Introduction

Circular economy has moved from niche sustainability circles to centre stage in global climate negotiations.

Recently, the seventh session of the United Nations Environment Assembly (UNEA-7) convened in Nairobi to deliberate on binding agreements that aim to tackle plastic pollution and resource depletion.

Last year also marked the first time that the circular economy was discussed at the United Nations’ Conference of the Parties (COP) platform, underscoring the importance of the circular economy transition for countries and the circularity spillover that can enhance economic growth as well as opportunities for the member states.

Despite these developments, Southeast Asia as a region continues to generate a staggering amount of waste annually, at 150 million tonnes of municipal solid waste (MSW) in 2016. This figure is projected to double by 2030. The World Bank also projected that global waste generation is expected to increase by 73% from 2020 to 2050 (to 3.88 billion tonnes in 2050).

Waste management outcomes vary significantly across ASEAN Member States (AMS). Malaysia, for example, discards approximately 39,000 tonnes of MSW daily, yet only 37.9% of which was recycled by the end of 2024. To mitigate this problem, the government aims to ameliorate this by aiming to increase the figure to 56.2% by 2030 under the 13th Malaysian Plan (13MP).

Meanwhile, the Asian Development Bank warns that resource depletion and waste mismanagement could c

A more sobering news comes from the Circularity Gap Report 2025, which states that the worldwide circularity has dropped to just 6.9% in 2024. However, several regional instruments are already in pla

For example, the Framework for Circular Economy for the ASEAN Economic Community, established in 2021, outlines priority areas such as trade openness, innovation, sustainable finance and resource efficiency, while the Circular Economy Implementation Plan (2023–2030) focuses on agriculture, transport, and energy.

But barriers remain in place despite the adoption of some circular economy frameworks and policies by several AMS. Part of the problem lies in the policy fragmentation across ASEAN, which disrupts the operation of circular value chains that span across national borders.

Financing gap represents a major challenge because public funding exists but does not provide enough capital to expand circular business models from their current pilot stage to widespread implementation.

Against this backdrop, AMS should aim to establish policy harmonisation as the top priority instead of simply focusing on trade liberalisation.

Insights from ACEF 2025

The ASEAN Circular Economy Forum (ACEF) 2025, held in Kuala Lumpur on 16-17 October under the theme “Accelerate the Circular Economy Transition in ASEAN with Green Skills, Innovative Solutions, and Investments”, convened more than 500 participants from across the region to examine how capital can be mobilised to translate circular economy ambitions into market-ready solutions.

Across the discussions, a consistent message emerged. While ASEAN offers strong potential for scaling circular business models, particularly in areas such as waste management, sustainable consumption and resource efficiency, early-stage ventures continue to face structural financing constraints.

Investors and practitioners highlighted three enabling conditions that remain critical to scaling circular solutions: clear and predictable policy signals, demonstrable commercial viability, and credible impact measurement frameworks.

The discussions also highlighted the importance of patient capital in supporting c

Practical examples from across sectors illustrated how circular approaches – ranging from agricultural waste valorisation and durable materials innovation to service-based consumption models and e-waste recovery – can enhance competitiveness and long-term value creation when supported by appropriate financing structures.

Despite the diversity of sectors and solutions discussed, access to patient and well-structured capital emerged as the most persistent constraint. This points to the need for closer coordination between institutional investors and policymakers to bridge the gap between circular ambition and scalable implementation across ASEAN.

Bridging the Investment-Implementation Gap

The ACEF 2025 conference discussed that circular economy funding does not face barriers from insufficient business prospects because investors face challenges that current projects cannot address. The blended finance mechanisms operate as risk reduction tools for circular economy investments through their combination of public funding at reduced rates with commercial investment capital.

Retirement funds, financial institutions and sovereign wealth funds have an opportunity to support the circular transition by embedding circular economy assessment standards into their investment guidelines, informed by practices demonstrated by Malaysia’s public sector pension fund, Kumpulan Wang Persaraan (Diperbadankan) [KWAP].

Policy harmonisation requires immediate attention. The ASEAN region requires standardised rules that should include certification recognition systems, unified Extended Producer Responsibility programmes and established procedures for moving secondary materials between countries.

The ASEAN Circular Economy Stakeholder Platform maintains existing infrastructure for knowledge sharing. However, we need to establish this knowledge base throughout public sector organisations and private companies as well as banking institutions. All parties involved must use the same playbook during circular economy project planning and budgeting activities.

ACEF 2025 identified that the constraints to circular economy investments are not due to a lack of opportunities but the systemic mismatches between what investors seek and what ventures are able to provide. To this end, blended finance mechanisms have the ability to de-risk circular economy investments—combining concessionary public financing with commercial capital.

Institutional Investors as Catalysts: The KWAP Model

Across ASEAN, public pension funds and long-term institutional investors are increasingly exploring how sustainability objectives can align with fiduciary responsibilities. Malaysia’s public pension fund, KWAP, provides one example of how such alignment can be operationalised through long-term capital deployment.

Managing over RM185.6b (approximately US$45b) in assets, KWAP shows that long-term financial returns and sustainability objectives can reinforce each other through commitments that include achieving a Net Zero Portfolio by 2050 and increasing investments in transition assets to RM20b by 2030.

Thus far, KWAP has launched three catalytic investment programmes. Dana Perintis (RM500m) invests its funds into local start-ups through venture capital support for agritech and automated manufacturing businesses.

The Dana Pemacu (RM6b) investment fund operates through a co-General Partner model, which unites international investment experts with Malaysian-based professionals to support food security and energy transformation initiatives.

