The Three-Month Government and the Technocrat Façade

Thailand, the sick man of Asia, roared back to life at the recent general election that delivered an overwhelming mandate to a pro-establishment party.

This is the same party that just a little over two years ago was no more than a medium-sized regional outfit not known for much other than a pro-cannabis platform.

The Bhumjaithai Party’s (BJT) victory, with 193 seats in the 500-member Parliament – up by 122 from the 2023 general election – allows incumbent Prime Minister Anutin Charnvirakul to continue in his role.

Late last year, Anutin was asked to assume the premiership for three months by the reformist People’s Party (PP), which had the most seats in Parliament at the time, in exchange for BJT support for constitutional reform. He accepted the offer but reneged on the deal, refusing to reduce the legal power of the 200-strong Senate, which is, according to observers, stacked with BJT allies.

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But he made something of those three months in power by bringing in technocrats to fill key cabinet posts – foreign affairs, commerce and finance – and allowing others to fight over the remaining seats.

The move played well with voters as BJT members are not known for possessing any kind of expertise. Images of these technocrats were plastered on posters all around the country, with Anutin at the centre.

The result of the February 2026 general election was welcomed, as expected, by the country’s private sector, citing continuity and stability.

The Legacy of the King Cobra

BJT was founded by veteran politician Newin Chidchob in January 2009 after leading a high-profile defection from the Thaksin Shinawatra-aligned People’s Power Party (PPP) to support the rival Democrat Party in forming a new government and making Abhisit Vejjajiva the prime minister.

Newin is the namesake for the political term “cobra”, used in Thailand to describe those who betray their allies. The defection in January 2009 essentially made him a king cobra. A cable from the US Embassy in Bangkok described him as an “infamous dirty trickster” known for his “abrasive personality”. BJT’s power base is centred in the Khmer-speaking Buri Ram province, the Chidchob family’s long-standing political stronghold.

Today, BJT, the party that Newin created and continues to influence, has become the ultimate case study in Thai money politics.

Coming in second at the polls was the progressive-leaning PP with 118 seats (10 million votes at the national level), a drop from 151 (14 million votes) from the 2023 general election, making them the lar

Before the recent election, PP stated that they would not join a coalition with BJT as the lead. PP insiders said the decision was made on principle, citing the fact that BJT had gone back on its promise to push through constitutional reform.

Still, PP supporters felt let down by the decision to allow BJT to take the top post, but PP leaders would not go so far as to admit mistakes were made.

Poor and regrettable decision aside, PP has been constantly tested from the moment it surfaced as Future Forward eight years ago. The party has been dissolved

At the moment, 44 of their leading members face bans from politics by the Supreme Court for supporting a proposal to soften the punishments under the lese-majesté law.

PP’s predecessor, the Move Forward Party, came in first in the 2023 election but was denied the fruits of victory by the junta-appointed Senate. However, this was no sweat off Pheu Thai’s (PT) back, and PT wasted little time in putting together a ruling coalition.

During its two years in power, PT went through two prime ministers—both were removed by the Constitutional Court on ethical grounds.

The Fragility of the Reformist Front

Much of the support for PP was concentrated in urban areas, while BJT invested in local power brokers locally known as “Big Houses”. BJT also moved to put family members of these Big Houses on its party ticket to ensure t

Another big factor that helped BJT was the downfall of PT and the jailing of its nominal leader, Thaksin, who made a Faustian deal with the conservative elites to secure his return from 15 years of exile in exchange – at least he thought so – for his safe return to Thailand.

The move alienated his supporters, particularly those at the grassroots level. PT was hoping their populous policy would win them back, but the digital wallet scheme faced significant resistance and implementation challenges. Thailand’s economy grew only 2.5% for the full year of 2024.

This time around, to form a government, BJT has decided to form a coalition with PT. This is awkward indeed, as it seems like yesterday when BJT abandoned PT following the leaking of a private conversation between Paetongtarn Shinawatra and Cambodian strongman Hun Sen.

BJT’s departure in July 2025 left the PT-led government hanging by a thread with a slim majority. The Constitutional Court later ruled that Paetongtarn had committed gross ethical violations and removed her from office.

Where Are the Democrats?

Following in PP’s footsteps towards the opposition bench was the Democrat Party of former prime minister Abhisit Vejjajiva, who announced before this election that his party would not join any government that has the Khla Tham Party (KT) in the coalition.

The Democrats cited concerns about corruption and unethical business practices among KT members. Incidentally, KT performed rather well with 58 seats, while the Democrats won only 22.

The deeper meaning of the Democrat Party’s position on KT, said political observers, is to signal that the party is prepared to sit on the opposition bench with the PP.

KT’s nominal leader, Capt Thamanat Prompao, was convicted of conspiring to import heroin to Australia, with the ruling handed down on 31 March 1994, sentencing him to six years’ imprisonment. A plea bargain with Australian authorities got him released after four years.

During Anutin’s three-month administration, Thamanat expressed interest in the defence ministry portfolio but was not appointed. He may pursue this position again; however, Anutin could also seek the role, as he aims to enhance his collaboration with the military.

Both PP and the Democrats are expected to use their time in opposition to reassess and refine their positions, as there is widespread scepticism regarding the longevity of the BJT-led coalition, which many believe will not endure beyond two years.

The specific manner in which this coalition might dissolve remains uncertain. While retaliation from PT is conceivable, BJT currently maintains strong momentum, whereas Thaksin’s party has reached its lowest point in years, compounded by the incarceration of its leader.

At present, political survival appears to be the foremost concern, superseding any ambitions for retribution.

Poll after poll leading up to the 2026 general election had PT, BJT and PP neck-and-neck in a three-way race. But in the final analysis, toxic nationalism won the day.

The Border Wall

During his short stint in office, Anutin also gave the army a blank cheque on Thailand’s handling of the Cambodia border conflict. Building a wall along the Thai-Cambodian border was the centrepiece of his election campaign. At the time when the two sides reached a ceasefire agreement in late December 2025, Thai troops were sitting on top of strategic hills and border localities previously used as Cambodian military positions.

Talk of military reform, which in the Thai context means removing the armed forces from national politics, forced PP to put the issue on the back burner as the public cried out for a stronger and bigger army that can “cripple” Cambodia’s military capabilities to ensure they would not pose a threat for many years to come.

The Thai public was angry about Cambodia laying fresh mines along the disputed areas on the border. But no one asked the Thai military commanders why they kept sending troops on foot patrol to these areas when all sorts of technologies are available to monitor the areas.

It did not seem to matter to the policymakers and defence planners that much of the area along the border is disputed and has yet to be demarcated. With physical barriers and troop reinforcement, short-term political gain, not sustainable solutions, is good enough for Anutin.

It remains to be seen how his administration will deal with the border issue. Were the rhetorics about the border something politicians say during campaigns, or will Anutin continue to give the military full power to do whatever they want on the border once his government is formed?

Anutin also vowed to clamp down on online scammers. He will not be able to do it without the support of Cambodian law enforcement, which is not going to work with their Thai counterparts if Thai politicians continue to conflate the border conflict with Cambodian leaders being in bed with cybercriminals.

Some Considerations

The fact that Anutin does not seem to be as ambitious as Thaksin, whose every move was seen as challenging the status quo, works in his favour. Anutin seems very satisfied with the vote count. But of course, time will tell if this election result has planted crazy ambitions in Anutin’s head the same way it did with Thaksin two decades ago.

If recent Thai political history teaches us anything, it is that when here-today, gone-tomorrow politicians get aspirations and try to be more than what they can be, only disasters will follow. The toxic nationalism that Anutin has been riding will die down once tension along the Cambodian border subsides. The people’s attention will turn to Thailand’s “sick man of Asia” status as critical topics like salary and job security, as well as pocketbook issues, hit Anutin like a freight train.

Introduction

Since 2004, the persistent insurgency in Patani has resulted in a devastating toll of 7,780 fatalities stemming from 23,488 documented incidents. The protracted nature of this violence is also a principal factor driving this region to the lowest rank in Thailand for both development and poverty indices.

Approximately two decades of persistent instability have led scholars to define the Patani issue as a protracted conflict, characterised by deep-rooted grievances, structural complexity and extended duration.

In such a context, is the prospect of peace in the region realistically attainable? This is a pertinent question, particularly given the recent period of pronounced political fluidity at the national level, which has seen the country led by three different prime

Political Fluidity and Stagnation

The administration of Anutin Charnvirakul, which was initially positioned as a four-month transitional government, generated tempered expectations regarding its capacity to effect meaningful change.

However, mere days into his tenure,

Furthermore, the Office of the National Security Council (NSC) organised a public forum featuring both current and former key figures in the peace process, titled “Peace Dialogue: From the Past to the Future”.

While critics noted a deficiency in the inclusion of local stakeholder voices, the event served as a robust exercise in strategic communication, signalling – at least on the part of NSC – a renewed commitment to reviving the peace process.

During its brief mandate, the government sought to leverage its expertise in economic policy and provincial administration to prioritise developmental interventions, including educational reform.

If executed effectively, such an approach, though not addressing the fundamental root causes of the Patani conflict, could foster a societal environment conducive to peace.

