.

This is called the anchoring tactic, though he likes to impose extreme terms to turn the negotiations in his favour. His recent ordeals with Mexico and Canada exemplify this – he has also issued follow-up threats of increased tariffs should these countries retaliate.

Trump understands that his unpredictability has given him an advantage over others, thus making his threats more effective. He succeeded; following these salvo of threats, Canada and Mexico agreed to address the issue of drug smuggling and illegal immigration in exchange for a one-month pause in tariffs.

Unlike his first term – which saw him imposing tariffs on others and allowing negotiations only after some time had passed – this time he had reached an agreement with Canada and Mexico before any real actions were taken.

This is exactly what Trump hopes to achieve. He is using aggressive tactics by instilling fear and unpredictability to get what he wants before really starting a tariff war. In fact, a tariff war might be something that he does not desire after all, as it would cause inflation in the United States.

Sun Tzu might have approved – in The Art of War,he postulated that a “skillful leader subdues the enemy’s troops without any fighting.”

Past Lessons

As this is his second and last presidency, Trump understands that he is running out of time to achieve his political agenda. He hopes to quickly achieve concessions that others will make in exchange for not imposing high tariffs.

Although Trump has toyed with the idea of running for a third term, the odds are almost zero. The US Constitution limits a person from getting elected more than twice as a president and it would be very difficult to amend the constitution because of its rigidity.

Constitutional expert Bruce Fein argues that one possible way for Trump to hold on to power is by disregarding the law, though this is very unlikely to happen given that the United States has a long democratic tradition that provides checks and balances. A case in point: Trump’s bid to hold onto power after he lost the 2020 election was unsuccessful.

Even more important is that Trump seemed to have learned lessons from his first presidency.

After a years-long trade war with China, Trump concluded his Phase One trade deal successfully. This trade deal appeared to be a massive victory for the United States, as China pledged to protect intellectual property rights and agreed to purchase more goods from the United States to correct the trade imbalance between both countries. However, China failed to fulfil its obligations under the Phase One trade deal.

Trump is not keen to repeat this mistake, which could explain why Trump would want to achieve concessions as soon as possible.

He is using this plan of reciprocal tariffs as a bargaining tool for countries to reduce tariffs or eliminate non-tariff barriers.

A recent poll run by Reuters showed that over 90% of economists believe that the rapidly shifting trade policies would increase the likelihood of a recession, which could lead to unintended consequences of Trump’s own doing. This is a situation that Trump would want to avoid.

Weeks before he unveiled his “Liberation Day” plan, Trump also announced the imposition of 25% tariffs on all aluminium and steel imported to the United States without any exceptions or exemptions.

Interestingly, after a phone call with Australia’s prime minister, Trump said that an exemption for Australia is under consideration, given that Australia is one of the few countries with which the United States has a trade surplus. Such statements have sent an ambiguous signal to other countries, thus prompting countries such as South Korea to also request exemptions.

Trump also managed to extract concessions from India and Japan, both of which promised to buy more goods from the United States. Before the meeting with Trump, Modi announced that India would cut import tariffs on selected products. Following the meeting between both leaders, India agreed to buy more energy from the United States, thus aligning with Trump’s goal to make the United States the leading energy supplier.

Trump’s tariff tactic would be a mainstay in his administration – his unveiling of a base 10% global tariff on the rest of the world suggests he is willing to play this long, uncomfortable game with both allies and enemies alike.

Trial and Error

However, this kind of psychological tactic may not always work.

The United States and China were unable to come to an agreement and have since led to China’s quid pro quo levies. While the Chinese do not want to back down from the trade tensions with the United States, news reports from early March showed that Trump might visit China in April to hammer out a deal. This indicated that Trump might not be interested in fighting a tariff war.

Though the prospect of Trump visiting China has been dampened by Chinese countermeasures against his recently announced global tariff plan, he responded by threatening to further increase tariffs on China by 50%, in addition to the recently announced 34% tariffs as part of the Liberation Day plan. This led to over 100% cumulative tariffs on Chinese goods exported to the United States.

