Introduction

In January 1998 – when the Malaysian government handed over four senior members of the Patani United Liberation Organization (PULO) to Thai law enforcement – few knew what to make of it.

Thailand’s Malay-speaking South was relatively peaceful at the time; armed insurgency had already subsided for some years. The blanket amnesty given to various separatist groups from the late 1980s to early 1990s appeared to have paid off—or so it seemed.

While combatants put down their arms and returned to their villages, many leaders remained abroad, obtaining residency status or citizenship in Northern European countries and Malaysia.

Thailand wrongly assumed that peace had been achieved in this Malay historical homeland known as Patani. So, when Malaysian authorities detained Abdul Rohman Bazo, Haji Daoh Thanam, Haji Mae Yala, and Haji Sama-ae Thanam and handed them over to Thai counterparts in January 1998, Patani residents and members of various Patani liberation groups were dumbstruck.

Four years later, when a new generation of Patani Malay fighters under the command of the Barisan Revolusi Nasional (BRN) resurfaced – carrying out sporadic attacks against police and military outposts in the region – Malaysia realised they had shot themselves in the foot with the handover of the four PULO members.

Rocky Road

The official explanation as to why the Thais were after these PULO leaders was unconvincing. No one believed they were trying to start another standing army, as they were living openly in Malaysia, running legitimate businesses such as a restaurant.

One explanation that made the most sense came from a senior Thai diplomat who said the request for the arrest of the Thanam brothers and their associates was Thailand’s way of testing the waters with Malaysia—to gauge the level of commitment from then-prime minister Dr Mahathir Mohammed to his Thai counterpart, Chuan Leekpai.

At first, as sporadic attacks occurred in mid-2001, the then-government – led by Thaksin Shinawatra – was dismissive, calling the insurgents “sparrow bandits”. Following the 4 January 2004 arms heist, in which BRN combatants made off with more than 350 military weapons from an army battalion in Narathiwat, Bangkok could no longer deny the political underpinnings of these attacks.

Suddenly, there was acknowledgment that a new generation of Patani Malay Muslim separatist combatants had resurfaced.

The first few years were not smooth sailing for the two countries as public accusations and microphone diplomacy took their toll on bilateral relations, with each side accusing the other of not doing enough to quell the insurgency.

Fleeing Villagers

One low point came in August 2005 when 131 Malay Muslim villagers from Narathiwat’s Sungai Padi district crossed the border and took refuge in Kelantan’s mosques following alleged harassment by Thai security forces.

Deporting these villagers back to Thailand would have been difficult as Malaysia sought to maintain its place in the Muslim world. Moreover, the 131 displaced villagers were not just Muslims; they were fellow Malays who shared the same cultural and linguistic traits as Malays in Malaysia.

At the time of the exodus, death squads were on a killing spree, targeting ethnic Malays at village teashops; the imam from Narathiwat’s Sungai Padi district and a female teacher at an Islamic preschool in the village were shot dead by unknown gunmen.

The atmosphere was tense and a climate of fear enveloped the entire region.

Malaysia did not push the 131 back to the Thai side but refused to recognise or treat them as asylum seekers. There were concerns that more would come. Eventually, the Malaysian government asked the United Nations High Commission on Refugees (UNHCR) to assist these fleeing Patani Malay villagers, thus internationalising the issue.

Thaksin was furious because he never wanted the problem in the far South to be more than a bilateral issue. Putting Patani on an international stage forced Thailand to confront this disturbing aspect of its state-minority relations. This is not to mention its failed assimilation policy that Patani Malays violently rejected because it threatened their ethno-religious identity and historical-cultural narrative.

Eventually, over the years, the issue faded from officials’ memories. Some of the displaced villagers quietly returned to their homes in Narathiwat, while others remained in northern Malaysia as undocumented migrants.

Yet, someone must pay the price. Thaksin was ousted in a coup in October 2006 by an army general who cited his handling of the separatist insurgency as one of the reasons.

Strings of Prime Ministers

The relationship between Malaysia and Thailand during the reign of prime minister Surayud Chulanont was described as cordial and respectful. The former army chief placed great emphasis on the root causes of the conflict. In late 2007, Surayud made a public apology to the people of Patani for the deaths of 87 unarmed protesters in Tak Bai in late 2004.

He reached out to the international community for help to establish a foundation for peace negotiations with the rebels, but his time in office lasted just 16 months. The foundation he laid was largely ignored by the subsequent government of prime minister Samak Sundaravej of the Thaksin-linked People Power Party (PPP).

In March 2012, Thaksin held a quiet meeting in Kelantan with leaders from various Patani Malay separatist organisations, during which he blamed his heavy-handedness on distorted information given to him by the Army. Thaksin thought his direct participation would help improve the situation. He urged all participants to let bygones be bygones and start over.

Two weeks after the meeting, a triple car bomb exploded in the heart of Yala, one of Thailand’s three southernmost border provinces, killing 13 and wounding about 140 civilians. Conflict observers and Thai security officials said the attack was a stern message to Thaksin that nothing in the far south comes easy.

The following year, on 28 February 2013, prime minister Yingluck Shinawatra, Thaksin’s sister, caught everyone by surprise, including the Royal Thai Army, by launching a peace process with a group of exiled old guards claiming to be BRN members. Malaysia was officially designated as the facilitator.

It has been repeatedly pointed out that, due to geographical proximity, Malaysia cannot be seen as an honest broker. Some conspiracy-minded officials in Thailand even suggest that Patani wants to join Malaysia.

However, among security officials, it was generally understood that mainland Southeast Asian borders have a life of their own. At one time or another, buffers and proxies along borders were common among countries in the region while diplomatic relations took their course.

To some BRN members, Malaysia’s opposition to an independent Patani already disqualified them as an honest broker. But this is Southeast Asia, where peace and conflict resolution theories do not align well.

Malaysia took up the mediation role, thinking that Thailand was politically stable. Nevertheless, just over a year after peace negotiations launched, Yingluck was ousted in a coup.

The coup leader, General Prayut Chan-ocha, appointed himself the country’s prime minister and deliberated continuing Yingluck’s peace initiative. After all, the Army had not been consulted and learned about it just days before the official launch in Malaysia. In the end, Prayut relented and allowed the talks to continue.

From the start, Yingluck’s peace initiative wavered between a hoax and a leap of faith. The representatives at the table lacked command and control over the combatants on the ground. But when BRN finally came to the table in January 2020, these old guards from the 2013 talks were immediately sidelined.

Having the real BRN at the table did not mean violence on the ground would end. The new chief negotiator, General Udomchai Thamsarorat, was appointed in October 2018 and immediately sought help from local civil society organisations, hoping they could amplify messages to BRN about the need to talk and reconcile differences.

However, it remained unclear what the Thai side had to offer or what concessions the government was willing to make to the people of Patani. Besides engaging local CSOs, Udomchai also asked Malaysia to bypass BRN negotiators and arrange a meeting for him with top leaders from the BRN military wing. BRN refused.

Decline

Another low point between Thailand and Malaysia came in late 2019 when Bangkok created a back channel with BRN through foreign mediation without informing Malaysia.

There are several reasons as to why Malaysia was uninformed. Firstly, Thailand blamed Malaysia for its failure in bringing BRN’s military leaders to the table. Secondly, Thailand was still not satisfied with talking to the BRN negotiators, even through a proper channel.

Thailand assumed that if it can talk to the military wing, it can (somehow) convince the movement to lay down their arms. Thus, Thailand approached a foreign NGO to establish a back channel with BRN, with the assumption that this could be done without giving any concession to BRN or the Malays of Patani.

In theory, a back channel is supposed to support the main (official) channel. However, in this case, the two tracks continue to compete against one another (the official track with Malaysia as the lead and the back channel with a foreign NGO trying to convince everybody that Malaysia needs to be dumped because it is not an honest broker).

Tensions arising from this competition took their toll on BRN unity. Thus, in early 2022, the BRN central committee decided to end all forms of back channels unless Malaysia is kept in the loop.

Udomchai was replaced by retired National Security Council (NSC) chief General Wallop Raksanoh, who spent the next three years developing a blueprint to serve as the roadmap for the peace process. A commitment from BRN that future negotiations would align with the Thai Constitution was a significant victory for Wallop, but more work remained for the Malaysian mediator to get both sides to agree on the roadmap’s content.

Meanwhile, Thailand held a general election in May 2023 that created a coalition government, with Thaksin’s Pheu Thai Party coming in second but successfully forming a coalition with like-minded partners, including parties from the junta leaders who ousted Yingluck in 2014.

Later, real estate tycoon Srettha Tavisin became prime minister. During his tenure, Malaysia was left pondering when Thailand would appoint a chief negotiator. This was because national security was not an immediate concern of the Srettha administration.