Nevertheless, the government’s inept handling of the flooding crisis in the southern region has precipitated a sharp decline in its political capital. Consistent with historical precedents, Bangkok has once again diverted its focus toward broader national crises, leaving the Patani issue marginalised.

Currently trapped by tensions with Cambodia and the ongoing flood emergency, the government has allowed the peace process to lapse into silence. Ultimately, the prime minister’s recent decision to dissolve Parliament, leading

Institutional Dissonance and the Crisis of Political Will

Within the state’s structure, the success of an effective peace process in Patani hinges on two critical prerequisites: unwavering political will and a unified strategic vision across the bureaucratic apparatus.

This necessitates a synergy between soft-liners and hard-liners, as well as seamless alignment between high-level policy design and grassroots implementation.

Cultivating the political will necessary to resolve the Patani conflict requires the courage to introduce alternative perspectives to Thai society—narratives that may provoke public backlash by challenging the dominant national discourse.

This traditional discourse frames the Patani issue as a matter of territorial separatism instigated by criminal elements whose distinct ethnic and religious identities are perceived as a betrayal of the nation’s sacred values.

Consequently, successive administrations, including the Anutin government, have bypassed the ontological roots of the problem to avoid alienating their voter base.

A profound lack of understanding among parliamentarians prevents them from becoming the agents of change required. Thus, while solving the Patani issue is often declared a national agenda, such proclamations remain largely symbolic and fail to reflect a genuine commitment to a correct way of resolution.

The Divergence of Policy and Praxis

Since 2006, national security policies have officially redefined the Patani issue as a political rather than a military problem. Theoretically, this shifts the focus toward winninghearts and minds, promoting local identity, and fostering peace dialogues within a conducive environment.

In practice, however, militarised operations continue to dominate the landscape. Civil society reports to the National Human Rights Commission (NHRC) highlight ongoing concerns. These include the non-consensual collection of DNAs from civilians, aggressive use of force violating human rights standards and legal irregularities under security special laws enforcement for approximately two decades.

Furthermore, the systematic indictment of local activists has been criticised by international standards as Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation (SLAPP) cases.

This phenomenon could be referred to as tacticsthat ruin strategies. The cumulative result of this 20-year impasse is that while Bangkok maintains territorial sovereignty, it has failed to secure the political legitimacy and local support essential for ending an asymmetric conflict. Given this context, serious questions arise regarding the scope of upcoming peace talks. With a peace dialogue team that lacks a clear mandate from a politically hesitant government and NSC that appears reluctant to exercise its authority over military factions, the potential for reaching a substantive resolution remains deeply uncertain.

Impasse

Prior to the stagnation of the past years, the Kuala Lumpur Process – facilitated by the Malaysian government – had incrementally transitioned from foundational confidence-building measures between the Thai government and Barisan Revolusi Nasional Melayu Patani (BRN) towards a technical collaborative framework known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan towards Peace (JCPP).

This roadmap comprised three pillars: violence reduction, public consultation and the pursuit of political solutions.

The resumption of dialogues in December 2025 allowed both parties to formalise these concepts into the Peace Dialogue Process Implementation Framework (PDPIF). While the government solidified its three primary negotiating pillars, BRN disclosed five same-vein requirements regarding the “end state” of the conflict, notably excluding the possibility of merdeka (full independence).

The Divergence of Strategic Objectives

Historically, both the Thai military and insurgent wings have demonstrated a functional, albeit imperfect, degree of command and control over their respective operations.

However, the true friction lies within the latter two components of the government’s framework: public consultation and political resolution.

The Thai state – specifically the military – seeks to maintain a unilateral monopoly over political discourse to preserve territorial integrity and national values.

Conversely, BRN aims to leverage the political pr

This ideological inconsistency has prompted the government to employ information operations (IO) and the surveillance of local activists perceived as threats to the national narrative.

In response, BRN utilises sophisticated strategic communications – ranging from grassroots mobilisation to social media campaigns – to frame their struggle as a rightful resistance rooted in local Malay identity and historical grievances.

The Legitimacy Gap

Regrettably, this political dimension has devolved into a zero-sum stalemate. Neither side has garnered sufficient political legitimacy; Bangkok is often viewed as an external intruder by the local Malay populace, while BRN’s credibility is hampered by its history of civilian casualties and a lack of clarity regarding the status of the local Thai Buddhist minority.

Furthermore, a significant portion of Thai society views any dialogue involving local autonomy as a slippery slope toward eventual secession.

Internally, the protracted nature of peace talks, devoid of tangible political outcomes, risks eroding the authority of BRN’s dialogue team. Rank-and-file combatants on the ground, though generally strict under command, may favour the revolusi approach of their 1960s constitution over a peaceful, reformasi path toward autonomy.

Consequently, the Kuala Lumpur Process remains effective only in the realm of de-escalation and military coordination, while failing to address the fundamental political issues.

When the dialogue shifts from military to political substance, the circumstances turned out to be heavily awkward for both parties, who must claim to be speaking on behalf of all local people.

Without the courage to openly discuss these sensitive “end state” realities and renounce their monopoly of the peace process to the public, the peace dialogue inevitably risks being reduced to mere “peace small talks”.

Re-engineering the Peace Process

A fundamental redesign of the peace process is imperative, rooted in the recognition that local populations have historically been treated as mere objects of reference by both the state and insurgent factions. This lack of genuine political agency has prevented both parties from garnering the legitimacy required to resolve a protracted conflict.

Consequently, an alternative framework must be adopted, one that transforms the local populace from passive objects into active subjects of the peace process.

To achieve a people-centred resolution and secure the political legitimacy necessary for a systemic redesign of regional power, the peace dialogue should be structured into two distinct, yet interconnected, phases.

Phase I: Security Stabilisation and De-escalation

Phase I must focus exclusively on the military domain, seeking a formal agreement between both parties to reduce violence and limit logistical combat operations. A primary objective of this phase is a mutual commitment to ensure that civilians and public spaces remain strictly non-combatant zones, overseen by a robust third-party monitoring mechanism.

That is why the recent arson attacks on 11 petrol stations across Narathiwat, Pattani and Yala provinces are very much regretted, as these could derail this phase before it even begins.

Crucially, the Thai government and BRN must collectively guarantee a safe space, free from intimidation, which is a prerequisite for local stakeholders to participate meaningfully in the subsequent phase.

This security-centric dialogue can be effectively managed within the existing Kuala Lumpur Process, with Malaysia continuing its role as facilitator.

Phase II: The Political Domain and Indigenous Consensus

The second phase, addressing the political domain – including public consultation and long-term political solutions – requires a different approach.

Given the legitimacy deficit inherent in bilateral dialogue held abroad, phase II cannot succeed through exclusive agreements between the state and BRN on a foreign platform. Instead, the process must be re-territorialised, taking place within the country itself to ensure local ownership and procedural integrity.

While the current administration and BRN appear to be moving toward public hearings, such activities often lack the depth of political participation required to confer true legitimacy. Phase II must thus facilitate a consensual building process between actors in the local society regarding power-sharing models, transitional justice and socio-economic development.

The Role of the Internal Third Party

To reach a definitive “end state”, the role of the third party must evolve beyond mere facilitation into mediation, addressing sensitive issues such as fact-finding, a proper remedy for the victims and rehabilitation as well as reintegration. However, to avoid the perception of foreign intruders violating state sovereignty, this mediation should be led by a domestic committee instead of Malaysia or other foreign actors.

This internal mechanism should be composed of diverse local stakeholders, with independent bodies, such as the National Human Rights Commission (NHRC), serving as a central node or coordinator.

Finally, to ensure the sustainability of this process, the Thai Parliament must enact legislation that legally enshrines and protects the right of local citizens to engage in active, meaningful involvement in phase II of the peace process.

Beyond the Impasse: Making Local Consensus

The Patani peace process currently stands at a critical juncture where technical roadmaps like JCPP and PDPIF are insufficient to mask a deeper structural failure: the deficit of legitimacy.

As long as the dialogue remains a bilateral discussion between a state clinging to a unilateral monopoly on discourse and an insurgent leadership struggling to reconcile revolutionary ideals with political pragmatism, it will remain trapped in the cycle of what is referred to here as peace small talks.

The path forward necessitates a courageous transition from military de-escalation to political transformation. By decoupling security stabilisation from political resolution, we can preserve the facilitator role of the Kuala Lumpur Process for phase I while domesticating the political consensus in phase II. To move from being objects of reference to active subjects, the local populace must be granted the legal and institutional agency to co-author their own “end state”. Only by enshrining this local ownership through a domestic mediation committee – protected by parliamentary mandate – can the process move beyond symbolic proclamations towards a durable, rights-based peace that honours both state sovereignty and the indigenous political identity of the Patani people.

Electoral Ambitions vs Security Realities

In the beginning of this year, 11 PTT petrol stations in Thailand’s southernmost border provinces came under simultaneous arson and bombing attacks in the wee hours of Sunday, 11 January 2026.

The country is currently undergoing preparations for a nationwide poll to elect local administration organisation officials.

Prime Minister Anutin Charnvirakul said the attacks might have been connected to the local elections in this region, which has a history of political violence. Success at the local level can shape national party strategies for the upcoming general election scheduled for 8 February.  