Due to the price and quality competitiveness of Chinese products, Chinese products are not easily replaceable. Since American consumers have to bear the brunt and inflation is expected to rise, Trump will be put in a difficult position, potentially prompting a revision to his tariff policies.

Impacts to Southeast Asia

Trump announced his Liberation Day global tariff plan on 2 April 2025, a drastic move that caused stock markets across the globe to tumble. A baseline of 10% tariffs on all exports to the United States are imposed, but all Southeast Asian countries are levied different rates of tariffs depending on their trade balance with the United States.

Cambodia and Laos are slapped with the highest tariffs (at 49% and 48%, respectively), followed by Vietnam (46%), Myanmar (44%), Thailand (36%), Indonesia (32%), Malaysia and Brunei (24%), the Philippines (17%) and finally Singapore (10%).

Barely a day after the new regime came into effect, however, Trump announced a 90-day pause on tariffs for 75 countries, including those in ASEAN. This hard reverse adds on to the psychological pressure that Trump aims to impose on leaders of other nations.

Before the Liberation Day announcement, ASEAN countries had diverse responses to the ongoing situation. Vietnam was already restless and expressing willingness to purchase more US agricultural products, open its market to US investments and refrain from imposing retaliatory measures. Thailand, on the other hand, was seen to be slow in responding to the trade issue and had no clear negotiation strategy, which was a great concern for the private sector in Thailand.

The Philippines and Malaysia appeared more optimistic, holding the opinion that the United States’ tariff policies have less direct implications on them. Both believed that they should maximise the existing regional trade agreements and diversify their trade partners in light of the steps pursued by the Trump administration.

Needless to say, the announcement must have sent massive shocks across the region, especially to countries with no concrete strategy and response plan.

Moving forward, ASEAN countries need to understand that Trump’s end goal is not to have a tariff war with the rest of the world. The United States is simply using threats of tariffs to force other countries – particularly those who have trade deficits with the United States – to reduce or remove tariffs and non-tariff barriers.

If this is a psychological war, how should Southeast Asian countries respond to it?

In such a setting, it is never a good idea to fully accede to the demands, as it would only lead to more concessions. We have seen, for example, how Vietnam’s good offer to the United States was being rejected.

Instead, countries should preserve their autonomy and continue to engage with the United States to get a mutually beneficial deal. A good instance is how the president of Mexico handled Trump – she kept a “cool head” and persuaded Trump with evidence that the deployment of Mexican soldiers to the borders has slowed down the flow of fentanyl.

Such a diplomatic approach led to praises from Trump and also to Trump’s decision to reverse some of the tariffs. Though Trump also reversed some of the tariffs on Canada, Trump continues to target its prime minister due to the latter’s more aggressive approach.

As ASEAN chair this year, Malaysia bears a huge responsibility to ensure that ASEAN has a united and coordinated response towards the trade issue. Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim has engaged some ASEAN leaders and called for a united front against this challenge.

If ASEAN is divided and chooses to negotiate bilaterally with the United States, the deals that each member secures would be different, potentially benefiting the United States more than ASEAN collectively. In the negotiation, ASEAN must present the hard facts to the United States, showing that the tariffs would not only harm ASEAN but would also be equally damaging to the US economy. If it is indeed psychological warfare, then ASEAN needs to know that it goes both ways.

Introduction

In late October 2024, rumours circulated in Bangkok’s diplomatic circle that Thailand would hand over the remaining 48 Uyghurs in a Thai prison and Immigration Detention Centers to China in February 2025. Despite strong objections from the international community and human rights groups, this was seen as a “gift” from Thailand to China to commemorate the 50^th anniversary of diplomatic relations.

Former prime minister Thaksin Shinawatra was the brain behind this idea. As the father of the current prime minister and the nominal head of a powerful political machine dominating Thailand’s political scene for more than two decades, nobody stood in his way. Reasons as to why the previous government led by General Prayuth Chan-ocha did not deport the Uyghurs did not seem to matter.

If anything, Prayuth was in a better position to do so. Being the chief of the junta behind the 2014 coup that ousted Thaksin’s sister – Yingluck – from power, his government was at first isolated by the West, particularly the United States. The isolation pushed Thailand closer to China, leading to, among others, an important submarine deal.

