Slowing Down the Sciences

“Science needs time to think. Science needs time to read and time to fail.”

Such is the powerful proposition made by the Slow Science Manifesto, supported by the Slow Science Academy in Germany. Considering the state of sciences and academia in ASEAN today, it is a message that intellectuals here must heed.

The concept of “slow science” is sparking a lively debate in academia, particularly in Europe and other Western nations. Slow science aims to address a fundamental issue: How can we produce meaningful, quality science in today’s fast-paced academic environment?

Ironically, this movement – despite calling for a slowdown – has gained momentum because of the perceived problems in academia recently.

The pressure to publish more papers is what proponents of slow science are concerned about. The obsession with metrics – paper counts, citation scores and institutional rankings – turns research into mere accumulating numbers rather than about the true quality and impact of the work.

This critique is mainly reflected in the works of scholars like Christian Fuchs and Isabelle Stengers.

In many fields, particularly economics and medicine, the pressure to publish frequently has led to practices like “salami slicing”, where researchers break down a single, comprehensive study into smaller, less substantial papers simply to meet publication quotas.

Similarly, in engineering and psychology, the pressure to meet publication targets has contributed to the unethical practice of “p-hacking”, where researchers manipulate data analysis to achieve desired outcomes, thus undermining the integrity of scientific work.

This problem is not just a Western one; it is unquestionably relevant in developing economies, especially ASEAN, where academic pressures can be intense.

Scientists in ASEAN are pressured to meet artificial targets and work within rigid deadlines that prioritize output over substance. For instance, in Indonesia, the “publish or perish” culture demands a specific number of publications in high-impact journals for promotions and funding.

Similarly, in Malaysia, academics must meet rigid Key Performance Indicators (KPIs) tied to publication quotas, which often result in fragmented or less meaningful studies. In Thailand, graduate students are required to publish in indexed journals just to graduate, which leads to superficial work.

All of this phenomenon creates a dilemma: how can we produce truly impactful, interdisciplinary research when the conditions for such work—time, focus, and critical thinking—are in short supply solely to meet immediate institutional demands?

At its core, slow science calls on academicians to take a step back from rushing publications and examine their professional lives carefully. This is not just about a slower pace for the sake of it; it’s about creating space for deeper thinking and better science for all.

But how does slowing down help? If universities are too focused on trying to hit big numbers and rankings, it can compromise the depth and quality of research. When we focus too much on numbers, we forget what really matters—conducting research that helps people and makes a difference.

Publish or Perish?

When scientists discover something new, they share their findings in scientific journals so others can learn from them and make even more discoveries. This helps science move forward.

However, research papers can be retracted if there are issues concerning their accuracy or ethical standards. In fact, this issue has surged in recent years. In 2023 alone, over 10,000 papers were retracted globally, setting a new record.

Recent studies show that the pressure to quickly produce data and publish research has a detrimental effect on the quality of studies, leading to more papers being retracted. Plagiarism is the second most common cause, responsible for 16% of these retractions.

Fake peer reviews are also a big problem. Normally, experts review research papers and give helpful feedback, but in the last 10 years, these issues have become much more common – increasing 10 times – eroding the integrity of this essential process.

To make it worse, some companies sell fake research papers—about 2% of all research published in 2022 came from these companies.

More science papers are being retracted because the research was not conducted right. This underscores a worrying misuse of government spending on research or studies that are not relevant.

But it is not just about wasting money. Erroneous studies can mislead other scientists into spending time and resources on ideas that do not work. This can slow down progress, harm public trust and undermine the credibility of science. Therefore, there is an imperative to address these cracks in the system.

Nourishing Science

The slow science concept borrowed its rationale from the Slow Food movement that began in Italy in the 1980s. The idea behind it was simple: Fast food, while convenient, is often stripped of nutritional value and people would be healthier if they cooked nourishing meals made from fresh ingredients.

As a movement, Slow Food started with big ideas, though it has faced challenges against fast food corporations.

People who support slow science believe that the research process today is a bit like fast food—it is undertaken quickly, yet lacking the depth and quality.

This notion has been propagated by individuals like Dr. Joël Candau, an anthropologist from Université Nice-Sophia-Antipolis, who equates “fast science” to fast food—one that focuses on accomplishing a lot quickly instead of properly.

To truly embrace the idea of slow science, we need to think beyond just research practices and consider the mindset it calls for—a focus on slowing down and fully immersing in the process.

This approach resists the pressure to “publish or perish”, a pressure that often reduces research to a numbers game, turning science into a fast-food simulacrum that is produced for consumption rather than contemplation.

Just like slow food means taking time to make food tasty and healthy, slow science means scientists should take their time with research. In other words, conducting studies that are genuinely beneficial for humanity.

Concerns for ASEAN Countries

Ethical issues, plagiarism, the “shortcut” to professorship and poor welfare for academicians are some key challenges that stem from our obsession with fast-paced science. This is because, as mentioned above, universities are pressured to produce high output as quickly as possible, in large part to climb the global rankings and attract elusive research funding.

This system may produce more papers, but it often misses the true purpose of academic research—advancing knowledge in ways that benefit society. If Indonesia wishes to build an academic system that genuinely contributes to its development, it must start by valuing depth over speed. The government must invest in fostering an environment where scientists are encouraged to think critically and freely rather than just “producing on demand”.

The conversation about “slow science” is one that academic leaders and thinkers in Southeast Asia must start. Indeed, for Indonesia and many other ASEAN Member States (AMS), there is an urgent need to speed up higher education reforms to catch up with leading global institutions elsewhere, an imperative that cannot be ignored.

The push for modernization, funding and global recognition is real, and there is no question about the necessity of speeding up these processes. However, this swift pace must not come at the cost of quality and depth in research.

The hard part is getting things to balance. AMS have to rapidly transform the quality of their educational institutions to meet global standards. However, if these changes are solely focused on speed and quantity, they risk undermining the very essence of what science should be – thoughtful questioning, deep exploration, and significant discovery.

Thus, AMS must not only reform quickly but also create environments where researchers can work with the intellectual freedom and time needed to truly innovate, reflect, and contribute to societal development in ways that are sustainable as well as impactful in the long run.

Where to from Here?

So, what is the solution? The government, representing the general public interest, bears the greatest responsibility to address the externalities of fast-paced science.

One of the first steps in reforming our higher education system is to restore the autonomy of public research universities. By autonomy, we mean the ability of universities to function without undue external interference, especially from government bodies, political influences or commercial interests.

In practical terms, this autonomy allows universities to define their own academic, research and institutional priorities. This reform is pivotal, as it holds far-reaching implications—from securing stable funding to enabling researchers to pursue long-term goals that prospectively lead to groundbreaking discoveries.

At the same time, it is essential to streamline bureaucratic processes that often impede progress. Revising centralized policies and cutting down on unnecessary administrative barriers will create a significant change.

The new Minister and Deputy Minister of Higher Education of Indonesia, Satryo Brodjonegoro and Stella Christie, can take the lead by focusing on this reform. Once universities regain their autonomy, they will be able to function as dynamic knowledge hubs, addressing national challenges deliberatively.

Furthermore, universities, research institutions and funding agencies need to improve their due diligence and hold those responsible for misconduct accountable. These steps are crucial to ensure scientists can focus on their research without unnecessary distractions – creating an environment where they can approach their work with the care and attention it deserves.

Pioneering initiatives, such as the Max Planck Society in Germany and the Wellcome Trust in the United Kingdom, could serve as valuable benchmarks for ASEAN research ecosystems. These institutions exemplify the power of good governance, strategic funding and thoughtful institutional design, enabling researchers to pursue long-term goals without the pressure of immediate results. Ultimately, it is up to the scientists themselves to engage with society’s problems – in a different kind of academic atmosphere – one that is not defined by speed but by the quality of reason. Therefore, a slower, more thoughtful academia will enable real progress in solving our most pressing social challenges.

WARNING: SPOILERS AHEAD

Introduction

Alien: Romulus spares no time at grasping the audience’s attention.

The deafening silence that accompanies its magnificent first scene – a spaceship gliding through the debris of Nostromo – is a confident way to demonstrate its fine quality as a film.

The spaceship in question was inviting a well-known monster onboard, extracting a meteorite in which the Xenomorph from the first Alien movie was entombed.

For a movie franchise that is 45 years old, the horror trope is all-too familiar. Anyone with a remote knowledge of the 1980s pop culture can already predict what would happen next: facehuggers, chest-bursting alien babies and acid-blooded Xenomorphs slaughtering everyone on board. After six Alien movies, the setting and plot of Romulus do not exactly offer anything new.

And yet, boredom did not strike me for even a second. Despite its tired elements, Romulus offers new ways of storytelling to the Alien canon that kept me invested in the story throughout its runtime.

It does not revolutionize the tenets of the franchise – in fact, many of Romulus’ elements follow the template established by the six movies that came before. How then, did Romulus become one of the best movies in the franchise as well as an entertaining horror in 2024? The answer lies in three factors: nostalgia, stunning visuals and a new interpretation of its true horror.

That ‘80s Formula

In short, Romulus is a story about a group of indentured workers and a synthetic (i.e., an android) trying to escape their homeworld and undertake a multi-year voyage across space. To achieve so, they needed to extract cryochambers from a defunct space station that, unsurprisingly, was infested with facehuggers and Xenomorphs.

Itcapitalizes on the ‘80s nostalgia that has swept the film and television industry in recent years, fuelled by the decade’s cultural gravitas as well as Hollywood’s lack of confidence at producing new materials. Blade Runner 2049, Stranger Things and It exemplify this, evoking visual imagery that is native of the ‘80s or setting an entire story in the decade.

Romulus leans towards the former. A portion of its first act is set in Jackson, shown as a dark, steampunk-ish sunless planet that reminds us of the “dirty” and bleak dystopia typical of Blade Runner and The Terminator.

When the setting finally shifts to the space station Renaissance, this identity remains just as strong, manifesting through the ‘80s interpretation of “advanced” technologies. This includes computers with convex screens, bulky keyboard keys and cubic fonts typically used for coding today, all of which give a major throwback to how technologies were depicted in the decade’s movies.

It stands in sharp contrast with its immediate predecessors Prometheus and Alien: Covenant, which opt for futuristic physics, a clean look and an optimistic take on technology. The problem is, the two movies were released around the same time period as other movies that featured a similar look and feel (such as Star Wars, Star Trek and the more realistic Interstellar). They failed to stand out among the rest.

