The Intersection between Terrorism and Politics

Terrorist narrative and propaganda, particularly that of jihadi groups, are not just tools for spreading ideology. They are sophisticated political disinformation machineries designed to distort reality, manipulate perceptions and incite violence.

These extremist messages have found fertile ground in Indonesia, where latest major events, such as the 2019 presidential elections and the Covid-19 pandemic, have facilitated the surge of fake news, national polarization and an increasing distrust in the government.

Generally, disinformation is understood as false information deliberately and often covertly spread (such as by planting rumors) to influence public opinion or obscure facts.  

However, Thomas Rid argued in his book Active Measures that disinformation is not necessarily all lies; it can be accurate information presented in a harmful way. Typically, it mixes about 80% of facts and 20% of falsehood to deceive the audience. Think about messages that aim to misrepresent the truth by planting hoaxes in them.

In the political context, examples include the false claim about the origins of AIDS, the Pizzagate conspiracy during the 2016 US election and the allegations of Jokowi’s Chinese heritage during Indonesia’s 2019 presidential election. All these cases share the trait of blending truth and lies.

Interestingly, these traits are also present in jihadi terrorist narratives. Per Rid’s definition, these narratives blend authentic references from the holy texts with twisted interpretations to support their agenda.

Findings from my personal conversations with reformed terrorists align with this. The extremists combine the holy scriptures and the perceived global oppression of Muslims to attract followers.

Terrorist groups like Daesh are masters of this art. They can quickly spread their disinformation globally using social media platforms’ wide reach and anonymity, which algorithms study user preferences and amplify these messages by providing similar content. This digital shift has increased the impact of their propaganda, making it harder to control.

For instance, it was found that YouTube’s algorithms do recommend extremist content to users who actively search for it. This is occurring on other video-sharing platforms as well, such as what happened to migrant worker Ika Puspitasari who was hooked on extremist content after seeing it on Facebook.

The employment of bots and buzzers in disinformation campaigns has only complicated the matter, as these things foster confusion, erode trust in government and media, and contribute to societal polarization in the long run. This trend was very popular during the US and Indonesian elections, signifying the close association between methods of disinformation campaign and politics.

Terrorist groups such as Daesh, Jemaah Ansharut Daulah (JAD) or the recently disbanded Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) fit the same mold. Their ultimate goal is to establish a caliphate in Iraq, Syria or Indonesia, overturning the status quo and replacing existing governments with their own rule, thus revealing their political ambitions despite their proclaimed religious objectives. Interestingly, they have also employed bots to magnify their disinformation campaign.

Having considered these points, the similarities in the processes of both terrorist groups and political actors cannot be overlooked. Through their pursuit of power and ability to govern, terrorist groups’ agendas are political in nature. Besides, they also use disinformation tactics similar to those employed by legitimate political players, such as the use of bots and blurring the lines between facts and lies in their messages.

It is easier to detect hoaxes, fake news and the likes when several factors are present, such as high literacy, strong education, solid trust in government, high social capital as well as fair and just political process. In such conditions, terrorist narratives and disinformation may not take root in the society.

But what happens if these conditions are not met?

Is Indonesia Vulnerable?

The unfortunate news is that the political landscape of the world’s largest Muslim-majority country, especially since the contentious 2019 presidential election and the Covid-19 pandemic, has become more vulnerable to disinformation.

This has created perfect opportunities for jihadi groups to exploit tensions and erode trust in the government.

High internet penetration and social media usage in Indonesia are not matched by high media literacy and education, making the majority of the population sitting ducks for disinformation campaigns.

Low trust in the government and its institutions, coupled with polarization and identity politics, has made it harder for the government to combat disinformation, as the government does not enjoy high trust from the governed.

This condition is suitable for terrorist groups to spread their hate-filled disinformation against the government as part of their radicalization efforts. Once radicalized, individuals find it difficult to change their minds, even when presented with facts and logic by the government.