This was demonstrated with Srettha making no reference to the far south (or to Burma) during his speech to the Parliament. His priorities were clear. Firstly, to prioritise the economy as a means to winning back the constituency whom his party had lost after the Faustian deal with the pro-junta/military camp to get Thaksin back to Thailand. Secondly, to deny the Move Forward Party the lead in setting up a government. Thirdly, to make the Pheu Thai Party the overall lead in this coalition of political parties that compromised their stated democratic principles in exchange for a political truce that may not last very long.

Eventually, then-NSC deputy chief Chartchai Bangchuad was appointed as chief negotiator. His stint lasted only a few months, as the Constitutional Court removed Srettha from office in August 2024 following ethical violation charges.

The government of Prime Minister Paetongtarn Shinawatra, much like the one preceding it, showed little concern for the conflict in the far south. Last December, BRN threatened to walk away from talks and withdrew its earlier commitment to operate under the Thai Constitution if Thailand continued to drag its feet on the peace process.

Bangkok refused to yield and insisted that a new negotiating team would be appointed only after BRN curbed violence on the ground. BRN maintained that even the reduction of violence had to be negotiated.

Just before Ramadhan in 2025, the new Malaysian facilitator, Datuk Mohd Rabin Basir, tried to help Thailand secure a ceasefire during the holy month. However, Bangkok found BRN’s demand for international observers to monitor the ceasefire too much to accept. Thailand has always resisted outside intervention, leading to the rejection.

Interestingly, BRN sources had shared with the author that Datuk Mohd Rabin’s appointment to replace Tan Sri Zulkifli Zainal Abidin, the retired chief of the armed forces and a professor at the National Defence University of Malaysia, was perceived as a setback to the peace process. This was because Tan Sri Zulkifli had worked hard to gain BRN’s trust and respect during his appointment as Malaysia’s facilitator.

The recent spike in violence has become the new normal. Targets include Defense Volunteers (DV), locally hired security personnel assigned to the Ministry of Interior’s provincial governors and district chiefs. These DVs have been asked to serve as government informants. BRN has demonstrated that they have no qualms about targeting DVs who spy on them.

In March 2025, Thaksin offered to carry out a direct talk with BRN leaders from the military wing. He suggested Phuket as the venue and offered legal immunity. BRN leaders turned down the offer, as no one was certain about what kind of mandate Thaksin had to be making such an offer.

Observers said Thaksin just wanted photo ops with BRN military leaders. For BRN, the peace process is the start of a very long journey, one that should not be taken lightly, much less used as a photo op for an ageing, former fugitive prime minister who does not seem to know his place.

Conclusion

Despite the challenges, Malaysia plays an important role in attempting to resolve the long-running insurgency in Thailand’s southernmost provinces. The relationship with Thailand has become much calmer compared to the early days of microphone diplomacy.

Both Thailand and BRN see Malaysia’s geographical proximity as beneficial to their logistical and operational needs. Furthermore, ethnic Malays in Malaysia may share similar cultural-religious characteristics with the Malays of Patani, indicating that a great sympathy for the plight of the latter might exist among the former.

But it stops there. Both government and non-government entities in Malaysia know that nurturing this bilateral tie is extremely challenging, as one wrong move could bring down the whole house.

Balancing its relationship with Thailand while maintaining credibility with insurgent groups has not been an easy act to follow for Malaysia. Some in Malaysia say the Malaysian government should do nothing more than facilitate discussion, while others said the proximity makes the country a stakeholder and intervention is extremely necessary. Nevertheless, it is generally agreed that BRN needs all the help it can get from members of the international community and that Malaysia should facilitate the discussion. Getting Thailand to go along with the idea, on the other hand, is like moving a mountain.

Introduction

In late October 2024, rumours circulated in Bangkok’s diplomatic circle that Thailand would hand over the remaining 48 Uyghurs in a Thai prison and Immigration Detention Centers to China in February 2025. Despite strong objections from the international community and human rights groups, this was seen as a “gift” from Thailand to China to commemorate the 50^th anniversary of diplomatic relations.

Former prime minister Thaksin Shinawatra was the brain behind this idea. As the father of the current prime minister and the nominal head of a powerful political machine dominating Thailand’s political scene for more than two decades, nobody stood in his way. Reasons as to why the previous government led by General Prayuth Chan-ocha did not deport the Uyghurs did not seem to matter.

If anything, Prayuth was in a better position to do so. Being the chief of the junta behind the 2014 coup that ousted Thaksin’s sister – Yingluck – from power, his government was at first isolated by the West, particularly the United States. The isolation pushed Thailand closer to China, leading to, among others, an important submarine deal.

What Happened to the Detainees?

The Prayut administration did not know what they were waiting for, but they played that waiting game and kept the Uyghurs in Thai detention centres. They knew that a deportation would invite the wrath of the international community, potentially isolating Thailand further.

Adding to the drama was a jailbreak (some said it was assisted by officials) at the Songkhla detention centre in November 2017, where 25 Uyghurs escaped from to make their way to Malaysia. The Malaysian government later resettled them in Turkey. Beijing raised a stink, but bilateral ties normalised quickly because China needed Malaysia’s support for its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). Besides, no Malaysian leader was about to compromise his standing in the Muslim world.

Thailand, on the other hand, was not exactly a champion of anything.

The 40 Uyghur who were sent back to China on 27 February 2024 by the Thai government were part of some 220 men, women and children who were caught on the Thailand-Malaysia border in March 2014 as they were about to cross into Malaysia (scores of others were arrested in separate occasions around the same time period).

Shortly afterwards, about 170 women and children were resettled in Turkey, but around 100 men were transferred to the Chinese authorities a week later.

Worse, the following month (17 August 2015) saw suspected Uyghur terrorists bomb the Erawan Shrine in the heart of Bangkok, killing 20 and injuring 125. The shrine is popular among Chinese visitors, who made up the majority of the dead and wounded.

The remaining 50 or so Uyghurs were charged with illegal entry and served their jail time; afterward, they remained in Thailand’s detention centres under no clear justification other than the lack of political will to take decisive actions on the leaders’ part. Some had passed away due to illness, while five were serving prison time for attacking security guards as they were escaping detention.

Between the United States and China

China never let up with their demand for Thailand to deport the rest. To avoid further headaches, Thai law enforcement was told not to detain any Uyghur coming through the country. They were told to direct any incoming Uyghurs to Malaysia.

Thaksin came afterwards with his quirky ambition to be some sort of a statesman and perhaps the first among equals – in the eye of China. He and his long-time associate, Foreign Minister Maris Sangiampongsa, were tone-deaf to the international community from the start to the last minute, even as US Senator Marco Rubio was going through a Senate hearing to confirm his appointment as the US Secretary of State.

“Thailand is a very strong US partner, a strong historical ally,” Rubio said during his Senate hearing on 15 January 2025. “That is an area where I think diplomacy could really achieve results because of how important that relationship is and how close it is.” Or so he thought.

Rubio, a leading critic of Beijing, co-sponsored the 2021 Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act, which bans imports from Xinjiang unless free of forced labour. His stance on human rights in China has subjected him to Chinese sanctions since 2020.

It appeared that the Thailand government did not care about what Rubio had to say. Even if they did, it probably would not matter, as Thaksin was already set on his effort to please the Chinese.

On 14 March 2025, Rubio hit back and announced “visa restrictions on current and former officials from the Government of Thailand responsible for, or complicit in, the forced return of 40 Uyghurs from Thailand on February 27.”

One day before the US order on visa restrictions, the European Parliament condemned the deportation and “urges Thailand to halt any further forced returns to countries where people’s lives are at risk.”

The resolution also urged Thailand to reform its lèse majesté law (Article 112) and called on the European Commission to “leverage free trade agreement negotiations to press Thailand to reform the country’s lese-majesty law, release political prisoners, halt the deportation of Uyghur refugees, and to ratify all core International Labour Organization (ILO) conventions.”

China was quick to hit back but directed its comment to Washington. “On the one hand, the US engages in indiscriminate deportations of illegal immigrants, yet, on the other, it points fingers at and smears other countries’ legitimate law enforcement cooperation, imposes sanctions, and pressures others,” said China’s Foreign Ministry spokeswoman, Mao Ning, describing the United States’ actions as “typical bullying”.

While the fear among human rights activists that the remaining Uyghurs would be deported to China did not subside, it was not until January 2025 that everybody sensed something was not right; a group of Thai government officials visited the Uyghur detainees and politely asked them if they would like to return to China voluntarily. They were asked to sign the deportation paper, which they rejected outright.

Words of the meeting got out and the activists as well as opposition parties responded in full force, demanding an explanation from the government. Some of the detainees staged a hunger strike to protest what they saw as a ploy to get them to agree on the deportation.