Romulus refuses to bow to this convention, instead choosing “backward” imagery that strongly registers with today’s audience.

Magnificent Shots

Romulus is also supported by some truly magnificent shots, placing it closer to Interstellar than Star Wars in a spectrum of comparison.

Some of these are worth mentioning here. The atmospheric ascension of Corbelan, the characters’ ship, through thick and stormy clouds conjures the image of their rise from a hellscape (Jackson) to a hope for a brighter future (Renaissance) with divine intensity.

Once above the atmosphere, wide shots are also utilized to showcase Jackson’s gloomy surface coupled with its impressive belt of icy rings, portraying the outer space that is beautiful and dangerous at once. My awe was further elevated as Renaissance came into view, an imposing, floating object that would soon be the characters’ fatal agony.

This interplay between beautiful visuals and danger becomes a leitmotif throughout the movie. Renaissance’s halls, labs and rooms are well-designed but leave enough room for danger to lurk in shadowy crevices.

The station’s striking exterior is also beautifully shot, even as Corbelan crashed against its fuel tank and augmented the sense of emergency.

Of most memorable is the collision of Renaissance with Jackson’s planetary rings, depicting a stunning catastrophe brought about by ice, fire and empty space.

Beautiful shots like these usually bear a small contribution to the plot progression, but in the case of Romulus, they act as a counter to the potential boredom created by our overfamiliarity with its horror.

In other words, these shots improve the movie’s quality by injecting artistic components that force the audience to judge it beyond just its horror elements.

Moreover, they also widen our perspective of the Alien franchise by introducing a creative dimension to its expanding universe, in a way that is more impactful than the franchise’s most recent attempts. Again, Prometheus and Covenant look stylish and modern, yet they are not as striking as Romulus.

As if this is not enough, consider also the clever use of colors to accentuate the movies’ mood and ambience, which overall raised my cinematic experience. Loosely, yellow is suspense, white is safe, blue is low temperature and red is death. These accents also rarely play any role in the story but act as a useful compass as to what the audience can expect in the next few minutes or so, thereby swelling the thrill. For example, had the movie used standard lighting and colorization for the scene where dormant facehuggers were coming back to life in their cryopods, I doubt it would have had an effect as terrifying as the one shown in the movie’s final cut.

Technology and Corruption

To my surprise, my familiarity with Romulus’ alien life forms allowed me to pay more attention to its other aspects, thereby facilitating a different interpretation of what its core horror really is to me personally.

This relates to the corrupt use of technology, as well as to humans’ helplessness at trying to control it.

An early point in the story shows a bureaucrat of Weyland-Yutani, the corporation that “enslaved” the human characters on Jackson, who was manipulating her computer data to deny Rain (Cailee Spaeny) her right to relocate to a planet outside the corporation’s control.

This might seem like a menial detail. However, such a crucial act was what propelled Rain and Andy (her synthetic “brother” played by David Jonsson) to embark on their deadly adventure with the rest of the characters.

The intersection of corruption and horror is rife in Southeast Asia, where the abuse of power could pave the way for personal horror in the life of the abused. Romulus reminds us that technology can be a vector for such abuse, which, in the region’s context, has resulted in social ills and crimes.

In Indonesia, for example, the recent data leak disaster represents the nation’s desire for modernization that is not sufficiently paired with efforts to address the fundamentals, i.e., cybersecurity. As a result, the loss of millions of citizens’ personal data would be a looming anxiety over years to come, as they await in concern over how their data would be exploited by irresponsible parties.

The Malaysian government has also been under pressure to combat cybercrimes targeting vulnerable individuals, particularly children. With 4% of internet-using children in Malaysia (aged 12–17) having become victims of online sexual exploitation, we can only imagine the tales of horror these victims have experienced in the past and may continue to struggle with in the future.

Meanwhile, Cambodia has emerged as something of a hotspot of cyber-slavery, where gangsters allure individuals (often young and English-speaking) from neighboring countries with a promise of well-paid employment. The victims would soon find themselves in closed compounds with their documents seized, forced to perform online scams with no prospect of getting released.

These are just snippets of how technology has been exploited by malicious parties in Southeast Asia, leaving only destruction in their wake. They are not too dissimilar to Weyland-Yutani’s activities to keep Rain on as an indentured worker, by way of manipulating technology.

Futile Attempt

It is not an Alien movie if it does not depict the tension and collaboration between humans and synthetics. In Romulus, this manifests in the human characters’ perplexity – and eventual dread – over their inability to control Andy’s behavior and actions.

To recap, the friendly synthetic was invited to join the crew for his ability to communicate with Renaissance’s AI, allowing him to perform all sorts of tasks such as opening locked doors and navigating the station’s alien-infested corridors. Andy started to behave outside the humans’ expectations once a new module was installed on his processor, shifting his priorities away from serving Rain’s best interest to Weyland-Yutani’s.

In other words, whereas Andy’s prime directive was to preserve human lives, his “upgrade” changed to fulfilling the company’s pursuit. He also started to apply cold logic to his actions which frightened the human characters for how inhuman they seemingly were.

Nothing in this plotline also feels refreshingly new. This theme of human-synthetic tension has been a staple since Ash betrayed the human crew of Nostromo in 1979’s Alien. Subsequently, we have had Bishop (Aliens), who was a poster boy of an obedient synthetic, as well as David (Prometheus and Covenant), who was just as capable of enjoying classical music as instigating a genocide.

Romulus applies a more sinister undertone to this long-running theme, mixing Andy’s identity question and the human characters’ futile attempt at keeping him under control. The result was the latent horror that amplifies Romulus’ overt horror, i.e., the facehuggers and Xenomorphs.

For example, the cold logic of upgraded Andy demanded he terminate the pilot who was impregnated by a facehugger. Though he was unsuccessful, his attempt to do so resulted in a disaster that only worsened the overall situation. At that point, the horror shifted from the Xenomorph to Andy, as the surviving characters and audience wondered about which posed more threat.

Meanwhile, despite his initial task of obeying the humans’ request to open locked doors, upgraded Andy showed that he could decide not to abide by such a demand. At one point, he refused to open a locked door, thereby condemning the pregnant person on the other side to oblivion by Xenomorph.

The tension between Andy and the humans represents the latter’s failed attempt at controlling technology despite their utilitarian design when inviting him onboard. Ultimately, their downfall came about from their inability to anticipate the consequences of upgrading Andy, which was portrayed as the synthetic being “corrupted” by Weyland-Yutani’s capitalist pursuit.

This plotline is also consistent with the popular discourse about humans’ latent fear over machines’ unpredictability and display of higher independence, a topic which has also been highlighted in The Terminator and Mass Effect, among others. In the former, Skynet saw all humans as a threat after becoming self-aware, while in the latter, the Geth spooked its creators by asking if it has a soul, a question that can only be conceived by a sentient creature.  

In real life, AI has been observed to have behaved in unpredictable ways or even rogue-like manners thanks to glitches, biases and vulnerabilities, albeit in a far less catastrophic fashion. Linked to the previous section is how AI could also be warped by certain parties to pursue less-than-altruistic goals, such as instigating cyber-attacks, online fraud and spreading hoaxes. Furthermore, it does not help that AI continues to be viewed suspiciously among certain quarters; in Singapore, for example, less than half of SMEs surveyed claimed that AI has had or will make a positive impact on their business productivity.

If such are our concerns today, then in the probable future, Romulus shows that humans remain unable to subjugate technology to their will. The question is no longer about what we are going to use AI for; it is whether humans should be entrusted with this technology in the first place.

Whereas such plotlines would have been relegated to science fiction in previous decades, we cannot help but wonder if these have become a not-so-remote possibility thanks to today’s state of technology. Romulus’ true horror, thus, lies in its Lovecraftian approach to advanced technologies—the dread over what machines would do once they become self-aware and obtain free will, as well as humans’ futile attempt at trying to tame it.

Conclusion

Romulus is a strikingly beautiful movie and its artistic choices worked well in amplifying its quality. It abandons the clean, futuristic and high-tech look while choosing to remain faithful to the imageries of the first Alien movies, which resonate well with the audience’s taste today. The latest advancement in technology has also prompted new ways to interpret its true horror, away from the alien life forms to the synthetic beings that we strive to create today.

Introduction

The Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad) has had an interest in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) since its first summit in March 2021. The Quad has expressed its intention to support and collaborate with ASEAN through joint statements produced after each summit, clearly signalling a desire to be closer with ASEAN.

However, ASEAN Member States (AMS) have had their reservations. ASEAN’s sentiment tends to perceives the Quad as merely the latest attempt at marginalizing China in the Indo-Pacific region, which is not in line with ASEAN’s paradigm of an inclusive regional dialogue. A survey conducted by the Foreign Policy Community of Indonesia (FPCI) found that 78,8% of respondents perceive a tension between the Quad and China, though at varying degrees.

It does not help that China is among, if not the biggest, trade partners with each of the AMS. This means each AMS and ASEAN as a whole stand to lose economically if there is a heightened tension between the Middle Kingdom and the Quad.

Despite this hesitation, the Quad members – the United States, Australia, India and Japan – have been trying to convince the region that the minilateral grouping is not meant to corner China, but to serve as an alternative cooperation partner to the region.

“QUAD’s” wish for ASEAN

In its past four joint statements, the Quad had consistently expressed its support for ASEAN’s centrality. The Quad acknowledges the strategic position and the role of ASEAN in the Indo-Pacific geopolitical architecture.

The Quad also sees the importance of ASEAN unity aside from its centrality. In all of its joint statements, the Quad has always mentioned the terms ASEAN “centrality” and “unity”, treating both terms as essentially inseparable. However, the Quad also recognizes ASEAN disunity in addressing political-security issues to some degree, particularly in addressing the ongoing disputes in the South China Sea and Myanmar crisis.

ASEAN’s Wish for the Quad

ASEAN’s core principle in the Indo-Pacific is inclusivity. This principle has been stated and written in all of ASEAN leaders’ speeches and ASEAN documents. For the grouping, the principal idea behind inclusivity is that the Indo-Pacific cannot exclude China from the picture.

On the Quad side, the word “inclusive” has been expressed since its first joint statement in March 2021. They added the word in addition to “free”, “open” as well as “resilient Indo-Pacific”. Compared with former President Trump’s Indo-Pacific concept, which did not use the word, this is a notable paradigm shift.

