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CCIGE is pleased to invite you to our upcoming Webinar Session via Zoom. Come and join us for an engaging and insightful discussion with Dr. Zouhir Gabsi. The session will be opened and moderated by Assoc. Prof. Dr. Danial Yusof (Director, CCIGE).

 Date: Thursday, April 10, 2025

 Time: 11:30 AM (Kuala Lumpur Time)

 Platform: Zoom

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Agriculture has long been the backbone of Southeast Asia, contributing significantly to food security, economic stability, and rural livelihoods. The ASEAN region, rich with diverse agricultural practices and resources, faces common challenges such as climate change, urbanization, market volatility, and policy discrepancies. As countries navigate these complexities, understanding the socio-economic dimensions of agriculture within the ASEAN context becomes crucial for fostering resilience, sustainability, and collective growth.

In light of these challenges, Yayasan Strategik Lestari (YSL) and stratsea are honored to create a platform for dialogue and knowledge exchange to achieve three primary aspirations: to cultivate a society that understands international relations, to identify Malaysia’s role in addressing agricultural socio-economic issues through expert perspectives, and to gather recommendations for further research and policy benchmarking.

The webinar will delve into critical questions such as:

• What are the socio-economic dynamics shaping ASEAN’s agricultural sector?

• How can collaboration among ASEAN countries enhance agricultural productivity and resilience?

• What policy interventions are necessary to address the impacts of climate change and market volatility on the region’s food security?

• How can Southeast Asia harness its agricultural diversity for mutual benefit and sustainable development?

Webinar Details

Date: Friday, 11 April 2025

Time: 09:30 AM (Indonesia/Thailand) / 10:30 AM (Malaysia/Philippines/Singapore)

Speaker Details

Dr. Dona Laily Wahyuning is a prominent scholar in agribusiness management, specializing in agricultural competitiveness, trade dynamics, and rural socioeconomics. As Head of the Agribusiness Management Laboratory at Universitas Pembangunan Nasional Veteran Jawa Timur, her research offers valuable insights into Indonesia’s agricultural landscape and its regional implications.

Among her notable works is the analysis of rice farming competitiveness in Bojonegoro Regency, which explores strategies to enhance productivity and resilience in one of Indonesia’s key rice-producing areas. She has also examined factors influencing rice imports in Indonesia, shedding light on trade policies and food security challenges. Additionally, her study on the competitiveness of Indonesian cloves compared to Tanzania and Madagascar provides critical perspectives on global spice markets and Indonesia’s position within them.

Dr. Dona’s research reflects a deep commitment to strengthening agricultural resilience and market performance, making her a valuable voice in advancing sustainable agricultural development across ASEAN.

Introduction

The strategic visit of South Korean President Yoon Suk-Yeol to Singapore marked a significant moment in the evolving relationship between the two nations, particularly in their collaborative efforts to strengthen supply chain resilience.

The partnership promises to enhance both countries’ economic standing in an increasingly interconnected global economy.

South Korea’s industrial expertise, particularly in semiconductors, complements Singapore’s status as a global logistics hub.

Yet, despite these clear advantages, the collaboration faces challenges stemming from geopolitical tensions and supply chain vulnerabilities. Addressing these issues requires concerted efforts in diversification, policy alignment and digital innovation.

In this essay, we will examine the opportunities presented by the partnership, the obstacles it faces and solutions that both nations can adopt to ensure a resilient and mutually beneficial supply chain.

The Strategic Importance

The relationship between Singapore and South Korea has steadily grown over the years, marked by increasing trade, investment and diplomatic engagements. The two countries – both economically advanced and highly dependent on external trade – share an interest in ensuring the stability of their supply chains. Indeed, the Singapore-South Korea partnership offers numerous advantages for both countries.

Singapore’s importance as a gateway to Southeast Asia provides South Korea with access to the broader ASEAN market. Singapore’s position as a regional hub offers South Korean companies a reliable base from which to expand their operations throughout the region.

The logistical advantages of Singapore’s world-class port, airport and infrastructure offer South Korea an efficient supply chain network that can support the transportation of goods across Southeast Asia.

ASEAN, with its burgeoning middle class and increasing demand for high-tech products, represents a key market for South Korean exports.

Meanwhile, South Korea’s technological prowess offers Singapore a crucial partner in industries such as electronics, semiconductors and automotive production. The semiconductor industry, in particular, stands out as a key area of cooperation.

With global shortages of semiconductors disrupting industries worldwide, Singapore can benefit from South Korea’s expertise in this critical sector, helping the city-state secure a more resilient supply chain for its industries.