Last but not least, Dana Iklim⁺ (RM2b) investment fund serves as Malaysia’s initial climate-focused investment fund, which operates under an impact measurement system that monitors climate resilience and SDG-related co-benefits.

At the same time, KWAP has also launched various initiatives and activities to further promote this agenda domestically. The KWAP Inspire Conference 2024 took place to advanc

Others include the “Fuel the Future” campaign, which collected 742kg of used cooking oil for conversion into Sustainable Aviation Fuel (SAF). This was part of a collaborative initiative with Petronas Dagangan Berhad (PDB) and FatHopes, demonstrating

Renewable Energy as Circular Economy Infrastructure

While the circular economy seeks to improve material flow, the transition towards a circular economy requires a simultaneous transformation of energy systems. KWAP’s investment in Vantage Solar UK Ltd (VSUK) demonstrates how renewable energy is a part of circular economy infrastructure.

VSUK has generated a consistent amount of greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions avoidance through its 365MW solar generation capacity, which equates to avoiding 49,057 tonnes of CO₂e in FY23 and 46,141 tonnes of CO₂e in FY24. These amounts were derived using Partnership for Carbon Accounting Financials (PCAF) emission factors and Project Finance methodologies.

The kind of transparency demonstrated by KWAP’s disclosure of VSUK’s carbon impact represents an important step forward in the development of institutional investor accountability for climate-related disclosures.

According to PCAF reporting standards, KWAP must measure and disclose the total amount of GHG emissions associated with its portfolio. This transparency makes the carbon impact of the project quantifiable. Additionally, the avoided emissions data, designated as PCAF Data Score 2, provide high-quality proof of the contributions made to decarbonisation by VSUK while providing clean electricity to approximately 87,000 UK households per annum.

To understand what the circular economy actually entails, it is useful to think about the requirements of the circular economy: manufacturing recycled materials, operating reverse logistics and powering remanufacturing facilities. All of these requirements necessitate energy. Where that energy comes from renewable resources, the potential for climate impacts of the circular economy increases.

KWAP’s portfolio-based approach enables synergies to exist when both clean materials and clean energy are used together, while at the same time maintaining strict reporting and measurement standards to ensure that there is real accountability.

The Path Forward

Experie

Yet important questions remain. If circular business models are increasingly viable, why do they continue to struggle to access patient capital at scale across ASEAN?

The direction is clear. The region has begun to lay the foundations for a circular transition through policy frameworks, growing investor interest and emerging business models. However, progress will not be automatic, nor is success guaranteed.

Advancing the circular economy requires deliberate and coordinated action through a triple helix approach. Policymakers must continue to shape enabling and coherent frameworks. Industry players, including investors and entrepreneurs, must deploy patient capital and scale circular solutions. Meanwhile, citizens must increasingly demand products and services designed for circularity. Whether ASEAN can capture the economic opportunity of the circular economy while addressing its environmental imperatives will depend on the choices made today. The pace and coherence of those choices will shape the region’s long-term resilience and prosperity.

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In December 2025, scholars and policy an

Hosted by the Republic of Indonesia Defense University and Universitas Airlangga, the focus group discussion assessed Russia’s post-2022 pivot to Asia

Introduction

The year 2025 is drawing to a close. Over the past 12 months, the Indo-Pacific strategic landscape has shifted dramatically. Political and economic uncertainty has deepened. Conflicts and humanitarian crises in Gaza, Sudan, and Myanmar have worsened. New border tensions have emerged in Southeast Asia. Pluralism is rising at the expense of regionalism. Meanwhile, East Asia is experiencing intensifying geopolitical friction.

Many observers believe the world is undergoing a transition that no one can yet define. Prime Minister Lawrence Wong of Singapore captured this uncertainty when he told the Financial Times: “The old rules no longer apply, but the new rules have yet to be written.”

What is truly regrettable is how far the region has drifted from the Indo-Pacific visions that so many governments once endorsed.

This is not to dismiss the tangible progress made—ports, railways and connectivity agreements have been delivered across the region. Rather, the concern lies in how the broader vision of a free, open, inclusive, transparent and rules-based Indo-Pacific is slipping away from reality.

Some may disagree, but it is fair to argue that the Indo-Pacific has lived through a “hot peace” this past year, where any miscalculation could set the region back and push the aspiration of a peaceful and rules-based order even further out of reach.

Foundational Frameworks

This article draws from the visions enshrined in the ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific (AOIP) and the Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP).

In 2016, the late Abe Shinzo, Japan’s then prime minister, introduced FOIP at the Tokyo International Conference on African Development. Meanwhile, in 2019, Indonesia catalysed Southeast Asia’s own Indo-Pacific strategy, which ASEAN Member States (AMS) adopted as AOIP.

These visions were never meant to compete; they were designed to complement one another.

Both frameworks rest on the belief that the Indo-Pacific order must be free, open, inclusive and rules-based to achieve peace, stability, and prosperity.

Japan frames “free and open” as a principle of conduct that treats the Indo-Pacific as a public good, governed by existing international law. ASEAN goes further: it seeks to turn tension into dialogue, competition into cooperation and insists that any Indo-Pacific vision must remain inclusive—meaning China must remain part of the region’s strategic map.

Nonetheless, the region’s strategic landscape is drifting further from these shared visions. The gap between what leaders proclaim and what actually happens on the ground stems from four underlying realities.