The situation had gone quiet and the Uyghurs ended their hunger strike. Then, on 27 February 2025, it was rumoured that the Immigration Police were preparing to deport the Uyghur detainees. Reporters and activists went to the detention centre in Bangkok where they were held, but as the vehicles pulled out of the station, reporters were blocked. The rest was history.

Dumbstruck by Rubio’s harsh responses, Thailand insisted that the deportation was voluntary despite evidence to the contrary.

Raised Questions

A trip was organised for a group of journalists to tag along with Thai ministers to Xinjiang to visit the returnees. Observers said it was a sham, but the government insisted that it was not.

According to photos released by the government, the deportees were united with their relatives – but their immediate family members were sent to Turkey by Thai authorities over a decade ago.

Critics and activists came out in full force, particularly the Malay Muslims in the southernmost provinces who had looked up to Justice Minister Thawee Sodsong and considered him to be one of their own, especially as one of the leaders of a political party from the region. They had hoped that he would stand up against the deportation of the Uyghur detainees.

Asmadee Bueheng, a writer from Pattani, said that for Thai and Malay activists, deportation was about human rights. However, for local Islamic leaders, it was about Muslims being mistreated.

Moreover, many Thais wrongly assumed that the government, being democratically elected, would be more sympathetic to the voices of human rights activists. They felt let down, especially those who had given the government the benefit of the doubt for changing their words on military and constitutional reforms.

Concluding Thoughts

For the time being, officials in Bangkok are putting on a brave face, playing down Washington’s sanctions on government officials. However, it was nothing less than a major embarrassment, considering the fact that the two countries are treaty allies. This is not to mention the fact that Washington was quick to point out to Bangkok the repeated offers to resettle the Uyghur.

The United States has in the past imposed sanctions on Thailand, suspending military aid after coups. This marked the first time that the sanction targeted government officials, although the United States has not identified these individuals. How this will affect the bilateral ties between these so-called longstanding allies, on the other hand, remains to be seen. However, there is no indication that the sanction will slow down Thaksin and his quest to steer Thailand in the direction that serves his personal and political ambitions.

Partnered Content

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Webinar Details

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Speaker Details

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Introduction

The Thai Government was hoping to secure a ceasefire with the Patani Malay separatist rebels for this year’s Ramadhan. However, after over two weeks since the start of the holy month, the two sides still have yet to find middle ground.

Worse, violence has not only spiked – the recent attacks have been extremely daring. As seen on 8 March 2025, a group of about 10 combatants raided the compound of the Sungai Kolok District Office in Narathiwat just before midnight, killing two and wounding seven security officials in a brief but fierce gunfight.

The combatant arrived in two vehicles, one of which was packed with explosives, parked near the district office building. It was set off shortly after they retreated from the vicinity. The same evening, in Sai Buri District of Pattani, a smaller explosive lured Paramilitary Rangers to the scene, where they were hit with a much more powerful bomb. Insurgents commence fire immediately upon explosion, killing three Rangers at the scene. This was not an isolated incident. Earlier in the week, suspected insurgents threw pipe bombs at security officials near the train station in Yala, wounding four bystanders. And on Monday morning (March 17), a security officer from the Ministry of Interior barely survived a blast from a bomb that was hidden underneath her personal vehicle that went off as she was driving to work. Words have been out for some months now about rebel forces urging MOI’s security officials, locally known as Defense Volunteers, to quit their job and to refrain from acting as spies or agent for the Thai security apparatus.

These incidents, caught on CCTV from various angles, reinforced the understanding that insurgency is a form of communicative action in which a non-state actor uses violence to send political messages to the state security apparatus.

Indeed, the Barisan Revolusi Nasional (BRN) has not been pleased with the Thai government’s foot dragging with the peace negotiation. In December 2024, Nikmatullah Bin Seri, the head of BRN technical team, issued a public statement saying the group was prepared to walk away from the process and take back their commitment to negotiate under the Thai Constitution if Bangkok is not serious about the talk. The peace process was supposed to resume once a new government came to power after the 2023 general election.

The following month, Thai Defense Minister Phumtham Wechayachai called on all relevant agencies to draft an “actionable solution” to resolve the conflict. Days later, Prime Minister Paetongtarn Shinawatra made her first visit to the far South. Incidentally, she visited the Thamvithya Mulnithi school, where several BRN political figures and the chief negotiator, as well as the late spiritual leader of the movement and the Patani region, Sapae-ing Basor, had worked as teachers and principal before fleeing Thailand to avoid arrest.

Phumtham’s directive and the PM visit may suggest that the government was giving in to BRN’s demands. But in fact, Bangkok was setting rigid terms for future talks. According to a government source, Phumtham has demanded that BRN curb their violence before he would appoint a negotiating team.  He is also considering doing away with foreign mediation, which would mean an end to all back-channeling, and axed the position of the five international conflict experts who function as observers for the high-level talks. Malaysia, the designated facilitator, will be the sole mediator for the talks, according to one Thai official who spoke on condition of anonymity.

It is not clear if Phumtham will scrap the Joint Comprehensive Plan Toward Peace (JCPP), the so-called road map for peace. Thailand and BRN, with the help of foreign NGOs and Malaysia working in separate and often competing tracks, spent the past three years going back and forth on the JCPP. They identified three items to be on the negotiating table: reduction of violence, public consultation, and a political solution to the conflict. Specific details are to be negotiated in the following phase.

BRN leaked the draft of the JCPP to the public early last year to test the water; the result was a big stir among government security officials and the military, who never liked the idea of talking to the rebels in the first place. They still think military option is the best way forward.

Because of the outpour of criticisms from the public and top government advisors, the Thai negotiating team was badly isolated; they were accused of giving in too much to the BRN. What Phumtham does not understand is that for the BRN, the peace process is the beginning of a very long journey that will not rest until the movement achieve either independence or a form of “self-government”. Under the latter arrangement, sovereign remained with Bangkok but regional Parliament makes the law for this historically contested region. According to a report released by The Patani on the peace process, BRN maintained that even under a “self-government”, the people of Patani must retain the right to succession. 

These are tall order, indeed, considering that after two decades of off-and-on peace initiatives, Thailand has never permitted the talks to move beyond confidence-building measures. Even with direct engagement with BRN, the one group that control virtually all the combatants on the ground, Phumtham continue to sound like a broken record – suggesting that the government is still doubtful of working directly with BRN or if BRN is truly the party that the government should work with. While this suggests a need for the government to verify that it is talking with the right people, such verification may not amount to anything in light of the government’s high level of distrust to BRN.

Stalled Negotiation

In line with past practices, the Thai side – remnants of the now-defunct Peace Dialogue Panel, the official negotiators – tried to push for a ceasefire during this year’s Ramadhan, which started on 1 March 2025.

Malaysia’s facilitator for the peace process, Mohd Rabin Basir, tried hard to help the Thais push this request through but was not able to do so. This was because BRN refused to budge on their demand that the ceasefire include a monitoring mechanism by international peace and conflict experts and that local civil society organizations be given a role in observing the process as well. Other demands include the release of BRN prisoners and the appointment of a negotiating team for the peace talks.

Observers of the peace process said they are not surprised why BRN refused to give in to the Thai government’s call for separate unilateral ceasefire during the month of Ramdan. First, said Artef Sohko, president of The Patani, a political action group dedicated to the right to self-determination for the southern people, Thailand has always tried to use the reduction of violence for short-term political gains.

“BRN can see through Thailand on this and that’s why they are not going along with it this time around,” Artef said.

BRN still recalled how the Thai Army belittled their unilateral ceasefire during the Covid-19 pandemic following a call for a global ceasefire from the UN Secretary General António Guterres. It was an opportunity missed as the Thai side could have reciprocated BRN’s gesture of goodwill and build on it. Instead, the Thai Army in the far south unleashed search and destroy operations, taking down combatants who were laying low in and around the home village in a series of lob-sided standoffs.

What was astonishing in the mind of the many security officials was the fact that, despite being outnumbered by 60-70 to one, all but one of the combatants chose death, or rather, fight to death, instead of surrendering, even though their chances of making it out alive were slim to none. A total of 60 BRN combatants were killed in the standoffs during this window.

Despite the grave disappointment because the Thai Army’s refusal to stand down, BRN did give Thailand the benefit of the doubt. The agreement for Ramadhan 2022 was pretty straightforward – the Thai military vowed not to go after cell members, while BRN agreed not to carry out attacks during the Muslim holy month and through Visakha Bucha Day, a Buddhist holiday observed this year on 15 May. A bigger leap of faith was the move to declare all mosques in this region a sanctuary where combatants could meet their family members during the last 10 days of Ramadan, which ended on May 1.