Innovation is another key area. Singapore’s focus on becoming a “Smart Nation” aligns with South Korea’s leadership in sectors such as AI, 5G technology and biotechnology.

Collaborative efforts in these areas can lead to advancements that benefit both countries, particularly as they seek to integrate cutting-edge technologies into their supply chains.

Furthermore, enhanced connectivity with South Korea allows Singapore to further solidify its role as a critical node in the global supply chain, making it an attractive destination for international investments. At the same time, increased South Korean trade and investments provide Singapore with a more diversified economic portfolio, reducing its dependence on traditional trading partners such as the United States and China.

President Yoon’s visit to Singapore signified an intention to deepen these economic ties, particularly in sectors where both nations have strategic interests.

Discussions during the visit emphasized the importance of building a resilient supply chain that could withstand external shocks, such as those caused by geopolitical tensions or global crises like the Covid-19 pandemic.

This focus reflects a broader trend where nations seek to diversify their supply chains to minimize risks associated with over-reliance on any one market or region.

Challenges and Potential Problems

Despite the clear advantages, several challenges could undermine the partnership’s potential.

The most significant is the ongoing geopolitical tension between major global powers, particularly the United States and China. Both Singapore and South Korea have strong economic ties with these two giants, and the increasing rivalry between Washington and Beijing poses risks to their supply chains.

For example, South Korea’s semiconductor industry is deeply integrated with both the US and Chinese markets, making it vulnerable to any trade restrictions or sanctions imposed by either side.

Similarly, Singapore’s position as a neutral trading hub could be threatened if tensions escalate and force the city-state to choose sides.

Another challenge is the vulnerability of global supply chains to external shocks. The Covid-19 pandemic exposed the fragility of just-in-time manufacturing systems and subsequent disruptions in logistics have highlighted the need for greater supply chain resilience.

Both South Korea and Singapore are heavily dependent on external trade, and any disruption in global supply lines can have a significant impact on their economies.

In particular, over-reliance on specific industries such as semiconductors leaves both countries exposed to sector-specific shocks.

Finally, regulatory and policy differences between Singapore and South Korea present hurdles that could slow down the partnership’s progress.

While both countries are known for their business-friendly environments, differences in regulatory standards, particularly in emerging industries like AI and biotechnology, could create friction in cross-border collaborations.

Harmonizing these regulations will be essential for ensuring smooth trade and investment flows between the two countries.

Solutions and Strategies for Success

To address these challenges, both Singapore and South Korea must adopt strategies that enhance the resilience and sustainability of their supply chains.

One key solution is the diversification of supply chains. By investing in alternative sources for critical materials and technologies, both countries can reduce their dependency on any one market or region.

For example, South Korea could explore sourcing semiconductor components from suppliers outside of China, while Singapore could look to diversify its energy sources to ensure a stable supply for its industries.

Digital connectivity also plays a crucial role in enhancing supply chain resilience. Both countries are already leaders in digital innovation, and expanding joint ventures in digital infrastructure – such as blockchain-enabled supply chain management systems – could help streamline trade processes and improve transparency across borders.

Collaboration in fintech and digital payment systems can further enhance the efficiency of cross-border trade, making it easier for businesses in both countries to engage in seamless transactions.

Moreover, establishing new bilateral agreements aimed at addressing regulatory barriers is crucial. By harmonizing regulations in key industries like technology and logistics, Singapore and South Korea can facilitate smoother trade and investment flows.

These agreements could also include provisions for joint research and development (R&D), encouraging public-private partnerships that drive innovation in areas such as AI, biotechnology and clean energy.

Conclusion and Recommendations

In conclusion, the Singapore-South Korea supply chain partnership holds great promise for both countries, offering mutual benefits in terms of economic growth, technological advancement and supply chain resilience.

However, to fully realize these benefits, both nations must address the challenges posed by geopolitical tensions, supply chain vulnerabilities and regulatory differences.

By diversifying their supply chains, enhancing digital connectivity and aligning policies through bilateral agreements, Singapore and South Korea can create a more robust and future-proof partnership. Continuous dialogue, innovation and adaptability will be key to ensuring the success of this collaboration in the face of an ever-changing global landscape.

Socio-political developments in the Nusantara region have again accentuated issues surrounding race and/or religion in their respective societies. Recent and forthcoming events in Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore highlight tensions between different segments of society, which may have newer implications on social cohesion.

stratsea.com, in partnership with PAKAR and SeRVE Indonesia, will host a webinar to discuss the contemporary concerns of Malay/Muslim communities today – taking into account latest developments centering around Malaysia’s 15^th General Election (GE15) and Indonesia’s General Election 2024 (Pemilihan Umum – Pemilu 2024), as well as the repeal of Section 377A in Singapore. It will discuss the perspectives of Malay/Muslim communities, political and religious authorities, and civil society in these events. It will also explore ways the Malay/Muslim communities can contribute to wider social cohesion in their respective multicultural contexts into the future.