Four Realities of a Drifting Region

First, trust deficits are widening, and new conflicts are emerging across the region. Findings from the ASEAN Peoples’ Perceptions Surveyin 2024 showed that 57.94% of Southeast Asian respondents believed armed conflict between AMS was unlikely in the next two years. That optimism was quickly disproven by the recent Thai-Cambodian armed clashes, which revealed how fragile intra-ASEAN trust remains.

Tensions have also escalated in East Asia, where the China-Japan relations have deteriorated further due to a recent statement by the Japanese Prime Minister Takaichi Sanae. Fragile situation remains in the South China Sea, whereas miscalculation may lead to an open conflict.

A similar dynamic persists between India and Pakistan in South Asia, where mistrust continues to shape their strategic behaviour. Meanwhile, the humanitarian crises in Gaza and Sudan have worsened, adding to the sense that conflict is becoming more widespread and less containable.

This deteriorating landscape has become a pretext for governments across the Indo-Pacific to ramp up their military budgets, pushing the region toward its highest level of militarisation in modern history.

Asia’s total military spending reached US$603.9 billion in 2024, a 4.9% increase from 2023, even after a record spike the previous year. China alone spent US$314 billion, more than triple any other country in the region. India came second with US$86.1 billion, while Japan and South Korea allocated US$55.3 billion and US$47.6 billion for defence, respectively.

Southeast Asian states are also accelerating their buildup: Singapore spent US$15.1 billion and Indonesia US$11 billion, driven by maritime insecurity and rising regional tension.

Taken together, these figures show a region arming faster than at any point in the past two decades—a clear sign that the Indo-Pacific is drifting away from its vision of peace, openness and stability.

Second, the “confluence of the two seas and continents” – as imagined by Abe – has become more rhetoric than reality. Politically and economically, the appetite to connect the Pacific and Indian Oceans through multilateral frameworks such as AOIP remains limited.

Even though ASEAN and the Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA) signed an MoU in 2023, and ASEAN and Japan recently announced an AOIP–FOIP synchron

Third, Ch

In September 2023, China signed the ASEAN-China Joint Statement on Mutually Beneficial Cooperation on AOIP, which was widely regarded as a diplomatic achievement for ASEAN, especially given China’s long-standing opposition to the Indo-Pacific concept.

Despite this, that commitment remains largely symbolic. Beijing’s endorsement has not translated into meaningful deliverables, concrete programmes or sustained engagement under AOIP’s four priority areas. In practice, China still channels most of its regional cooperation through BRI and SCO rather than through ASEAN-led Indo-Pacific frameworks.

Fourth, as teased above, the connectivity projects intended to link the Indian and Pacific Oceans have not produced meaningful integration. Despite the Indo-Pacif

No major cross-ocean transport corridors have been completed, and most trade still flows through long-established routes such as the Malacca Strait and Singapore’s hub-and-spoke system.

World Bank data shows that South Asia’s manufacturing value added is only 13.5% of regional GDP, far below East Asia’s 22.5%. India’s manufacturing share stands at just 12.5%, underscoring the region’s limited integration into East Asian-led supply chains.

Key projects like the India-Myanmar-Thailand Trilateral Highway and t

Recommendations

Despite the widening gap between rhetoric and implementation, regional leaders should treat this moment as both an alarm and an opportunity. Investing in confidence-building measures (CBMs) is now more strategic than ever.

Critiques of key forums like the East Asia Summit must be taken seriously, and the ASEAN Indo-Pacific Forum (AIPF) needs to be strengthened rather than allowed to become another talk shop. Bottom-up Track 2 initiatives including the AOIP Vision Group Conference should receive sustained support and be meaningfully integrated into

Furthermore, promoting conceptual, institutional, and implementation between AOIP-FOIP is strategic for concrete and game-changing implementation. Endorsing public-private partnership (PPP) projects under the AOIP-FOIP framework can accelerate deliverables and help address the persistent connectivity gaps between the Indian and Pacific Oceans.

ASEAN’s relevance in today’s geopolitical environment ultimately depends on its ability to turn its long-standing mantra – “from rivalry to dialogue, and from competition to cooperation” – into practice. The AOIP-FOIP synchronisation offers a timely opportunity for ASEAN to advance more inclusive cooperation and deliver projects that benefit all. All in all, the Indo-Pacific cannot afford to drift further from the vision that most regional actors have endorsed. The region must remain open, free, inclusive and rules-based, where ASEAN plays its centrality. As 2026 approaches, ASEAN’s relevance will depend on whether it can uphold that vision and play the crucial role it has long claimed—turning principles into practice and cooperation into real outcomes.

On 18 November 2025, a forum was organised by the Asia West East Centre (AsiaWE), in collaboration with the Peace, Dialogue and Xenophobia Studies (PEDIXS) Centre of the International Islamic University Malaysia (IIUM), the Policy and Area Studies Research Unit (PASRU), and stratsea.

Entitled “Forum on the World Order: Preserving Sovereignty, Eluding Neo-Imperialism”, the discussion brought forth ideas from several key thinkers within the region and was held at the Senate Hall of IIUM.

Presenters include Professor Dr Fauzi Abdul Hamid, Professor of Political Science, School of Distance Education at Universiti Sains Malaysia; Ms Farah Michelle Kimball, Senior Research Fellow of PEDIXS; Dr Meor Alif Meor Azalan, coordinator of PASRU-IIUM and; Professor Syed Farid Alatas, Co-founder and Director of AsiaWE, who also serves as Professor of Sociology at the National University of Singapore (NUS).