It is Not (Just) Religion

Local activists who observed the conflict warned against bringing religion into the equation could complicate things because the root causes of this conflict are political in nature as it has to do with the Malays’ rejection of Thai policy of assimilation that comes at the expense of their ethno-religious identity. For Muslims in this historically contested region, it is already a big turn-off when this predominantly Buddhist state tries to use Ramadan for its political gain.

Every now and then, Islamic religious leaders have been called upon to issue fatwa, or religious edict, to condemn the rebels on religious grounds. Needless to say, this effort made Muslim clerics in this region extremely uncomfortable as it would pit them against the separatist combattants. Moreover, separatist insurgency between the Thai state and the Malays of Patani does not have the support of the Thai Muslims who live outside the Malay-speaking South.

It has always been the Patani Malay cultural-historical narrative, not religion, that keep on producing generation after generation of fighters. While the banner of the struggle is rooted in Malay nationalism, words and actions are often expressed in religious terms. All Patani Malay fighters are buried as shahid, or martyr, for example. For the Malays of Patani, identity and religion are two sides of the same coin. Thus, when Thailand pushed through its policy of assimilation that required the Malays to deny their own identity and embrace the Thai one, they rejected it violently.

Today, the battle over the narrative between the Malay activists and the Army has reached the court. Patani Malay activists feel that they should be able to talk about referendum in a public forum, while the Army insisted that such discussion is not negotiable. Sadly, said Artef, the Army appeared to have the support of the so-called pro-democracy movements in Thailand when it comes to Thai nationalism.

While many may support the idea of a separate Malay Muslim state, no one would openly say it publicly as it would invite nasty retaliation from the Thai government. So far, more than 40 youth activists have been charged by the police, at the request of the Army, with instigating a separatist state because they had used words like “Bangsa Patani”, “referendum” and “shahid” in relation to the conflict resolution and the combatants killed in a gunfight against the Thai security forces. In the local context, Bangsa can be translated as community, nation or even narrative.

History Stings Still

While Ramadan carries a religious significance for Muslims worldwide, the Malays of Patani are reminded of the Tak Bai massacre – an incident in October 2004 – in which 78 young Malay Muslims were smoldered to death on the back of Thai military trucks; seven others were shot dead at the protest site.

However, just a month before the 20-year statute of limitation expired, a Narathiwat court decided to try to cases on murder charges against 14 men linked to the death of the unarmed demonstrators. Officials were not able to bring any of the accused to the court and the case was permitted to expire. For some, it was their last attempt for justice. For others, it was an opportunity for some kind of closure with the hope that the country could move on as a nation. Obviously, that did not happen.

Introduction

A 30-minute walk from the glamour and glittering of Ban Rak Thai village is a quiet border crossing that divides Thailand from a nameless checkpoint. It is manned by a lone soldier from the Wa National Army (WNA), a small outfit that came into being in 1973 under the leadership of Maha Sang, the son of Sao Maha, the saohpa of Vingngun, a region in Shan State just north of Panghsang.

They sided with the Chinese Nationalist Party (Kuomintang – KMT) against the China-backed Communist Party of Burma (CPB) back in the day. Like other warlords, Maha Sang survived the rugged Golden Triangle through deals and alliances with militia groups and their warlords.

His ailing brother, Maha Ja, took over Khun Sa’s Hua Muang stronghold immediately after his surrender and assumed the role of the town’s mayor with his own militia that functioned more like his personal security details.

Following the death of Maha Sang in 2007, the WNA placed itself under the United Wa State Army (UWSA) command and control. The group was permitted to keep their flag and uniform, as Thai authorities along the border are much more comfortable dealing with the WNA.

There are just too many histories with the UWSA, a senior Thai Army officer on the border said.

Thorny Relations

The UWSA and the Myanmar government established a ceasefire in 1989, but this was a far cry from a peace treaty. Thus, getting Myanmar to “talk sense” to get the UWSA to pull back – so that the Thai Prime Minister Paetongtarn Shinawatra does not have to look weak and bad in the eyes of the critics – is still a pipe dream.

In fact, said sources on the border, the Myanmar junta wants Thailand to “teach the Wa a lesson.” Myanmar’s State Administration Council (SAC) could not do it, as it would open a new can of worms that the Tatmadaw may not be able to handle.

A Thai think tank Center for Strategic Policy presented its report “Myanmar and Thailand: Strategic Pathways to Regional Peace and Stability” at a December 2024 seminar. Author Supalak Ganjanakhundee said Thailand should not rule out the idea of strengthening cooperation with the UWSA as well as other ethnic groups on cross-border management that could facilitate trade, movement of people and humanitarian responses.

The question is this: why does Thailand want to be seen courting the UWSA?

Like any other organisations, the UWSA wants acceptance and recognition. Having demonised the group over the years, presenting the Wa as a trusted partner of the Thai government will not be an easy sell. The two sides have had several rounds of face-to-face talks between unit commanders on the ground, but these were not negotiations, as the Thai side did not go there with anything to offer.

Ethnic armed organisations along the Thai border are similarly disturbed by the UWSA southward expansion. These include the Shan State Army-South, the Karen National Union, the Karenni National Progressive Party, the Karen National Army and the Kawtoolei Army. Wa flags have been planted at locations where the Three Brotherhood Alliance scored victory.

Chinese Presence

The UWSA is presenting itself as a “peacekeeping force” in places like Lashio, the largest town in northern Shan State that was captured by the Three Brotherhood Alliance in late June 2024. This current role and newly conquered territories left open the question of what exactly constitutes a Wa state.

Moreover, will this arrangement become permanent and serve as a link between the UWSA in the north on the Chinese border and its southern command on the Thai border?

The UWSA and Chinese officials have always insisted that their relationship is more nuanced and based on mutual interest and respect. Thai security planners, on the other hand, are concerned that the Thailand-Myanmar border could fall under China’s sphere of influence.

Beside the UWSA, Thai authorities are not comfortable with the presence of Chinese law enforcement officers poking around the Tak province and the adjacent areas. These are where militia-protected cyber scam centres operate freely in Myawaddy Township, opposite from the Mae Sot district.

In early 2024, dozens of Chinese police operated out of a resort that they had rented out for months. Royal Thai Police HQ in Bangkok instructed local officers to assist their Chinese counterparts to make their stay worthwhile.

Credit: Tha Lahu National Development Organisation/The Nation

But there was no sharing of intel. The Chinese police handled the investigation all by themselves, including their engagement with the Chinese crime syndicates behind the scam centres in and around the Myawaddy border town, adjacent to Mae Sot.

Things heated up in early February 2025 during the visit of Vice Minister Liu Zhongyi to Thailand. Pressured by China to do something, the government ordered a power cut to several towns on the Myanmar side of the border, including areas where the scam centres were operating.

Similar actions were taken two years ago, but the scam centres made up for it with powerful generators and a Starlink Internet connection.

Falling in Line

This time around, however, sensing that the Thais were serious, Colonel Chit Thu, leader of the 7,000-strong Karen National Army (KNA), the outfit that protects sizeable Chinese crime syndicates in his area, began to make moves. Starting with the press conference on 17 February 2025, he conveyed to Thai journalists that “We will take responsibility for clearing out the call centers in KK Park, Myawaddy, and Shwe Kokko and will send all foreign nationals to Myawaddy.”

“It is then the responsibility of the Myanmar police, as the Naypyidaw central government has sent officers to handle the cases. From the tripartite meeting, each country will take their people back, but how they return, I don’t know,” said Chit Thu.

He added that he was disappointed that some Thai lawmakers were calling for a warrant for his arrest, insisting that he had not broken any law. A number of Western countries beg to differ.

A much smaller outfit, the Democratic Karen Benevolent Army (DKBA), responded to Thailand’s request and set a 28 February 2025 deadline for all Chinese scam operators to leave Phayatongsu. This is a DKBA-controlled area (about 133 miles south of Myawaddy) opposite the Three Pagoda Pass of Thailand’s Kanchanaburi province.

On 13 February 2025, the DKBA sent 260 people of various nationalities over the border to Chong Kaeb subdistrict, 76 km south of Mae Sot. The group said another 400 of mostly Africans and South Asians were stranded with them, waiting to be sent to the Thai side of the border where they could link up with diplomats of their respective countries.

“It’s obvious that the DKBA wants to be seen as being helpful to Thailand as they depend so much on us for their survival,” said a Thai police officer with working relations with this Karen outfit.

The DKBA controlled an area opposite from the Chong Kaeb subdistrict where several casinos had been operating until Chinese scam centres moved in this past year. Obviously, however, the DKBA weighed the two options – income from the Chinese scam centres vs a long-standing relationship with Thailand – and the latter made more sense for the outfit’s survivability. The KNA’s Chit Thu, on the other hand, is still holding out, weighing his next move carefully. If the history of this rugged region tells us anything, it is that the leaders and warlords of the Golden Triangle know how to compromise if the conditions and situations are right. They may not rush to the negotiation table, as seen by Panghsang not being too eager to resolve the border dispute with Thailand. Yet it does not mean they are unwilling to make compromises.