What Happened to the Detainees?

The Prayut administration did not know what they were waiting for, but they played that waiting game and kept the Uyghurs in Thai detention centres. They knew that a deportation would invite the wrath of the international community, potentially isolating Thailand further.

Adding to the drama was a jailbreak (some said it was assisted by officials) at the Songkhla detention centre in November 2017, where 25 Uyghurs escaped from to make their way to Malaysia. The Malaysian government later resettled them in Turkey. Beijing raised a stink, but bilateral ties normalised quickly because China needed Malaysia’s support for its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). Besides, no Malaysian leader was about to compromise his standing in the Muslim world.

Thailand, on the other hand, was not exactly a champion of anything.

The 40 Uyghur who were sent back to China on 27 February 2024 by the Thai government were part of some 220 men, women and children who were caught on the Thailand-Malaysia border in March 2014 as they were about to cross into Malaysia (scores of others were arrested in separate occasions around the same time period).

Shortly afterwards, about 170 women and children were resettled in Turkey, but around 100 men were transferred to the Chinese authorities a week later.

Worse, the following month (17 August 2015) saw suspected Uyghur terrorists bomb the Erawan Shrine in the heart of Bangkok, killing 20 and injuring 125. The shrine is popular among Chinese visitors, who made up the majority of the dead and wounded.

The remaining 50 or so Uyghurs were charged with illegal entry and served their jail time; afterward, they remained in Thailand’s detention centres under no clear justification other than the lack of political will to take decisive actions on the leaders’ part. Some had passed away due to illness, while five were serving prison time for attacking security guards as they were escaping detention.

Between the United States and China

China never let up with their demand for Thailand to deport the rest. To avoid further headaches, Thai law enforcement was told not to detain any Uyghur coming through the country. They were told to direct any incoming Uyghurs to Malaysia.

Thaksin came afterwards with his quirky ambition to be some sort of a statesman and perhaps the first among equals – in the eye of China. He and his long-time associate, Foreign Minister Maris Sangiampongsa, were tone-deaf to the international community from the start to the last minute, even as US Senator Marco Rubio was going through a Senate hearing to confirm his appointment as the US Secretary of State.

“Thailand is a very strong US partner, a strong historical ally,” Rubio said during his Senate hearing on 15 January 2025. “That is an area where I think diplomacy could really achieve results because of how important that relationship is and how close it is.” Or so he thought.

Rubio, a leading critic of Beijing, co-sponsored the 2021 Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act, which bans imports from Xinjiang unless free of forced labour. His stance on human rights in China has subjected him to Chinese sanctions since 2020.

It appeared that the Thailand government did not care about what Rubio had to say. Even if they did, it probably would not matter, as Thaksin was already set on his effort to please the Chinese.

On 14 March 2025, Rubio hit back and announced “visa restrictions on current and former officials from the Government of Thailand responsible for, or complicit in, the forced return of 40 Uyghurs from Thailand on February 27.”

One day before the US order on visa restrictions, the European Parliament condemned the deportation and “urges Thailand to halt any further forced returns to countries where people’s lives are at risk.”

The resolution also urged Thailand to reform its lèse majesté law (Article 112) and called on the European Commission to “leverage free trade agreement negotiations to press Thailand to reform the country’s lese-majesty law, release political prisoners, halt the deportation of Uyghur refugees, and to ratify all core International Labour Organization (ILO) conventions.”

China was quick to hit back but directed its comment to Washington. “On the one hand, the US engages in indiscriminate deportations of illegal immigrants, yet, on the other, it points fingers at and smears other countries’ legitimate law enforcement cooperation, imposes sanctions, and pressures others,” said China’s Foreign Ministry spokeswoman, Mao Ning, describing the United States’ actions as “typical bullying”.

While the fear among human rights activists that the remaining Uyghurs would be deported to China did not subside, it was not until January 2025 that everybody sensed something was not right; a group of Thai government officials visited the Uyghur detainees and politely asked them if they would like to return to China voluntarily. They were asked to sign the deportation paper, which they rejected outright.