But by afternoon, the National Security Council (NSC) issued a statement saying the spate of attacks had “disrupted the peaceful co-existence of people of all races and faiths in the region, and that it was a clear indication that the responsible party has no legitimacy and is not qualified to claim representation of the people of this area.”

NSC stopped short of directly blaming Barisan Revolusi Nasional Melayu Patani (BRN), the long-standing separatist movement that controls virtually all of the fighters on the ground. NSC has maintained that such violence undermined the ongoing peace process and has conveyed its concerns to BRN through the Malaysian government, the designated facilitator for the peace talks.

Official peace talks between Thailand and the Patani Malay separatist movements started in February 2013. The two sides have never moved beyond what they called “confidence-building measures”.

Divergent Visions

A leap of faith was taken at the high-level official meeting in December 2025, in Kuala Lumpur, when chief negotiators of the two sides, after nearly two years of no talks, discussed this flimsy notion of “end state”. It is a loaded term that is supposed to encapsulate how this century-old conflict should be resolved.

The previous government under Paetongtarn Shinawatra refused to engage in any official talks with BRN until the movement ceased violence on the ground. Moreover, her government insisted that BRN must send their military leaders to the table.

Technical representatives of the two sides came together from  6 to 8 January to continue with the discussion on the end state.

Thailand was not prepared to put all their cards on the table, but BRN spelt out in real terms what this notion means. For th

Obviously, the Thai representatives at the table did not have the kind of mandate to negotiate such a matter. It is way above the negotiators’ pay grade.

Demands for Autonomy

BRN went on to say that agreement on power and resource-sharing will have to be worked out between the two sides; the most disturbing clause is the right to secession. Until then, this historically contested regi

A Thai government official from

But there is no guarantee that Parliament would pass such a law, as it would be political suicide. Political and administrative powers in Thailand are extremely centralised.

Moreover, the Thai public in general is not sympathetic to the plight and grievances of the Malays of Patani.

Thailand suggested that the Southern Border Provinces Administrative Center (SBPAC), a bloated multi-agency body that focused on development – particularly pilot projects to be handed back to line ministries – could be an entry point for BRN. Needless to say, the January meeting ended badly.

The Signal

Three days later, 11 PTT petrol stations and the attached convenience stores across the region were attacked. All fingers pointed to BRN.

It is worth noting that BRN does not confirm or deny operations on the ground. BRN fighters operate on autopilot; combatants act independently of their political leaders, who intervene when they deem the fighters have violated ground rules or when coordinations are needed. Such an arrangement allows the movement’s political leaders and negotiators a plausible deniability.

Thai officials said that instead of reverting to violence to pres

They need to be certain if their model of governance is what the people want, Thai officials said.

The current wave of insurgency violence resurfaced in mid-2001 after a decade of relative calm but was not officially recognised until 4 January 2004, when scores of BRN combatants raided an army battalion and made off with about 350 pieces of military weaponry.

Civilian and soft targets, including public schools and sometimes Buddhist monks and teachers, were targeted in the early phase of this wave of insurgency until local civil society organisations and community leaders stepped up their criticisms against BRN, calling for greater respect for civility and rules of engagement.

Attacks against civilian targets have virtually disappeared but do happen once in a long while, usually as a stern warning to the Thai security forces. A case in point was the brief but dramatic spike in violence against civilian targets in May 2025, in response to the shooting death of Abdulroning Lateh, a key BRN leader from the military wing. As expected, Thai security forces denied killing Abdulroning.

While the attackers may not have been after body counts in these arson attacks, the 11 petrol stations are nevertheless civilian targets. A local political action group, The Patani, issued a statement calling on all sides to embrace humanitarian principles and to end attacks on civilian targets.

BRN sympathisers often cite economic injustices whenever private businesses come under attack. Artef Sohko, president of The Patani, said the corporate brands of these petrol stations and convenience stores may belong to PTT and 7-Eleven, but the people who suffer most from these attacks are the franchisees, not the corporations themselves. BRN said they felt the Thai side treated them as a “plaything”—throwing out some fancy words, like “end state”, but refusing to elaborate or act on it. They felt the current government resu

Introduction

At the heart of Thailand and Cambodia’s stormy bilateral relations lies their border conflict that has gone through periodic flare-ups, but none as severe as 2025’s clashes.

The conflict’s root causes are now intertwined with modern forces of globalisation, such as transnational crime and information warfare, offering grave lessons in modern governance and addressing security threats that transcend borders.

Meanwhile, elite capture of domestic and foreign politics, major power involvement, and regional inertia on conflict management contribute to the conflict’s protracted nature, ensuring no easy solution for peace.

Background

Colonial-era boundary treaties between Siam (Thailand before 1933) and French Indochina placed various Khmer-style temples in ambiguously demarcated zones. With the exception of the Preah Vihear Temple, which the International Court of Justice (ICJ) ruled as belonging to Cambodia in 1962, the area around three other temples remains hotly contested, with little to no progress on border demarcation.

Between May and July 2025, severe fighting broke out along several border provinces in Cambodia and Thailand.

A fragile ceasefire was reached on 28 July, overseen by Malaysia, then chair of ASEAN, the United States and China. On the sidelines of the 47th ASEAN Summit in Kuala Lumpur, Thailand and Cambodia signed the Kuala Lumpur Peace Accords, witnessed by Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim and President Donald Trump.

After weeks of renewed fighting in December 2025, another ceasefire was reached on 27 December.

To complicate the already volatile border environment, Chinese-run transnational criminal networks housing thousands of trafficked workers are operating cyber-scam compounds along the Cambodian border.

Stoking the Flames of War

While both sides blame the other for starting the hostilities, what is clear is that the lopsided domestic power balance enables the political and military elites in Thailand and Cambodia to needlessly prolong the conflict. This is done by shaping domestic and foreign policies based on ultra-nationalist sentiment, as well as exploiting information asymmetries of both local and international

Military information operations on both sides have each vilified the other and downplayed the significance of the temples as shared cultural symbols. Such operations have exponentially scaled up, exacerbated by the proliferation of fake news.

Former Cambodian strongman Hun Sen remains the most powerful actor in the country, despite his son serving as the current prime minister. He has been dictating all military decisions surrounding the conflict.

Although Cambodia is the militarily weaker nation, Hun Sen seems confident in waging war by utilising his authoritarian grip on power and deep knowledge and relationships with Thai politicians to destabilise Thai politics.

The country’s information vacuum – stemming from the stifling of government criticism and dissenting views of the war as well as scant information about the Cambodian military – has allowed Cambodian elites to perpetuate a narrative of victimhood.

On the other hand, the powerful Thai military has gained public trust and enjoyed a resurgence in popularity over its handling of the border conflict, with a view to shoring up support for pro-military parties in the next general election in February 2026. It has deliberately projected its image as a unified, disciplined unit and protector of national security, especially after pledging to regain the disputed temples.

Despite this, technical issues of border demarcation continue to be shrouded in secrecy, with the Thai military refusing to publicly disclose the results of its own border surveys.

Multidimensional Conflict

The conflict has become entangled with scam operations that operate openly on the Cambodian side, demonstrating the extent of corruption and complicity with organised crime inside the Cambodian government.

The global spotlight is now firmly on the border scam economy that likely provides illicit income for Cambodian elites, generating revenue equivalent to half of Cambodia’s GDP.

For much of 2025, the Thai government has largely been foot-dragging to tackle scam operations. Only recently have they begun seizing assets and expanding the investigation of Cambodian-Chinese criminal networks after being pressured by major power scrutiny. Thai air strikes now specifically target scam compounds housing Cambodian military assets.

As investigative reports increasingly point to an alleged connection between scam operators and high-level Thai elites, the tactic to cut off the Cambodian government’s alleged source of revenue has hit a wall of reticence by the current administration. This raises questions about possible vested cross-border business interests between the two countries’ elites.

Are Major Powers Helping or Hurting?

Prolonged b

As the world grapples with Trump’s erratic behaviour, the United States’ involvement is perceived as performative, with no sincere desire to resolve the conflict but to push for its economic interests in the form of high tariffs, which the Thai side has rejected.

The United States has not taken the opportunity to shore up its alliance with Thailand, its major non-NATO ally. Instead, it has been hedging its bets in the conflict by downplaying the grievances of Thailand and the thawing US-Cambodia ties after the peace accords by lifting an arms embargo and pledging to restart joint military trainings.

Nonetheless, the judge is still out on whether Cambodia can genuinely become the United States’ strategic partner, as it traditionally has close security ties with China.

Meanwhile, Cambodian Prime Minister Hun Manet has played up his shared authoritarian affinities with Trump – as well as the latter’s personal interest in peacemaking – by nominating him for the Nobel Peace Prize after the peace accords were signed.

Hun Manet’s friendship with fellow graduates from his alma mater, the United States’ West Point Academy, also raises questions about the neutrality of US policy decision-makers towards the conflict.

In contrast to the United States’ high-stakes diplomatic pressure, the Chinese have preferred low-profile, non-coercive diplomacy to mediate the conflict. But there is scepticism over China’s declaration of having no vested interest in the conflict, given its significant political, economic and defence ties with both countries as well as its desire to counter the United States’ overtures to its key partners in the region.