Introduction

Along the Thailand-Myanmar border, remnants of China’s lost army persist, transforming into tourist attractions where visitors sample Yunnanese cuisine and traditional Chinese tea.

Ban Rak Thai, locally known as Mae Aw, exemplifies one of the numerous villages where descendants of the Nationalist Chinese Kuomintang (KMT) forces established settlements in the 1960s.

Forced out of Shan State of Myanmar – also known as Burma – after several failed attempts to stage attacks against Communist China, these communities represent a complex geopolitical legacy.

“Between 1950 and 1952, the Kuomintang army in Burma’s Shan States tried no fewer than seven times to invade Yunnan but was repeatedly driven back across the border. The Burmese Army then entered the Shan States to rid the country of its uninvited guests, and that in turn led to an unprecedented militarization of the Shan States,” wrote Chiang Mai-based Swedish journalist Bertil Lintner in his book, “The Wa of Myanmar and China’s Quest for Global Dominance,” published in 2021.

“But the areas east of the Salween River were too remote to be affected by the buildup. There, the Kuomintang reigned supreme through alliances it had established with local warlords, most of them from Kokang and the eastern Shan States, but some of whom were also Wa,” Lintner added.

One of the few cash crops in the Wa Hills and other mountainous areas where the KMT had established bases was opium, which they used to finance their campaign against the communists.

By 1961, the combined forces between Burma and the People’s Liberation Army began to push back against the KMT. A turning point came in January 1968 when the China-trained Communist Party of Burma (CPB) militias crossed the border from Yunnan into Shan State and went straight to the KMT bases.

Eventually, it was time for the KMT to move. Some were evacuated to Taiwan while others crossed into Thailand to form communities like the one here in Ban Rak Thai, a 90-minute drive north of Mae Hong Son provincial seat.

The Thai government convinced the KMT leaders as well as the hill tribes in the region to kick the opium habit in exchange for tea and other cash crops. Thai citizenship was gradually given first as a reward to those fighting against the Communist Party of Thailand and gradually to KMT descendants.

Warlords and Militia Leaders

With the KMT gone, it did not mean Shan State was at peace. New warlords and militia groups would emerge in the Myanmar sector of the Golden Triangle to continue with the opium and heroin business, sending it halfway around the world to streets of New York.

One such person was Chang Shi-fu, who, incidentally, started as a young government village militia to fight the CPB.

Born in 1933 to a Chinese father and a Shan mother in northern Shan State, Shi-fu rose from a young government militia to become the head of his own outfit. He was convicted of high treason in 1973 by the Burmese government and released the following year after his supporter kidnapped two Soviet doctors and ransomed them for his freedom. His release was brokered by a Thai Army general.

From 1974 onward, Shi-fu directed his fight against the Burmese Government, proclaiming himself a Shan nationalist, and adopted the name Khun Sa, or “Prince Prosperous”, in the Shan/Tai language.

Another figure was Wei Hsueh-kang, an ethnic Chinese who fled Yunnan after the Communist victory and relocated to northern Shan State to do business with the local soapha, or chaofah in Thai, which means “lord of the sky”, a royal title used by the hereditary Tai rulers in mainland Southeast Asia.

Wei and his two brothers would relocate to an area near Thailand’s border, where they joined Khun Sa and his outfit. A fallout with Khun Sa forced him out of the Shan circle. They then reconnected with his old network in Shan State and later linked this newly formed alliance with the powerful United Wa State Army (UWSA) when it was established in 1989. Afterwards, they gained access to the vast poppy field in the Wa Hills where raw opium could be refined into heroin.

In 1993, the United States indicted Wei with heroin trafficking and offered a US$2 million reward for information leading to his arrest. Three years earlier, in March 1990, Khun Sa was indicted by the United States for the same crime, with the same amount of bounty placed on his head.

By mid-1990, relentless assault on Khun Sa’s Mong Tai Army (MTA) by its arch-rival the UWSA and the Burmese government troops forced him to surrender in exchange for amnesty.

After Khun Sa’s defeat, the Burmese Government told the UWSA to return to the Sino-Burma border in the north. They refused and instead mobilised more than 100,000 villagers from its Special Region 2 along the Sino-Burma border to newly built towns along the Thai border that stretches from Chiang Rai to Chiang Mai and southward to the northern part of Mae Hong Son province. Special Region 2 is an autonomous area secured from the Myanmar Government in 1989 in exchange for an unwritten ceasefire agreement.

About 10,000 UWSA troops control this so-called UWSA southern command under the leadership of Wei and his brothers. Border outposts and camps along the border once under Khun Sa were immediately taken over by the UWSA. Wherever possible, the UWSA set up a volleyball court on hard-dirt plains – daily matches were supposed to bring them and the Thai troops closer together.

The turning point came one morning in February 1999 when authorities found nine Thai villagers from Chiang Mai’s Fang district beaten to death, with their hands tied behind their backs. Authorities said it was a drug deal gone bad. All fingers pointed to the UWSA.

Deteriorating Relationship

Closing the border leading to Wa’s towns built by Thai contractors was the next logical thing. Thai contractors were told to pull out. For the Thai troops along the border, it meant their daily volleyball game with the Wa soldiers had to come to an end.

Clashes between the two sides became frequent as drug caravans carrying Wa’s methamphetamines make their way into Thailand.

An all-out offensive occurred on 20 May 2002. The battles took place well within Myanmar’s territory and went on throughout the day. Artillery fire supported the advancing Thai soldiers carrying out search-and-destroy missions against the UWSA’s outposts several kilometers inside the Myanmar border.

Thai Army’s armored personnel carrier, along with soldiers from Special Forces, cavalry squadrons and artillery units had been seen taking up positions along the northern border in Chiang Mai, Chiang Rai, and Mae Hong Son provinces for the past weeks to await instruction.

The mobilisation was called Surasri 143, supposedly a military training exercise. One elite unit was tasked with capturing Wei but could not find him as he had fled deeper into Myanmar.

When the dust settled, the UWSA began to build nine outposts that sit smack on the Thai fence. Three of these crossed into Thai territory, according to Google Map. Thai conservative media and right-wing press decided to play this up, calling on the government to take action against the UWSA, giving both the government and the Army that much more headache.

The Current Landscape

Today, no one in Thailand wants to turn back the clock to 2002. Thai troops and UWSA soldiers at the local level are talking to one another in a much calmer atmosphere; local troops described their conversations as friendly but Wa’s crystal meth and methamphetamines continue to find their way into Thai soil.

No one is turning a blind eye to the drug caravan as massive drug bust along the border demonstrated but the Thai government has retreated from politicising the drug issues, as it was not worth the cost.

Talking is better than shooting one another, said a Thai Army unit commander on the border.

For years, Thai Army in the region has wrecked their brain on how to get the UWSA to move the nine outposts, particularly the three that allegedly crossed into the Thai side, just a little bit back to avoid any possible confrontation. The UWSA has had presence there since the fall of Khun Sa in the late 1990s.

The Thai Army even asked Myanmar’s supreme commander, Senior General Min Aung Hlaing during his visit to Thailand in 2014, to intervene on Thailand’s behalf. Still, the UWSA refused to pull back.

Thai Army has held several face-to-face meetings with the local command, including with senior UWSA officials in Mong Hsat back in November 2024, but to no solution has been reached. Wa soldiers at the Thai border said they are not authorised to pull back without an order from Panghsang, their main headquarter located on the Sino-Burma border.

According to Thai Army sources, Panghsang has suggested the Thais take up any allegation of territorial dispute with the Myanmar Government. Interestingly, the UWSA treats territory under their command as a country within a country; this is despite Myanmar soldiers and officials being required to disarm and be escorted when entering the Wa territory.

Many critics, especially those on social media, appear to want the Thai Army to use force to push the UWSA back. Officials on the border said a military victory will not be difficult. However, no one wants to turn the clock back to the old days when clashes between the two sides were all too common.

The hard parts are obviously an all-out offensive and its aftermath. There are just too many tourist attractions and foreign visitors along the northern border; the stakes are just too high for Thailand, particularly the tourism industry, Thailand’s golden goose.

Introduction

On 23 January 2025, the Pathumwan District Office in Bangkok organised a marriage registration event at Siam Paragon, a large shopping mall in the heart of Bangkok, where over 300 couples sought to wed. On the same day across the country, 1,754 couples of diverse genders registered their marriages at district administration offices.

The recent passage of the Equal Marriage Act in Thailand, which allowed the LGBTQ+ community the right to marry, made Thailand the first country in Southeast Asia to legally recognise the right of sexual minorities to form a family. It is also the first in Asia to grant this right through an amendment to the Civil and Commercial Code, which was approved by Parliament late last year.