Words of the meeting got out and the activists as well as opposition parties responded in full force, demanding an explanation from the government. Some of the detainees staged a hunger strike to protest what they saw as a ploy to get them to agree on the deportation.

The situation had gone quiet and the Uyghurs ended their hunger strike. Then, on 27 February 2025, it was rumoured that the Immigration Police were preparing to deport the Uyghur detainees. Reporters and activists went to the detention centre in Bangkok where they were held, but as the vehicles pulled out of the station, reporters were blocked. The rest was history.

Dumbstruck by Rubio’s harsh responses, Thailand insisted that the deportation was voluntary despite evidence to the contrary.

Raised Questions

A trip was organised for a group of journalists to tag along with Thai ministers to Xinjiang to visit the returnees. Observers said it was a sham, but the government insisted that it was not.

According to photos released by the government, the deportees were united with their relatives – but their immediate family members were sent to Turkey by Thai authorities over a decade ago.

Critics and activists came out in full force, particularly the Malay Muslims in the southernmost provinces who had looked up to Justice Minister Thawee Sodsong and considered him to be one of their own, especially as one of the leaders of a political party from the region. They had hoped that he would stand up against the deportation of the Uyghur detainees.

Asmadee Bueheng, a writer from Pattani, said that for Thai and Malay activists, deportation was about human rights. However, for local Islamic leaders, it was about Muslims being mistreated.

Moreover, many Thais wrongly assumed that the government, being democratically elected, would be more sympathetic to the voices of human rights activists. They felt let down, especially those who had given the government the benefit of the doubt for changing their words on military and constitutional reforms.

Concluding Thoughts

For the time being, officials in Bangkok are putting on a brave face, playing down Washington’s sanctions on government officials. However, it was nothing less than a major embarrassment, considering the fact that the two countries are treaty allies. This is not to mention the fact that Washington was quick to point out to Bangkok the repeated offers to resettle the Uyghur.

The United States has in the past imposed sanctions on Thailand, suspending military aid after coups. This marked the first time that the sanction targeted government officials, although the United States has not identified these individuals. How this will affect the bilateral ties between these so-called longstanding allies, on the other hand, remains to be seen. However, there is no indication that the sanction will slow down Thaksin and his quest to steer Thailand in the direction that serves his personal and political ambitions.

Background

The return of Donald Trump to the White House may cause new tensions geopolitically, which will not spare Southeast Asia.

Indonesia has also been under the spotlight since Prabowo Subianto took over the reins as Indonesia’s president. As the biggest democracy in the region, the country aspires to become a significant power in Asia.

Nevertheless, it faces a complex, crucial challenge with regards to how and what strategy Prabowo’s foreign policy will adopt to navigate the competition between China and the United States.

Indeed, Prabowo may likely contrast former President Joko “Jokowi” Widodo’s more passive approach to foreign policy. Prabowo seems determined to consolidate Indonesia’s place on the global stage and solidify its role as an emerging power in the region.

Such a vision will encourage Prabowo to focus on national security, e.g., Indonesia’s role in the South China Sea as well as China’s activity vis-à-vis the Taiwan question.

Nevertheless, Indonesia’s economic dependence on China imposes crucial constraints that Prabowo will need help to manage.

Trump’s return means that the US administration may pursue policies that erode Prabowo’s ability to keep Indonesia neutral within the parameters of its bebas (free) and aktif (active) foreign policy. This may eventually press Prabowo to make that hard choice between closer alignment with the United States or China.

Dynamic Engagement

Prabowo’s foreign policy views have shown signs of dynamic engagement with the two superpowers. Prabowo visited China in the second week of November 2024, where he met with President Xi Jinping and signed MoUs on cooperation in multiple sectors, particularly infrastructure, trade, and energy.

A key takeaway of the visit was the promise of increased investment in the blue economy. The agreement will not only regulate the role of fishing vessels but also the production and sale of marine products. Perhaps more importantly, the visit concluded with a commitment by China to support Prabowo’s free meal program, a key point in his campaign.