We may not have a clear picture as to what the Quad really means when it talks about “inclusivity”, however, it appears that the Quad have readjusted its parameters to better align with ASEAN’s paradigm of an inclusive Indo-Pacific. Thus, it can be argued that the core principles of both the Quad and ASEAN on Indo-Pacific are more compatible now.

More Attention to ASEAN

Does ASEAN Matter? may be the title of Dr. Marty Natalegawa’s latest book, but the same question can be asked to the Quad members. Does ASEAN really matter to the minilateral grouping?

The word “ASEAN” is mentioned more frequently with each subsequent joint statements produced by the Quad. The first joint statement only mentions ASEAN once. The second (September 2021) mentions it four times. The third (May 2022) mentions six times. Significantly, the recently concluded summit in Hiroshima produced a joint statement that mentions ASEAN a whopping 13 times.

Through this indicator, we can simply conclude that ASEAN is getting more attention from the Quad members, an acknowledgment that the Quad sees ASEAN as a strategic regional partner.

The Room for ASEAN-Quad Cooperation

During Cambodia’s 2022 ASEAN Chairmanship, ASEAN leaders committed to operationalizing the ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific (AOIP). Since the adoption of AOIP in 2019, analysts have criticized the concept for not offering something new and lacking details on steps to operationalize it.

However, this is perhaps where the words of a Singaporean senior diplomat Bilahari Kausikan ring true when he said that the AOIP is an old wine in a new bottle. We could not ignore the fact that it is never easy to operationalize it and that ASEAN should work towards getting buy-in from and mobilizing its dialogue partners to achieve such objective.

Engaging the Quad is a worthwhile option to consider. The latest joint statement from the Hiroshima summit expresses that “We will continue to strengthen our respective relationship with ASEAN and seek opportunities for greater Quad collaboration in support of the AOIP.“

This shows the Quad’s political will and readiness to be engaged by ASEAN. In a previous joint statement, the Quad specified the cooperation areas to include digital connectivity, clean energy, climate resilience, disaster resilience and energy. These are in line with AOIP’s four pillars of maritime cooperation, connectivity, Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) and economics.

A Potential ASEAN-Quad Meeting?

Engaging the Quad is timely and relevant to ASEAN. Quad has demonstrated that it is not merely a security-oriented minilateral grouping, but also one that focuses on connectivity, regional resilience, economics and other dimensions which align with the AOIP.

There is a possibility to actualize the ASEAN-Quad engagement under Indonesia’s ASEAN chairmanship this year. President Joko Widodo has stated that the Quad as well as the Australia, the United Kingdom and the United States (AUKUS) security pact should be viewed as partners and not as competitors. This is the first time any ASEAN leaders has openly said the possibility of engaging with the Quad, even with the AUKUS. For Indonesia, this statement is a shift of position considering how sceptical Jakarta viewed the Quad and AUKUS before.

To propose for an ASEAN-Quad summit at the sideline of this September’s ASEAN Summit would be too much to ask, but an informal meeting of the foreign ministers between ASEAN and the Quad is a possibility worth considering.

On the other hand, it is also worth asking why there should be an ASEAN-Quad summit when all Quad members are already ASEAN Dialogue Partners. An exclusive meeting between ASEAN and the Quad could may also be too sensitive, if not treated as an outright provocation, to China.

Despite this, ASEAN could not afford to ignore the Quad as an important grouping in the Indo-Pacific, just as ASEAN could not afford to ignore China in Indo-Pacific discourse. Thus, engaging the Quad could be argued as part of ASEAN’s exercising its centrality and inclusivity.

Pragmatically, the operationalization of the AOIP should start with opening and widening ASEAN engagements. The Indonesian chairmanship has pushed ASEAN to engage more with the Indian Ocean Rim Organization (IORA) and Pacific countries; why not with the Quad as well?

Furthermore, the Quad is an alternative of source for ASEAN to meet its development plan. The Master Plan on ASEAN Connectivity (MPAC) 2025 estimated that around US$110 billion is required to build connectivity hardware and software from 2016 to 2025. ASEAN cannot be only relying on one partner; ASEAN should work with all available partners. The momentum for cooperation is there. All in all, there is no doubt that the Quad has an appetite to get closer to ASEAN. The ball is now in ASEAN’s court. If the metaphorical ball means exposing ASEAN to geopolitical risk, we should remember that ASEAN story has always been about taking geopolitical risk and exercising our strategic autonomy.

Introduction

Turkey’s economic and political situations have been deteriorating progressively over the last decade. The macroeconomic indicators that started to decline in 2011 became more obvious in 2013. Turkey’s government transformed into authoritarianism in 2016 and its economy faced a crisis in March 2018, before a full-blown depression occurred two years later when the pandemic hit.  

The government adopted a variety of economic strategies throughout this tumultuous period, most of which were at odds with one another. Numerous shifts taken by the government had also been difficult for both businesses and investors.

Turkey’s economic woe is not unanticipated. Two decades of steady economic development were followed by shakes and wobbles in recent years. Turkey also took on significant amounts of debt in foreign currencies to support growth. However, Turkey’s economy is sensitive to exchange-rate shocks that have an exaggerated impact on the value of Turkish lira due to low currency reserves in comparison to debt. Simply put, Turkey lacked the financial means to efficiently and swiftly quell minor economic problems before they grew into more serious ones.

This essay explains Turkey’s present economic downturn. It begins by outlining the present economic situation in Turkey and then looks at the effects of the massive earthquakes that wreaked havoc in the southeastern part of the country.

Turkey is currently bracing for a rising budget deficit, new inflationary pressures and a hit to its gross domestic product (GDP). The essay also focuses on Turkey’s shift to Southeast Asia to counter economic and strategic challenges. The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) may be a fresh avenue for Turkey to diversify its economic relationships given the unpredictability of its relations with the European Union and the United States.

There is no possible long-term revival for the Turkish economy without a thorough reform of the system and its administrators. Moreover, important factors include societal acceptance, commercial backing and favorable international circumstances. The essay concludes with a review of Turkey’s economic prognosis and proposed remedies for the current crisis.

Turkish Economy in the Present Context

Turkey’s economy is currently in a dire state. According to the most recent figures, the nation is significantly indebted to foreign investors, totaling US$451 billion. The government also owes US$185.3 billion in short-term foreign debt.

Despite the devaluation of its currency, Turkey’s current account deficit has persisted due to high cost of energy and commodity prices, exacerbated by Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. This indicates that the higher cost of imported products is not enough to reduce demand and the cheaper cost of the Turkish labor has not sufficiently boosted the competitiveness of local industries.  

Additional conditional liabilities associated with megaprojects, developed through public-private partnerships (PPPs), are thought to total about US$160 billion. After excluding the effects of swap agreements, the Central Bank of the Republic of Turkey’s (CBRT) net official reserves decreased significantly from US$71.1 billion in 2011 to US$52.3 billion in 2022. In order to safeguard and guarantee holders of Turkish lira against foreign currency (FX) risk, the Ministry of Treasury and Finance and the CBRT have also put in place a pricey mechanism. The value of FX-protected deposits was about US$75.34 billion as of the end of September 2022.

While Turkey’s population is expected to expand at a pace of 1-1.5%, its potential GDP growth rate is roughly 3-3.5%. The long-term growth potential of the nation is constrained by bad infrastructure investment choices, a subpar educational system, inefficient use of public funds and state bank credits, and low confidence in the future. Inflation rate in Turkey is at 83.45%, which is the highest level in 24 years and it might reach triple digits if there is a further currency shock. The unemployment rate is 10%, but when discouraged employees are taken into account, it approaches 20%. The monthly minimum wage is about US$300, which is what two-thirds of workers make. The young population, especially the most educated, are pressured to emigrate due to widespread poverty and limited opportunities. All in all, Turkey faces a magnitude of challenges to achieve sustained growth and prosperity. Society is losing faith in the future and this has sparked a wave of young people eager to emigrate to wealthy nations.

The Earthquake and Economic Woes

The infamous 6 February 2023 earthquake occurred before the scheduled on 14 May 2023 and mounted pressure on President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, who is facing the most challenging re-election campaign of his two-decade leadership. Erdoğan had intended to provide some economic respite to an electorate frustrated by increasing costs before the key elections, but annual inflation is already running at close to 83.45%. In order to address the requirements of 13.5 million impacted individuals — 15.7% of Turkey’s population — and repair extensive damage across 10 provinces, the catastrophe response now needs a major increase in public funding. The government’s anticipated budget deficit of 3.5% of GDP in 2023 is therefore expected to rise to as much as 5% of GDP, endangering Turkey’s current account deficit and other economic weaknesses.

The growing budget deficit, new inflationary pressures and a hit to its GDP are looming over Turkey’s horizon. Although the administration expects economic growth of 5.3% on average between 2023 and 2025, many analysts previously predicted that the economy would only grow by approximately 3% at most as a result of current insecurities and anticipated post-election austerity measures.

The economic effects of the earthquakes are now expected to cause that rate to decrease a little bit more. A reasonable estimate places the price of demolished flats alone at US$6.3 billion, assuming that the buildings that fell held roughly 6,000 units, each of which was worth an average 2 million (US$105,000). The amount would increase to US$10 billion when taking into account damaged structures that are no longer functional.

Turkey’s total GDP is predicted to be impacted by the impending economic downturn in the 10 afflicted provinces. The calamity poses a threat to the region’s agricultural production, which makes up 15% of the nation’s total. Turkish food inflation, which was 71% in January 2023, might be fueled by a fall in agricultural supply. Due to the interruptions in business and industrial activities, the Ministry of Treasury and Finance would receive less tax income. All tax obligations in the area have already been postponed by the government until the end of July 2023. According to official figures, the 10 impacted provinces generated 7.5% of 2.3 trillion (US$122.1 billion) in tax receipts last year. In a similar vein, delays in loan repayments in these provinces might put banks under pressure.

Turkey’ Turn to Southeast Asia: Implications for Economic Revival

As part of the country’s Asia Anew Initiative, Turkey is committed to expanding ties with ASEAN Member States (AMS). The strategy was announced in 2019 and is meant to diversify connections with Asian countries in education, military, trade, technology, culture and political discussion, though Turkey has yet to take any significant measures under the program.