Lee McIntyre, in his book On Disinformation, argues that many disinformation believers or deniers – those who deny facts even when shown clear evidence – are driven by values and identity, not just facts. Their beliefs are part of who they are, so presenting them with counterfactuals may be perceived as an attack on their identity.

Worse, disinformation facilitates an “us vs. them” mentality and pushes individuals to view those who disagree with them as enemies. This mentality is written all over the takfiri ideology, which views the government and its institutions as enemies. As a result, many members of JI and JAD who were arrested refused to participate in the authority’s deradicalization program, thus undermining its effectiveness.

This is reflected in the government’s struggle to earn public trust. Key government institutions – including the House of Representatives (DPR), the Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK), and the National Police (Polri) – were among the least trusted institutions last year.

High profile cases of corruption and power abuse in the past two years alone have damaged Polri’s reputation, which will need some time to be rehabilitated.  Furthermore, recent wrong turns by the government also play a factor. For example, the cybersecurity disaster affecting the country’s Temporary National Data Center casts doubt over the government’s competency to protect the nation’s interests.  

If similar misfires persist, public trust in the government will likely decline further. This could render people more vulnerable to terrorist groups, which propagate the beliefs that the government has transgressed (taghut) and that no positive outcome can emerge from a government led by infidels.

This is clear from both past and recent arrests made by Densus 88. The 2022 Astana Anyar suicide bomber, a terrorist recidivist, harbored hatred towards the police and the government. More recently, a 19-year-old in Malang was arrested for planning to bomb religious houses after being influenced by similar Daesh propaganda.

Thus, anti-government campaigns may easily find an audience in a society that has growing discontent with the government. This is a major risk that the authorities must attend to.

Way Forward

The World Economic Forum has ranked disinformation as the most significant global risk for the next two years and the fifth greatest over the next decade. Therefore, addressing this issue is crucial, especially in the context of Indonesia, where political instability might enable terrorist groups to spread their wing.

Will McAvoy of The Newsroom: “The first step in solving the problem is admitting that there is one.”

The Indonesian government should not turn a blind eye or be in denial about the disinformation issue, as terrorist groups can easily exploit it. Furthermore, it is imperative for the authorities to acknowledge and immediately ameliorate the mistakes that they have committed, as ignorance and dismissiveness would only hamper the government’s effort to rebuild public trust. 

There is no silver bullet for this. Due to the political nature of the disinformation used by terrorist groups, continuous efforts to educate the public and raise awareness about its dangers and the political elements within their propaganda are necessary.

Other steps, such as fact-checking initiatives, are important, but public campaigns and face-to-face conversations with those who sympathize with radical ideology can also be effective, especially when involving “credible voices” like reformed terrorists and Daesh returnees.

Moreover, coordinated efforts between governmental and non-governmental entities must also be improved. This is especially true for agencies like the National Counter Terrorism Agency (BNPT) and Densus 88 of Polri, as they are the primary authorities the public relies on for matters related to counterterrorism and counter violent extremism. Displaying competence and reliability would help boost public trust.

Furthermore, improving media and digital literacy, along with education, are essential for long-term solutions. This is especially important given the rise of AI, deep fakes and generative AI, which make it even more difficult to differentiate between fake and real information. As a final thought, tackling this issue requires a comprehensive strategic communication approach involving all stakeholders, including the government, media, religious organizations, civil society groups, youth organizations and technology companies.

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Introduction

Terrorism remains a serious problem in Indonesia. In recent years, women have increasingly become part of the execution stage of these acts of terror.

Between 2009 and 2020, at least 39 Indonesian women were involved in terrorism. However, this figure only represents those who have been prosecuted for such activities. Many more, whose degree of involvement varies, remain undetected.

Notably, there are at least five factors that explain women’s involvement in terrorist activities. These are marriage, the search for redemption, revenge, the pursuit of religious knowledge and the opportunity for gender equality (especially for roles that are traditionally assumed by men).

While women are assuming bigger roles in terrorism, they are also crucial in preventing and countering terrorism. Fortunately, such roles of preventing and countering terrorism are not limited to specific women such as mothers. Any women can play a part including those who were previously involved in terrorism.