These are positive signals denoting Indonesia’s intent to maintain good relations with China despite growing regional tensions.

His second strategic destination of balanced engagement was the United States. The trip was an opportunity to recalibrate Indonesia’s position with the United States and explore future possibilities for economic and security cooperation with Washington.

Indeed, the visit facilitated Indonesia’s attempt at diversifying its economic portfolio, potentially inviting US investors to participate in sectors such as semiconductors and technology. The response was also positive; President Biden declared the importance of Indonesia and establishing new collaborations.

Nevertheless, how Trump will engage with Indonesia is another question. Politically, Prabowo’s move to open a dialogue with both superpowers separately shows his attempt at keeping a more politically-friendly approach in exercising the bebas dan aktif foreign policy.

In larger context, Jakarta has given signals that it is also open to breaking free from the United States’ economic influence. Through his foreign minister, Prabowo has indicated Indonesia’s interest in becoming a member of BRICS, a move that signifies his willingness to be somewhat independent from the Western-centric global order.

Specifically, the outcomes of both trips indicate that Prabowo is sidestepping the pressure to closely align with either of the two, as well as assuming a nuanced neutrality to maximize Indonesia’s geopolitical flexibility.

Running Up That Hill

Indonesia has based its philosophy of non-alignment on a vision that mirrored the political conception of Mohammad Hatta. Historically, one can see how this vision manifested clearly during the presidency of Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, with his “one million friends and zero enemies” foreign policy.

However, maintaining neutrality will become more intricate today. That is because, after Trump’s victory, his administration may step up pressure on Southeast Asian nations to align with Washington’s China containment strategy, seeking not only greater economic cooperation but also military support.

From a geopolitical perspective, developments in the South China Sea increase the complexity of maintaining a neutral position. The geopolitical tension stems from China’s attempt to expand its military influence across the zone, which includes areas of territory disputed by other countries like the Philippines. Indonesia, which claims an exclusive economic zone in the South China Sea, is particularly vulnerable to Chinese incursions.

A recent furore erupted when Prabowo, during his visit to China, seemingly agreed to China’s interpretation of the nine-dash line, a move that landed him as a subject of criticism over alleged foreign policy inexperience. While this has continued to put certain quaters on edge, it has also been interpreted as a step to managing the tension with China.

For Prabowo, therefore, the challenge will be in finding a balance between national security and the economic benefits of partnering with Beijing.

Yet this will be an increasingly uphill task in the near future. Trump’s administration may compel Prabowo to put pressure on China, potentially jeopardizing Indonesia’s own relations with the Middle Kingdom.

On the other hand, Indonesia cannot do this easily; China is arguably Indonesia’s most essential economic partner. Indeed, it can also be argued that this dependence on China may have become a potential vulnerability for Indonesia.

The Taiwan Question

Another critical issue that needs further examination is Taiwan, with which Indonesia has recently increased diplomatic engagement. This move could exacerbate tensions between Washington and Beijing, with the former putting pressure on Jakarta to take a more pro-stability stance in the Taiwan Straits.

In addition, Taiwan is strategically important for Indonesia. It is also home to a large Indonesian community, the second largest destination after Malaysia for its migrant workers. Indonesians number around 300,000 in Taiwan today.

Interestingly, the last presidential election saw almost 70% of Indonesian workers vote for Prabowo, driven by promises of reforms that would increase their protection as migrant workers.

Moreover, Indonesia is also a gem from the perspective of Taiwan’s. Indonesia is of its target countries for the New Southbound Policy, which sees Indonesia playing a vital role.

While closer relationship between the two is much desired by both sides, it might invite consternation from Beijing.

It remains to be seen if the Taiwan question could destabilize Indonesia’s relationship with China. One thing is certain: Prabowo needs to navigate this potential landmine tactfully.

Conclusion

Probowo has seen the rise of polarization in the international context and how foreign policy decisions could directly affect internal stability. He also understands that his political legitimacy is rooted in economic stability and the perception that Indonesia can prosper without outside interference.

