Introduction

The Russian invasion of Ukraine has entered its third year with no end in sight. As hope for a just and swift resolution to the conflict slowly fades, Russia instead intensifies its disinformation efforts to garner sympathy from both domestic and international audiences.

One of the most disturbing elements of the Kremlin’s propaganda is deeply intertwined with anti-Semitism, that is, the justification of the military attack as the “denazification” of Ukraine. This narrative stems from Russia’s efforts to falsely align the invasion with Soviet Union’s past war against Germany, a powerful memory that President Vladimir Putin has manipulated to create domestic pro-war sentiment and popular legitimacy.

To amplify these narratives, Russian officials, including Putin himself, have made several notoriously anti-Semitic remarks, such as denigrating Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy’s Jewish background and labelling his government as neo-Nazis. In doing so, the Russian government is attempting to undermine the reputation of the Ukrainian government and leaders in the eyes of the people in Russia and abroad.

Yet, interestingly, such anti-Semitic elements of pro-Russian narratives are packaged quite differently in other parts of the world. Indonesia, where anti-Semitic sentiment is rampant despite the lack of local Jewish communities, serves as an example to highlight the role of anti-Semitism in reinforcing the reach of pro-Russian propaganda.

Weaponizing Anti-Semitism

While Russia’s image in Indonesia was extremely negative during the early days of its military involvement in Syria, this time it appears to be entirely different. Public perception of Russia over its invasion of Ukraine has been strangely positive in Indonesia.

Russia’s public diplomacy effort to rehabilitate its image post-Syrian war might partly explain this shift. Indeed, evidence points to the fact that this positive sentiment emerges due to the attempts to mislead the Indonesian public. A major theme of pro-Russian narratives is religion-related disinformation, such as deceptively presenting Russia’s public image as a defender of Islamic values, while undermining Ukraine and the “West” as the enemy of Muslims.

Interestingly, some of these narratives are not coming directly from official channels representing Russian government, but organically from local news outlets (e.g., Tribun Timur) and content creators. However, a thorough open-source intelligence (OSINT) investigation reveals that the Russian Internet Research Agency (IRA), a company once operated by the Wagner group to perform influence operation, amplifies emotionally charged pro-Russian content to maximize reach and engagement. The investigation also found individuals recruiting Russian expats residing in Bali as “social media strategists”, which are likely tasked to amplify pro-Russian narratives.

Damaging Zelenskyy’s reputation has always been at the heart of Russia’s disinformation tactics. Pro-Russian actors highlight his Jewish background and past as a former entertainer to discredit his competence and character as a leader.

Some of these narratives are popular on TikTok (7.3 million views) and YouTube (>300,000 views), deliberately highlighting Zelenskyy’s Jewish heritage. Not surprisingly, the comment sections of these videos are flooded with anti-Semitic tropes. Additionally, some anti-Semitic comments appear to be driven by perceptions of Western countries’ alignment with Israel in the context of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

Because Russian propaganda is notorious for tailoring sensitive topics to vulnerable audiences, it is crucial to identify who the main audiences of these false narratives are.

To this end, I conducted two surveys (Survey 1: June 2022; Survey 2: March 2024) to take a closer look at those most likely to subscribe to pro-Russian narratives. My first survey invited 1,044 people to participate, while the second survey collected data from 373 participants.

Both surveys lead to similar conclusions: the propensity to believe anti-Semitic conspiracy theories is strongly associated with the endorsement of pro-Russian narratives, over and above participants’ personality and cognitive profiles.

While experts suggest that anti-Western attitudes and the desire for strong leadership may explain the popularity of pro-Russian narratives in Indonesia, my surveys show that both aspects contribute much less than anti-Semitic conspiracy beliefs. Since religion-related disinformation is popular, one might expect that Muslims with a stronger emphasis on Islamic values in their identity might be susceptible to these narratives, but the centrality of Islamic values to one’s identity does not seem to correlate with the propensity to support pro-Russian narratives.