With the Turkish lira losing its value against the dollar, Turkey’s economic situation is dire and the government is reaching out to Southeast Asia, though historically Turkey has had minimal engagement with the region. Turkey has expanded its presence in the region by establishing embassies in Brunei, Cambodia, Laos and Myanmar from 2015 onwards, while ASEAN accorded Turkey Sectoral Dialogue Partner status in 2017.

Turkey’s relations with AMS still have space to grow. No AMS is now among Turkey’s top 15 commercial partners, although Turkey does have free trade agreements with Malaysia and Singapore, which went into effect in 2015 and 2017 respectively. Turkey and Thailand are negotiating a free trade pact that could increase bilateral commerce by up to 40%. Currently, Thai exports to Turkey account for the vast bulk of the bilateral commerce, which is valued at US$1.6 billion annually. In late 2010, Turkey and Indonesia agreed to work together to enhance trade from US$1.5 billion annually to US$10 billion, and the two are now in negotiations for a free trade agreement called the Turkey-Indonesia Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement.

Turkey and Malaysia

Turkey has a unique tie with Malaysia, a Southeast Asian nation with a long history and vibrant culture. Ever since diplomatic ties between Malaysia and Turkey were established in 1964, the two countries have been close allies and brothers. One of the first countries to help Turkey in the search and rescue (SAR) of earthquake victims was Malaysia, through the Special Malaysia Disaster Assistance and Rescue Team (SMART), which was able to mobilize effectively within 24 hours.

Malaysia has been in the forefront of relief and rescue efforts to identify earthquake victims as a sign of solidarity with those impacted by the tragedy. According to Prime Minister Datuk Seri Anwar Ibrahim, apart from the 2004 Indian Ocean earthquake and tsunami, the Turkish-Syrian earthquake is the biggest calamity in recorded history. It is one of the reasons why Malaysia is paying special attention to the Turkey-Syria earthquake.

Anwar’s recent visit to Turkey, which was arranged at the request of Erdoğan, shows not only the former’s sincere support and encouragement for the Malaysian rescue teams working on the disaster sites but also his solidarity with the victims.

While Anwar’s rate of travel is related to the easing of Covid-19 travel restrictions and a general reopening of the area, his diplomatic engagement with nations like Turkey demonstrates his determination to make the most of the period of time while he is still relatively politically secure. Anwar would fill the critical leadership void in after years of political crisis if he can keep the window open by maintaining public approval and, more importantly, the support of his coalition partners. Such overseas trips, intended to attract foreign commercial interest to Malaysia would be key to achieving public approval and gaining the support of his coalition partners. This could, thus, allow Kuala Lumpur to stop underperforming and even exceed expectations.

Cooperation in disaster response and management may also likely open doors for more economic cooperation. Malaysia is now being sought after by Turkey as a potential commercial partner in the ASEAN region. In an effort to strengthen their economic ties across a range of industries, Malaysia and Turkey aim to trade RM20.87 billion annually by 2025.

Year 2023: Turkey’s Year of Transition?

The year 2022 was not good for Turkish economy. The country’s typical gross energy imports increased from US$3-4 billion per month to US$7-8 billion during the dramatic surge in global energy costs last spring as a result of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Last year’s rebound in tourism and an increase in energy imports have not made up for it and the current account deficit – the gap between imports and exports of all kinds of goods and services – keeps growing. Turkey is approaching a presidential election soon; thus, this year will be a crucial turning point for the country. Whether incumbent Erdoğan retains his position or not, the outcome of that election will have a significant impact on Turkey’s populace, economy, currency and democracy.

Erdoğan’s response to the tragedy, as well as any demands for answers as to why so many structures were not adequately built to resist such shocks, will now be crucial to his political future. There could be a backlash if the rescue operation is deemed to be conducted improperly. The buildings themselves, and which ones have collapsed, are of course another problem. There may be severe repercussions for  if these were constructed in accordance with the new norms but without government oversight. In an effort to address the country’s rising cost of living, Erdoğan called for an early election in May. According to a number of commentators, the action demonstrates Erdoğan’s desire to win a second term in office before his contentious economic policies backfire.

The Future of Justice and Development Party (AKP)

Erdoğan has undoubtedly been affected by the enormity of the catastrophe. It took him some time to make an appearance in public and he has spent a lot of time defending the state and his government in his speeches and visits across the affected areas. Naturally, he began searching for “the guilty,” or poor construction workers and looters he could blame and shift responsibility to. It is challenging to think that the area would be able to recover enough to hold elections. It is difficult since many residents are expected to scatter around Turkey in search of refuge with family and friends, in addition to the damage of property and deaths.

His AKP failed to get a majority of votes in Hatay at the 2018 parliamentary elections out of the four affected provinces (Adiyaman, Gaziantep, Hatay and Kahramanmaraş), though it remained the leading party. In the upcoming election, he would likely be losing these votes.

Political aftershocks from this earthquake will undoubtedly continue. Erdoğan was already in the midst of his most difficult reelection campaign prior to the earthquake, despite the country’s numerous economic problems. However, he gave the impression that he was holding his ground by manipulating the legal system and removing rivals, politicians, and parties. The earthquake will undoubtedly and radically change voters’ projections, and despite Erdoğan’s political abilities, a wave of unrest is on the horizon.

The fact that Erdoğan has made it obvious he has no desire to cede authority and would do whatever it takes to maintain it suggests that his actions may not always be consistent with the democratic process. This year’s election will be a turning point for Turkey as it approaches the 100^th anniversary of its republic. A further descent into authoritarianism and cronyism under Erdoğan’s administration would likely result from another five years in office. If there is a final departure before the bridge to save Turkish democracy will be determined by this election.

Turkey must be positioned within the framework of the world economy. The construction industry has been at the heart of Turkey’s economic expansion, which has received plaudits from several international organizations. The situation in Turkey is a specific illustration of what occurs when neoliberalism and the collapse of democracy coexist.

The opposition, a six-party alliance, still has not chosen a candidate for president and has its own challenges. If they prevail, it would be challenging for them to rule since Erdoğan supporters may still readily occupy public institutions. Or they could take over government agencies that have been completely gutted and are no longer operational. However, that this is more about taking one step to make things better and less about things getting perfect.

After a string of corruption scandals, economic problems, and a deadly earthquake, Erdoğan’s administration entered power 20 years ago with the promise of cleaning up Turkey. It appears Turkey has come full circle and, in some respects, gone backwards in terms of democracy, which, in my opinion, is a really tragic picture.

Addressing the Crisis

Maintaining financial stability and keeping inflation under control should be the first priority for whoever is in charge of the government. It will be difficult to generate robust development and enhance economic well-being without resolving these two problems. It is also essential to adopt accommodative fiscal policy since small firms and widespread poverty both pose serious financial challenges.

Achieving this equilibrium will be a very difficult undertaking for an economy like Turkey that is highly indebted in hard currency. Reaching medium-term development goals means tackling problems outside of the economy, such as foreign policy and education. Due to Erdoğan’s reluctance and the United States’ veto as part of the restrictions imposed under the Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA), the Erdoğan administration does not have access to funds from the International Monetary Fund (IMF).

In order to be convinced that a new, more stable period is beginning, international investors and markets will be watching not just the next general elections but also the municipal elections in March 2024.

Short-term policy normalization and confidence-building will be relatively simple tasks if the opposition parties prevail in the 2023 elections because they already have an agreement on this. These immediate goals will be easily attained by their collaboration. Their performance in the local elections of 2024 will be a crucial test of their cohesiveness and continuity of policy as their inter-party harmony is still in doubt. The opposition will be given a startlingly high foreign debt as well as a state budget that is incredibly weak financially, making it harder for them to meet their medium-term goals.

Additionally, the society will have high expectations on a number of fronts after years of economic misery, which will be hard to meet all at once. The opposition parties’ economic platforms do not diverge significantly in the medium term, but their stances on welfare and lending by state banks might spark a heated discussion. If Erdoğan is re-elected to power, the government may impose stricter capital controls on foreign currency deposit accounts or attempt to forge new financial relationships by making concessions on foreign policy. As the government would not have enough space to conduct structural reforms, it will probably try to treat the problem’s symptoms by severely constraining free markets. In order to keep the economy humming, cheap labour and loans will be employed as the primary instruments and public pressure will probably be increased to get individuals to comply.

Whoever wins the 2023 election, whether it is the current administration or the opposition alliance, will have to battle for a better economy in the face of difficult global financial conditions. In terms of developing markets, Turkey is slipping to the bottom and approaching the group of nations, which also includes Pakistan, Tunisia and Egypt, where international lenders have serious doubts about their capacity to make timely loan repayments. Thus, achieving medium-term goals will require more than just the proper policies and strong public support.

Conclusion

Since the latter half of 2021, Turkey has experienced a more serious economic slump following the reduction of interest rates by Central Bank and rising inflation. By the end of that year, a significant economic downturn started, with living standards being negatively impacted by extraordinarily high inflation rates and support for the president’s AKP, which has championed economically questionable policies. Turkish poll-of-polls data from May 2022 showed that the AKP’s support had fallen below 30%. In order to gain popular support ahead of the elections that will take place by June 2023, Erdoğan, who personally opposes hiking interest rates to combat inflation, may try to raise Turkey’s reputation abroad and pursue foreign business prospects.

Early 2023 saw signs of improvement for Turkey’s struggling economy after a challenging year. However, two massive earthquakes with magnitudes of 7.8 and 7.5 struck Turkey and neighboring Syria on 6 February 2023, killing over 45,000 individuals (at the time of writing), injuring and displacing thousand others. Thousands of structures were damaged and the overall economic loss is estimated to be in the tens of billions of dollars. Uncertainty surrounds the overall cost of the damage brought on the earthquakes, but experts agree that it will not be less than US$10 billion and may even reach US$84 billion, or 10% of GDP.

Turkey has pursued monetary easing, using both conventional and unconventional methods to reduce the lira’s devaluation, which has raised the financial burden of businesses with foreign-currency debt. This is in contrast to other nations that have tightened their monetary policies in response to the post-pandemic and surge in global commodity prices, induced by the war in Ukraine.

Nevertheless, despite the fact that this unconventional approach has helped Turkey’s economy grow at a time when the majority of nations are experiencing a recession, it has also increased the nation’s vulnerability to a financial crisis, with market-based indicators of default risk tangibly rising over the past year. After the election next year, the Turkish government could adopt more traditional and conservative economic policies. However, because the nation’s long-term economic condition will continue to improve, the risk of a recession will persist. Turkey’s economy is probably going to expand slowly or stall. The administration needs financial support from foreign development banks, but their contribution will be modest and given in installments because of how poorly the government is getting along with the West. Regardless of how the next elections end out, Turkey’s economy has several obstacles and the path ahead is certain to be difficult.