A too-direct alliance with one of the two superpowers could disrupt the balance in Indonesia’s policy of non-interference. However, more studies should be undertaken to investigate how the public would perceive such a move by Prabowo’s administration. Finally, Trump’s return to the White House could also force Prabowo to make decisions that are unpopular with Indonesians. Yet, if the strategy is based on political autonomy and directed towards all without enemies, Indonesia could emerge as a new international player with Prabowo as a critical regional leader.

Introduction

President Ferdinand “Bongbong” Marcos Jr. of the Philippines plays a crucial role in the intricate geopolitical dynamics of Southeast Asia.

The administration’s strategic realignment towards strengthening ties with the United States represents a notable change in regional politics, especially in light of the escalating rivalry between the United States and China.

The reconfiguration is driven by the wider involvement of the United States in the area, as demonstrated by initiatives like the AUKUS security agreement involving Australia, the United Kingdom and the United States.

Although the Philippines is not directly participating in AUKUS, the agreement highlights the potential advantages that Manila could gain from military and strategic collaboration, particularly considering its ongoing maritime conflicts with Beijing.

The bolstered US military presence in the area, backed by agreements such as AUKUS, acts as a deterrent to China’s aggressive territorial assertions, particularly in the South China Sea. The sea in question serves as a focal point in the diplomatic relations between the Philippines and China, thus making the support of the United States vital to Manila’s strategy of deterrence.

Marcos Jr. aims to utilize the advantageous position of the Philippines to optimize its diplomatic and security advantages, by aligning more closely with US interests in order to strengthen its regional position.

Not So Easy

Nevertheless, the possibility of Donald Trump returning to the presidency in the United States brings about a sense of uncertainty regarding the changing security condition.

During Trump’s previous term, there were notable changes towards isolationism, evident in his decision to withdraw from international agreements and his skepticism towards long-established alliances.

An exemplary instance was his choice to withdraw from the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), a decision that was widely perceived as a withdrawal from the United States’ involvement in shaping regional economic frameworks and countering China’s increasing influence in the Asia-Pacific region.

Moreover, Trump’s lack of clear commitment to NATO and his confrontational requests for member nations to augment their defense expenditures demonstrated a more general unwillingness to participate in collaborative endeavors. The President’s decision to withdraw from the Paris Climate Agreement has further strengthened this pattern, indicating a potential scaling back of US participation in international obligations, which may be reinstated if he assumes office again.

The potential consequences of a Trump presidency have significant implications for the Philippines. Trump’s policies of isolationism may result in a decrease in the United States’ defense obligations, including those pertaining to the South China Sea.

This region holds significant importance for the Philippines, not only because of its ongoing territorial conflicts with China but also as a crucial passageway for global commerce.

If there is any uncertainty in the support provided by the United States, Marcos Jr. may need to adjust his foreign policy. This could involve seeking new alliances or enhancing the country’s military capabilities within its own borders to make up for the perceived withdrawal of US support.

If Trump’s isolationist approaches are reinstated, Marcos Jr.’s foreign policy strategy, which currently depends heavily on US support, could be at risk. The Philippines could be vulnerable if the United States reduces or withdraws its military presence, particularly in light of its recent assertive position against China.

This revelation may be interpreted within the country as a setback to Marcos Jr.’s plan to strengthen the Philippines’ global reputation and improve its security, which could potentially result in political instability domestically.

Internally, the political dynamics within the Philippines are highly responsive to changes in foreign policy. Marcos Jr.’s predecessor, Rodrigo Duterte, had developed stronger relations with China, moving away from the traditionally pro-US foreign policy path of the Philippines.

Duterte’s adoption of a pro-China policy was a strategic move aimed at expanding the Philippines’ diplomatic ties and decreasing its dependence on the United States.

If Marcos Jr.’s strategy, which is aligned with the United States, is unsuccessful in obtaining the expected support due to changes in US policy under a potential Trump administration, it may result in a revival of pro-China sentiment within the country, potentially led by Duterte or his political allies.

This has the potential to stimulate opposition movements and shape public opinion, resulting in a substantial transformation of the political environment. These changes have the potential to undermine Marcos Jr.’s legislative agenda and impact the electoral prospects of both him and his political allies.