Signs of changing attitude are evident across the region, where there have been recent legal changes regarding the LGBTQ+ communities.

In 2022, Vietnam’s Health Ministry declared that homosexuality is “not an illness.” Singapore repealed a colonial-era ban on gay sex but amended its constitution to define marriage strictly as a union between a man and a woman. Meanwhile, Malaysia’s Federal Court ruled in February 2024 that Kelantan’s Sharia law on “unnatural sex” was unconstitutional.

Despite this, Indonesia remains vehement in its opposition against the LGBTQ+ community. Aceh, where Sharia-based laws are enforced, is an example. Last month, two university students were flogged for engaging in consensual same-sex relations.

This law is an important step for Thai society, particularly in terms of inheritance rights, tax reductions for spouses and decision-making in critical situations, such as emergency surgeries.

However, while the passage of the Equal Marriage Act represents a significant legal and social shift in Thailand, the impact of such changes is not uniform across the country.

In the southern border provinces – Patani, Yala, and Narathiwat – where the insurgency has persisted for more than two decades, Islamic traditions strongly influence community values and practices.

Thailand’s Push for Marriage Equality

This was not the first proposal to recognise same-sex marriages within Thailand’s legal system, though previous attempts always ended in failure.

The idea of marriage equality originated from a proposal by the Move Forward Party and was later carried by the Pheu Thai Party, alongside NGOs, activists and other stakeholders aiming to recognise the right of sexual minorities to form families. They view LGBTQ+ rights as a global norm that needs to be adapted to domestic political, organisational, cultural and societal conditions.

On 16 June 2022, there was a push for consideration of the draft Marriage Equality Act in the House of Representatives, which includes the draft amendments to the Civil and Commercial Code and the Civil Partnership Act. Ultimately, the House of Representatives approved the principle of these bills. Key provisions include issues relating marriage, dissolution of marriage, property management and inheritance. For example, the term “spouse” is used instead of “husband and wife” to encompass family formation between individuals of the same sex, with a minimum age requirement of 18 years old.

Challenges at the National Level

After the overwhelming approval of the bills (369 in favor and 10 against), concerns were raised by Muslim representatives from the southern border provinces on 21 December 2022. They argued that the proposed bills conflicted with Islamic principles, as Islam is followed by around four million people in Thailand.

Among the 10 who opposed, seven were from the Prachachat Party (which received over 500,000 votes in the last national election, mostly from Muslims in Pattani, Yala and Narathiwat), two were from the Bhumjaithai Party, and one was from the Democrat Party. Nine out of the 10 opponents were from the southern border provinces.

A representative from the Prachachat Party stated that “We are not campaigning [for marriage equality] …. These are facts that will appear in the three southern border provinces and will be evident to the general Muslim community because it impacts their way of life.”

This opposition is significant. Section 66 of the draft Equality Marriage Bill, which was considered by the committee, states that “The provisions of the Civil and Commercial Code, as amended by this Act, shall not apply in cases where specific laws concerning family or inheritance are provided.”

It should be noted that the application of Islamic law is an exception to the general law. In Pattani, Yala and Narathiwat, it has long been used to handle cases related to family matters or inheritance, with a separate court system based on Islamic principles.

Although it is evident that the opposition of Muslim MPs has been relatively minor, it shows a dialectic that continues to exist among political actors regarding the subject of same-sex marriage.

Challenges in Southern Thailand

Thus far, there has been no strong opposition or protest against the Equal Marriage Act by Thailand’s Muslim communities. In Bangkok, there have only been symbolic acts, such as some mosques displaying signs of “No Same-Sex Marriage” to encourage the Islamic community to follow religious principles. Meanwhile, Tok Imam in the southern provinces typically express their opposition by delivering a khutbah during Friday prayer.

Interviews conducted in the southern provinces offer some nuances.

According to a local, “The reason people in this area fervently oppose it is because our religious beliefs are relatively strong.”

Meanwhile, a Muslim transgender who was born and raised in the area explained that “Society forces us to hide our identity. Even though the “Equal Marriage” law has been passed, religious and cultural influence do not allow us to come out, express ourselves or make decisions for our own lives. Meanwhile, transgender people and those with diverse sexual orientations in the area are citizens who deserve the same rights and welfare as everyone else in the country.”

Both of interviewees agree that in southern Thailand, local traditions and community norms still hold significant influence.

Additionally, the adoption of this law may not have a major impact on the Muslim population in these provinces, as Muslims in the region place greater importance on “nikah”, a religious marriage ceremony in Islam guided by Islamic law, rather than civil marriage registration, which follows the state law.

After performing nikah, Muslim couples are not required to register their marriage at the government office. As a result, at this early stage, there is no urgency for Muslim individuals or groups to openly support or endorse marriage equality.

However, the consequence is it remains near impossible for Muslims with diverse sexual orientations to enter same-sex marriage (under religious law) and live openly. The religious principles of the local population act as a filter through which the acceptance of the LGBTQ+ rights is interpreted domestically.

As a result, rather than accepting or rejecting the norm outright, the community exhibits neither strong resistance nor full acceptance. The fact that Islamic law is considered separate from the state law also helps, as it creates a perception that Islamic customs and practices are “protected” against the influence of such global norms as the LGBTQ+ rights.

Such might not be the case in Thailand’s urban centres, however, including Muslim-dominated areas in central regions. Owing to their heavier exposure to global norms and more secular social environments, acceptance towards same-sex marriage might be higher.

Conclusion

Compared to the rest of Southeast Asia, Thailand has been more progressive with regards to the LGBTQ+ rights, but we need to acknowledge the nuances. At the national level, the Equal Marriage Act, as a manifestation of the rising global norm, seems to be well accepted. However, opposition has been expressed by the Muslim population of southern Thailand. This is because this new norm cannot be fully adapted into the region’s strong religious values (i.e. Islamic principles), which shapes the community’s beliefs and practices regarding marriage.

Consequently, it remains almost impossible for the people in the southern region to fully accept or open up to this issue. Their deeply rooted cultural and religious beliefs pose a barrier that hamper a full reconciliation with the concept of same-sex marriage. As a result, sexual minorities in the region continue to live on the margins, under the shadow of societal rejection.

Introduction

In the age of mercantilism, economic dominance was not merely about trade—it was enforced through brute military strength.

European empires deployed gunboats to the coasts of nations, coercing them into opening markets, signing lopsided treaties or even submitting to colonial rule.

The Opium Wars of the 19^th century stand as a stark example—when China resisted British trade demands, gunboats rained fire upon its ports, forcing the Middle Kingdom to cede Hong Kong and open its economy on unfavourable terms.

Power was exercised through the barrel of a cannon while nations bent under the weight of superior firepower.

Today, the battlefield has shifted, but the objective remains the same: influence, control and dominance. Gunboats no longer dictate policies; instead, social media does.

The rise of digital platforms has created a new arsenal of influence operations—one where narratives, not naval fleets, determine the direction of entire countries. Algorithms replace admirals and viral trends become the new cannonballs.

Those who can shape public opinion can shape long-lasting policies. No warships needed; no shots fired—yet the effects can be far more enduring. A single viral campaign can sway elections, overturn governments or redefine national identities.

The ASEAN Landscape

In ASEAN, where youth make up a significant portion of the population and digital adoption is at an all-time high, this reality is unfolding at an unprecedented pace.

From likes to legislation, the power once wielded by empires through brute force is now in the hands of millions of young, digitally empowered individuals. What they believe, share and push into the mainstream today will become the policies that shape their nations tomorrow.

ASEAN’s economic rise has been nothing short of remarkable. In 2024, the region contributed 7.2% of the global economy and was responsible for 8.6% of the world’s GDP growth over the past decade.

With a combined GDP projected to reach US$4.25 trillion by 2025, ASEAN is on the verge of surpassing major economies and cementing itself among the world’s top five economic powerhouses.

This growth is not merely a statistic—it is reshaping global supply chains, investment flows and economic alliances.

Unlike the aging economies of Europe, where labour shortages are becoming a structural problem, ASEAN enjoys a demographic advantage. With a median age of just 31, its workforce is young, vibrant and digitally connected.

The contrast with Europe, where the median age is over 40, is stark. While Western nations grapple with declining birth rates and economic stagnation, ASEAN’s youths are driving an unprecedented wave of innovation, entrepreneurship and consumption. This demographic dividend is fuelling the rise of a powerful middle class, which is expected to reach 350 million people by 2030—larger than the entire population of the United States today.

These are all concrete indicators which enable the possibility of a digital revolution which squarely puts power and influence in the hands of the digitally savvy young generation.