The forum began with the keynote by the Rector of IIUM Emeritus Professor Osman Bakar,an experienced and reputable scholar who specialises in the Philosophy of Science. Prof Osman touched on how the scientific revolution in Europe proved to be a turning point in history, in which the separation of the divine from the mundane affairs of the world became more prevalent and was thus accepted. This process was carried out through the scientific method, an observation of the physical world that was for the sake of deriving information—without acknowledgement of anything beyond the tangible.

The author of The History and Philosophy of Islamic Science (1999) and Classification of Knowledge in Islam: A Study in Islamic Schools of Epistemology (2019) called attention to how science was then used as a tool of Western imperialism. He argued that the periodisation of Occidental dominance over the world was in tandem with the advancement of the scientific method.

One can also make the argument that the classification of species within the animal kingdom brought a logic of the distinction between races, as espoused by Herbert Spencer, the British polymath who introduced the idea of “the survival of the fittest”. This distinction paved the way to widespread racism in the West, with the spillover effect being the assumed superiority of the categoriser over the categorised, the observer over the observed.

The next speaker was Professor Dr Fauzi Abdul Hamid. He began his presentation by offering prophecies of mass killings attributed to the Final Messenger of Islam, the Prophet Muhammad (PBUH). In Muslim: Book 41, Number 6903, Abu Hurairah reported Allah’s Messenger as saying:“The last Hour will not come unless there is much bloodshed. They said: What is harj? Thereupon he said: bloodshed.”

The word “Al-Harj” was referred to in a previous hadith. This backdrop was provided by Dr Fauzi as an indicator of the times we are living in, where the mass killing of children is deemed to be “normal”, even livestreamed on our handphones.

Moving on from this introduction, he talked about the current international geopolitical situation that sees the waning influence of the United States over global affairs. While the United States acknowledges that the days of hegemony are coming to an end, it seems that they are not giving up this primary position without a fight. This fight, however, pertains

As such, the Oxford graduate gave a bleak projection of the future in that the weaponisation of religion would persist, proving to be a point of division between people. He cited examples of outright racism influencing religious violence particularly pernicious because it is based on notions of superiority pertaining to God-given, unchanging physical features or phenotype.

This can be tied to incidences of the justification of racism in colonial history

The next presenter was Dr Meor Alif from PASRU. The London School of Economics (LSE) graduate laid the foundations for how we – as a political collective – have adopted the lexicon of warfare in our daily parlance. At the level of policy formulation, terms such as “deterrence”, “capacity building” and “vigilance” have become common—carrying with them connotations of power and domination. Titled “Languages of Power: Militarism, Malaysia, and a World Order Worth Unsubscribing To”, Dr Meor’s presentation highlighted the need to question these terms and to come up with alternative terminologies that are not derived from the dictionary of militarism.

He contends with enthusiasm that when there is an adoption of a vocabulary, there is an inheriting of a specific worldview. In this instance, the worldview is one which is bleak—often viewing reality as one of scarcity instead of abundance. He provided a list of books that shaped such a view, including A History of Militarism: Civilian and Military by Alfred Vagts, Post-Military Society by Martin Shaw, as well as Metaphors We Live By by George Lakoff and Mark Johnson.

Dr Meor ended by quoting the prominent philosopher of language, Ludwig Wittgenstein: “The limits of language are the limits of my world.” Indeed, it is a timely reminder of how language is crucial in constructing praxis.

With the title “The Global Economy of Genocide & the Erosion of Sovereignty”, Ms Farah Michelle Kimball’s talk revolved around the report provided by the UN Special Rapporteur, Francesca Albanese, on the “economy of genocide”. The report investigated how corporate machinery continues to sustain Israel’s settler-colonial project of displacement and replacement of the Palestinians in the occupied territory.

While political leaders and governments shirk their obligations, far too many corporate entities have made lucrative profits from Israel’s economy of illegal occupation, apa

Ms Kimball, taking on Albanese, reminded us that the complicity exposed in the report is just the tip of the iceberg; ending it will not happen without holding the private sector accountable, including its high-rolling executives. International law recognises varying degrees of responsibility—each requiring scrutiny and accountability, particularly in this case, where and when the self-determination of an entire people is at stake.

Next, Prof Farid Alatas talked about how colonialism and capitalism are intertwined. The control of capital opens the possibility of domination of one group of people over another. The Singapore-based academic pointed out – and in agreement with the towering Muslim historian Ibn Khaldun in his magnum opus The Muqaddimah – that governments are as a rule unjust. We cannot expect governments to have futuwwa (chivalry) for the very simple reason that vested interests are at play.

Prof Farid suggested a recentring of discussions on development to link it to the overarching theme of (neo)imperialism. In the modern world, coloniality does not come in the form of brute force or overt violence but through the seemingly “innocent” domain of academia. With intensity, he questioned how knowledge is produced in universities and how some structures of coloniality persist by way of the syllabi in the aforesaid institutions. As such, the co-Director of AsiaWE called for a change in the way the social sciences are taught in universities.

Moving on from this suggestion, it must be noted that the economy of new nations could only work within the terms of trade set down by the industrial countries; they lack the resources to build themselves up into sustainable nations. Independence did naught to dent the abiding physical dependence of new nations upon the old co

This is, of course, an imposition that persists to this day. This dependency is certainly one that is manufactured to keep the new “independent” nations in check and to continue the exploitation of resources in these countries. To rub salt into collective wounds, new nations inherited a network of modern services, such as education and healthcare. It is not an exaggeration to say that these services were designed to serve the needs of the colonialists, as well as the indigenous elite corps of functionaries who serviced the administration.