China already has a poor track record in conflict management in Southeast

ASEAN’s Role

ASEAN’s lack of binding frameworks and structured conflict management has prompted member states to rely on personal rapport and informal discussions over institutionalised mechanisms. But leaning on current mechanisms and personalities, such as Track 1.5 diplomacy, has failed to resolve regional conflicts.

Before last year’s clashes, the calculated military build-up in both countries was clear, but ASEAN did little to address heightening tensions.

The current ASEAN Secretary-General Kao Kim Hourn, a Cambodian, is not trusted to mediate the current conflict, as was the case with the former secretary-general, Surin Pitsuwan, a Thai, during clashes in 2008.

Malaysia’s Anwar has proactively mediated in the conflict by facilitating various ceasefire meetings and coordinating the work of the ASEAN Observer Team (AOT) that has provided a neutral source of facts from the ground. Nevertheless, his time for peacemaking has run out, as Malaysia’s chairmanship ended late last year.

ASEAN’s conflict management modus operandi cannot be reformed overnight. But stepping up peer pressure to bolster adherence to regional and UN mechanisms on early-warning systems, confidence-building measures, and weapons non-proliferation will go a long way to prevent escalations and encourage dialogue.

The region should coordinate with external partners to pressure both countries to clamp down on transnational crime that plays both a direct and supporting role in sustaining the conflict. Ramping up efforts to tackle illicit money flows in Thailand, the main destination for laundered scam profits from Cambodia, would be a good start.

Silencing the Guns

The border conflict has dragged on due to both sides’ belligerent, authoritarian tendencies and toxic ultra-nationalism, alongside the dubious attempts at mediation by external players.

There is little political will on both sides to de-escalate the situation, as pro-military parties attempt to win over hearts and minds of the public for Thailand’s general election in February 2026, while Cambodia’s Hun regime appears more entrenched in power than ever.

Although Thailand has the military advantage, the Thai side is mindful of Cambodian retaliation as well as backlash from the international community if military operations are stepped up. Thus, a stalemate is the current medium- to long-term scenario, especially if both sides do not sincerely return to mechanisms such as the Joint Boundary Commission, the main bilateral mechanism for negotiations on border demarcation.

To ensure neutrality and impartiality of mediation, returning to ASEAN-led mediation is the most constructive path forward as well as boosting the capacity of the AOT. The Philippines, as the current ASEAN chair, is expected to bring its conflict management skills from domestic experiences to the role of mediator.

The Deadlock of Divergent Aspirations

On the surface, the statement by the designated Malaysian facilitator for the peace talks sounded promising: Thailand and the rebel Barisan Revolusi Nasional Melayu Patani (BRN) agreed to work towards an “end state”.

The term emerged from decades of establishment officials asking one persistent question: how will this all end?

For BRN, however, the end state means self-government through a regional assembly empowered to draft its own laws and manage local affairs, including taxation, education and power sharing with the central government. Most controversially, they seek the right to secede from the Thai state.

For the Thais, the end state is something that has to be negotiated.

But after more than two decades of on-again, off-again peace talks, the two sides can still find a common ground to guide the peace process towards a meaningful end. The furthest they have progressed is establishing a framework – the so-called Joint Working Group on Peace Process (JCPP) – under which both sides identified three priorities. These are the reduction of violence, public consultation and a political solution to end the conflict.

Little progress has been made on concrete details, however.

The previous government under then prime minister Paetongtarn Shinawatra refused to resume talks unless BRN stopped attacking Thai targets. They also insisted on negotiating only with BRN’s military wing—those who supposed

BRN countered that violence reduction must be negotiated, and any ceasefire would require monitoring by the international community.

Within days of taking power, the government under Prime Minister Anutin Charnvirakul announced the resumption of peace talks. No one was certain what he hoped to achieve, g

Thai and BRN chief negotiators met briefly in November 2025 to prepare for a high-level official meeting on 8 December in Kuala Lumpur. This time, the term “JCPP” was dropped and replaced with the Peace Dialogue Plan Implementation Framework (PDPIF). The content is more or less the same, but the rebranding creates an impression that Anutin’s camp is pursuing something fresh and new.

Rebranding the Stagnation

“But nothing fundamentally has changed,” said Asmadee Bueheng, a local writer and a close observer of the conflict. “Youth activists still face legal persecution for speaking out, and the controversial Emergency Law remain in place.”

This short-lived new beginning saw the end of the role of five internat

The press statement from Malaysia’s Office of the Facilitator for the southern Thai peace talks contained some promising words. But considering the background and context – how this high-level meeting suddenly materialised after nearly two years of no official talks – it is difficult to feel excited about any claims of success.

There were secret meetings, facilitated by Malaysia, to get BRN to stand down during last year’s Ramadhan (from 1 to 30 March), but Bangkok did not have anything to offer.

While a regional assembly may be too controversial at this juncture, other issues such as the Patani Malay ethno-religious identity, historical narrative and cultural space could have been pushed through to demonstrate the country’s willingness to meet BRN halfway. 

Instead, the Thai side offered nothing new beyond a different chief negotiator and fancy words that confused more than clarified any meaningful intent.

The Living Memory of Tak Bai

BRN combatants, who have been operating on an autopilot mode in which a set of broadly defined rules of engagement are normally observed, are reminded of the Tak Bai massacre in 2004 when 85 young Malay men died at the hand of Thai security forces. As many as 78 of them died from suffocation because they were stacked on top of one another, and seven were shot dead at the protest site.

Thailand never made a closure on this incident, as the statute of limitations expired 20 years after the incident, but the security forces continue to pay the price for the incident. The massacre became an important part of the rebels’ narrative.

Based on the public statement released after the December meeting, it appears that the Thai representatives could have taken this chance to respond to the longstanding grievances expressed by BRN and the people of Patani.

In short, the recent high-level meeting itself represents progress only because peace talks had been put off for some time.

But the meeting’s modest output risks creating false hope among local people who want to see meaningful talks resume. It came at a time when Anutin was facing a desperate political situation following poor handling of flooding in the South.

Moreover, his unchecked support for the army over the border clashes with Cambodia could backfire against his mid-size party if the current frantic nationalism loses steam and his base in the northeast begins demanding attention to bread-and-butter issues – or, in their case, rice and fish – as the cost of military operations takes a toll on their livelihoods.

As with the far south conflict, allowing the army to define “national threats” limits the scope of solutions. For more than two decades, this threat perception has confined the peace process to a tiny box of confidence-building measures. It has merely served as a talk shop that never advances because bureaucrats cannot agree on the nature of the violence, much less the needed concession for peaceful coexistence with the Malays of Patani.

Calling it a “conflict” means recognising the historical grievances of the Malay people and legitimising BRN. But calling the combatants anything other than criminals invites counterattacks not just from the hawks but from a public that has long believed official claims that these Melayu fighters are drug-crazed yo

The “Criminal” vs “Conflict” Narrative

Yet, even after security officials came to the realisation that they had been barking up the wrong tree – that religion is not the driving force of the struggle, but Malay nationalism – they lacked the political will to explore terms for peaceful coexistence with the Malays. Instead, they relied mainly on military-led counterinsurgency measures.

According to Asmadee, nothing has changed under the current Thai government. The controversial Emergency Law and Martial Law remain in place, and political activists continue facing harassment from security agencies and through judicial channels. Mi

Moreover, five youth leaders from The P

The participants were asked if they would support a formal referendum on RSD – not independent Patani – if the law permits it. The Fourth Army Area, the command in charge of the Thailand’s counterinsurgency in this restive region, was displeased and directed the police to press charges.

Ironically, The Patani is often the group security officials consult – and at times ask to intervene – when addressing extremely sensitive issues with BRN. The Patani criticises all sides – Thai authorities and BRN – when rights are violated and rules of engagement, civility and humanitarian norms are disrespected.

Anutin will certainly go to the polls in February 2026 claiming to have accomplished something for the far south—more than the previous government, at least. If his Bhumjaithai Party becomes a coalition member of the next government, the current negotiating team could receive another mandate. Whether they can develop the political courage to be more creative than their predecessors – or convince the conservative establishment to open space for critical dialogue – remains to be seen.

Introduction

After years of military rule in Thailand, democracy seems to be back in full swing. With an eye to win the next general election in March 2026 or possibly sooner, new players, power brokers and alliances have emerged, while the public has grown generally more progressive, calling for deep structural reforms.

Three main political parties and their alliances – namely the “blue” (Bhumjaithai Party – BJT), “orange” (People’s Party – PP) and “red” (Pheu Thai Party – PT) factions – are the main contenders in Thailand’s upcoming general elections, likely held in March 2026 or sooner.

The year 2025 saw several unexpected developments, such as the fall of populist PT as a major political force and the rise of conservative BJT, while progressive PP is still the most popular party among the public.

However, despite the return of democratic dynamism, it remains to be seen which of the three biggest parties can join hands to form a coalition government and come to

This is the very constitution that has time and time again been exploited to remove politicians and facilitate elite capture of key democratic institutions.

Uneasy Alliances

In August 2025, the Constitutional Court removed then prime minister Paetongtarn Shinawatra of PT from office after a controversy involving a leaked phone call with Cambodian strongman Hun Sen.