This is demonstrated through a case study of how Ibu Kartini Panggabean who was associated with terrorism in Indonesia. She eventually realized the error of possessing such violent belief and now runs a school to counter such belief.

Ibu Kartini’s journey can be broken down to three stages: 1) introduction to extremist beliefs and marriage; 2) involvement in terrorism and her turning point, and; 3) deradicalization and re-engagement with society.

Stage One: Introduction to Extremist Beliefs and Marriage

Ibu Kartini hails from Tebing Tinggi, North Sumatera and has been married for several decades. Since the initial stages of marriage, she knew that her husband harboured radical belief.

Her husband, Khairul Ghazali, is a former terrorist inmate. He was known as an ideologue who also actively participated in high profile terrorist cases, including the heist at the CIMB Niaga bank in Medan and the attack on the Hamparan Perak police station.

But her marriage to Pak Ghazali was not her first exposure to such ideology. Ibu Kartini learned about Negara Islam Indonesia (Islamic State of Indonesia – NII) during her time in junior high school via exposure from various discussion fora that she participated in. At her public school, she even became known as the girl who refused to salute the Indonesian flag during the flag raising ceremony. This stemmed from her indoctrination that saluting the flag is forbidden in Islam (haram) and could compromise her faith. A scolding from her sociology teacher did little to shake her position on this.

Stage Two: Involvement in Terrorism and Turning Point

During her marriage, Ibu Kartini and her husband migrated to Malaysia for 10 years. Their stay abroad did nothing to their hardened belief. Upon their return, they opened a place for children to recite the Al-Qur’an in Tanjung Balai, Riau. Kartini’s husband was also installed as the Imam of a mosque. Leveraging on these platforms, they began to spread their violent belief.

This came to an abrupt end with the arrest of Ibu Kartini’s husband along with his five other friends. During these arrests, two were shot dead by the police. Her husband was subsequently brought to Jakarta for processsing.

Ibu Kartini was not spared herself. She was detained for a week at the Tanjung Balai police station. Upon her release, she immediately sought to reunite with her husband in Jakarta whom she later found was still in detention.

Seeing her husband behind bars challenged her belief. She was especially troubled by the impact of their detainment on their children and their extended family. She realized how her actions impacted her loved ones and prevented her from meaningful engagements such as fostering children’s education. She was particularly moved when she discovered several of her friends’ children did not attend school, for various reasons. This inspired her to open a school for children in her surrounding areas to receive formal schooling. It was this strong belief in children’s education that convinced her to let go of her radical belief and contact with her previous terrorist network.

Stage Three: Deradicalization and Re-engagement with Society

While Ibu Kartini is determined on this new cause, fortune was also on her side. With little savings, she was gifted a plot of land from her brother-in-law for agricultural use. This was out of concern that her husband might return to the terrorist network if he did not have economic avenues to sustain him and his family.

It was also during this time that she discovered a lack of prayer facility in that plot of land. With the little money she had, she decided to build a musholla, a prayer hall. Eventually, this hut expanded into a pesantren (boarding school) named Al-Hidayah Islamic Boarding School run by both Ibu Kartini and Pak Ghazali, following his release.

The pesantren was inaugurated in 2016 and initially aimed at only providing education to children of terrorist inmates and former terrorist inmates. Gradually, the pesantren accepted students living close by. This demonstrates how their community had grown to accept and trust the couple. 

This trust is also recognized when the local education authority granted an operational permit for the school. To assist with its operations, Al-Hidayah Islamic Boarding School has received support from the police, Badan Nasional Penanggulangan Terorisme (National Counter Terrorism Agency – BNPT), local government as well as the society.

Ibu Kartini: An Agent of Peace

Ibu Kartini and Pak Ghazali’s journey is remarkable albeit arduous and long. Initially spreading radical beliefs to being school administrators teaching children to prevent and counter radical belief.