Youth’s Digital Revolution

Over the past decade, the digital landscape in the ASEAN region has undergone a significant transformation, marked by substantial increases in internet access, mobile phone usage and social media engagement among young people.

In 2013, the average internet penetration rate in ASEAN was approximately 34%. By 2021, this figure had more than doubled, reaching 73%. This surge reflects the region’s rapid digital adoption and infrastructure development.

A study conducted in 2019 revealed that 97.5% of Thai high school students owned smartphones, while in Indonesia between 2013 and 2018, smartphone ownership among young adults (ages 18-34) surged from 17% to 66%.

To compound on to this trend, the average youths spend close to five hours a day on their smartphones, thus making them the most digitally reliant generation.

The omnipresence of youths on social media has blunt the influence of mainstream media which in nascent democracies are largely controlled by the government or its cronies.

In Malaysia, for over six decades, the Barisan Nasional (BN) coalition maintained political dominance, partly by controlling mainstream media narratives. The BN government either directly controlled the mainstream media through its ownership of news agencies like The Star and Bernama, or indirectly through strict media licensing laws that promote censorship.

Billionaires linked to the government through monopoly-like multibillion dollar concessions also owned other major media houses.

However, in the lead-up to the 14^th general election (GE14), social media platforms emerged as vital arenas for political discourse, especially among the younger demographic, thus breaking the long-held information monopoly.   

A study analysing 187 news pieces from six online news platforms during the 11-day campaign period highlighted that social media was effectively utilised to influence public perception.

Key issues such as the Goods and Services Tax (GST), the 1Malaysia Development Berhad (1MDB) scandal, and the reputations of political candidates were extensively discussed online, contributing to a wave of political dissent and activism.

This online engagement played a crucial role in shifting public sentiment, leading to BN’s unprecedented electoral defeat.

This was particularly evident on the night before voting, whereby the prime minister candidate for the opposition directly communicated to the public via a Facebook-live event, a feat that was viewed by more than 220,000 people and reached 10 million people in less than 24 hours.

This last figure was more than half of the voting population. Comparably, the then sitting prime minister, who enjoyed the full backing of the media establishment, only garnered 15,000 audience while conducting a similar event.

Knowing that the government had a solid grip on the media establishment, the opposition then actively mobilised the youths to showcase the opposition videos to their parents and grandparents via WhatsApp groups, or in-person when they meet to cast their votes. This merged the influence of social media and the youths to successfully break the government-controlled information monopoly, thus leading to a historic election win.

The same trend could be seen in Thailand. The Move Forward Party’s (MFP) rise in Thailand’s 2023 general election is a testament to the power of social media and youth-driven political engagement in disrupting traditional power structures.

Winning 151 seats, the MFP effectively leveraged digital platforms to bypass mainstream media controls and mobilise grassroots support. On election day alone, the party was mentioned over 245,932 times across social media, with post-election engagement reaching 83.4 million interactions, 70% higher than any other party.

This surge in online activism translated into real political momentum, particularly among Thailand’s younger generations. Of the 52.3 million eligible voters, nearly 44% belonged to Gen Z (18-26 years old) and millennials (27-42 years old)—the demographic that overwhelmingly backed the MFP’s progressive policies.

Their engagement contributed to a historic 75.22% voter turnout, one of the highest in Thai electoral history. Through a combination of digital mobilisation, targeted messaging and political activism, the MFP demonstrated how social media can break conventional information monopolies, empowering young voters to reshape national politics despite institutional resistance.

The Dark Side of Social Media

Social media in the hands of the youths can also be a double-edged sword. It can empower the people, but it can also be weaponised to deceive them. Nowhere is this more evident than in the whitewashing of corruption and dictatorship.

In the Philippines, the Marcos family turned social media into a propaganda machine, rewriting history and painting the brutal Marcos dictatorship as a “golden age”. YouTube and Facebook were flooded with revisionist content, downplaying human rights abuses and glorifying an era of plunder and oppression. This relentless online misinformation campaign worked—Marcos Jr. rode the wave of digital deception all the way to the presidency.

In Malaysia, Najib Razak, convicted for his role in the 1MDB scandal, used social media to rebuild his image. His “Bossku” persona on Facebook and Instagram transformed him from a disgraced leader into a man of the people. He posted selfies. He cracked jokes. He played the victim. Suddenly, he was not a kleptocrat anymore—he was a hero to many.

This is the terrifying power of social media. It does not just shape the present—it rewrites the past.

In the digital age, the erasure and rewriting of history through social media not only deceives the present but also imperils the integrity of future generations’ understanding of truth.

The youth of today are unshackled from the past. They do not carry the weight of old political battles or the emotional baggage of previous generations. History, to them, is not lived experience—it is content they consume online.

Just like how Marcos Jr. benefitted from a rewritten past, we see the same phenomenon in Malaysia with Anwar Ibrahim’s Reformasi movement. In 1998, Reformasi was a fiery rebellion against Mahathir Mohamad’s rule, marked by street protests, mass arrests and cries for justice.

For those who lived through it, Anwar was either a hero or a threat—there was no in-between. But for today’s youth, 1998 is not a memory, it is a hashtag. They see Reformasi not through the lens of those who fought for it, but through the narratives being shaped today.

The same Anwar who was once the face of resistance is now the prime minister, navigating compromises and coalitions. For the youth, the past is not set in stone—it is fluid, shaped by what trends, what gets shared and what is most convincing in the digital age.

Indonesia, ASEAN’s most populous democracy, is no different. President Prabowo Subianto’s transformation is nothing short of a political masterclass in digital rebranding. Once a controversial military figure, even banned from entering the United States, he is now Indonesia’s president—winning outright in the first round with 58.6% of the vote.

How? Social media magic. His campaign deployed the gemoy strategy, turning him from a feared general into an adorable, meme-worthy grandfather figure. Viral videos showed him dancing with his cat Bobby, AI-generated animations softened his image and TikTok flooded with content making him look fun, lovable, and approachable.

This was not just a campaign—it was a full-blown digital personality makeover. And it worked. Youth voters, who once saw him as a relic of the past, now saw him as their gemoy leader. In today’s politics, perception is reality—and social media decides both.

Final Reflections

The latest ISEAS survey in six Southeast Asian countries showed that young undergraduates rarely engage in political discussions online, with more than 50% of youths in five out of the six countries surveyed never or rarely discuss political or social issues online.

However, it fails to capture the nuances of youth activism.

Just because they do not actively post about politics does not mean they are apolitical or politically ignorant. More often than not, these youths are “lurkers” online—consuming hours of political content without actively posting. In fact, they are often more politically informed than older generations (the boomers), thanks to their constant exposure to digital information and reliance on social media as their primary news source.

This phenomenon becomes most evident during elections, when young people, once labelled as “politically disinterested”, suddenly mobilise in massive numbers to vote—often becoming the decisive force in political outcomes.

A local poll conducted just one month before Malaysia’s GE14 showed that more than 50% of youths were disinterested in politics. Yet, in less than 30 days, over 80% of young voters turned up to vote. Not only that, they also actively convinced their parents and grandparents to vote in their favour—triggering the greatest political upset in Malaysia’s electoral history.

All of these show that social media has become the new battleground for power. It can spark revolutions, rewrite history, elevate the fallen and bring down the mighty. It has given the youth of ASEAN a voice louder than ever before—a voice that can shape policies, influence elections and redefine national narratives.

But with great power comes great risk. The same platforms that expose corruption can also whitewash it. The same digital tools that empower democracy can also manipulate it.

The future of ASEAN will not be decided in old halls of power alone, but in the ever-evolving digital arenas where perception is reality and those who control the narrative control the future. The question is no longer whether social media matters—it is who masters it first.

Part of an ongoing article series on the impact of the Middle East conflict on Southeast Asia.

Introduction

Israel’s war on Gaza has sparked concern of a rise in insurgent activities in Thailand’s southern provinces.

The potential threat is significant: An active insurgency is destabilizing the contested region of Pattani, a Malay historical homeland encompassing Thailand’s three border provinces. There is a concern that anti-Israel protests in various parts of the globe would also galvanize Muslims in these Thai provinces to launch their anti-establishment activities.

Approximately two million people inhabit the Pattani region, with about 85% identifying as Malay, or Melayu, rather than Thai. These Malays vehemently reject Thailand’s policy of assimilation, which calls upon the Malays to adopt a Thai identity. For Muslims in this region, Islam and Malay identity are inextricably linked – changing one aspect inevitably impacts the other.

On the state level, Thailand’s relationship with Israel has never been the central defining factor in the interaction between the state and its Malay minority. However, when issues arise – whether related to the ongoing war or other events in the Middle East – the stance of Thai Muslims is unmistakably clear, as will be explored below.