The power vacuum was filled by BJT leader Anutin Charnvirakul who succeeded her with the lower house’s majority support, enabled by a surprising new coalition between BJT and PP, albeit with certain conditions.

The surprising alliance came on the heels of the growing rift between PT and BJT over the legalisation of cannabi

All eyes are now on Anutin to keep his word to meet PP’s conditions that led them to support BJT in forming a majority government, outlined in a Memorandum of Agreement (MoA) to cement their new alliance.

The agreement includes resolutions to dissolve the Parliament by 31 January, organise general elections, conduct a referendum to set up a constitution-drafting assembly for a new charter and remain a minority government. All these must be completed within a four-month timeframe, with PP remaining as opposition all the while.

However, recent moves by the blue party suggest that they are prepping to consolidate power and win the election at the expense of genuinely reforming Thailand’s democratic system.

Constitutional Tussles

Charter change is undeniably one of the main contentious points today that is needed to level out the democratic playing field.

Under the current constitution, one of the main difficulties for elected politicians to assume power lies with the upper house. Consisting of 200 interim unelected senators, the Senate can block prime minister candidates as well as pick and choose elites for unelected agencies – including the Election Commission (EC) and the Constitutional Court that have frequently intervened in political disputes – mandated the dissolution of political parties and paved the way for military coups.

PP’s predecessor, Move Forward, won the last election but was blocked from assuming power under current constitutional provisions. Thus, constitutional amendment has become PP’s flagship issue. Other parties appear not as committed; they are less interested in democratic change and more geared towards preserving the status quo, winning the election, and gaining power.

In September 2025, the Constitutional Court ruled that three referendums are required for charter change, but the public is not allowed to elect a Constituent Drafting Assembly. PP is racing to finalise their draft bill that focuses on expanding public participation as much as possible by the end of this year, which would enable them to gain popularity as the party that prioritises democratic reforms.

The Meteoric Rise of the Blue

Anutin and BJT’s true agenda seems not on furthering charter change but on laying the groundwork to lead BJT to electoral victory. Consider this: in open violation of the MoA, BJT continues to poach parliamentarians and support from smaller parties.

Anutin’s background also casts doubt over his commitment to democratic change. The rise of Anutin, a former president of Sino-Thai – one of Thailand’s largest construction conglomerates – is in large part thanks to his shrewd cultivation of close ties with military, bureaucratic and business elites over decades. His connections and associates now populate the Senate and hold key ministerial positions; he also acts as their proxy in Thai politics while advancing his party’s interests. He has kept the powerful Minister of Interior portfolio for himself to oversee provincial administration and voting in key constituencies, such as Northeastern Thailand.

Having served in the military-aligned administration of Gen Prayut Chan-o-cha as well as that of PT-led ruling coalitions of his immediate predecessors, Anutin has taken a direct leaf out of PT’s past playbook in befriending parties of all ideological persuasions. He does this by doling out favours to local politicians in key constituencies, which enabled him to seamlessly seize the opportunity for power.

On the economic side, the Anutin administration is implementing “Quick Big Wins”—populist policies such as tax relief and stimulus programmes for consumer goods. It has also conducted a flurry of free trade negotiation talks with several large economies that have temporarily curried favour with the business community and public. However, thus far, it has failed to address structural economic reforms that could meaningfully jumpstart Thailand’s sluggish economy, which has one of ASEAN’s lowest GDP growth rates at 1.8%.

The Thai-Cambodia border conflict has shed light on the alleged links of elites on both sides to illicit border activities, including cyber-scam and money laundering operations. Curiously, however, despite mounting domestic and international pressure, the Anutin administration appears to be dragging its feet in proactively safeguarding the integrity of Thailand’s financial system and investigating numerous Thais and foreigners residing in Thailand allegedly linked to this widening ring of criminality.

His deputy finance minister already resigned over allegations of his connection to money laundering practices. If not tackled seriously, more scam-related scandals could prompt an overthrowing of the government and inflict serious damage to Thailand’s political and economic credibility.

Anutin is also seen as pandering to nationalist sentiments to keep ultra-nationalist politicians on his side by playing the role of the strongman who will not “yield a single centimetre” to Cambodia. He has also deferred to the army for border management decisions in northeastern provinces along the Thai-Cambodian border, which are all BJT strongholds.

However, there exists some distrust of Anutin’s cosy dealings with the military – the latter is seen as interfering in civilian politics once more – as well as his clumsy diplomacy with President Donald Trump, who raised the stakes for both sides to comply with the US-supported Kuala Lumpur Peace Accord in return for favourable negotiations o

PP’s Fight for Office

Public support for progressivism appears to be unwavering despite the MoA with BJT and numerous attempts to cripple the progressive movement, including the dissolution of Move Forward and the banning of key party leaders – such as Pita Limjaroenrat – from politics for 10 years.

PP continues to maintain popularity by fielding a plethora of young, magnetic and informed members of parliament and portraying themselves as a clean, reform-minded party under the slogan “Thailand ungrey, equal and future-ready”. The “grey” term refers to capital funding from illicit activities that is embroiling other parties in scandal.

PP have abandoned Move Forward’s key policy platforms, such as pledges to reform the military, break up business monopolies and reform Article 112 of the Thai Penal Code (lese-majeste law). The party is now prioritising political practicality over values by putting these sensitive issues on the backburner while they forge an alliance with BJT and continue talks with PT on keeping the government accountable.

Is PT Declining?

Despite winning the second most votes in the last election, PT’s popularity has steeply declined since then due to a series of mishaps from overplaying their hand and overestimating the sincerity of conservative factions.

Supporters view that PT abandoned their democratic credentials by joining the conservative coalition government after the 2023 election—something they explicitly promised not to do during their election campaign. An alleged informal deal made between the Shinawatra clan and the elite establishment to pave the way for PT to govern once more also appears to have allowed the return of former leader Thaksin to his homeland after a 15-year self-imposed exile. This further alienated the public that increasingly rejects secret deals among el

However, this deal appears to have broken down, as Thaksin, one of Thailand’s richest and most powerful men, is now serving a one-year imprisonment sentence. Meanwhile, the short-lived Srettha and Paetongtarn administrations failed to deliver outstanding policy achievements and significant democratic reforms during their terms.

To cap off a disastrous year in power, Paetongtarn resigned in disgrace after nationalist-leaning elites and the public were extremely displeased with her leaked phone call with the former Cambodian leader. The severe backlash from across the political spectrum and the public demonstrates a red line that cannot be crossed regarding strong nationalist sentiment but also the renewed respect and trust towards the military in safeguarding national security.

Nonetheless, even as the family brand lost its widespread appeal and the party is now headed by a non-Shinawatra, PT has demon

Rocky Road Ahead

The dynamic competition between the three big parties and the spirited public debate indicate the positive return of a freewheeling democratic and policy discourse that has largely been missing during the rule of previous military-aligned governments.

Each party is utilising the constitutional drafting process as a tool to pressure their rivals and gain political legitimacy to win over the public. As the election and referendums are slated to be organised simultaneously on 29 March, Anutin and EC must declare the constitutional referendums by December 2025.

Both PP and PT are urgently ramping up the pressure on Anutin to finalise the constitutional amendment draft bill by this year; otherwise, they will trigger a no-confidence motion against the government when the new parliamentary session opens on 12 December.  Anutin may boldly take advantage of BJT’s growing popularity by dissolving Parliament within this year in order to move forward the election date and avoid scrutiny over corruption and influencing. This would nullify the current constitutional amendment process, which would need to be restarted and represent a significant setback for recalibrating Thailand’s political landscape.

None of the three parties seem capable of a landslide victory in the next election and will need to team up with one or the other for enough seats to form a coalition government. PT and PP are both kingmakers, but PP could be left out in the cold and out of office again if PT or BJT decide to put aside their differences and team up once again. Given the flexible nature of PT and BJT in forming and breaking alliances, as well as the continuous attempts to block the success of the progressive faction, this scenario cannot be discounted.

The political battles are happening amidst a backdrop of an increasingly frustrated public who are discontent with the lack of effectiveness and political will to tackle immediate challenges, such as economic doldrums, ballooning corruption cases and the prolonged border conflict, as well as recent mismanagement of severe flooding in Southern Thailand.

With few outlets left to express public frustration, large-scale protests, such as the youth-led 2020-2021 demonstrations that saw unprecedented

Resumed Talks

After nearly two years of stagnation, peace negotiations between the Thai government and the rebel Barisan Revolusi Nasional Melayu Patani (BRN) are getting back on track. Leaders from both sides met recently to acquaint themselves and prepare for a high-level official meeting next month, facilitated by Malaysia.

Thailand’s newly appointed chief negotiator for the conflict, Gen (rtd) Somsak Rungsita, along with National Security Council (NSC) Secretary-General Chatchai Bangchuad, met with BRN chief negotiator Anas Abdulrohman in Kuala Lumpur on 11 November 2025.

According to a press statement from the Of

A BRN officer from the negotiation team said the organisation acknowledges the short time the current government of Thai Prime Minister Anutin Charnvirakul has in office but pledged the movement would do its utmost to ensure continuity.

The last high-level talks with the BRN – the longstanding separatist group that controls combatants in Thailand’s far south – were held in Kuala Lumpur on 6-7 February 2024.