Ibu Kartini opined that radical belief is difficult to abandon. Once an individual embraces such belief, it would take a gradual yet consistent effort to facilitate a change in worldview. Such effort includes participation in therapy, socializing with the community, attending religious classes and being open to pursue other knowledge for one to see the error of his/her way.

Ibu Kartini’s strive for children’s education rightfully earned her the title of “agent of peace.” Her experience was lauded by Siti Rofi’ah, an Islamic scholar, who explained that Ibu Kartini critically reassessed her earlier position and had the courage to explore the values of peace in Islam, as opposed to being trapped in her own narrow-mindedness. She also states that the country needs more people like Ibu Kartini to be agents of peace.

Srikandi Lintas Iman (SRILI), a partner of stratsea.com, is a women interfaith community in Yogyakarta, Indonesia. The organization strive to empower women and children in various issues including terrorism. To prevent and counter terrorism, SRILI documented Ibu Kartini’s journey which can be assessed on their YouTube channel. This video is a collaboration between SRILI and the Center for Security Studies and Peace, Gadjah Mada University.

Introduction

On 7 December 2022, two blasts were registered at a police precinct on Jalan Astana Anyar, Bandung (Polsek Astana Anyar), West Java, killing the perpetrator and a police officer as well as injuring nine other officers.

Spot Report, News Coverage and Early Observations

1. On 7 December 2022, two blasts were registered at a police precinct on Jalan Astana Anyar, Bandung (Polsek Astana Anyar). The first, allegedly a suicide bombing, occurred at 8.20 Western Indonesia Time while the second one took place on 10.45.
2. As of 11.30, the blast reportedly killed the perpetrator and a police officer. The attack was carried out during morning assembly (apel pagi) by an individual brandishing a knife who attempted to get into the middle of the assembly.
3. The police believed that the perpetrator brought two explosives but only managed to detonate one. The second blast occurred several hours later as police tried to secure the area and media personnel gathered to cover the development. It was reported later that the second blast was triggered by the police for disposal purpose.
4. The police suspected the involvement of a religiously motivated violent extremist group in the blasts. The National Police’s Head of Public Information Bureau Ahmad Ramadhan stated that the counter-terrorism unit has been engaged to investigate the incidents.
5. An officer of the Badan Nasional Penanggulangan Terorisme (BNPT) shared  that Jama’ah Ansharut Daulah (JAD) may be behind the attack, as they have carried out similar attacks previously.
6. The police are investigating a blue motorbike alleged to be used by the perpetrator. The police also found a note rejecting the recently passed Revisi Kitab Undang-Undang Hukum Pidana (revised criminal code – KUHP), stating that it is a product of an infidel government. Ironically, some of the recently passed KUHP may have religious influences (e.g. outlawing premarital sex).
7. The attack is arguably Indonesia’s most serious terrorist incident by religiously motivated violent extremists in an otherwise peaceful year. A recent notable case before this was the arrest of a female youth attempting to stage a shooting at Istana Negara.
8. This attack also occurred when national perception towards police is on decline, following multiple incidents and blunders that tarnish the reputation of the force this year.

The Perpetrator

The suicide bomber was Agus Sujatno alias Abu Muslim, a former member of Indonesian Islamic State (NII) and a  former treasurer of Jama’ah Ansharut Daulah (JAD) in South Bandung and former Pasir Putih Prison terrorist inmate. This differs from initial reports and chatters pointing to another suspect. Prior to this attack, Agus had been involved in the failed suicide attack in Cicendo, Bandung, that took place on 27 February 2017. He was the bomb maker of that incident.

Agus joined the West Java chapter of JAD in 2015. He learnt about the Islamic State (IS) and “jihad” at a Ponpes Ansorullah, a JAD school in Ciamis, West Java. He studied under the tutelage of West Java JAD leader, the late Fauzan Al Anshori. During his time there, he became acquainted with other JAD members from Jakarta, Indramayu, Solo, and Maluku, such as Iman Namakule.