Tensions in the South China Sea Series: A Five-Part Series (Part 1)

Introduction

The South China Sea (SCS) issue is presently one of the hottest flashpoints of the territorial and jurisdictional disputes in this twenty-first century. The area is claimed by China, Taiwan, Vietnam, Malaysia, the Philippines and Brunei. The claims centre mainly on the maritime features in the Spartly and Paracel Islands.

There have been numerous incidents between the claimants in the SCS since the mid of 1970s, including the 1974 Paracel Islands Incidents, the 1988 Johnson Reef incidents, the 1995 Mischief incidents, the 2012 Scarborough Shoal incidents, and the 2014 HSY Oil Rig incident. There were also stand-offs between China and Vietnam in the Vanguard Bank, as well as with Malaysia between the Haiyang Dizhi 8 and MV West Capelle. However, the most obvious action by China that might shaking the stability of the region is China’s reclamation in the SCS.

Another issue is China’s illegal claiming of territories based on historical background. Chinese officials point to maritime documents dating back to dynastic times as support for their claim. Termed the Nine-Dash Lines, these territories were considered to be traditionally China’s fishing grounds.

China Previously Restrained, Accommodating

However, China’s attitude in the region was not always hostile. There was a time when China’s behaviour in the region was described as relatively restrained and accommodating. This attitude was observed between the period after the 1995 Mischief incident to the years of 2007 – 2009, and it contributed to the signing of the Declaration on the Conduct of the Parties in the South China Sea (DOC) in November 2002. China also signed the Treaty of Amenity and Cooperation of ASEAN (TAC) in 2003. These two documents restrained not only China but also other claimant states in making any provocative moves. Moreover, China’s willingness to join the COC negotiations was also China’s assurance towards ASEAN. In short, the SCS experienced a conducive period from the mid of 1990s to 2007 – 2009.

The situation changed due to the stand-off between China and the Philippines in Scarborough Shoal in 2012. This leads to the Philippines seeking legal action at the United Nations Convention of Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA) Tribunal in 2013.

The External Power – The United States and its ally.

Additionally, the presence of the United States (the US) in the region also plays an important if not an essential role in the SCS. The US presence in the region, according to former US Secretary of State, Hillary Clinton, was merely for maintaining freedom of navigation in the SCS. This principle was announced in the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) meeting in Hanoi 2010.

In order to implement this position, the US launched the Freedom of Navigation Operations or FONOPs in the region. These FONOPs are means to enforce UNCLOS by reinforcing freedom of navigation through practice, using ships to sail through all areas of the sea permitted under UNCLOS, including those areas that state(s) have attempted to close off from free navigation. For sure, US FONOPs in the SCS have attracted greater international attention and Chinese anger.

In addition to the US FONOPs, two Indian navy warships and a Vietnamese navy frigate, recently held exercises that started at a port in Vietnam. The exercise is part of the ongoing deployment of Indian Navy ships in the SCS. Also, a Royal Canadian Navy warship joined Australian, Japanese and U.S. naval vessels for a coordinated exercise in January this year. Moreover, ships from Australia, India, Japan and the United States conducted their annual Malabar exercises near Guam recently. All in all, warships from eight countries have passed through or near the SCS since the beginning of this year. Interestingly, those eight countries do not have actual maritime claims to the region. Therefore, this is simply a statement that the US and its allies would like to convey to China.

China’s Reaction

Despite these developments, in the last 30 years, there was no open war between the navies in the region, as what happened in 1974 and 1988. However, the situation is still regarded as a low-level conflict (or low-level contingency). This may change with the recent situations in the SCS.

For China, activities by the US and its allies are regarded as a foreign interference to a regional issue between ASEAN and China vis-à-vis the SCS. China believes that these actions are beyond the principles of freedom of navigation. For China, it is an act of provocation.

With these foreign navy operations in the area, China fears the dispute is becoming more internationalized. Therefore, China might lose its strategy to discuss sovereignty disputes bilaterally with other Asian states. As we know, China prefers to discuss the issue one-on-one rather than through multilateral mechanism.

To balance the situation, the People’s Liberation Army Navy ships are expected to travel the SCS more often as well as to step up the frequency of its navy exercises. In fact, China already held its naval exercises since January to September 2021. Unsurprisingly, China will react with something comparable to what the US and its allies are doing in the region which might change the situation. China would also bolster its diplomatic protests against the non-Asian naval exercises.

Other Claimants

Brunei, Malaysia, the Philippines, Taiwan and Vietnam lay claims in the SCS. Mostly they value the sea for its fisheries, undersea fossil fuel reserves and marine shipping lanes. In fact, all are militarily weaker than China. Out of those countries, Vietnam and the Philippines have spoken out against China’s ship movement and land reclamation at disputed islets.

Without any clear domestic policy on how to “handle” China, these claimant states, for the time being, benefit from the presence of the US and its allies in the region. The Southeast Asian maritime claimants now have some leverage and “protection” from the US, India, Australia, the British and others. They also have the “power” not to engage China bilaterally. This is the reason, for example, why Vietnam might now feel emboldened to step up its drilling for undersea oil and gas exploration. The US actions are certainly offsetting China’s dominance in the region and also counterbalancing or even attacking China’s hegemonic desire in the SCS.

The Non-Claimant: Indonesia

Even though Indonesia is directly bordering the SCS (Indonesia named the sea north of Natuna Island as North Natuna Sea), however, Indonesia has no maritime features claim to the territory. Also, Indonesia persistently rejects China’s claim of the Nine-Dash Line, and secured Indonesia’s Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) as defined by UNCLOS 1982, in which China is a signatory to. This position was reinforced by the decision made by the PCA of 12 July 2016 that there are no maritime features that has the right of EEZ and Continental Shelf. In short, there is no overlapping claim between Indonesia and China, therefore, there is no territorial claim issue to be negotiated between the two countries.

In addition, since 1993 to 2020, Indonesia has continuously objected China’s Nine-Dash Lines map by emphasizing that the map clearly lacks international legal basis and is against UNCLOS. Through persistent objections, Indonesia would like to prevent such claim to become an embryonic and systemic claim, that Indonesia is ultimately not bounded to.

Indonesia’s interest in the SCS remains the same, namely, to maintain peace and security in the SCS. As an honest broker to the conflict, Indonesia would like to create an enabling environment to engage dialogue for peaceful dispute resolution in the SCS based on international law – especially UNCLOS. With its Free and Active Foreign Policy, Indonesia calls on all parties to exercise restraint, refrain from escalatory activities and secure Southeast Asia from military activities that could threaten peace and stability.

Conclusion

The Hague PCA Tribunal 2016 and the presence of the US and its allies in the SCS bestow a positive advantage to Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia, Brunei Darussalam, Taiwan and even, to Indonesia. But the questions remain: for how long? How long will the US and its allies be in the region? What happened if the US and its allies change their policies on the SCS? What will happen if China withdraws from UNCLOS? What will the claimants’ states do if China declares its Air Defence Identification Zone (ADIZ) in the SCS?

Unlike Indonesia, the other claimants need to define its own strong policy on the SCS and on how to “deal” with the People’s Republic of China, with and without the back-up of other states. Without a clear, strong policy, there is no doubt that those claimants will always be the objects of disputes.

These ASEAN Claimant states, together with Indonesia, need also to push China to adhere to the Declaration of Conduct (DOC) 2002 in order to establish mutual trust as well as commitment to the freedom of navigation and overflight principles. Though the Code of Conduct of the SCS (CoC) is not aimed to settle the territorial disputes, CoC is important in managing the conduct of the states in the region. Thus, ASEAN and China need to quickly finish the formulation of COC.

Additionally, Indonesia also needs to develop its national policy on Natuna Islands, its EEZ and surrounding. The national policy should include, among others, policy on economy activities development, military and non-military law enforcement, the enforcement of maritime sovereign rights in Indonesia’s continental shelf and EEZ, maritime domain awareness policy, as well as developing an effective and strong defence and sovereignty diplomacy. The policy must also send a strong message that Natuna Islands, North Natuna Sea and its EEZ belong to Indonesia.

The view expressed is his own.

Part 2: Indonesia and Maritime Rules-Based Order in the South China Sea

Part 3: Changing Realities for Malaysia in the South China Sea Dispute

Part 4: Malaysia’s Diplomacy in the South China Sea: Between the Devil and the Deep Blue Sea

Part 5: A Matter of Firm Resolve: The Philippine’s Strategic Posture in the South China Sea

While many of us are still grappling with the COVID-19 and its derivative challenges, I warmly welcome the five articles touching upon a very critical issue that has been overshadowed, for at least the last two years, namely the South China Sea. I sincerely hope that the other readers share the same sense as of mine.

These articles provide meaningful insights from Indonesia, Malaysia and Philippine over the most recent developments related to the South China Sea saga. The South China Sea is predominantly perceived as a legal issue for the very foundation of the nine dashed line claimed by China contradicts with the provisions of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). Each of the note verbales submitted by the member States of UNCLOS to the Secretary General of the United Nations, which contains a comprehensive legal analysis of why China’s nine dashed line claim is inadmissible, reflects the desire of the international community to uphold the constitution of the ocean and maintain the longstanding order in place. Unfortunately, as everyone sees it, the reality has not changed so much despite of multiple formal rejections.

As a result, States in the Southeast Asia particularly must continue their effort and simultaneously develop layers of strategic plan to anticipate various possibilities that may emerge in the nearest future from China’s assertiveness. This series capture this interesting point. It provides us with wide-range perspectives, from the international relation point of view to the defense and strategic one.

A careful reading upon these four writings gives us understanding of how important the South China Sea for Indonesia, Malaysia and Philippine and what is at stake at this period of uncertainty; What are the possible outcomes from the three countries’ outreach expansion to the Japan, United Kingdom, and United States of America; How the government carefully navigates the country in the middle of competing super powers; and What are the internal improvements currently in progress and ought to be made in Indonesia, Malaysia and Philippine respectively. Additionally, the authors include their analysis upon the multilateral cooperation such as the QUAD and the ASEAN that may have a substantive role in relaxing the tension peacefully.

I enjoyed reading these writings and I believe that you will as well.