Past Setbacks

As for the meeting next month, the two sides will pick up where they left off—discussing the Joint Comprehensive Plan toward Peace (JCPP). This framework identifies three key items: reduction of violence, public consultation and a political solution to end the conflict, which has claimed over 7,700 lives since the current wave of insurgency resurfaced in January 2004. The region is the historical Malay h

Initially, they had planned to delve deeper into these three items. However, fierce criticism from insiders of the then-ruling Pheu Thai Party, particularly Prof Surachart Bamrungsuk, sidelined the negotiators and effectively put formal talks on hold for nearly two years.

Surachart was upset that the Thai team had not made the reduction of violence a binding commitment and lashed out at international donors for not pressuring the BRN to end its violent tactics; he said their role in the peace process has helped to legitimise BRN.

Still, quiet discussions between BRN and Thai representatives continued outside the formal track. During a meeting at the beginning of this year, the Thai side requested a temporary ceasefire during the holy month of Ramadhan, which ran from 1 to 30 March 2025.

BRN agreed on the condition that international observers be permitted on the ground and an unspecified number of detainees be released. The then-defence minister Phumtham Wechayachai rejected the proposal, insisting the government would only negotiate if BRN ended its campaign of violence and that they would only talk with those who have command-and-control over militants on the ground.

When political discussions hit a brick wall, BRN’s military wing took charge to map out the next move. On 9 March, a 10-strong BRN unit attacked the Sungai Kolok district office in Narathiwat, killing two Defence Volunteers (security details for the Ministry of Interior officials) and wounding eight others.

The combatants left behind a car packed with explosives that detonated during the

Differing Definitions of “Peace”

Today, with Pheu Thai and Surachart out, NSC has returned to the fold. A public event was organised by NSC on 29 October where all former chief negotiators were invited to share their experiences. They largely echoed the same points: that there is continuity despite political instability, a commitment to peace and that Thailand’s territorial integrity remains paramount.

But academic and peace expert Mark Tamthai, who led the negotiation team under former premier Abhisit Vejjajiva, said Thailand has yet to understand the nature of the conflict in the far south and therefore has not developed the necessary tools to extinguish it.

“At first, there is the simplistic view that people take up arms because they are upset with the state. But the reality is more complicated than that,” said Mark, a retired professor of peace studies at Chiang Mai’s Payap University.

Mark believes there must be a better way to involve the public because their participation could help strengthen the peace process and generate traction.

“My other question is why the peace process doesn’t seem to be going anywhere. We take a step forward and then take a step back. Why is that?” he asked.

One reason the process seems circular is that both sides define peace differently.

“For the government, peace is the absence of violence, as well as the people of Patani living within the framework set by the government. They are not allowed to make too many demands, such as self-determination rights, and there can also be no seminar on a public referendum,” Mark said. “If these demands continue to surface, in the state’s view, then the fire in the south has yet to be put out.”

Mark said BRN and local civil society agree with the state on the first point—that regional violence must end. But the second point involves opening a political space where no issue is off-limits. This is where the two sides differ greatly, as demonstrated by the ongoing court case against political activists in the far south.

“I’m glad that the new chief negotiator (Gen [rtd] Somsak) wants to hear what the local people are saying. But you must be serious about wanting to listen; you can’t let them speak and then turn around and charge them with what

Mark also pointed to JCPP as an example of progress that can only go so far. “But when the issue of public consultation comes up, some people retreat. Why? Because public consultation doesn’t fit their definition of what is politically permissible,” he said.

Hurdles

The upcoming high-level meeting will not be a walk in the park. It comes at a time when flimsy charges are being levied against five civic actors, scheduled to appear in the Pattani Criminal Court on 20 November 2025, to face charges of advocating separatism during a 2023 seminar that they had participated in.

What got on the nerve of the region’s military command was the mock referendum, which asked participants a hypothetical question on whether they would support the idea of a referendum on rights to self-determination if Thai law p

Moreover, old issues like public consultation under the framework of JCPP remain far from resolved. BRN has informed Thailand that its representatives should be permitted to enter the far south to conduct in-person public consultations.

This request was rejected by the Thai army, whose leaders feared a public relations nightmare. One military intelligence officer, speaking on condition of anonymity, asked to imagine an outpouring of public support for BRN delegates; such a scene would not only embarrass the Thai side but also shatter its long-standing claim that the Malays of Patani side with them.

Making the Most of Limited Time

After nearly two years of a halted formal process, BRN considered the setting up of a negotiating team as somewhat pretentious, considering the government has only less than four months in office before a general election is called. Yet, it could set a precedent for the incoming administration, especially if the ruling Bhumjaithai Party is part of the coalition and tasked with conflict resolution in the far south.

“We are looking to make the most of it given the limited time in office of this government,” one BRN operative said.

BRN has already stated it is willing to settle for something less than full independence. The ball now seems to be in Thailand’s court to reciprocate.

For Artef Sohko, president of The Patani – a political action group that often acts as an interlocutor between BRN and Thai government agencies – the clock is ticking. The next wave of BRN leaders might not be as accommodating as the current ones.

If the Thai government continues to kick the can down the road, the next generation of BRN leaders could retreat from their commitment to work within the Thai Constitution. Artef is one of the five civic actors being charged with advocating separatism for participating in a mock referendum.

The challenge for the current and incoming government is enormous. It is unclear if Bhumjaithai has the appetite or the mindset for a challenge that demands creative policy and serious thought about what aspects of Thailand’s nation-state construct must be revised for the sake of peace and peaceful coexistence with the Malays of Patani.

Moreover, violence in this historically contested region has been on the rise, with combatants (who are operating quite freely) straying outside the normal theatre of conflict. Last month’s gold heist in Narathiwat, where over 36.5 million baht worth of gold was stolen, as well as a

No Luck Anwar

The Malaysian government has been mediating the peace talks in Thailand’s far south since 2013, but when it comes to Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim, luck has not always been on his side.

Every time Anwar succeeded in getting the Thai government to accelerate progress, Thai politics invariably intervened, prolonging the peace process that has never been a high priority for any Thai administration.

Coming into power in November 2022, Anwar – a figure who has endured prison and a long political struggle – inspired excitement among M

However, when Srettha Thavisin assumed premiership in August 2023, he largely ignored the far south, unwilling to antagonise the Thai Army and its uncompromising counterinsurgency stance. Furthermore, Srettha focused on maintaining a delicate political balance that had enabled Thaksin Shinawatra’s return from exile—a Faustian bargain with the conservative establishment that required careful nurturing. Upsetting the military was not part of that deal.

Yet, the Malaysian-facilitated peace process had been developing for over a decade, and Bangkok could only delay for so long. A nudge from Anwar three months into Srettha’s term led to the appointment of Chatchai Bangchuad, then deputy secretary-general of the National Security Council (NSC), as chief negotiator—the first civilian in the role in 12 years.

This move allowed the Peace Dialogue Panel and Bari

Complications

But in the far south, nothing comes easily. When a draft of the JCPP was leaked, it drew harsh criticism from military and political insiders. Professor Surachart Bamrungsuk, a Pheu Thai insider, relentlessly attacked the NSC-led team, accusing them of exceeding their mandate and criticising European donors for not pressuring the

In reality, both Thai and BRN negotiators were participating in mediation training in Europe, and a Japanese organisation even offered to host high-level talks in Tokyo. Furthermore, Thailand participated in a back-channel discussion with BRN through foreign mediation without Malaysia’s participation. But the process never advanced beyond confidence-building measures. The political leadership above the negotiators showed no real intention of offering concessions to BRN or the Patani Malays.

Thai institutions have never been united on the south, even on basic issues like whether to classify BRN as a criminal organisation or as combatants. International NGOs face wrath for using the term “armed conflict”, and bodies like the Organization of Islamic Cooperation are criticised for engaging the BRN. Any hint of legitimacy for the insurgents provokes Thai ire—even as its negotiators are sent to meet with them.

U

But as an interlocutor, Malaysia faces a complex challenge: its proximity and refusal to support separatism require all Malaysian leaders to carefully balance between respecting Thailand’s territorial integrity and acknowledging the historical grievances of the Patani people.

Artef Sohko, president of The Patani, a local political action group, believes Malaysia must do more than just urge Thailand to come to the table. He argues that Thailand needs creative ideas, and Malaysia – with international help – can provide them.

“Negotiation is a give-and-take process,” Artef said, “but Thailand only wants to take.”

He points out to Thailand’s relentless push for a ceasefire, which does little to advance conflict resolution and more for public consumption, as Thai leaders are in a constant campaign to garner public endorsement.

In comparison, Malaysia was successful in mediating the peace process between the Moros and the Philippines government. That was because Malaysia was able to get a firm commitment from Manila for concession and compromise before it took up the mediation role. Malaysia did not make the same demand with Thailand before it committed itself as the mediator in February 2013.

While Malaysian officials discuss the southern Thai conflict with Thai NSC officials regularly, Dato Mohd Rabin Basir, the designated facilitator, has not had much luck reaching the army generals, the lynchpin behind conflict resolution in the far south.

Instability in Bangkok

But obstacles and roadblocks are nothing new in the quest for peace in this historically contested region known as Patani. Thailand’s political instability continues to take its toll.