Therefore, it is emphasized that there is a requirement for a well-rounded and adaptable foreign policy that can respond to changes in the global landscape while protecting the interests of the nation.

It Is All about Hedging

For Marcos Jr., effectively managing the delicate balance of international alliances, regional tensions and domestic political pressures is of utmost importance. Ineffectively handling these aspects could potentially lead to the Philippines becoming isolated on the global stage and undermine trust and confidence within the country, which would have negative consequences for the overall stability and effectiveness of the administration.

Aligning with the United States and taking a more assertive position on China signify substantial shifts from the previous administration’s approach. Trump’s return could disrupt this strategic positioning, making Marcos Jr. susceptible to domestic scrutiny and political obstacles.

The relationship between the Philippines’ foreign policy and its domestic political landscape is a constantly changing and flexible process, shaped by worldwide political patterns, regional security issues and internal political considerations. Essentially, Marcos Jr.’s foreign policy maneuver is a risky strategy with both positive and negative consequences.

Although there are advantages to aligning with the United States, relying too heavily on this partnership – considering the unpredictable nature of US politics – could result in significant challenges both domestically and internationally.

To successfully navigate this intricate terrain, it is essential to employ a sophisticated and flexible foreign policy strategy that can effectively protect the interests of the Philippines, irrespective of any changes in its relationships with major global powers.

The ASEAN Conundrum

In addition to the domestic and bilateral challenges discussed, an alignment with the United States places the Philippines in a precarious position within ASEAN.

Historically, the grouping has pursued a strategy of hedging—balancing relationships between major powers to avoid overt partiality and to maintain regional stability and autonomy. This strategy has allowed ASEAN Member States (AMS) to leverage relationships with both the United States and China, gaining benefits from each without becoming overly reliant on either.

However, putting all eggs on the US basket risks straining the Philippines’ relations with ASEAN. This shift could be perceived by other AMS as a departure from ASEAN’s traditional collective stance of neutrality and non-confrontation.

Such a perception might lead to diplomatic friction, as other AMS may be concerned about the implications of the Philippines’ US alignment for their own security and regional dynamics.

Moreover, ASEAN’s cautious approach to China contrasts sharply with the more confrontational stance that the Philippines is adopting under Marcos Jr. This divergence could isolate the Philippines within ASEAN and potentially reducing its influence in regional forums. In an organization that operates by consensus, the lack of alignment with the broader group could diminish the Philippines’ ability to shape regional policies and initiatives.

This potential isolation within ASEAN could compound the vulnerabilities Marcos Jr. faces due to potential shifts in the United States’ policy. If the superpower were to retract its military and strategic commitments in the region, the Philippines would find itself doubly disadvantaged—lacking both the robust backing of the United States and the supportive buffer traditionally provided by ASEAN.

Such a scenario could necessitate a recalibration of Marcos Jr.’s foreign policy to realign more closely with ASEAN’s principles of hedging and neutrality, or to seek strengthened bilateral relationships within the group.

Conclusion

Therefore, while Marcos Jr.’s alignment with the United States offers potential security benefits, it also introduces complexities into the Philippines’ regional relationships, particularly with ASEAN.

Balancing these relationships will require a nuanced approach to diplomacy that respects ASEAN’s collective ethos while safeguarding the Philippines’ national interests. Navigating this delicate balance is essential to ensure that the Philippines remains a proactive and respected member of the regional community, capable of influencing outcomes and advancing its national agenda in a rapidly evolving geopolitical landscape.

Tit for Tat

The previous Moon administration showed a cautious navigation between South Korea’s relations with China and the United States, placing Seoul in a blurry allegiance with both of them. Differently, the current Yoon administration has officially sided with the United States, with its own version of the Indo-Pacific Strategy, leaving South Korea’s strategic ambiguity behind.

Following this closer alignment, the United States is now able to maintain its strong foothold in Northeast Asia and, most importantly, protect Seoul from Pyeongyang’s aggression. This is essential as last year North Korea had nearly 40 missile tests while also firing a ballistic missile that flew over Japan and has the capability of hitting Guam, a US island in the Pacific Ocean.