My understanding of this situation takes on Merryl Wyn Davies and Ziauddin Sardar’s Distorted Imagination: Lessons from the Rushdie Affair, especially regarding the impact of “brown sahibs” in perpetuating colonial control.

Who were these brown sahibs? They were descendants of the pre-colonial monarchies and feudal landlords—a progeny of colonial administrations, who set themselves as the “go-between” between the rulers and the ruled. Unfortunately, these individuals are still in our midst and are often in positions of authority in developing nations. The colonial powers had left the colonised world with a network of economic and intellectual resources designed to only serve the interests of the metropolitan colonial authority. This is our current reality. 

After the presenters made their points, Professor Dr Nath Aldalala’a of IIUM was called upon as discussant. After integrating many of the idea

In my estimation, we can conclude that neo-imperialism is very much a reality of the time. It is the continuation of imperialist policies without direct political control, using economic, financial and cultural power to dominate other nations. It is characterised by the application of instruments – including financial trade agreements, financial aid and corporate influence – to maintain coercion, often to the detriment of a country’s own progress.

Any individual who questions how establishments gain legitimacy ought to question how the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) became the effective power in determinin

Overall, the “Forum on the World Order: Preserving Sovereignty, Eluding Neo-Imperialism” was a success, as the objectives of the event were met. It is with great hope that such events will be carried out in the future and that the (co)organisers continue their good work in bringing forth conversations on neo-imperialism and decoloniality, with our plight in sight.

A Trans-Pacific Moment

For the majority in Southeast Asia, baseball seems a distant spectacle, a sport watched from afar, if at all. Yet, on the night the Los Angeles Dodgers and the Toronto Blue Jays met in Game 7 of the 2025 World Series in Toronto, baseball briefly became a sport impossible to ignore.

What caught everyone’s attention was not just the event but also Ohtani Shohei, the Dodger’s Japanese two-way star player, whose presence alone could turn a regular game into a global broadcast.

Fans in Japan shifted their Sunday around games and sports commentators brimming with national pride. Even if one did not understand the rules of baseball, there is a sense of a moment of high drama, the kind of “winner-takes-all” occasion that we in Southeast Asia may associate with a World Cup Final. It was a euphoric moment for enthusiastic baseball fans and casual followers alike.

Ultimately, in the game, the Dodgers secured a 5-4 victory, delivering them back-to-back World Series titles, the first baseball franchise to do so in a quarter of a century since the famed 1998-2000 New York Yankees.

Throughout the series, Ohtani’s presence proved consequential in ways beyond any single play. Ohtani is not simply a star athlete; he is an anomaly that breaks the modern logic of the sport.

Baseball, since the early 20th century, has operated on the assumption that no individual can dominate both as a pitcher and a hitter. The physical demands and divergent skill sets prove to be a Herculean requisite for any baseball player.

Ohtani has dismantled this entirely, and he does so dominantly.

To illustrate, in Game 4 of the National League Championship Series, equivalent to a semi-final before entering the World Series, Ohtani produced a performance that commentators instantly declared the greatest in playoff history: six scoreless innings and three home runs at the plate.

This should not have been possible—it is comparable to a footballer scoring a hat trick while also keeping a clean sheet. The totality of his talent and performance at this level is simply inconceivable.

When an athlete redefines the constraints of

The resulting “Ohtani economy” produced an estimated US$770 million in value across viewership, sponsorship, merchandise and social engagement. Additionally, the Dodgers secured approximately US$75 million in Japanese sponsorships after his arrival, alongside a 32% increase in Asian viewership of Major League Baseball (MLB). Even before Ohtani was called a Dodger, the Canadians, whose Blue Jays launched an ambitious recruitment campaign to get Ohtani, found themselves in a cultural triangle connecting Tokyo, Toronto and Los Angeles.

It is here that a sporting story transforms into a global discourse. Scholars of international relations describe figures like Ohtani as non-state diplomatic actors, capable of shaping public sentiment, transmitting cultural meaning and fostering shared experiences.

These are elements that ASEAN can consider to enhance regional soft power beyond formal diplomacy. As Malaysia’s ASEAN Chairmanship 2025 draws to a close, the attempts to position cultural diplomacy as a strategic instrument becomes an ever-present appeal.

The question derived is also clear: what lessons can a region of 11 nations draw from the way a single athlete helped turn a North American sporting event into a genuinely trans-Pacific cultural moment?

ASEAN’s Cultural Diplomacy in a Visibility-Driven World

If Ohtani and his growing prestige show us anything, it is that cultural influence moves through people, in that we follow stories, personalities and industries that grow around them. This shift in the diffusion of culture carries important implications for ASEAN, where the ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community (ASCC) has been placed at its forefront during Malaysia’s 2025 chairmanship.

At the 34th ASCC Council Meeting, ASEAN Member States (AMS) reaffirmed Malaysia’s priorities in the cultural sphere, which include “Cultural Heritage for Value Creation” as well as “Youth and Sports Potential for All to Foster Growth, Unity and Excellence”.

Recent initiatives, from the China-ASEAN Gen-Z Youth Festival 2024 to the ASEAN Film Festival 2025, show how cultural spaces continue to soften tensions and deepe

To Malaysia’s credit, Kuala Lumpur is doubling down on ASEAN’s belief that unity arises from consistent social engagement, rather than a grand spectacle. In this sense, ASEAN’s cultural diplomacy is fundamentally different from the high-performance, revenue-driven models of sports leagues such as MLB. Its value lies in sustaining relationships and stability rather than monetising attention and visibility.