Webinar Details:

Date: Tuesday, 31 January 2023

Time: 1400 hrs – 1530 hrs (Indonesia) or 1500 hrs – 1630 hrs (Malaysia and Singapore)

Speakers:  Prof. Dr. Hamdi Muluk (UI), Dr. Hew Wai Weng (UKM), Dr. Walid Jumblatt Abdullah (NTU)

Moderator: Ms. Nur Diyanah Anwar (NIE/CENS, RSIS)

Zoom: https://us06web.zoom.us/j/82766039946?pwd=ME5oQ083RTF0MzVscFB0NkxDRmJvZz09

Meeting ID: 827 6603 9946

Passcode: PSS2023

Introduction

In January this year, Indonesia’s President Joko “Jokowi” Widodo and Singapore’s Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong met to formalize three agreements at once. These are the Extradition Treaty (ET), the Flight Information Region (FIR) and the Defense Cooperation Agreement (DCA).

In each of these agreements, only one country would be favored (i.e., one country would get the shorter end of the stick). Notably, though signed individually, the three agreements should not be deemed as separate issues. The DCA and the FIR are seen to be beneficial to Singapore while Indonesia should find the ET a valuable gain. In light of this lopsidedness, a closer look at these agreements reveals how they would prove costly to Indonesia’s strategic interests and sovereignty.

Ironically, similar reasons were cited in 2007 for the failure of the Indonesian government and Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat (House of Representatives – DPR) to ratify the DCA agreement. This led to the agreement to be put on hold (or cancelled). However, on 28 November 2022, the same DCA agreement was once again tabled for scrutiny by the Ministry of Defense, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Law and DPR. This time, it looks like both the government and DPR would ink the agreement as the majority parliamentary seats are dominated by the governing regime. This article examines why Indonesia will be the losing party once these agreements are ratified.

Why the ET is Valuable to Indonesia

Indonesia needs an ET with Singapore since many heavyweight criminals have escaped to Singapore to evade court proceedings. Fugitives such as Harun Masiku, Djoko Tjandra, Nazaruddin, Nunun Nurbaeti, Gayus Tambunan, Eddy Sindoro and Paulus Tannos are among those who have sought sanctuary in Singapore as they wait for an opportunity to return unpunished.

Aside from corruption cases, the treaty also covers numerous kinds of crime including money laundering, bribery, banking, narcotics, terrorism, and terrorism financing. The retroactive feature of the agreement enables law enforcement in both countries to apprehend perpetrators who committed the crime as far back as 18 years ago. The reality is that there have been more Indonesian criminals who fled to Singapore than vice versa. Additionally, it is important for Indonesia to bring these criminals responsible for causing a loss of billions if not trillions of Rupiah to the country. Through the ET, it is hoped that Indonesia can retrieve these stolen funds back into its national treasury. Collectively, the ratification of the ET would be more advantageous to Indonesia than Singapore.

Questions Surrounding the FIR

The FIR represents Indonesia’s desire to take over aviation control over its airspace from Singapore. It is known that Indonesia’s airspace above the Riau Islands and parts of Sumatra is controlled by Singapore. Such foreign control is common practice internationally after assessments by the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO). 

The FIR agreement signed by Indonesia and Singapore will partially turn over the control of Singapore’s FIR to Jakarta’s, specifically the space over 37,000 feet. In other words, the space between 0 – 36,999 feet is still under Singapore’s FIR control. The service cost of flights flying within Singapore’s aviation control will be paid to Indonesia too as compensation for flying over Indonesia’s territory. This payment mechanism, which replaces the previous one signed in 1995, will benefit Indonesia according to the Indonesian government.

However, those advantages seem to diminish if the agreement is examined closely. Currently, most civil flights from which service costs can be generated usually operate between 35,000 – 36,000 feet. In other words, there is not much point in having control of the sky over 37,000 feet because planes have to maintain fuel efficiency as well as avoid traffic, hazard, bad weather and turbulence which can only be achieved at the aforementioned altitude range. Additionally, the fee Singapore pays to Indonesia for operating at this altitude will be lower compared to the fee the latter would be entitled to if the airspace is under the direct control of Indonesia.

Additionally, the agreement also demands Indonesian airplanes on disaster relief operation to report to the Civil Aviation Authority of Singapore if they fly within Singapore’s FIR. Worse still, the FIR agreement will remain in place for 25 years and contains no clause for termination.