This leads to the conclusion that there are no clear personality or cognitive features that characterize the main audiences, yet pro-Russian propaganda seems to resonate well with those who are predisposed to hold extreme, conspiratorial anti-Semitic attitudes.

In the absence of visible Jewish communities, how is it possible that some Indonesians harbor such derogatory, if not conspiratorial, anti-Semitic views? Besides, how does it play an important role in shaping Indonesians’ perceptions of global conflicts, such as the Ukraine invasion?

Some experts suggest that anti-Semitic conspiracy theories were first introduced in the 1950s by clerics who had received their religious training in the Middle East, where such beliefs are known to be politically potent, hence the popularity among the far-right Islamists.

In the 1980s and 2000s, several Islamic magazines (e.g., Hidayatullah, Media Dakwah and Sabili) gave mass appeal to these conspiracy theories. Much of the content of these conspiracy theories was shaped in the context of the war in Iraq and Afghanistan during the “War on Terror”, as well as the continuing Israeli-Palestinian conflict. These conspiracy theories are perhaps a readily accessible source of information for those who are predisposed to interpret major world events through the lens of religious ideology.

The content of conspiracy theories disseminated in such media is almost similar, with strong but unsubstantiated accusations that the Jews are the primary cause of all moral ills that threaten Islamic values, as well as the main actor orchestrating many important world events.  

The Protocols of the Elders of Zion, a forged document once disseminated by KGB agents in the Middle East as a part of their anti-West disinformation campaign during the Cold War era, is repeatedly cited as the primary source of these unsubstantiated beliefs. Interestingly, however, the anti-Semitic rhetoric may actually have been around for a while in Southeast Asia, with the oldest historical record dating back to a manuscript written in the 17^th century.

Two-Face Anti-Semitism in Pro-Russian Narratives

Russian actors are notorious for spreading conflicting messages to appeal to the sympathies of different audiences. Unsurprisingly, the anti-Semitic elements of pro-Russian narratives in Indonesia, with a predominantly Muslim audience, assume a largely distinct face from the use of anti-Semitic rhetoric to promote pro-Russian narratives targeting audiences in the West.

Putin has made conflicting statements about Zelensky’s background, depending on the situation and the audience he is trying to reach. In front of Western audiences, for example, Putin questions and undermines Zelenskyy’s Jewish identity.

By contrast, pro-Russian narratives formulated by pro-Russian outlets and content creators targeting Muslim communities are much simpler: the messages embrace and emphasize Zelenskyy’s Jewish identity and the Western world’s alignment with Israel.

While these two narratives may be contradictory, this disturbing strategy maximizes the weaponization of anti-Semitism to spread disinformation about the invasion of Ukraine to various audiences.

As tensions rise over the Israeli-Palestinian crisis, pro-Russian narratives are dangerously finding fertile ground. Drawing a parallel with another Muslim community in the North Caucasus, organic anti-Semitic sentiments stemming from the Israeli-Palestinian crisis provoked a riot in Makhachkala. The Russian government then deceptively blamed Ukraine for inciting the incident.

Historical examples such as Soeharto who allegedly blamed the global Jewish conspiracy for the crisis that ended his dictatorship, or George Soros, a Jewish businessman accused of orchestrating the Asian financial crisis of 1998-1999, demonstrate how anti-Semitic conspiracy beliefs can be repurposed as a tool of political manipulation.

In the digital era, these old conspiracies are finding new life, skewing public perceptions of distant conflicts, such as the Ukraine invasion. The collision of disinformation campaigns and anti-Semitic conspiracy theories in Muslim communities is, apparently, an old wine in a new bottle.

Reflecting on this issue, the task ahead is clear but challenging. Before the invasion, I doubt that many Indonesians knew or were aware of the existence of Ukraine. Therefore, more Indonesians need to be exposed to counternarratives that emphasize solidarity, shared values and identity that can help build trust and solidarity between the people of the two nations. The Ukrainian government has made tremendous diplomatic efforts to achieve this, but more work is needed.

Note: The author does not include the links to the TikTok and YouTube videos to avoid amplifying harmful content. Interested readers are welcome to contact the author for data sharing.