Nonetheless, the strength of ASEAN’s inward-facing cultural model also reveals its limits. It was built to prioritise stability and consensus, both of which frequently necessitate slow, patient relationship-building rather than the quick pursuit of visibility.

However, it now sits uncomfortably within a global cultural environment where attention, speed and repetition increasingly determine whose stories are seen and whose identities travel.

Sports, in particular, have taken off as a major player in the realm of soft power. Research in this field

The link between visibility and influence has also been noted:  “The use of sport in shaping the international image of a state can also take the form of showcasing sport-related assets during the non-sporting event.”

In this visibility-oriented global landscape, ASEAN’s cultural diplomacy, grounded in patient internal engagement, often competes against far stronger engines of global attention.

This is where Ohtani becomes illustrative. It is not simply his individual brilliance that drives his global reach, but also, importantly, the commercial ecosystem that surrounds him. The machinery of broadcasting, merchandising and sporting infrastructure that propelled him to international fame is boosted by digital storytelling that operates at a speed ASEAN was never designed to match.

Each time he delivers, the world seems to know at once: a home run in Los Angeles can light up screens in Tokyo, Seoul, Mexico City and Cuba within seconds. In fact, Ohtani’s return to pitching with the Dodgers was the most-watched regular-season game in MLB.TV history.

ASEAN, by contrast, works on a different clock. Its cultural diplomacy prioritises slow, incremental, steady trust-building over the fast-paced exposure that drives global cultural markets. Ohtani operates within a platform designed for an international limelight, while ASEAN’s mechanisms are structured to maintain unity within the region.

There is no question about Southeast Asia’s cultural depth. ASEAN is not lacking in genuine stories, art forms or identities. What is missing is the machinery that carries these stories outwards: production networks, commercial partnerships and platforms that enable narratives to travel beyond borders.

This is the gap where the Ohtani playbook helps illuminate: it demonstrates how cultural influence now travels through networks of production and amplification that do not exist at the regional level.

What ASEAN Can Learn

The way forward lies in empowering individuals who have the capability to carry stories across borders. Cultural diplomacy works because people become symbolic ambassadors, and the visibility generated by celebrated individuals can project a cultural message before any official programmes do.

ASEAN has this prerequisite. The shortcoming lies in the deliberate strategy to identify, support and position talents as the embodiment of Southeast Asia, rather than simply as representatives of their home countries.

The success of the Ohtani phenomenon relies on a two-way flow of talent, capital and attention. Japan sends its cultural figures to North America, and the latter reciprocates through viewership, sponsorships and cultural engagement. ASEAN frequently excels at showcasing culture but rarely at constructing these exchanges.

Sports diplomacy research repeatedly emphasises the value of this logic. Envoy programmes, bilateral training systems and mobility schemes contribute to the deepening of ties. There is plenty of room to adapt these ideas beyond just sports; think about things like joint film production grants or co-funded creative fellowships. The principle is simple: what the region shares with the world must also have a way of coming back, carrying new audiences, new networks and new momentum into Southeast Asia.

Subsequently, if recognition must circulate, then ASEAN must also reckon with the machinery that makes this possible. The commercial ecosystem that made Japanese stars in MLB possible – broadcast clips, merchandise cycles, endorsement economies and digital storytelling – is the very definition of the soft power of markets.

If ASEAN hopes to elevate its cultural profile abroad, it must rethink its cultural assets as marketable. It is through these platforms that audiences accumulate, narratives repeat and identities gain traction, ultimately turning regional heritage into a competitive advantage.

Conclusion

Ohtani’s global influence is not a lesson for ASEAN to replicate, but it indeed reveals the conditions under which cultural influence travels today. ASEAN certainly does not lack culture, talent or diversity. It merely lacks the pathways that allow these to move with momentum.

Its traditional, consensus-driven approach still matters for internal cohesion; hence, the true challenge lies in combining the two models. It remains to be seen whether ASEAN can preserve its cultural authenticity while also building an ecosystem to project its image globally. Perhaps, if baseball can travel far, ASEAN’s stories can too.

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Opting for Soft Power

The South China Sea (SCS) is one of the most strategic and disputed maritime regions in the world. Territorial disputes, particularly between China and ASEAN countries, are a factor that disrupts regional stability and impacts global trade.

China’s unilateral claims and extensive land reclamation have escalated tensions with several ASEAN Member States (AMS), exposing the limits of ASEAN’s ability to maintain regional stability. Despite two decades of negotiations over a code of conduct, ASEAN’s collective response has remained weak, largely due to divergent national interests and varying levels of economic dependence on China.

These internal divisions weaken ASEAN centrality and reduce the organisation’s capacity to act as a cohesive security actor in the region.

Reliance on hard power only sharpens the existing tension over SCS. Therefore, ASEAN needs to strengthen its role by prioritising soft power through functional cooperation. This approach can strengthen trust and open opportunities for achieving sustainable political solutions.

Soft power focuses on shaping preferences through attraction

Environmental and Humanitarian Causes

Globally, soft power has proven instrumental in easing tensions, as seen in the role of the European Union’s environmental and cultural cooperation in stabilising the post-Cold War relations, or Japan’s use of development assistance and cultural diplomacy in Southeast Asia.

This approach aligns with ASEAN’s emphasis on functional cooperation as a trust-building mechanism that is not susceptible to political deadlock.

Soft power is directed at priority sectors, such as the restoration of the degraded SCS ecosystem. More than 70% of coral reefs in the South China Sea (SCS) have been damaged by reclamation, overfishing and pollution. ASEAN can encourage joint research or establish a multilateral marine park in the disputed area. This step avoids sovereignty debates while responding to ecological threats, which affect everyone, in a concrete manner. Such an initiative could foster valuable collective knowledge, guided by the 2002 Declaration on the Conduct of Parties (DOC).