According to the chief of Badan Keamanan Laut Republik Indonesia (Coast Guard – Bakamla), the FIR agreement will impede maritime security operations as Bakamla’s fleets usually patrol with the assistance of air support, including drones. As operations in the airspace must be reported, Singapore will be in the know of all kinds of activity in the airspace by Indonesian units. A similar situation is highly likely for Indonesian military forces.

Despite these disadvantages, the Indonesian government has accepted these conditions. This is because the FIR agreement is considered a successful implementation of the 2009 Aviation Act. The Act instructs the government to take over control of its aviation service within 15 years after it is passed (i.e. latest by 2024). Before the term expires, the government has the right to delegate control to other countries based on any previous agreements. This has been presented to the domestic audience as a success story of Jokowi’s administration to regulate air transportation, especially with the end of his term looming on the horizon. The government’s portrayal of the FIR as a success can be argued to be irrelevant as Singapore will continue to exert influence and control over Indonesia’s airspace, for both civil and military aviation. Several have expressed that the FIR is more than aviation safety since the sovereignty aspect of the agreement is also quite palpable. Notably, unlike the other two agreements, the FIR agreement will not need parliamentary ratification. This is because the Indonesian government considers it merely as an aviation safety agreement that is sufficiently regulated by Peraturan President (Presidential Regulation, Perpres).

Problematic Package

In 2007, the Singaporean government questioned the Indonesian government’s determination to ratify the ET and the DCA (plus Implementing Arrangements [IA] of military training area) following a deadlock between the Indonesian government and DPR. Several DPR members wanted to ratify the ET but not the DCA as the latter was considered an infringement on Indonesia’s sovereignty.

Subsequently, Indonesia requested Singapore “to make substantive changes to the IAs after the main agreements had been signed.” Such request was considered a lack of commitment from Indonesia as Singapore subsequently regarded that “future negotiations with Indonesia, or with any other country for that matter, difficult if not impossible because there would be no finality even after an agreement had been reached.”

The coupling of the ET and DCA agreements has also proved problematic for Indonesia. Singapore had occasionally assisted Indonesia with extraditions such as the cases of La Nyalla Mattalitti (former Indonesia’s football association chairman) and Hartawan Aluwi (businessman convicted of white-collar crimes) in 2017. Their cases highlighted extradition was possible without the ET agreement being ratified by DPR albeit out of goodwill.

However, an extradition request by Indonesia in 2017 was rejected despite appeals. The Singaporean authority rejected the notion on the basis that the ET was still pending as DPR had not ratified it whereas “Singapore is ready to proceed with both agreements (the ET and the DCA) once Indonesia is ready to do so.”

In international law, it is unheard of to treat treaty documents between two countries as inseparable. But it would be in the political interests of both Indonesia and Singapore to consider these agreements as a package. Such packaging, however, could create complications in downstream ratification. Having to ratify one good deal and two bad deals, for example, would be difficult for parliament of each country to pass through.

Nevertheless, the decision to package the agreements together was made by both countries. Both countries deem the outcome of such packaging as appropriately servicing their respective national interests. The ET is clearly counted a gain for Indonesia while the FIR can be framed by the Indonesian government as beneficial despite questions surrounding its value. It is possible for Indonesia to gain the most advantage were it not for the DCA, which constitutes the third aspect of the package. As the next section explores, the loophole in the DCA seems to be neglected by the Indonesian government.

The DCA – A Loss to Indonesia?

The Indonesian Air Force claimed that Singapore is the second top violator of the Indonesian airspace after Australia. This is understandable as Singapore only has limited aerial area in which its air force can operate. The downside of this is that the Indonesian authority cannot do anything about inevitable offenses by Singaporean air force.

In general, DCA usually regulates the general cooperation points between two parties. In this Indonesia-Singapore DCA, both countries have agreed to conduct several joint exercises, intelligence information sharing, regular bilateral strategic dialogues and other personnel development activities. The activities would enable the Singaporean military to utilize its counterpart’s vast operational areas.

From Singapore’s perspective, this DCA could legalize what it has been doing and expand what it can do to neighboring aerial areas. Conversely, Indonesia views this DCA as an opportunity to regulate and pressure Singapore to respect Indonesia’s airspace. Nevertheless, it is worth the wait to see whether Singapore would really respect the agreement. The area of military practice that Singapore demands is as follows:

Referring to the map, Alpha-1, Alpha-2 and Bravo are busy areas where civilian ships sail through the Malacca Strait and where local fishermen operate. These areas are also where the underwater wires are installed and offshore platforms are located, not to mention their proximity to the natural conservation regions such as Marine Geopark Natuna dan Anambas Conservation Area (areas designated as Alpha-1, Alpha-2 and Bravo in the map above).