Sponsored Article in Commemoration of Earth Day 2021

Introduction

The COVID-19 pandemic has not only disrupted businesses globally but also numerous sustainability projects and climate change mitigation goals. Notably, action against climate change is one of UN’s 17 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). This is rather concerning as to avoid the worst impacts of climate change and for global temperature to stay within 2 degrees Celsius by 2100, global emissions must be reduced to zero by 2030.

For land-scarce Singapore, climate change is an existential threat, given its small size and geographical location near the equator, a hotbed region for tropical storms.  Almost a decade ago, Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong expressed his desire for citizens to take up ownership of the environment and approach climate change by adapting the ‘Total Defence’ strategy at the launch of the Clean and Green Singapore 2011 campaign. Eight years later, Prime Minister Lee reiterated in his 2019 National Day Rally that “Both the SAF (Singapore Armed Forces) and climate change defences are existential for us. These are life and death matters.”   Clearly, local policymakers are not sitting on their hands when it comes to climate change.

Yet current policy measures have not translated into sustainable results. Singapore may have contributed to 0.11% of global emissions in 2018 compared to China’s 30%, but emissions per capita is at 8.56 tons per capita, making Singapore 27^th out of 142 countries based on IEA data from 2018, worse than China’s 7.95 tons per capita and 39^th spot in the same report. The annual transboundary haze affecting Singapore, Malaysia and Indonesia continues unabated without a definite solution, a sign that the region as a whole is not meeting its target for climate change mitigation. Noteworthily, COVID-19 has made food security a higher priority concern for Singapore, especially when 90% of its food is imported and subjected to the volatilities of the global food market, including climate change and the pandemic.

Here, Biochar is proposed as a potential solution applicable to Singapore and Southeast Asia to climate change, food security and energy needs.

Biochar: A Carbon-sequestering, Nutrient-rich Resource

Biochar is a fine-grained, highly porous charcoal that helps soils retain nutrients and water. It is produced using pyrolysis by subjecting organic wastes to high temperature in an oxygen-deprived environment, while generating useful by-products to be reused for energy or component refining for industrial chemicals. The end-product has carbon as the main constituent, with other plant nutrient chemicals in variable composition. Application of biochar to soil is a carbon negative process, since carbon in biochar is more recalcitrant than the natural environment and will remain in the ground longer, without adding to the atmospheric carbon dioxide.

Biochar is particularly beneficial in agriculture. Farmers have a vested interest in increasing and maintaining the soil carbon in their fields as studies have shown a correlation between soil carbon levels and crop yield. Organic soil carbon plays an important role in the chemical composition and biological productivity in soil, which includes fertility and nutrient holding capacity. Biochar have been shown to improve crop production in maize, wheat, rice, oil palm, soybean, all of which are major crops and oilseeds used globally. Additionally, biochar can reduce surface runoff, and therefore nutrient leaching ,and promote more stable soil structure.

From research, Biochar has other interesting uses such as the removal of Volatile Organic Compounds (VOCs), chemicals harmful to human health, from buildings, a potential building material that can strengthen concrete, and  a novel method to sequester carbon in concrete. Notably, biochar is significant in the recovery of washed-off fertilizer chemicals.  Water hyacinths used in the clean-up of fertilizer chemical contaminants in freshwater bodies are ideal materials for biochar production. Therefore, a future circular economy is envisioned, with environment sustainability at its core: remediation service, fertilizer chemical recovery and reuse, biochar production, and climate change mitigation through carbon sequestration.

A Potential Solution to Three Existential Threats

1) Climate Change Mitigation

With is carbon sequestering properties, Biochar can potentially remove up to 1.1 billion ton of CO2 per annum globally. Currently, Singapore has implemented a carbon tax of SGD$5 (~USD$3.80) per ton of Green House Gases (GHG) released for the period of 2019 to 2023, with plans to review the tax thereafter, and an end-goal of between SGD$10 to SGD$15 by 2030. By investing carbon taxes into carbon sequestration projects such as biochar production and selling it as carbon credits to other nations or corporations creates a win-win situation for everyone including the environment. One such project would be a biochar commercial plant in Johor, initiated by JTS Optimax Pte. Ltd., a Singapore-based start-up with the goal of converting oil palm waste in Malaysia to biochar and electricity.

Singapore can benefit economically from funding such projects  while exporting biochar-based technologies to neighbouring countries. One significant contribution could be the mitigation of the  transboundary haze crisis  by converting the large volume of agricultural waste material in the region into biochar instead of resorting to slash-and-burn. Not only will it entail a low-cost production of biochar, but also the production of electricity that could be supplied to rural areas. Additionally, biochar can generate a calculated agriculture value of between USD2.30 and 3.30 per hectare  while reducing fertilizer transportation and spreading costs. Amongst Southeast Asian nations, Philippines has been actively using biochar to remediate mining grounds and prepare rehabilitated grounds for replanting. Malaysia, Vietnam and Indonesia are each making inroads into biochar usage and production as well.

2) Food security

Singapore has signed an Agreement on the ASEAN Food Security Reserve which included the ASEAN Emergency Rice Reserve in October 1979. Despite the pact, agriculture activities in Singapore declined from the 1980s as food import became the cheaper and pragmatic option. In 2019, Singapore Food Agency has set a target of achieving 30% of the country’s nutritional needs through local means by 2030. However, this goal is not enough to ensure food security.

Biochar can provide a win-win strategy for food security. Being alkaline in nature, biochar can deacidify soil, thereby maintaining and saving scarce local arable land from fertilizer overuse through the direct application of Nitrogen-Phosphorous-Potassium (NPK) nutrients. Additionally, direct uptake of biochar carbon by fungi crops and the use of biochar as scaffold for beneficial micro-organisms promote crop growth. More importantly, biochar indirectly improves crop production by reducing soil-borne plant diseases and promoting beneficial soil bacteria growth, thereby boosting soil health.

Biochar research in hydroponics has also shown that not only half of the growth substrate can be replaced with biochar and crop growth can be enhanced, but harmful algal growth can be reduced with its application. By replacing half of the Perlite or woodchip growth substrate with biochar will lead to significant production cost reductions for hydroponics farms which can promote price competitiveness with conventional soil-grown crops. However, proper application must be done to ensure the crops receive all the nutrients as biochar can act as a sponge for absorption of water and chemicals. Collectively, this means that with care, biochar can also be used in conjunction with Singapore’s current food security strategy of local vertical and indoor farming.

3) Sustainable Energy Needs

In fulfilment of the UN Sustainable Development Goals, Singapore has explored ways to source for more sustainable energy to satisfy the needs of the populace, including importing energy from Malaysia in a trial run. This is on top of increasing solar panel usage locally on HDB rooftops. Given the production of biochar yields sustainable energy production, this is one potential alternative source in which Singapore can import from Malaysia as well.

Therefore, biochar can directly and indirectly address existential threats to Southeast Asia namely, climate change, food security and sustainable energy needs. It is, thus, timely to incorporate biochar into national strategies to ensure a sustainable future.

Introduction

The signing of the RCEP on 15 November 2020 signified the establishment of the largest free trade agreement (FTA) in the world. The agreement comprises ten members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), Australia, New Zealand, China, Japan and South Korea. Even after the exit of India, the RCEP constitutes no less than 30 percent of world’s gross domestic product (GDP). The deal also covers 27.4 percent of world’s trade, only a little smaller than the European Union (EU) that makes 29.8 percent.

An interesting element of the RCEP is the vaunted “ASEAN centrality” principle. RCEP’s 2012 Guiding Principles and Objectives document states that “negotiation for the RCEP will recognize ASEAN centrality in the emerging regional economic architecture”. Likewise, the FTA’s Joint Leaders’ Statement, launched in November 2020, also explicitly mentions that “the RCEP agreement is the most ambitious FTA initiated by ASEAN, which contributes to enhancing ASEAN centrality in regional frameworks and strengthening ASEAN cooperation with regional partners”.

How is ASEAN centrality defined? What is the position of RCEP’s ASEAN centrality amidst economic and political dynamics of Asia-Pacific region? What are the challenges for ASEAN leaders to maintain centrality in trade sector? While RCEP is an economic agreement, the involvement of regional major and secondary powers makes it imperative to analyse the deal from a (geo)political perspective.

Defining ASEAN Centrality

There are at least two definitions on ASEAN centrality. First, centrality means ASEAN as a forum provider. RCEP is a part of ASEAN “Plus X” forums that gather and arrange cooperation with external powers. In the security arena, ASEAN’s most high-profile forums are the East Asia Summit (EAS) and the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF). EAS’ membership includes powerful countries such as the United States (US), China, Russia and India, whereas the ARF even includes the EU and North Korea. Meanwhile, in trade sector, in addition to the RCEP that convenes five ASEAN’s dialogue partners, the Association has developed six separate ASEAN “Plus One” FTAs. Second, centrality means the driver of substance. ASEAN should develop substantial cooperation within its various forums. For example, there have been expectations for the RCEP to negotiate a truly substantial (rather than a mere rhetoric) “high-quality agreement”, meaning to comprehensively liberalise trade barriers in substantially all sectors, so that it would maximize economic gains and domestic reforms. Among these two definitions, many academics evaluate that ASEAN has only shown a modest progress in achieving centrality, by preferring forum membership to substance.

Why has ASEAN centrality emerged? In a region where rivalry has persisted between China and Japan, China and the US, China and India, and South Korea and Japan, any regional initiatives from one will be treated suspiciously by another power. ASEAN has met this challenge by projecting open, inclusive and non-confrontational images to its “Plus X” frameworks, therefore making these external powers convenient to accept ASEAN’s initiatives. Southeast Asian countries have benefited from this situation since, as a collection of small and medium powers, they have had the opportunity to voice their concerns among these external giants.

The Three Challenges

After the RCEP, ASEAN confronts three challenges to maintain centrality in trade regionalism: the first relates to being a forum provider and the next two pertains to centrality of substance.