Introduction

On February 24, 2024, the world witnessed the second anniversary of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. The full-scale invasion has caused global geopolitical repercussions and deeply affected the grassroots at various corners of the world.  

In Indonesia, the full-scale invasion surprisingly caught a lot of traction in social media. Our previous research found that Indonesian netizens responded eagerly after the invasion, with prevailing narratives being predominantly pro-Russia. This highlights the positive attitude held by the Indonesian public towards Russia. Considering Indonesians are long believed to be an “inward-looking community,” this is an intriguing finding. For example, a previous poll discovered that 92% of respondents believed that the purpose of Indonesia’s foreign policy is to protect their jobs.

Amidst the myriad of responses we gathered, we discerned two narratives expressed by Indonesian netizens towards the invasion. The first praises Russian President Vladimir Putin’s perceived masculinity, while the second ridicules President Joko “Jokowi” Widodo’s administration.

The netizens praised Putin for his perceived masculinity for bravely waging war against Ukraine, a country they saw as a Western puppet. Interestingly, however, they also demonized the masculine quality exercised by the West, symbolized by its attempt to dominate other parts of the world.

In the second narrative, we noticed the attempt to “feminize” the Indonesian government as an attempt to mock Jokowi’s administration, comparing it side by side with Putin’s machismo. The rhetoric often portrays Putin as brilliant while poking fun at Jokowi’s influence in the international arena.

Our analysis using Twitter (now X) data at the beginning of the invasion indicates that both narratives stem from a patriarchal attitude deeply ingrained since colonial times, which has influenced Indonesia’s glorification of masculine dominance. The Dutch colonial government influenced gender roles by making the native chief wear traditional clothes while the Dutch officials dressed in European-style military uniforms. They spread pictures comparing the two, with messages degrading the native chief’s masculinity compared to the Dutch officer. This propaganda aimed to diminish the native leader and portray the Dutch officer as the ideal masculine figure.

This historical trajectory of hegemonic masculinity, established during colonial rule, has persisted in contemporary Indonesian society, shaping perceptions of gender relations. Hence, the first narrative reflects this entrenched patriarchal attitude. However, we posit that this discourse can catalyze a broader conversation on how gender perspectives inform international responses to foreign policies, particularly in how social media discourse mirrors societal attitudes toward specific global events.

Projection of Putin’s Masculinities

The societal focus on Putin’s masculinity did not emerge from a vacuum. After scrutinizing the Instagram posts of the Russian Embassy in Indonesia from October 2022 to June 2023 using a content analysis methodology, we concluded that the Embassy actively articulated Putin’s masculinity.

The identified patterns of Putin’s projection of masculinity revolve around two distinct concepts: national patriotism and militarized masculinity. In these posts, Western elites are portrayed as perpetrators of the crisis, the Ukrainian people as victims of the conflict, and Russia’s Muslim population as combatants in the Ukrainian conflict. The presumed focus of the Embassy’s posts is to stigmatize Western elites in a bad light, reinforcing the positive perception of Putin, especially as a robust and resolute leader.

The concept of national patriotism in this context underscores the involvement of Russian citizens in safeguarding national security and the engagement of the Russian Muslim community in the conflict. It highlights gratitude for Russian citizens safeguarding the constitutional system and recognizes the Muslim community’s role in promoting cooperation in trade and other areas.

Additionally, another post by the Embassy portrays Putin expressing concern over Russian citizens having to fight against their brethren in the context of domestic uprisings within militarized masculine narratives. It involves using military context, such as portraying Russian citizens involved in the war as brave soldiers to defend against perceived enemies. In addition to defending against enemies such as minority groups, the “Western elite” has become an overarching antagonist. This is exemplified by it becoming the primary focus of the Russian Embassy in Indonesia Instagram posts.

Data Interpretation

In the two years since the invasion, we have consistently observed traces of the above narratives in daily online activities of Indonesian Facebook accounts.