As these important activities surround the areas that Singapore wishes to control, it may be a disservice for Indonesia to give up such vulnerable locations for military training that uses live ammunitions. It would be worse if the use of guided missiles by Singapore’s military is allowed with Indonesia authority’s consent or otherwise.

Both countries may also be giving up valuable information to each other albeit potentially one-sided. Such information includes the underwater contours in these areas which could be mapped for submarine routes. Notably, the DCA explicitly prohibits the divulging of such sensitive information to others.

From the author’s knowledge, negative sentiments on the DCA arose as there remains the perception among Indonesian military that the Singaporean military continues to claim the Indonesian territory for their operation areas even though the 1996-2001 agreement between the two had expired. During this period, even Indonesia’s fighter jets inside Indonesian airspace were pushed away by Singapore with the latter insisting that its measures were regulated legally under the bilateral agreement.

All that Indonesia could do to minimize its loss is to create a tight IA on which the whole technical operation will be based. As explained by the Indonesian government during the ratification process, Indonesia and Singapore military will set the IA to ensure details of the agreement are regulated. Experts argued that the IA should at least include: 1) the scope of the cooperation; 2) the limit of the authority given up to Singapore; 3) the specific geographical areas used for Singapore’s military exercises; 4) the protection of confidential information from this agreement; 5) budgeting of activities conducted by both parties; 6) dispute settlement if problems arise in the future and; 7) host’s consent if the user invites other external parties.  

These points are meant to prevent potential negative implications of the agreement, such as preventing environmental damages, affecting fishermen’s activities, the use of dangerous weapons and the entry of unwanted parties. Unfortunately, the IA will only be negotiated closed door. There are no formal regulations in Indonesia forcing the Ministry of Defense and Indonesian Military to discuss its terms with DPR. Hence, any weak negotiation points will not be revealed publicly until the factual destructions and damages take place in the future.

Moreover, the DCA between Indonesia and Singapore might ring a bell for Beijing as this agreement could be perceived as the West’s attempt to balance China’s rise through Singapore. If the Singaporean military invites other countries to conduct joint exercises in the designated area of Indonesia’s territory, those external parties could tread across and around the nine-dash-line. Such military activities might be considered a direct threat by Beijing to its territorial claim. The geopolitical implications of the DCA have to be anticipated by Indonesia too as the country has positioned itself not to pick any side in the Indo-Pacific power competition.  

Even though Singapore and China initiated a closer defense agreement in 2019, recent Singapore’s condemnation to Russia’s invasion to Ukraine might reveal Singapore’s geopolitical leaning. However, more studies should be conducted to assess the wider strategic implication that Singapore will have with Indonesia in the context of Indo-Pacific political contestation through the DCA.

The DCA was ratified in DPR on 6 December 2022 and it revealed the weakness of the Indonesian government. Minister of Defence Prabowo Subianto, who is popular for his strong nationalism and die-hard stance to protect national sovereignty, seems resigned to accept the DCA. In the end, the DCA is packaged simply as an opportunity for Indonesia to develop good relations with Singapore. However, the issue around the DCA is also considered a stage for Prabowo to exercise his strong “presidential” capacity before an international audience. It is true that the DCA explicitly states that both countries could have military activities around their area equitably, but having considered the tiny aerial territory that Singapore has compared to extensive Indonesia’s air, Indonesia obviously has more to give than Singapore does.

Conclusion

Indonesia will suffer a great loss if this package of agreements comes into force, though it is only a matter of time before this happens. While the DCA has been approved officially by the DPR, the ET will follow as it has been scheduled in mid-December this year.

Using football terms, in hindsight, if the package of agreements was concluded in 2007, the final result of the diplomatic negotiation match between Indonesia and Singapore would be 1-1. Indonesia could get one point out of the ET and Singapore could gain one from the DCA. However, the 2022 agreements would only deliver a defeat to Indonesia as the country would only get a single point from the ET while its counterpart scores points from the DCA and the FIR.