Apart from the homework to lure India back to the RCEP (and perhaps, in the long run, to entice the US and Russia to join the FTA), ASEAN should be watchful of any possible forum alternatives. ASEAN’s forums will remain attractive in so far as rivalry and distrust among external powers continue to exist. Should external powers achieve some degree of understanding and develop a common platform to cooperate, there will no longer be a need for ASEAN to be an honest broker. A case in point is the possible conclusion of the long-stalled China-Japan-Korea (CJK) FTA. After the finalisation of RCEP, both Japan and China have expressed their optimism regarding the prospect of CJK-FTA. The trilateral FTA is difficult since it involves the long-standing Japan-China and Japan-Korea rivalries. ASEAN’s proponents may exultantly declare that the RCEP has become the first FTA between these politico-economic rivals. Yet, a successful negotiation of CJK-FTA may potentially reduce the tension among the three countries, and even evolve into a distinct Northeast Asian institution that is independent from ASEAN forums. Another case in point is the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP). The FTA was once named Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), and was politically strategic to serve US’ engagement policy in the Asia-Pacific under President Barrack Obama. President Donald Trump pulled the country out of the deal in 2017, however, the new President-elect Joe Biden had indicated US’ return. Interestingly, soon after RCEP’s signing, Chinese President Xi Jinping has also expressed his country’s interest in joining the deal. If this scenario comes true, then the CPTPP will economically far outweigh the RCEP. Geopolitically, the CPTPP may serve as a platform to negotiate cooperations and future relations among the two most powerful countries, and these prospects will likely make the ASEAN centrality run out of stream. At the time being, it is definitely too early to tell the likely occurrence of these dim scenarios (from ASEAN’s view) of CJK-FTA and CPTPP. However, in the long run, ASEAN needs to cautiously observe these regional developments.

Second, ASEAN leaders need to emphasize the substantive contribution of ASEAN centrality. RCEP is oft-repeatedly described as of a lower quality than the CPTPP for its less ambitious agendas in regulating investment and intellectual property rights, as well as the absence of labour and environmental chapters. However, the RCEP has actually provided different substantial contributions. Rather than simply an economic agreement that promises economic benefits, RCEP is essentially a part of ASEAN’s geopolitical instrument to entangle conflicting external powers in a joint platform of cooperation. To be clear, RCEP may not extirpate the gamut of profound politico-military conflicts in the Asia-Pacific. Yet, providing a platform for communication and collaboration is a necessary stepping stone to conflict reduction. Therefore, RCEP is an instrument of peace. Another area of contribution is the representation of developing countries’ interests in the RCEP. Substantively, RCEP incorporates special and differential treatment (SDT), economic and technical cooperation, and trade facilitation mechanism. These points are easily overlooked, or even underestimated, given the massive “high-quality FTA” narratives from developed countries and large businesses. Not all developing countries are comfortable with such a demand since it potentially brings massive distributional costs and structural adjustments. While it is indeed true that the RCEP also aims to be a “high-quality” FTA, the incorporation of the above-mentioned elements mean that the developing members still retain some room for policy and pace of adjustments. Politically, joining a regional agreement is a typical strategy of weak developing countries as it allows them to build a common bargaining position against the more powerful developed countries. Therefore, ASEAN has indeed provided some substantial contribution to ASEAN centrality, and the challenge here is to elevate these frequently neglected achievements more widely.

Third, substantively, the principle of ASEAN centrality should be directed to engage civil society organizations (CSOs). Despite the people-centred rhetoric, many ASEAN meetings, especially FTA negotiations, are held secretively without sufficient public deliberations. During RCEP’s negotiations, it was only when the hosts (as Indonesia did) initiated a separate forum for CSOs that the latter could directly express their concerns, yet as testified by a Jakarta-based CSO activist, the forum was brief and its content was too general. Such a top-down process is a typical ASEAN’s reach-out strategy to the CSOs, in which the former limits the latter’s participation in “ASEAN-created spaces” only. ASEAN should consult the CSOs more meaningfully. It is indeed true that ASEAN centrality processes are of high-level security nature, nevertheless, trade is different. FTAs, including the RCEP, will affect the livelihood of small farmers, labours, and other ordinary citizens, hence the opportunity to create a more inclusive ASEAN centrality.

Conclusion

The completion of the RCEP is a milestone for ASEAN centrality. However, the road ahead is still a hard slog. ASEAN leaders should rivet to address the above-mentioned challenges to maintain future relevance in the Asia-Pacific.

Women and Children in Terrorism: A Four-Part Analysis (Part 4: CVE Assessment for Southeast Asia’s Women and Children)

Introduction

Local and Foreign Terrorist Fighters (FTFs) rely on the presence of women and children to circumvent detection by authorities. Women and children garner less media attention for their actions and are often perceived as victims rather than perpetrators in the theater of terrorism and violent extremism (VE). If the right opportunity exists terrorist organizations can exploit gender and age stereotypes to their advantage.

Women and children aligned with terrorist groups leverage gender and age dynamics for their benefit by claiming ignorance of terrorist acts in an attempt to minimize their culpability. When government authorities view male and female adherents of terrorism as distinct threats bearing different degrees of risk, these policy makers fall into the inherently flawed implementation of Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) and Deradicalization programmes. Skewed views that downplay the threat of women and children involved in terrorism activities are detrimental to the security and stability of the nation state. Consequently, it is vital for justice systems to recognize that women more actively facilitate or perpetrate violence, and play the most integral role in the recruitment and radicalization of children to become the future leaders of terrorist organizations.

CVE in Southeast Asia

Indonesia

Indonesia does not have specific laws and regulations that specifically address CVE. The policies for countering VE are inscribed in Law No. 15 of 2003 on the Eradication of Criminal Acts of Terrorism (the Anti-Terrorism Law). Using this law, combatting terrorism focuses on prosecution by the special anti-terror detachment, better known as Densus 88. The prevention of terrorism or the handling of conditions prior to terror acts occurring have been less rigorous both for men and women. The Coordination Forum on Terrorism Prevention (FKPT) involving religious leaders, youth organizations, academia, and civil society leaders focus primarily on seminars to stimulate dialogue on the prevention of terrorism. However, the women’s special role in terrorism is seldom tackled in these seminars.

Philippines

Some Filipino women take on significant roles in preventing violent extremism and terrorism through raising awareness on the importance of early guidance and detection by helping parents, guardians, and educators mentor children and youth to veer away from radicalization and terrorist recruitment, and by engaging their respective communities in strategic activities and events. In 2019, UN Women convened three conversations with a total of 32 male and female community peace advocates from women’s groups and civil society organizations from around the Bangsamoro to discuss their perspectives on violent extremism. Among other recommendations are to intensify rights education, gender equality, social cohesion and peaceful narratives in educational curricula and instructional materials and create opportunities for women’s participation in formal and non-formal peace mechanisms such as local peace and order councils, and barangay peacekeeping.

In a serious bid to stem the spread of violent extremism, the Philippine Government through Proclamation No. 216 imposed martial law in Mindanao in May 2017 when local Maute terrorists and Daesh/ISIS-backed FTFs seized the city of Marawi. The peaceful implementation of martial law from 2017 to 2019 led to fewer violent incidents due to the checkpoints installed between geographic areas consisting of municipalities and cities, implemented curfews, and the strict regulation of firearms and ammunition.

Another worthy CVE initiative is that of the International Alert UK Philippines, which established a Violence Intensity Index in the Bangsamoro Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao through a Conflict Monitoring System. Members of the Communist Party of the Philippines-New People’s Army (CPP-NPA) communist-terrorist network are encouraged by the Philippine government to peacefully surrender in order to avail of the Enhanced Comprehensive Local Integration Program (E-CLIP). E-CLIP benefits include guaranteed safety and security; Php50,000 (USD1,040) in cash as livelihood assistance; an open-ended monthly allowance of Php21,000 (USD436) for meals and Php15,000 (USD311) for mobilization expenses; employment; loan processing for business capital; firearms remuneration amounting to the value of turned-in firearms; education; livelihood training; and free housing provided by the National Housing Authority (NHA) in coordination with the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP). Former NPA terrorists are also given the option to stay in their place of origin and be given Php450,000 (USD9,368) for the renovation of their old house. From July 2018 to November 2019, Php171.6-million (USD3.5-million) in financial assistance was reportedly released to 2,882 CPP-NPA surrenderers.

The Department of National Defense guarantees that “the budget of E-CLIP is intact and ready for release, and as soon as the former rebels obtain their Joint AFP-PNP Intelligence Committee (JAPIC) clearance, they will immediately receive their benefits.” The government has lauded the more than 10,000 former NPA terrorists who have surfaced and returned to the fold of the law since the Task Force Balik-Loob (TBFL) managing the E-CLIP was organized in 2018. Of the 10,000 former NPA terrorists, only about 3,000 so far have been awarded the E-CLIP benefits due to the “very stringent vetting process implemented to ensure that the program won’t be taken advantage of.”

Malaysia

Malaysia has yet to craft its own national action plan on P/CVE. The actions taken by the state are based on the experiences of other ASEAN countries. Malaysia has to craft a CVE action plan that is bottom-up, taking into close consideration the nuances and complexities of violent extremism in a highly diverse society. This well-tailored CVE action plan entails reflecting the stark realities of stateless persons who provide the cheapest form of labor with no healthcare benefits, no minimum wage, and no legal protection, which are favored by business interests, and are thereby the most vulnerable to violent extremism, and terrorist recruitment and radicalization. Moreover, the government should be prepared to develop a set of mechanisms (both legal and operational) for the rehabilitation of violent extremist offenders (VEO), returnees, and deportees. The new government needs to appreciate the essential role non-state actors can play in CVE efforts. Non-state actors, consisting of civil society organisations (CSO), contribute to holistic CVE efforts, including preventive programmes and rehabilitation and reintegration (R&R).

Child Soldiers

Child soldiers in Southeast Asia have been continuously targeted for recruitment by violent extremists and terrorist groups. Child soldiers do not have access to education, thus, they experience a negative personal transformation during their time in paramilitary service. Thus, it is important that all CVE efforts should include youth leaders as important participants. The UN Security Council Resolution 2250 issued in 2015 puts youth at the center of processes and policies for the sustainable development of peace and security.

P/CVE for Female Migrant Workers

Southeast Asian female migrant workers are attracted to imbibe terrorist causes in their search for a secure sense of stability amid the challenging array of societal forces and influences at work and in their personal lives. Governments that rely on the regular remittance from overseas workers to keep their economies afloat will need to design free but mandatory programs that would require old and new applicants aspiring to work abroad, or to continue to work abroad, to all undergo at least a 5-day course on P/CVE. This intervention will dramatically reduce the recruitment and radicalization of overseas workers preyed upon by local and foreign terrorist groups that exploit the financial resources of selfless workers who can be manipulated to send their hard-earned income and/or liquidate their personal investments to finance terrorist activities.