Meanwhile, the maritime region sees frequent typhoons every year. ASEAN can design an emergency response protocol by making disputed islands neutral aid centres. This effort would not only provide humanitarian benefits but also build a tradition of cooperation in the region.

Furthermore, fish stocks in the region have declined by 70-90% since the 1950s due to overfishing. A joint management agreement is important for food security for all parties whose maritime interests lie in the SCS.

Intelligence Diplomacy

In addition to environmental and humanitarian cooperation, ASEAN can also utilise intelligence mechanisms to strengthen soft power diplomacy.

The Our Eyes Initiative (OEI), launched by Indonesia in 2018, should be expanded from its focus on counterterrorism to include maritime security issues, illegal fishing and grey-zone tactics in the South China Sea. If packaged as a confidence-building instrument rather than a coercive force, the OEI could provide an avenue whereby intelligence cooperation is preventive in nature and aimed at maintaining stability.

Intelligence diplomacy has the potential to complement Track 1.5 and Track 2 by offering a closed dialogue space when formal negotiations reach an impasse. Through this mechanism, ASEAN can unify perceptions of threats and strengthen regional resilience without division. This way, intelligence could also play a role in supporting ASEAN’s centrality while strengthening soft power leadership in the management of the SCS.

Furthermore, intelligence sharing on issues such as illegal fishing, maritime smuggling and grey-zone tactics supports economic security while strengthening ASEAN’s credibility as a provider of regional stability.

Indonesia’s and the Philippines’ Roles

In this regard, Indonesia, as a non-claimant in the SCS, is strategically positioned to lead this soft power agenda. Indonesia, as the largest country in ASEAN, could emerge as an honest broker and normative leader.

Several steps that Indonesia can take include: 1) promoting minilateral projects such as marine research and joint environmental programmes with selected partners; 2) strengthening the capacity of the ASEAN Secretariat to manage technical cooperation, and; 3) aligning soft power initiatives with the ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific (AOIP) to ensure consistency with the organisation’s broader strategy.

Beyond Indonesia, claimant states and involved parties could also employ soft power tools to foster trust, such as joint humanitarian response mechanisms, environmental protection initiatives and people-to-people exchanges. Expanding this approach from a national to a regional level would help reinforce ASEAN’s collective leadership and complement ongoing security dialogues, including those involving the Philippines, ASEAN chair for 2026.

The Philippines is a test case for the effectiveness of soft power. Despite winning the 2016 international arbitration, Manila continues to face pressures from China through naval maneuvers, water cannoning and laser interference with its coast guard. This situation has led to domestic demands for a firm response.

However, the Philippines could pursue a dual strategy of strengthening its defence alliance with the United St

As ASEAN chair, the Philippines would have the opportunity to strengthen regional unity by promoting deep-sea governance norms, raising maritime economic issues on the ASEAN agenda, and proposing symbolic measures such as renaming the SCS to the Southeast Asian Sea to affirm collective identity. Strengthening ASEAN’s internal funding is also important to prevent initiatives, especially those related to marine resources, from becoming dependent on external donors.

Limitations and Looking Forward

Soft power strategies are not always effective. Their goal is not to quickly resolve sovereignty conflicts but to create a more stable and manageable environment. In practical terms, functional cooperation can only succeed if it does not interfere with territorial claims, which require careful formulation and negotiation.

Every initiative must be managed by a neutral ASEAN institution and packaged as a mutual benefit. Therefore, they should not give the impression of supporting specific claims.

China might view such efforts with suspicion, perceiving them as restrictions or internationalisation issues. Conversely, China might also embrace them as a safe way to demonstrate its commitment to “mutually beneficial cooperation”. Therefore, ASEAN must be able to emphasise that this framework is inclusive and beneficial to everyone, including China.

ASEAN must actively leverage the financial resources and technical expertise of Dialogue Partners such as Japan, Australia and the European Union to strengthen its position. All initiatives must remain under ASEAN’s control and leadership. Communication must be expanded through intelligence cha

Strategic threats such as the exploitation of the seabed economy and hybrid threats, including underwater cable sabotage, must be taken more seriously. ASEAN has great collective strength, but unfortunately it is often not used properly. This potential can be realised as real regional influence under the Philippines’ leadership. Ultimately, resolving the conflict in SCS cannot be achieved solely through legal or military means because the dynamic is too complex. A more practical approach is to strengthen soft power diplomacy through the principle of ASEAN centrality. By focusing on issues and benefits for all parties, ASEAN can build trust and a culture of cooper

Immobile

It is well noted that ASEAN has made impressive efforts in tearing down the barriers for trade and investment. Under Malaysia’s chairmanship of the ASEAN Business Advisory Council (ASEAN-BAC) alone, 12 initiatives have been launched to boost regional integration. Tariffs are lower, rules are clearer and supply chains integrate across the region.

Yet, while goods and capital flow easily, talent mobility does not. Many skilled young professionals and fresh graduates remain trapped in their home countries, slowing business growth and shaking investor confidence. Private equity (PE) and venture capital (VC) have declined by 47% since 2018, suggesting that ASEAN’s full economic potential is being wasted.

Without freer movement of talent, the region risks staying a factory floor instead of becoming a hub of innovation and ideas.

Corporations and foreign investors now see ASEAN as one market requiring talents that understand the different economies in the region and are capable of deciphering the interlinks among all of them. However, due to rigid systems and recognition schemes tangled in bureaucracy, qualifications acknowledged in one country may not be trusted in another.