In the final session of our 3-part webinar series on Tuesday, four expert panelists will share their insights on the propagation of violent extremist propaganda and fund raising tactics in Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, and Singapore. Do join us on 18 April 2022. 1400hrs – 1600hrs (Indonesia) 1500hrs – 1700hrs (Malaysia, Singapore, Philippines)

Join us for Session 2 of our 3-part webinar series on Tuesday, 12 April 2022. 1400hrs – 1600hrs (Indonesia) 1500hrs – 1700hrs (Malaysia, Singapore, Philippines)

Sponsored Article in Commemoration of Earth Day 2021

Introduction

The COVID-19 pandemic has not only disrupted businesses globally but also numerous sustainability projects and climate change mitigation goals. Notably, action against climate change is one of UN’s 17 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). This is rather concerning as to avoid the worst impacts of climate change and for global temperature to stay within 2 degrees Celsius by 2100, global emissions must be reduced to zero by 2030.

For land-scarce Singapore, climate change is an existential threat, given its small size and geographical location near the equator, a hotbed region for tropical storms.  Almost a decade ago, Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong expressed his desire for citizens to take up ownership of the environment and approach climate change by adapting the ‘Total Defence’ strategy at the launch of the Clean and Green Singapore 2011 campaign. Eight years later, Prime Minister Lee reiterated in his 2019 National Day Rally that “Both the SAF (Singapore Armed Forces) and climate change defences are existential for us. These are life and death matters.”   Clearly, local policymakers are not sitting on their hands when it comes to climate change.

Yet current policy measures have not translated into sustainable results. Singapore may have contributed to 0.11% of global emissions in 2018 compared to China’s 30%, but emissions per capita is at 8.56 tons per capita, making Singapore 27^th out of 142 countries based on IEA data from 2018, worse than China’s 7.95 tons per capita and 39^th spot in the same report. The annual transboundary haze affecting Singapore, Malaysia and Indonesia continues unabated without a definite solution, a sign that the region as a whole is not meeting its target for climate change mitigation. Noteworthily, COVID-19 has made food security a higher priority concern for Singapore, especially when 90% of its food is imported and subjected to the volatilities of the global food market, including climate change and the pandemic.

Here, Biochar is proposed as a potential solution applicable to Singapore and Southeast Asia to climate change, food security and energy needs.

Biochar: A Carbon-sequestering, Nutrient-rich Resource

Biochar is a fine-grained, highly porous charcoal that helps soils retain nutrients and water. It is produced using pyrolysis by subjecting organic wastes to high temperature in an oxygen-deprived environment, while generating useful by-products to be reused for energy or component refining for industrial chemicals. The end-product has carbon as the main constituent, with other plant nutrient chemicals in variable composition. Application of biochar to soil is a carbon negative process, since carbon in biochar is more recalcitrant than the natural environment and will remain in the ground longer, without adding to the atmospheric carbon dioxide.

Biochar is particularly beneficial in agriculture. Farmers have a vested interest in increasing and maintaining the soil carbon in their fields as studies have shown a correlation between soil carbon levels and crop yield. Organic soil carbon plays an important role in the chemical composition and biological productivity in soil, which includes fertility and nutrient holding capacity. Biochar have been shown to improve crop production in maize, wheat, rice, oil palm, soybean, all of which are major crops and oilseeds used globally. Additionally, biochar can reduce surface runoff, and therefore nutrient leaching ,and promote more stable soil structure.

From research, Biochar has other interesting uses such as the removal of Volatile Organic Compounds (VOCs), chemicals harmful to human health, from buildings, a potential building material that can strengthen concrete, and  a novel method to sequester carbon in concrete. Notably, biochar is significant in the recovery of washed-off fertilizer chemicals.  Water hyacinths used in the clean-up of fertilizer chemical contaminants in freshwater bodies are ideal materials for biochar production. Therefore, a future circular economy is envisioned, with environment sustainability at its core: remediation service, fertilizer chemical recovery and reuse, biochar production, and climate change mitigation through carbon sequestration.

A Potential Solution to Three Existential Threats

1) Climate Change Mitigation

With is carbon sequestering properties, Biochar can potentially remove up to 1.1 billion ton of CO2 per annum globally. Currently, Singapore has implemented a carbon tax of SGD$5 (~USD$3.80) per ton of Green House Gases (GHG) released for the period of 2019 to 2023, with plans to review the tax thereafter, and an end-goal of between SGD$10 to SGD$15 by 2030. By investing carbon taxes into carbon sequestration projects such as biochar production and selling it as carbon credits to other nations or corporations creates a win-win situation for everyone including the environment. One such project would be a biochar commercial plant in Johor, initiated by JTS Optimax Pte. Ltd., a Singapore-based start-up with the goal of converting oil palm waste in Malaysia to biochar and electricity.