A security cooperation with the United States is a vital to South Korea to ensure its safety against further aggressions such as these.

For the time being, the United States remains an important actor that can defend South Korea in the Pacific, especially in the Korean Peninsula. However, as the relationship took on a more and more military tinge – as evidenced with frequent military exercises and military cooperation – North Korea naturally grew threatened which encourages the hermit kingdom to turn to its only bargaining chip – its missile arsenal. The missile tests by North Korea prompted its southern neighbour to align its military closer with the United States, creating a continuous loop of security dilemma in the Korean Peninsula.

An example of this loop can be seen after North Korea fired a short-range ballistic missile in the New Year of 2023. South Korea retaliated by passing a resolution calling for a stronger alliance with the United States and to conduct more military exercises in March 2023. In response, Pyeongyang fired another Inter-Continental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) and threatened to turn the Pacific into its shooting ground. Such a display of tit for tat has already appeared countless times in the past and will likely remain a fixture in the near future.

The Beijing Question

With the US containment policy and the trilateral security relations between Japan, South Korea and the United States, Beijing is alerted for its security and felt contained in the Pacific.

China has a point to be concerned about Seoul’s shift in its foreign policy. Currently, the relations between China and the United States is not in good condition. The visit of the US House Speaker Nancy Pelosi to Taiwan inflamed the already tense US-China relations.

Moreover, the rogue balloon incident that flew over the United States airspace – resulted in the initial cancelation of the US Secretary of States Anthony Blinken’s visit to Beijing – sparked another spat between the two global powers as well.

Furthermore, the downward spiral in the relationship was fueled when President Joe Biden made a comment on President Xi Jinping that essentially regards the latter as a dictator, leading the Chinese foreign ministry to label the remark as a violation to China’s dignity.

This has not made it easier for Seoul. The shift in South Korea’s strategic maneuverability, with the United States as the major partner, can make China easily perceive this approach as a containment effort in which Seoul is perceived to have joined the United States in deterring Beijing.

However, in South Korea’s 2022 Defense White Paper, China was not mentioned as an issue to peace though the document emphasized on North Korea being an enemy for the first time in six years. The meeting between South Korea’s Foreign Minister Park Jin and the former Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi in August 2022 saw the latter encouraging Seoul not to be influenced by external obstacles. Meanwhile, South Korea’s message focused on promoting the relations between the two while also expressing concerns about North Korea’s provocation – an attempt to dilute the misperception Beijing is having on South Korea.

President Yoon also steered Seoul away from diving into the Taiwan conflict by refusing to have a physical meeting with Nancy Pelosi when she visited Taiwan, signaling to China that South Korea, at the end of the day, does not support the Taiwan Independence movement. This hints that despite Seoul’s shift in its strategic position, the relationship between South Korea and China remains vital – it is not in the best interest of both to headbutt each other.

This is understandable as China is an important trading partner for South Korea, trading over US$162 billion in 2021. China is also a major player in North Korea’s nuclear missile issue as Beijing could provide essential support for South Korea through dialogue with North Korea’s regime. Hence, provoking China is not in Seoul’s best interest as Beijing has the capacity to abandon or even further complicate the peace process in the Korean Peninsula.

Conclusion

The strategic clarity, under President Yoon Suk Yeol, has led South Korea and China into a new phase of relations. Beijing naturally becomes cautious as Seoul tilts towards the United States and labels North Korea as its enemy. China’s undoubted constraint could easily sour Seoul and Beijing relations.

South Korea needs a more concrete way of convincing China that its decision to join the US-led mechanism is not aiming to weaken China while Beijing should also enable high-level communication with Seoul to ensure continuous communication and avoid misconception. However, if the US-China strategic competition continues, North Korea would remain important to China, as it is an important buffer zone from one of the US’ closest allies in the region. This is especially pertinent as minor flare up between South Korea and China will continue to emerge from time to time. But with understanding and dialogue, it will become visible that South Korea is seeking to be China’s good neighbor, despite differences, while Seoul is pursuing to diversify its military cooperation to maintain its security that is currently threatened by North Korea.