Like other ASEAN Member States, Thailand also calls for an end to hostilities in Gaza and urges all sides to respect humanitarian norms and principles. However, Thailand would not take a strong political stance on the conflict. This is despite some Thai falling victims to this ongoing conflict.

Prior to Hamas’ 7 October attack that killed more than 1,200 people, including 39 Thai nationals, there were nearly 30,000 Thais in Israeli farms just kilometers from the Gaza border. These individuals went to work there under a government-to-government arrangement. Of the 240 taken hostage by Hamas, 32 were Thai nationals, some of whom have died.

Thailand has issued statements regarding developments on the warfront. However, its rather mild response could be explained by the fact that its bilateral ties with Israel are nowhere near as robust as its relationship with other Western governments. Besides, Israel has never featured prominently on any Thai political party’s agenda.

This, however, does not mean that Thailand’s security apparatus is not concerned about the possible spillover effect that Israel’s war has on its southern provinces.

Demonstrations and Parades in Southern Thailand

Not long after the onset of the war in Gaza, Thai military officials began visiting villages in these provinces, urging local chiefs and elders to keep the communities subdued. The last thing they needed was to witness unruly Malay demonstrators jeopardizing Thailand’s long-standing relations with Israel.

It did not take long for news of the officials’ activities to reach the youth activists in the region’s cities. Feeling compelled to respond to this perceived interference, these activists organized a march from the Pattani City Hall to the provincial central mosque in December 2023.

Palestinian flags flew high as local Muslims seized the opportunity to defy the state security apparatus, the very forces leading the government’s counterinsurgency strategy, which has yet to secure the loyalty of the local Malays.

The December 2023 march in downtown Pattani set off a small spark in Thailand’s Malay-speaking south. Palestinian flags, along with symbols and narratives of the Malays’ past and narratives, became a common sight in just about social and cultural activities, particularly among the youth.

This is the region that has been wracked with separatist problems and witnessed more than 7,500 deaths from insurgency-related violence since January 2004. Thus, the emergence of symbols and narratives that glorify the Malayness would rightfully raise anxiety on the part of the authorities.

The problem did not stop there. In May 2024, teachers at an Islamic preschool (locally known as tadeka)in Narathiwat pushed the line by dressing the children in military fatigues and led them in a march with toy guns, carrying Hamas and Palestinian flags to display solidarity with the people in Gaza.

Within days, the Ministry of Culture instructed the provincial governor to issue a public statement warning all tadeka in the region – about 1,660 altogether – that such demonstrations could lead to a halt in the government’s financial support for their school.

Unsurprisingly, the directive was met with discontent from the local Muslims, who have long felt alienated in this predominantly Buddhist kingdom, which embraced a separate set of narratives, heroes and myths from the Malays in the far south.

The tit-for-tat between the two sides seems to be a never-ending episode, however. Later still, in early September 2024, a paramilitary unit in Narathiwat broke up a village parade organized by a group of young people to remove Palestinian flags and portraits of Patani’s Malay historical figures and religious leaders. The unit’s reasoning was that these items have nothing to do with local culture.

As expected, social media and political activists responded ferociously. Narathiwat lawmaker Kamonsak Leewamoh even went on the parliament floor to demand a public apology from the local military unit for the alleged interference and called on the Royal Thai Army to investigate the incident.

The Dichotomy

Despite these concerning developments, we need to remember that the challenges facing the Muslims in Thailand bear little connection to the outside world, as the tensions are rooted in local dynamics. However, simply because the Malays’ response has been relatively muted, this does not mean they are apolitical.

Before we continue with this point, a dichotomy must be made. In this article, the “Malays of Patani” refer to traditionalist Muslims in the southernmost border provinces (the Patani region). Outside that, Muslims are referred to as “Thai Muslims.”

While Thai Muslims have to contend against anti-Islam sentiment and find themselves in a constant struggle to show the rest of the country that they are very much part of Thailand nationhood, the Malays of Patani, on the other hand, reject the Thai state-constructed narrative and constantly look for ways to assert their historical-cultural identity. For the latter, Malay identity and Islam are inseparable.

Thai Muslims, both Sunnis and Shiites, are patriotic and extremely loyal to the state. This explains their resentment towards the Malays of Patani for challenging Thailand’s nationhood and embracing separatism.

Despite their patriotism, Thai Muslims’ loyalty to the state is constantly questioned. They do what they can to avoid confrontation with the Thais, particularly the Buddhist nationalists who believe that Thainess is synonymous to being a Buddhist of the Theravada school.

Compared to heavy protests elsewhere in the world – the kind that is seen on US colleges – responses from the Malays of Patani and the Thai Muslims to the war in Gaza seem rather tame. As local writer and political activist Asmadee Bueheng explained, the lack of response must be understood in a proper context.

The vast majority of the Malays in the border provinces are traditionalist Muslims who embrace local culture and turn to the village ulema (religious scholars) for answers to personal and theological, sometimes political, questions. Conversely, they see the reformists as a bunch of globalized religious movements that compete among themselves to establish a modern identity at the expense of local culture. Groups like Hamas, the Muslim Brotherhood, Salafi, Wahhabi and Tablighi Jamaat are all considered reformists by the Malays of Patani.

Moreover, said Asmadee, local Malays have never been comfortable with “political Islam” as a concept. But being traditionalists does not mean they are not political. Their resistance to Thailand’s policy of assimilation has translated into an armed struggle for independence that keeps resurfacing generation after generation ever since the region was conquered by Siam in the late 18^th century.

However, not all reformists embraced political Islam: many Salafists, for example, take a “purist” or “quietist” approach and withdraw themselves completely from political affairs, while so-called “jihadists” take up violent actions to advance their political agenda in the name of religion.

The traditionalists among the Malays of Patani see the war in Gaza as very much a byproduct of political Islam. On the other hand, the reformist Muslims are calling for a more active response to the war in Gaza but fall short of calling on the government to make stern and concrete measures. They are concerned that their loyalty to the state would be questioned.

In spite of these differences, however, there is no open hostility between the two groups, as both keep to themselves.

The absence of major outbursts against Israel’s genocidal tendency in Gaza does not mean that the Malays of Patani or the Thai Muslims have shut themselves out of the affairs of the Islamic world or that they are indifferent to the suffering of fellow Muslims elsewhere.

Both groups have consistently engaged Muslim communities abroad on various platforms and on occasions. Many of these families continue to send their children to universities and madrasa in the Middle East and South Asia, where they are exposed to other schools of thought and competing ideas.

In the 1980s, for example, more than 1,000 Pattani Malays combatants joined fighters from Aceh and Mindanao in training camps in the Middle East and North Africa.

This is where they come to know fellow “revolutionaries” from other parts of the world, including Palestinian leftists who made a huge contribution to the development of the Palestinian national movement back in the day but no longer feature in today’s conversations.

In fact, Patani itself, prior to its defeat by Siam in 1786, was a flourishing commercial center where East Asian traders met and carried out business with their counterparts from Europe. This is the historical precedence of the region’s openness and willingness to engage others from the outside world.

Explaining the Authorities’ Anxiety

Two decades ago, when the current wave of Patani Malay separatists resurfaced to pick up what the previous generation had left off a decade earlier, several so-called security experts were quick to label the southern Thai conflict a new front in the global war on terrorism.

Such a label was convenient. After all, various factors at the time made it easier to do so. These include the political climate, the prevailing mood and narrative, the emergence of a new set of vocabulary, and a booming industry under the banner of a global war on terrorism that came to life following 9/11.

However, in the case of Southeast Asia, it did not take long to see that lumping ethno-nationalist struggles in the same basket as radical jihadist groups such as al-Qaeda or Jama’ah Islamiyah has no merit.

Separatist movements such as Barisan Revolusi Nasional (National Revolutionary Front – BRN), Gerakan Aceh Merdeka (Free Aceh Movement – GAM) and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) would eventually come to the negotiating tables with the government that they had been fighting. Today, the GAM and the MILF have signed a peace agreement with their respective governments. The BRN, on the other hand, is still negotiating with the Thai government.

Unlike radical jihadists, these Southeast Asian separatist groups never established the kind of global network because the banner of their struggle has always been centered on liberating their homeland from outside forces.

Conclusion

While the end to the southern Thai conflict is still nowhere in sight, there is nothing to suggest that the political context of the conflict in Patani will evolve from an ethno-nationalist to violent jihadist where the banner of the struggle becomes a religion. Nevertheless, local and foreign counterterrorism officials are on a constant lookout for any possible incursions of radicalism, the kind that Southeast Asia had witnessed in the early 2000s when violent extremist groups had penetrated the Mindanao region of the Philippines and in the various pockets of Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore.

The thinking among these officials is that one cannot afford to be complacent. Hence the anxiety of the Thai officials following the eruption of Israel’s war on Gaza, despite the rather mild response by the Malays of Patani so far.