Singapore can benefit economically from funding such projects  while exporting biochar-based technologies to neighbouring countries. One significant contribution could be the mitigation of the  transboundary haze crisis  by converting the large volume of agricultural waste material in the region into biochar instead of resorting to slash-and-burn. Not only will it entail a low-cost production of biochar, but also the production of electricity that could be supplied to rural areas. Additionally, biochar can generate a calculated agriculture value of between USD2.30 and 3.30 per hectare  while reducing fertilizer transportation and spreading costs. Amongst Southeast Asian nations, Philippines has been actively using biochar to remediate mining grounds and prepare rehabilitated grounds for replanting. Malaysia, Vietnam and Indonesia are each making inroads into biochar usage and production as well.

2) Food security

Singapore has signed an Agreement on the ASEAN Food Security Reserve which included the ASEAN Emergency Rice Reserve in October 1979. Despite the pact, agriculture activities in Singapore declined from the 1980s as food import became the cheaper and pragmatic option. In 2019, Singapore Food Agency has set a target of achieving 30% of the country’s nutritional needs through local means by 2030. However, this goal is not enough to ensure food security.

Biochar can provide a win-win strategy for food security. Being alkaline in nature, biochar can deacidify soil, thereby maintaining and saving scarce local arable land from fertilizer overuse through the direct application of Nitrogen-Phosphorous-Potassium (NPK) nutrients. Additionally, direct uptake of biochar carbon by fungi crops and the use of biochar as scaffold for beneficial micro-organisms promote crop growth. More importantly, biochar indirectly improves crop production by reducing soil-borne plant diseases and promoting beneficial soil bacteria growth, thereby boosting soil health.

Biochar research in hydroponics has also shown that not only half of the growth substrate can be replaced with biochar and crop growth can be enhanced, but harmful algal growth can be reduced with its application. By replacing half of the Perlite or woodchip growth substrate with biochar will lead to significant production cost reductions for hydroponics farms which can promote price competitiveness with conventional soil-grown crops. However, proper application must be done to ensure the crops receive all the nutrients as biochar can act as a sponge for absorption of water and chemicals. Collectively, this means that with care, biochar can also be used in conjunction with Singapore’s current food security strategy of local vertical and indoor farming.

3) Sustainable Energy Needs

In fulfilment of the UN Sustainable Development Goals, Singapore has explored ways to source for more sustainable energy to satisfy the needs of the populace, including importing energy from Malaysia in a trial run. This is on top of increasing solar panel usage locally on HDB rooftops. Given the production of biochar yields sustainable energy production, this is one potential alternative source in which Singapore can import from Malaysia as well.

Therefore, biochar can directly and indirectly address existential threats to Southeast Asia namely, climate change, food security and sustainable energy needs. It is, thus, timely to incorporate biochar into national strategies to ensure a sustainable future.

A Four-Part Series on Water (Part 4: Cleaned Water in Singapore)

Introduction: Harnessing Cleaned Urban Waters

Singapore’s “City in a Garden” vision was met with anticipation and great expectation by the international community. This new vision marks a stepping up of its environmental sector from simply being a “Clean and Green City.” This vision also served to integrate water into Singapore’s green matrix, signifying the interconnectedness of nature. As the population grows in this land-scarce city, so does the need for both its greenery and water to be well integrated to ensure their sustainability.

Currently, Singapore continues to face challenges to its water supply due to its scarce land availability for water storage and the pressure to meet the huge domestic household (45% of Singapore’s water demand) and industrial demand of 430 million gallons of clean fresh water per day. Singapore has built a diversified water supply from four water sources known as the Four National Taps – 1) local catchments, 2) imported water, 3) NEWater and 4) desalinated water. However, to be more self-reliant, Singapore has to be less dependent on imported water.

Receiving a mean rainfall of 2,165.9mm per year, Singapore uses two-thirds of its land to collect urban stormwater, channelling it into the 17 reservoirs the city has today (with the aim of expanding its urban catchment to 90% of the island in the near future). Through its 8,000km interconnected waterway network, water channelled into reservoirs is subsequently treated and distributed to households. This makes Singapore one of the few countries in the world to harvest urban stormwater on a large scale for potable consumption.

Singapore: “Cleaned” rather than “Clean”

Notably, this urban waterway network passes through the island’s heartland as drains, canals and rivers. Exposed to the environment, these water channels are prone to litter, eventually polluting the reservoirs. Additionally, litter can create further issues when it clogs drains and canals. In 2018 alone, NEA issued around 39,000 fines for littering offenses (21.9% increase from 2017), and 2,600 Corrective Work Orders (CWOs) for repeated offenders (30% increase from 2017). In 2019 and 2020, Waterways Watch Society (WWS) collected 12,141 kg of trash from Marina Reservoir (one of the 17 reservoirs) during their clean-up programmes and patrols. Since the outbreak of COVID-19, besides traditional litter such as tin cans, plastic bottles and bags, disposable masks are now one of the most commonly collected. In the past three months alone (December 2020 to February 2021), WWS volunteers conducted 25 rounds of patrol, collecting more than 700kg of litter including more than 500 masks. Unfortunately, these figures do not include litter collected during our Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) and Values-In-Action (VIA) programmes with schools and corporates which would reflect a more dire situation.