More importantly, working visa rules still make mobility a privilege. Only those who can afford lengthy applications, meet high salary thresholds, or secure sponsorship from established employers can access cross-border opportunities. Singapore’s Employment Pass, for example, requires minimum salaries of S$5,600 monthly for mid-level positions, indicating the significant barriers for ASEAN fresh graduates.

The track record of government-to-government (G2G) cooperation under ASEAN shows that consensus-driven approaches, while thorough, cannot keep pace with market dynamics. The existing Mutual Recognition Arrangements (MRAs) account for merely 1.5% of ASEAN’s total workforce, with 87% of intra-ASEAN migrants being unskilled workers not governed by formal agreements.

ASEAN must instead let the market lead and empower talent to move as freely as trade does. The ASEAN University Network (AUN) is a region-based educational consortium that offers a viable solution. Comprising over 30 leading universities as core members across the region, AUN should be the hub of fresh graduates’ mobility across the region.

Credibility

AUN operates under a charter signed by ASEAN Member States (AMS) and functions as a platform for its member universities to develop quality assurance systems and advance educational standards. It does not have the authority to regulate governments or replace national credentialing systems.

However, this limitation is actually an advantage for the proposed model. AUN can operate as a supplementary, market-driven credentialing body. It is akin to professional certification organisations such as the CFA Institute or the Project Management Institute that exist alongside national qualifications; these bodies have successful models because employers trust them.

In such a scheme, if implemented, major multinational corporations and regional investors could partner directly with AUN to co-design competency standards for critical sectors where FDI is concentrated. In this proposed model, the digital economy, advanced manufacturing, sustainable finance and green energy would attract massive investments for the region. AUN member universities then integrate these competencies into their curricula. Students earn an ASEAN Regional Competency Certificate (ARCC) alongside their national degrees, which signals regional readiness to employers who would partake in co-creating the standards.

On the one hand, this creat

For universities, this system enhances competitiveness in producing graduates with regional credentials while strengthening institutional reputation.

Limitation

The Erasmus programme has enabled over 13 million students and professionals to study and work across European countries. What began as a modest student exchange has evolved into compre

While Erasmus does include a traineeship programme, allowing students to gain work experience abroad, these remain time-bound academic experiences. Typically, it is limited to two to 12 months rather than offering concrete pathways to permanent regional employment.

The focus is on enriching education through temporary placements, not creating a labour market infrastructure where employers can recruit certified talent for full-time regional

Additionally, Erasmus operates largely as a publicly funded academic initiative. While companies host trainees, they are neither co-designers of competency standards nor committed to talent acquisition schemes. The relationship is transactional, in which companies provide temporary placements, rather than strategic partnerships whereby employers define what regional talent needs to know and commit to hiring certified graduates.

At the same time, AUN is dedicated to integrating universities in ASEAN by facilitating exchanges among member institutions. While these exchanges are successful, they have had a modest impact on universities as a whole, with most activities focus on particular individuals while many other students and staff remain unfamiliar with AUN.

More critically, AUN lacks a framework designed specifically for talent mobility beyond academic exchanges. There is no mechanism connecting graduates to regional employment markets or standardising competencies for regional careers. The exchange programmes conclude at graduation, leaving young professionals to encounter the same fragmented visa and qualification recognition systems that hinder regional talent flow.

In this sense, the AUN model should address both limitations by critically examining the purpose and structure of regional talent mobility. Certifications are designed not for temporary academic enrichment but for permanent employability across ASEAN. Competency standards are co-created by multinational corporations and regional investors who will actually hire these graduates, ensuring the skills certified are immediately market-relevant and regionally transferable.

Moreover, the business-to-business (B2B) framework makes companies committed partners, not passive placement hosts. With companies identifying the skills they need, AUN leads by certifying competencies, working together with universities to shape training programmes accordingly and with employers to hire fresh graduates. Therefore, students know their investment in certification paves the way directly to expanded career opportunities.

Action

Talent mobility remains restricted in ASEAN because AMS instinctively protect their labour markets and guard sovereignty over migration and employment. Meanwhile, AUN cannot act unilaterally because the education credentialing system and labour mobility remain firmly within national competencies. It is subject to domestic laws and ministerial oversight. This is precisely why the market-driven model is necessary.

Eventually this model does not challenge government authority but rather creates a parallel system that operates through voluntary participation. AUN could offer a supplementary credential that students choose to pursue and companies choose to recognise. When the market demonstrates value, governments typically follow. The path forward is not to wait for states to cede control but to prove that voluntary, business-led mobility serves everyone’s interests.

The drop in private capital flows is an alarm for ASEAN that it cannot afford to ignore. Investors are looking elsewhere because other regions are moving faster to exhibit their strengths. If ASEAN cannot turn its 680 million young people into a regionally connected workforce, that demographic advantage will fade away.

Conclusion

Youth talent mobilisation is the key to ASEAN’s competitiveness in an age where ideas and skills matter more than cheap labour. AUN already provides the connecting line between campuses. What is missing is the courage to make it market-driven and mobility-focused. The 12 initiatives introduced by ASEAN-BAC Malaysia under Tan Sri Nazir Razak’s leadership reflect a clear understanding that the private sector must step in where governments fall short. Among them, the AUN model stands out as a practical and scalable approach to unlocking ASEAN’s vast demographic potential. ASEAN can wait for governments to negotiate the perfect framework while investors flee, or it can empower universities and businesses to build the infrastructure now.