In August 2024, the Constitutional Court removed Srettha on ethical grounds. He was replaced by Paetongtarn Shinawatra, Thaksin’s daughter, who was shielded by party elders. Her deputy, Phumtham Wechayachai, refused to resume talks unless BRN stopped its violence first. BRN replied that violence reduction was negotiable but demanded international monitoring of any ceasefire.

Thailand rejected these demands, despite BRN’s agreement to negotiate under the Thai Constitution—effectively taking independence off the table. Instead, Bangkok stuck to its old strategy: trying to identify and negotiate directly with the leaders of BRN’s military wing despite not knowing their identities and being unwilling to offer meaningful concessions. BRN insisted that protocol must be respected and insisted that the government do not get to pick and choose who in the movement they want to meet.

The Pheu Thai-led government feared that entering talks amid ongoing attacks would make them look weak. Ironically, it was not BRN tha

Malaysia was called upon to mediate again, this time with the United States and China observing. Anwar also nudged Bangkok to restart the peace talks. A new, diverse negotiating team was planned, including retired generals, a former diplomat and a village chief from the far south, with an announcement set for September 2025.

But on 29 August, the Constitutional Court remo

Anwar, as ASEAN chair, had earlier appointed Thaksin as an advisor on Myanmar and the far south—a move that yielded no results. Thaksin’s influence evaporated entirely on 9 September, when the Supreme Court ruled that his hospital detention was an attempt to avoid his reduced jail sentence. He is now back in jail.

Now, the peace process for the far south is once again in limbo, likely delayed until after the next general election. It makes little sense for a four-month government to appoint a negotiating team only to dissolve it shortly after. But for Anwar, the pursuit of peace in Thailand’s deep south remains a story of promise and perseverance, continuously unravelled by the political fortunes of its neighbour.

Introduction

With the globe heating up and climate disasters occurring in every corner, Southern Thailand is particularly grappling with flooding, rising sea levels, diminishing coastal and marine resources, poor natural resource management, and the impacts of industrial development. 

These issues collectively heighten social tensions in a region already experiencing unrest.

Amidst the growing climate crisis, this year’s Melayu Raya event, the largest annual celebration in the southern border provinces, adopted a timely theme: “Green Melayu, Suci Patani”. 

This marked a meaningful shift, highlighting the growing connection between social, cultural, political and historical issues with environmental responsibility.

The event was directly influenced by a broader trend of environmental protests across Thailand and Southeast Asia, reflecting growing public impatience with unsustainable development and governmental inaction. This increased public consciousness and pressure were crucial factors driving national policy shifts, as exemplified by the impending passage of Thailand’s Climate Change Act.

It also deeply resonated with the younger generation, many of whom have experienced climate change’s tangible impacts firsthand, particularly recurring floods and the rise in development projects affecting their communities.

A New Direction

The Melayu Raya event took place on 2-3 April 2025 at Wasukri Beach in Pattani, marking its fourth edition. Nurhayatee Samoh, one of the event organisers, explained its significance, stating, “This event truly served as a vital platform for Malay Muslims to express our unique identity and culture”.

In previous years, the event saw tens of thousands of people attending, with young individuals from the region gathering, all proudly dressed in traditional Malayu attire. It also garnered international interest, particularly from Muslim-majority countries in Southeast Asia such as Malaysia and Indonesia.

Yet, this celebration of culture and identity was not always viewed favourably. In the past, it was seen as a threat to Thai national security and led to some individuals involved facing the tough side of the law.

Around nine individuals faced legal prosecution, including charges of sedition and conspiracy, for participating in the event in 2022. Some locals thought they were arrested for using words that the Internal Security Operations Command Region 4 (ISOC4) did not approve, such as “bangsa”. In the Malay language, it means “community” or “nation”, not necessarily referring to an “independent state”.

Despite past tensions, this time ISOC4 decided to take part in and support the event’s activities. These include facilitating medical units (accommodated by the Red Cross), providing mobile toilets, ensuring security and screening individuals attending the events.

The event’s new theme this year marked its pivot towards a new direction. While the Malay cultural identity remained central as it had for the past three years, the theme “Green Melayu, Suci Patani” signifies its embrace of the environmental values.

This shift was not arbitrary. It grew from a heightened awareness of pressing environmental challenges, such as flooding, alongside rising concerns over government and private sector projects that have unfortunately harmed natural resources. 

According to Hayatee,the theme“promoted environmental protection and a clean society in the region. It aimed to preserve its natural and cultural heritage for future generations and address recent challenges.”

The Impact of Environmental Challenges

Concerns shared by Hayatee and, indeed, articulated by the latest Melayu Raya event were not without basis.

Episodes of severe weather have caused damage to the area. For instance, during the rainy season two years ago, widesp

However, the state and local governments response, especially in remote areas, often provided only short-term relief. This was frequently hampered by bureaucracy,

A significant problem identified is the lack of a clear and reliable early warning system for major rivers in the region, such as the upstream areas of the Saiburi River, leaving communities unprepared and vulnerable.

Another recurring issue, which exacerbated the impact of these environmental challenges, is the government’s slow response to floods that consistently frustrated residents. Despite the ongoing impact on people’s lives, this critical problem has also not received the attention it deserves in local policy planning in many areas.

In recent years, the region has also seen a noticeable increase in development projects, which could significantly impact the environment, local communities and natural resources. For instance, around 30 biomass power plants were planned across the region (including in Songkhla). Other projects include the construction of seawalls in several coastal areas, an industrial zoning plan in the Nong Chik district, the dredging of Pattani Bay and a rock mining project in the Saiburi district.

As noted by Arifin Soh of The Patani Resource Center, disputes in the region are more than just cultural-historical issues—they are also struggles for local resource rights. State agencies often refuse to accept criticism for these disagreements, especially on sensitive topics such as unaccountability, human rights abuses or targeted killings. Meanwhile, critics of state natural resource policies are sometimes branded as national security threats.

Since the 2014 coup in Thailand, over 60 development projects led by both government and private sectors have been either ongoing or completed in these areas, some of which have led to conflicts with residents and local activists. Recent examples include the campaign against concrete and hard structures for water management at Wasukri Beach in

Post-coup, the Thai government’s approach to regional conflict often hinged on development projects. While meant to bring stability, many of these initiatives surprisingly have made life harder for local people by causing hardship and disrupting traditional ways of life.

These projects often created opportunities for corruption among officials and tycoons. Certain politicians also use their power to push the projects and create opportunities for them to accumulate wealth through large budgets for construction materials, ultimately boosting their own power and benefits. This not only wastes resources but also erodes public trust, thus fuelling resentment and ultimately hindering the path to lasting peace.

Reframing the Narrative

Originally, these regional issues were largely perceived through a lens of Melayu identity and culture, which was often linked to regional socio-political and historical issues. However, a significant shift is now underway to expand them by incorporating environmental concerns alongside traditional issues.

This reinterpretation acknowledges that problems, both stemming from natural disasters and government and private sector projects, are deeply intertwined with political, social, and economic dimensions. These include critical aspects like the state’s disaster management mechanisms and inequality in the region.

On the other hand, Melayu Raya’s new theme is a positive step towards raising environmental awareness among young people. It currently falls short of directly tackling the systemic issues that perpetuate these problems. This limitation is partly due to the involvement and monitoring of security agencies, which makes it challe

To move beyond mere awareness and truly address these deep-rooted environmental challenges, there is a need to significantly broaden stakeholder engagement and active participation of local communities, including individuals and groups who have not traditionally engaged with the region’s usual issues.

This requires concrete political action and robust government policies focused on proactive disaster prevention and rapid response when issues arise, accountability from the private sector, and decentralisation, which includes community participation and local ownership.

In addition, climate change and environmental management issues must now be addressed properly

Conclusion

The shift in the Melayu Raya event’

The essential environmental aspects are now strategically integrated into the redefinition as one of the main problems in the three southern border provinces by communities in the region. This is a necessity stemming from their direct experience with climate change impacts and unsustainable development.

Prelude

The five-day clashes between Thai and Cambodian troops that erupted on 24 July 2025 near Prasat Ta Muen Thom temple were more than another flare-up in a long-standing border dispute. It was the inevitable result of two nations trapped by historical grievances, domestic political posturing and a failure of bilateral diplomacy.

The conflict displaced more than 300,000 people and left at least 43 dead; it was the deadliest confrontation between the two countries in a decade.

While both sides hastily blamed each other for the violence, the deeper causes lie in unresolved colonial-era wounds, militarised nationalism and leaders exploiting tensions for political gains rather than pursuing lasting solutions.

A Cycle of Provocation and Empty Diplomacy 

The 28 May clash, which left one Cambodian soldier dead, and the subsequent 8 June handshake agreement between regional commanders to de-escalate followed a predictable script: a brief violence, a performative diplomacy by local commanders and a return to the status quo.

The pattern of escalation, temporary ceasefire, and renewed tension reflects the inadequacy of existing bilateral frameworks rather than the absence of diplomatic mechanisms. The Joint Boundary Commission (JBC) and various military-to-military agreements have repeatedly failed to prevent conflict because they address symptoms rather than underlying structural problems.