This certainly unveils the hidden fact: Singapore is a “cleaned city” rather than a “clean city.” En route to being a “cleaned city”, Singapore strictly enforced numerous laws and policies to regulate, govern and more importantly protect the environment. These include the Water Pollution Control and Drainage Act introduced in 1975, the Environmental Protection and Management Act 2008, the Environmental Public Health Act. Additionally, essential waste infrastructure such as traps and gratings were installed at drains, canals, and rivers. Regular dredging and drain maintenance were also conducted to prevent litter from blocking the waterways. Cleaners were also employed to clean the rivers and reservoirs daily. Disappointingly, even with the current efforts of manpower deployment (close to 70,000 cleaners) and a well-structured infrastructure, WWS volunteers still observe a lot of litter during their normal patrol rounds, especially in litter hotspots frequented by the general public. Eerily predicting such circumstances, the late Mr Lee Kwan Yew once said “The difficult part was getting the people to change their habits so that they behaved more like first world citizens.”

Lapse in Understanding among an Urban Population

Laws and regulations are ultimately meant to serve as deterrents for potential offenders. However, it is not enough to simply rely on laws and regulations nor is expanding more resources to clean Singapore’s waterways the way forward. The lack of awareness and concern towards protecting this vital source tap remains the crux of the matter; a vital issue the nation has to tackle. Therefore, a long-term, sustainable solution is to cultivate responsible civic behaviour without the need to rely heavily on enforcement.

Currently, there seems to be a significant lapse in understanding the various impacts of littering, more importantly, how it eventually affects the quality and sustainability of clean water. This lapse could be attributed to the urban population who have settled comfortably without the need to fret about water scarcity and sanitation problems. Therefore, the inconspicuous truth of Singapore being a “cleaned” city and not a “clean” city needs to be iterated regularly to its citizens.

“Zero-waste Nation” still a Distant Goal

Despite its inception in 2014, becoming a zero-waste nation is still a distant goal for Singapore to achieve. Singapore’s only landfill, the purpose-built trash island of Semakau is projected to be completely full by 2035 at the rapid rate it is filling up. In addition to the population’s high waste generation (even though there seems to be a declining trend), Singapore also faces a declining recycling rate even when the nation’s recycling initiatives have seemingly increased over the last two decades. In 2019, about 59% of the nation’s total waste was recycled, a 2% decline from 2018. In particular, the recycling rate from households further declined by 17% in 2019, reflecting a general passiveness from the public.

For Singapore to advance its recycling agenda, especially in residential households, it is imperative to increase public awareness and understanding of “Recycling Right”, the official slogan championing good recycling practices unveiled in 2019. As a start, it is crucial to guide Singaporeans on what can or cannot be recycled.

Hoping to benefit from a water-energy-waste nexus, Singapore’s National Environment Agency (NEA) is considering the development of an Integrated Waste Management Facility (IWMF) to help Singapore meet its future waste management needs and achieve long term environmental sustainability. One worrying consideration is that the establishment of an IWMF could drive an intrinsic demand for waste. If so, would this not be at odds with Singapore’s objective of active recycling? Will becoming a zero-waste city impact energy production by the IWMF? The articulation of how the development of the IWMF is aligned with recycling efforts is thus crucial, and something every citizen should be mindful of.

Conclusion

Environmental education is a long-term investment; one which may be difficult to yield concrete results within a short period of time. Despite this, the difficulty in quantifying results and level of impact should not be taken as a legitimate reason or warrant for us to be less conscious about this prevailing issue. It is now timely to come together to move away from simply being “cleaned” to a truly clean nation. To achieve the vision of becoming a “City in a Garden” requires the cooperation and responsibility of every individual, to adopt strong civic-mindedness, rather than its reliance on the government and current regulations.

It is always easy to play the blame game when it boils down to the issue of undertaking responsibility, but what is more important, is always about being honest and frank about where we are, what needs to be done, and what we are doing now, as an individual, an organisation, a corporate, an industry, and a nation.

Part 1: Tackling Riverine Litter in Indonesia: All Contributions Matter

Part 2: Sustainable Water: Lessons from an Indonesian Community Forest in a “Barren Village”

Part 3: Valuing Water through Community Empowerment in Malaysia