During the last 20 years, most counterterrorism efforts have been reactive, focusing largely on military and security measures. With the increasing national security threats from both FTFs and local terrorists who take advantage of vulnerable migrant workers, governments in Southeast Asia must collaborate in spearheading a P/CVE program specifically targeted to migrant workers and their children.

Millions of migrant workers and the children they leave behind under the care of extended families back home need to undergo P/CVE workshops to prevent their children from being recruited and radicalized by violent extremists and terrorists lurking not only in schools and colleges but also online. Parent-child relationships of migrant workers are often heavily strained by the many years of geographical separation and rely on cyberspace technologies to stay connected. When many governments in Southeast Asia depend on regular remittances to keep their economies afloat, especially in the midst of the COVID-19 pandemic, it becomes both an economic and moral imperative for such governments to assume responsibility in ensuring that the children left behind by said migrant workers are given proper guidance, which includes P/CVE programs.

Indonesian female migrant workers often have a low level of formal education, lack basic religious knowledge, experience intense social and individual pressures, live apart from their families, and have poor access to government services. These factors heighten their personal vulnerabilities which are then fully taken advantage of by recruiters belonging to terrorist organizations. There is an increasing pattern of women who are lured by online propaganda that preyed upon their feelings of deep marginalization and isolation as female migrant domestic workers. These female migrant workers are then exposed to radicalized teachings through social media. Despite being radicalized, these workers stay within the mold of what their community expects of them — as a daughter, wife, and mother. A clearer understanding of these specific influencing elements will facilitate a more enduring rehabilitation process. One Indonesian woman working in Hong Kong returned to Banten, in western Java, in 2015 to become the second wife of Adi Jihadi, a militant who was arrested in 2017 for purchasing arms and training in Mindanao with Isnilon Hapilon, who had been declared ISIS’s emir for Southeast Asia.

In the Philippines, the CPP-NPA communist-terrorist network deliberately targets for recruitment and radicalization the children and youth leaders in schools who have either one or both parents working as Overseas Filipino Workers (OFWs). The absence of parental discipline and guidance opens up the children of migrant workers to embrace radical ideologies and extremist views. Recruiters from terrorist organizations also have a preference to groom the children of migrant workers because they receive a significantly huge monthly allowance from their parents working abroad, and they are able to condition these young people to invest their financial resources and time to organize, agitate, and mobilize their peers at school to join CPP-NPA-NDF-linked youth organizations and anti-government activities. Daesh/IS-backed FTFs based in the Philippines marry Filipino women from Muslim communities that can provide them safe havens. It becomes the role of the Filipino wife of FTFs to receive and forward terrorism funds. Based on the author’s personal interviews from 2017 to 2018 in Marawi, local Daesh/IS-funded terrorists also use Filipino domestic helpers working abroad as conduits for regular remittances.

Some countries do not publish migration data or make them available to the public. For example, Singapore does not publish any data on inflow of foreign workers given the sensitivity to high dependence on migrant workers. Similarly, Malaysian data systems are not transparent. Female migrant workers are reportedly embracing radicalized forms of religion and violence after being exposed to extremist content on social media. Three women worked as domestic workers in homes across Singapore. But in their spare time, they promoted ISIS online, donated money to militants overseas, and became so radicalized that at least one was ready to die as a suicide bomber in Syria, according to Singapore’s Ministry of Home Affairs. The women, all Indonesian nationals, were arrested in September under Singapore’s Internal Security Act on suspicion of taking part in terror financing activities and face up to 10 years in prison and fines of up to $500,000 Singapore dollars (~USD$362,000). Most of the cases identified so far involve Indonesian nationals.

While waiting for each of the ASEAN governments to adopt a more enlightened approach, existing practices and policies concerning women and children in P/CVE need further refinement and polishing. At a broader and wider level, more attention must be applied to the realities of the experiences of these women especially that of migrant workers, and their children.

Part 1: A More Effective Counterterrorism Strategy for Indonesian Women by Acknowledging Their Motivations and Tactical Contributions

Part 2: Striving for Peace in the Philippines amidst Increased Combat-readiness and Continued Recruitment of Women and Children

Part 3: The Invisible Women and Children of Malaysia: The Vulnerability of Stateless Persons to Terrorism and Violent Extremism

Introduction

The importance of maintaining food security was re-emphasized with the onset of COVID-19. The pandemic has also emphasized the need for countries to invest in new technologies as they strive towards self-sufficiency i.e. reducing their reliance on trade. Previously, the impetus of such technologies was to ensure that the increase in global food demand, a consequence of rising population, will always be met. These technologies, known as agritech, also offer attractive and viable solutions particularly for countries facing limited available land. The following sections provide a brief description of agritech and its attractiveness as a target for attack.

What is Agritech?

Agritech is one of two part of the billion-dollar agrifood industry. This part refers to technologies that targets agriculture producers such as farmers. Unlike traditional agriculture methods, investors are more receptive to these new technologies due to their capability to ensure consistent production and quality. In other words, reducing the risk while increasing the potential Return on Investment (ROI). This is possible as key to agritech is its precise control of almost every factor that impacts the success of the harvest. Employed are sensors that assist in regulating the environment. Benefits include optimizing the use of resources such as fertilizers, preventing resource wastage thus decreasing overheads, decreasing the potential for such media to get leaked into the environment, maintaining an ideal growth environment for the products, and negating the need for succession planting. This potentially means all types of plants and animals can be cultivated anytime throughout the year.

Additionally, agritech will reduce the need for heavy equipment such as tractors as production facilities become more compact from the optimized use of space and reliance on automation. More important for investors is how agritech encourages research to not only better understand the needs of their products but for genetic manipulation for increased resilience and quality of their products. Such research can, thus, create other numerous revenue-generating sub-industries focusing on husbandry, nutrition, health, and breeding. Therefore, adopting agritech will ensure a shift in the recruitment of higher educated and trained personnel.

Currently, the four technologies that are present in Southeast Asia (SEA) are vertical farming, aquaculture, aquaponics, and cultured meat (also known as in vitro or lab-grown meat). Vertical farming is an innovation that leverages on two existing systems: hydroponics and aeroponics. Utilizing either one of these systems, plants are grown in stacks without the reliance of soil and in growth media. This, thus, improves food safety by eliminating soil-based contamination. Additionally, vertical farming improves space usage as it can be built in the form of tall towers or underground.

Aquaculture is the farming of seafood products such as fish and crustaceans. Previously, such farms are built outdoors and are dependent on the quality of existing water source. There is now a push for such farms to be built indoors i.e. overland for greater control. Aquaponics is simply a hybridized closed loop system that includes a hydroponic system and an aquaculture system. Its principle lies in using wastewater generated from the aquaculture system as growth media for the hydroponic system. Water from the hydroponic system is then treated and re-entered into the aquaculture system. Like its name, cultured meats are meats that are grown using cells in bioprocessing facilities. Although aimed at preventing animal cruelty, this technology still requires some animals to be reared and harvested for their cells. As it is still in its infancy, research is still ongoing to not only reduce the production costs but to expand the variety of meats produced in vitro.

Agritech Facilities as Attractive Targets of Attack

Unfortunately, the characteristics that make agritech appealing also makes it attractive targets of attack. Due to its compact processes, an attack on such facilities would result in higher damage and losses than traditional facilities. Additionally, any damage or disruption inflicted on their centralized control network would lead to similar outcomes. Those leveraging on closed loop systems are also vulnerable as an introduction of contaminants in any part of the system can lead to total system failure. Contributing to its attractiveness as targets could be its limited security features and the psychological impact of an attack on such facilities; food being a basic need. Currently, guidelines and gold standards to securitizing these facilities may be limited and may even be overlooked.

Three Groups of Potential Perpetrators

The first group of potential perpetrators are terrorists. Included in this group are religiously motivated terrorists and ecoterrorists. Religiously motivated terrorists, responsible for most contemporary terrorist attacks, have been argued to display organizational learning. They would therefore not only search for new tactics but also targets. Additionally, the ambiguity of whether lab grown meat are religiously permissible may legitimize them as targets. Aquaculture, aquaponics, and lab-grown meats may come under the crosshair of ecoterrorists as they act to advance animal rights. Though lab-grown meats involved a reduced number of live animals, it may be deemed unacceptable as it promotes the continued consumption of meat and the abuse of livestock. It certainly is a disservice to agritech as it requires electricity to power its operations. Unfortunately, in SEA, coal-powered generators are still a major source of electricity. This provides an additional point of contention for ecoterrorists.

The second group of potential perpetrators are those who are disenfranchised by these technologies. This group of individuals are likely those who have lost their employment when traditional farms adopt these technologies. It could also include small-scale producers who lose their livelihoods to agritech facilities. These individuals may carry out attacks uncoordinated and on their own, through anti-technology movements, or get recruited into terrorist groups. Anti-technology movements have been known to exist since the 1800s, most notable is the Luddites.

The third group of potential perpetrators are opportunists. These are individuals or groups who could demand a ransom from agritech facilities on the threat of disrupting their production. Their tactics would likely come in the form of online attacks to the facilities’ essential IT infrastructure. Non-functioning sensors, for example, will be disastrous for such facilities.

Likely Modus Operandi & Implications

Implicit from the list of potential perpetrators, two forms of modus operandi are envisaged. The first centres on perpetrators physically forcing entry into these facilities. Upon their successful entry, they could sabotage production by either inflicting structural damage to essential infrastructure or contaminating essential resources such as growth media. In such a scenario, the perpetrators potential weapons of choice include guns, explosives, and poisons. It is unlikely that perpetrators would resort to using chemical and biological agents in such attacks as introduction of large amounts of easily obtainable contaminants such as dishwashing liquid is enough to disrupt production.

Additionally, in such a scenario, it is thus important to maintain sufficient security to prevent any unlawful entry into these premises, particularly in essential areas such as control rooms. Personnel and vehicle checks at entry points are also essential. These checks are to screen for weapons and explosives. It is also ideal to create a stand-off distance to minimize damage to the main buildings. This would mean creating as much free space between the entry point and the main buildings.

The second likely modus operandi is the online penetration into the facilities IT infrastructure. In addition to constantly ensuring the facility’s cybersecurity, it may be ideal to also consider decentralizing their systems. A decentralized system allows the creation of redundancy and is more tolerant to faults.