Cambodia’s trench-digging earlier in 2025 and Thailand’s response with a military buildup were deliberate provocations, yet neither side was willing to de-escalate meaningfully. 

The real breakdown came on 18 June, when Cambodian Senate President Hun Sen leaked a private call with then Thai prime minister Paetongtarn Shinawatra, exposing her criticism of a Thai general as an “opponent” who “just wanted to look tough”.

The leak was not accidental—it was a calculated move to undermine Thailand’s leadership and exploit its civil-military divide. The resulting protests in Bangkok forced Paetongtarn’s suspension, leaving the military in control of border policy. 

Paetongtarn’s private acknowledgment of military intransigence – describing a senior commander as an “opponent” who “wanted to look tough” – revealed the disconnect between political leadership and military institutional interests. The resulting street protests and her subsequent suspension by the Constitutional Court demonstrate how border affairs have become a litmus test for political legitimacy in Thailand.

Colonial Ghosts and the Politics of Grievance

The Ta Muen Thom dispute cannot be understood without acknowledging the colonial legacy poisoning bilateral relations.

Thailand’s refusal to fully accept French-drawn borders – exemplified by its lingering bitterness over the 1962 International Court of Justice (ICJ) ruling that gave Preah Vihear temple to Cambodia – has fostered a nationalist narrative of historical victimhood.

Similarly, Cambodia’s 2003 anti-Thai riots that led to the burning down of the Thai Embassy in Phnom Penh were triggered by a claim by local Cambodian media that a Thai actress was reported to have said Angkor Wat, one of the world’s most important archaeological sites, once belonged to Thailand. The incident reveals how easily historical resentment can be weaponised.

Unlike the Thai-Malaysian border, where technical demarcation proceeds without major incident, the Thai-Cambodian frontier remains politicised.

Malaysia avoids inflaming Thai sensitivities over “lost” territories. The Thai national narrative around “lost territories” to British Malaya – particularly Kedah and Kelantan – demonstrates how colonial-era concessions have become embedded in national identity.

The persistent refrain that “it was ours and we gave it to the British for the sake of peace” illustrates how territorial loss remains a source of national trauma, even when, as with Malaysia, the current relationship remains stable because neither side politicises historical grievances. Despite this, separatist insurgency in Thailand’s Malay-speaking south demonstrates how nation building is never straightforward.

Thailand’s relationship with its colonial past reveals a unique psychological burden among Southeast Asian states—as the only nation in the region never formally colonised, Thailand nonetheless lost significant territories to European powers through forced treaties and diplomatic pressure.

Cambodia – under successive governments – has no such restraint. For Hun Sen and now his son, Prime Minister Hun Manet, anti-Thai rhetoric is a tool to consolidate power amidst economic struggles and a faltering transition from the father’s 40-year rule.

The July 2025 crisis exemplifies how both Thai and Cambodian leaders have consistently chosen to exploit historical resentments rather than educate their populations about colonial injustices and the need for pragmatic accommodation. This pattern of behaviou

For Thailand, the leaked phone conversation between Hun Sen and then prime minister Paetongtarn exposed the fundamental contradiction between diplomatic pragmatism and public nationalist expectations.

Cambodia’s approach reflects different but equally problematic dynamics. Hun Manet’s handling of the crisis must be understood within the context of a difficult political transition from his father’s four-decade rule. With ordinary Cambodians frustrated by economic conditions but lacking outlets for political expression due to media control and a parliament dominated by the ruling party (120 of 125 seats), external conflict provides a convenient mechanism for consolidating nationalist credentials and diverting attention from domestic f

Structural Impediments to Resolution

The fundamental challenge facing Thai-Cambodian relations lies not in the absence of diplomatic mechanisms but in the structural incentives that make conflict more politically useful than resolution for leaders in both countries.

Hun Manet needs nationalist credentials to establish legitimacy independent of his father’s legacy while facing economic pressures that limit his ability to deliver material improvements for ordinary Cambodians.

In Thailand, the military’s institutional interests in maintaining political relevance amid reform pressures align with public nationalist sentiment in ways that constrain civilian political leadership.

The Pheu Thai government’s effective marginalisation following the leaked phone conversation demonstrates how quickly external conflicts can destabilise domestic political arrangements. One can also make the argument that the Pheu Thai government had it coming; the writing was on the wall when they made an incompetent young lady the prime minister.

The Internationalisation of a Local Conflict

Both nations have reached out to members of the international community to present their case.

Cambodia succeeded in getting the United Nations Security Council to convene an emergency meeting but could not convince the council to issue a resolution for an immediate ceasefire. Cambodia was hoping that the council would suggest that the matter be taken up at ICJ, the principal judicial organ of the United Nations. But that did not materialise either.

According to a diplomat from

“The Thais were sophisticated and technical in their messaging, citing the Geneva Convention, breach of anti-mine and anti-cluster munition obligations,” he added.

Thailand’s rejection of ICJ’s jurisdiction, based on its negative experience with the 1962 Preah Vihear ruling, illustrates how past legal defeats can constrain future diplomatic options. However, this stance also reflects a deeper strategic calculation: accepting ICJ jurisdiction would require acknowledging the legitimacy of colonial-era maps and potentially accepting unfavourable rulings on other disputed territories.

Meanwhile, Cambodia’s push for ICJ involvement, while appearing to take the moral high ground internationally, serves multiple domestic political purposes.

It positions Hun Manet as defending national sovereignty through legal rather than purely military means, potentially appealing to international opinion while demonstrating resolve to domestic audiences. However, the impact of civilian casualties from Cambodian rocket attacks on Thai schools and hospitals undermines this strategy by providing Thailand with its own moral arguments.

This is affirmed by a Bangkok-based diplomat who said Cambodia was on the verge of obtaining the moral high ground with its request to ICJ and for outside mediation but shot itself in the foot with its attacks on civilian targets in Thailand.

Both sides’ attempts to claim moral authority – Thailand’s targeting of military rather than civilian infrastructure and Cambodia’s appeal to international law – reveal an understanding that regional and global opinion increasingly matters in territorial disputes. However, the use of cluster munitions by Thai forces and civilian casualties from Cambodian attacks demonstrate how quickly moral positioning can be undermined by military necessities.

From a bird’s eye view, Cambodia appeared to be positioning itself as a smaller nation standing up to Thailand’s “aggression”, leveraging international sympathy. Thailand, on the other hand, emphasises restraint – limiting airstrikes to military targets – to claim the moral high ground, despite allegations of cluster munitions.

Moreover, nations with more military might prefer bilateral mechanisms in settling disputes, while countries with a smaller army tend to go for multilateral forums.

Meanwhile, the involvement of the United States and China as observers in the Malaysian-mediated talks underscores how local conflicts could become proxy battlegrounds for great-power competition. Both superpowers cited peace and stability in Southeast Asia as their reason for involvement, but all eyes are on the China-funded naval base in Cambodia.

Geopolitical Competition and Regional Implications

While the presence of the United States and China signals how bilateral disputes increasingly serve as proxies for broader geopolitical competit

This shift carries significant economic implications, particularly regarding the estimated one million Cambodian migrant workers employed in Thailand and the potential US$300 billion in gas reserves in the disputed Gulf of Thailand area. The connection between Hun Sen’s decision to leak the private phone conversation and Thaksin Shinawatra’s alleged refusal to advance the offshore gas deal suggests that territorial disputes have become instruments for advancing broader economic and political agendas.

The deployment of F-16 fighter jets by Thailand served primarily symbolic purposes, demonstrating military superiority while remaining within bounds that would not trigger broader international intervention. This calculated escalation reflects a sophisticated understanding of how to project strength without crossing red lines that might invite foreign criticism.

Implications for Regional Security Architecture

The Malaysian mediation effort, while producing a temporary ceasefire, illustrates both the potential and limitations of ASEAN’s

The pattern of regular meetings between military commanders, direct communication channels between defence ministers and ASEAN observer roles represents an attempt at institutionalisation of conflict management rather than conflict resolution. These mechanisms may prevent escalation to full-scale war but do little to address underlying sources of tension. If ASEAN is willing to come this far, perhaps Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim can guide it a little further along this line.

Breaking the Wheel

Resolving the Thai-Cambodian border disputes requires addressing three fundamental challenges: 1) developing new national narratives that acknowledge colonial legacies without perpetuating grievances; 2) creating domestic political incentives for leaders to pursue accommodation rather than confrontation and; 3) establishing regional mechanisms capable of addressing root causes rather than merely managing symptoms.

The July 2025 crisis demonstrates that without addressing these structural factors, even successful mediation efforts will likely prove temporary. Both sides are quick to accuse the other of ceasefire violation but not doing enough to work towards creating an atmosphere conducive for peace and peaceful coexistence.

The pattern of escalation, ceasefire and renewed tension will continue as long as both countries’ political systems reward nationalist posturing over pragmatic accommodation. The broader implications extend beyond bilateral relations to the credibility of regional security architecture and the ability of middle powers to manage territorial disputes in an era of great power competition. The Thai-Cambodian case may well serve as a test of whether Southeast Asian nations can develop effective mechanisms for addressing colonial legacies and managing territorial disputes, or whether these issues will continue to serve as sources of instability and vehicles for external power competition.