We collected Facebook data from February 28, 2022, to February 18, 2024, using relevant Russia invasion keywords focusing on Putin’s persona, such as “Putin Barat” and “Putin Islam”. We unveiled that content with the highest interactions in Indonesia tends to harbor anti-Western and pro-Islamic sentiments, which will be explained in detail below.

Facebook was selected since it boasts Indonesia’s most extensive user base, second only to Instagram. Moreover, as Facebook is part of Meta, collecting Facebook data holds the potential to yield more comprehensive insights, given Meta also owns Instagram and WhatsApp.

We gathered 8,797 Facebook posts containing anti-Western narratives with 2,302,293 total interactions from other users. In contrast, we only found 1,064 posts with pro-Islamic sentiment with 160,069 interactions. A holistic reading of the data suggests that the highest interactions occurred during the initial phases of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This dwindled towards the end of 2022 and continued to decline throughout 2023. However, despite this declining trend, two specific dates exhibited significant deviations.

On June 29, 2023, there was a rapid surge in interactions involving content depicting thousands of Russian citizens chanting Takbir to celebrate Eid al-Adha. At the same time, a post portraying Putin extending Eid al-Adha greetings to all Russian citizens and acknowledging the role of Russian Muslims also circulated widely.

Notably, this content amassed the highest number of interactions on Facebook, surpassing even content published at the onset of the first blown invasion. This pro-Putin sentiment is consistent with the nature of Indonesia’s large Muslim population, which favors Islamic-related content, often those with bombastic, alluring narratives supporting Islam.

Another noteworthy date is September 14, 2023, when another content saw a spike in interaction. The content features a video quoting news from Russia Today about a meeting between Putin and Kim Jong Un, whereby the North Korean leader conveyed his readiness to support Russia against the United States.

This content garnered 31,000 interactions, the highest since the invasion began. The dominant interactions perceived the duo as “ideal-male leaders” due to their courage to stand up to the West.

This finding demonstrates that the Indonesian netizens had continued to a gendered lens in approaching the invasion, which is Putin’s expression of his masculinity. To a certain extent, part of the narrative was reinforced by the Embassy’s posts, which often display Putin as a masculine alpha and an ideal leader.

Possible Explanations

Our analysis indicates that the consistent romanticization of Putin’s masculinity in Indonesia’s digital space derives from a patriarchal social structure deeply ingrained during the colonial era. It exemplifies how Indonesian netizens glorify the image of alpha male leaders by celebrating masculinity through an exercise of power and dominance.

Recently, Prabowo’s unofficial leading vote in the 2024 election might provide indicators of how Putin is perceived by the Indonesian community. In the 2014 and 2019 elections, Prabowo built a public persona exuding ultra-nationalist, strongly chauvinist, and Islamist populist characteristics. In 2024, his image shifted to a more reachable, caring, ex-military general by utilizing AI and other popular approaches. Therefore, the persona shift caters to the community’s expectation for a more assertive yet caring military figure as an ideal masculine leader in contemporary political events.  

Such adoration for masculinity can be traced back to the colonial era, which at the same time also relegated feminine actors or expressions to a subordinate position. During the colonial era, Indonesian society endured a three-century-long struggle against Dutch colonialism. Throughout this period, prominent figures consistently led the fight against the Dutch. This aligns with the collective Indonesian belief in the existence of a savior known as “Ratu Adil” or “Just Ruler” who would ultimately deliver Indonesia from colonial rule. Thus, Putin is seen as embodying masculine values that stand up and fight against a perceived colonial force, the West.

This narrative seamlessly aligns with Indonesians’ appetite for hegemonic masculinity, characterized by a superior uniformed chief, the alpha male archetype, and the ideology of bapakism, considered a trademark of Indonesia’s New Order era.

Consequently, we conclude that the positive discourse surrounding Putin’s invasion emanates from an ingrained gendered perspective. This has influenced Indonesian society to exalt masculinity and, in the end, shaped persistent pro-Russian narratives that have continued for two years since the beginning of the conflict, regardless of the massive destruction and pain it has caused.

Acknowledgment: The Facebook Data collection is supported by Monash University Indonesia Data & Democracy Research Hub