Simultaneously, he visited JAD leaders imprisoned on Nusa Kambangan Island with Fauzan and other students from the school. He had met with figures such as Abu Bakar Ba’asyir and Aman Abdurrahman from his visits in February and March 2015, respectively.

Upon conclusion of his studies, he returned to Bandung a month after and joined the JAD chapter there.

In the last three months of 2015, Agus attended regular gatherings held by his JAD unit in Yayat Cahdiyat’s house in Ciwidey district on Sundays. But such meetings ended in January 2016 due to the arrest of their cell member, Fakhri Rizqi Rafsanjani alias Usaid. Usaid was arrested on 10 January 2016 for his involvement in the attack of a TV One van in Bandung on New Year’s Eve.

Agus also took part in his JAD unit’s idad (“jihad” preparation) activities held at Al Ma’soem school in Jatinangor. These activities included physical fitness training and swimming.

From early 2016 onwards, Agus also attended large-scale gatherings held once a month by Bandung JAD in Cisarua. These gatherings were led by Syamsul Hadi and Khoirul Anam, the last of which is a leader of a JAD school in Subang.

Agus also trained in martial arts conducted by Bandung JAD in Cimahi.

He started learning bomb-making techniques from online sources in January 2017. He downloaded bomb-making manuals from a Telegram messenger channel ran by the late Bahrun Naim, an Indonesian IS fighter killed in Syria on 19 April 2018. He did that as per order from Yayat Cahdiyat, his fellow JAD cell member and the perpetrator of the aforementioned failed Cicendo suicide attack.

Yayat convinced Agus that they should bomb the West Java provincial police headquarters in Bandung and police office in Cianjur, West Java. These attacks were to avenge the deaths of two Bandung JAD members, Abu Sofi and Abu Faiz. These two were killed in a raid on Jatiluhur dam in Purwakarta on 25 December 2016, where they had concocted a plan to attack police posts in Jakarta.

By late January 2017, Agus began building a bomb laboratory in a rented house in Kebon Gedang, Batununggal. It was in this rented house where he had made his explosives. On 20 February 2017, Agus and Yayat visited Sholeh Abdurrahman alias Abu Fursan in his house whereby Yayat told him that he would conduct a suicide attack on police mobile brigade headquarters in Depok, West Java and requested money to buy a pressure cooker. Sholeh agreed to help.

On 24 February 2017, Yayat and Agus made one pressure cooker and two pipe bombs. When the bombs were ready, Yayat took the pressure cooker bomb with himself while Agus kept the pipe bombs. The same pressure cooker bomb was used in the Cicendo bombing on 27 February 2017, where Yayat was killed.

Police arrested Agus on 7 March 2017 on Cancer Street, Turangga, Bandung for his involvement in the failed attack. On 20 December 2017, the East Jakarta District court sentenced him to four years of imprisonment which he spent in Pasir Putih Prison, Nusa Kambangan Island. While in prison, Agus refused to take part in the deradicalization programs run by Detachment 88 and BNPT. Thus, it is suspected that he still held firmly to his pro- IS ideology when he was released on 14 March 2021.

Upon his released, he joined pro-IS militants and unrehabilitated former terrorist inmates in Solo, Central Java, including Yus Karman and Ibadurrahman. Yus Karman and Ibadurrahman aremanagers of Anfiqu Centre (a pro-IS charity) and Hamalatul Quran (a pro-IS school). There, he worked as a parking attendant and bolstered his pro-IS stance. Following that, he returned to Bandung to prepare his attack on the Astana Anyar Police Precinct.

Agus Personal Life

Agus’ father is Wahid (deceased) and his mother is Sa’adah, a housewife. Agus was the first of two children in his family. His younger sister is Derawati Ningsih, a worker at a garment factory in Bandung.

He was married to Fitri Sania but later divorced her. Fitri is currently married to Sholeh Abdurrahman and lives with Sholeh’s parents in Bandung. Agus has a son with Fitri, called Abdulloh Usama who currently lives with Sholeh’s parents too.

Agus’ educational background is as follows:

a. Graduated from SDN Gumuruh 4 in 2001;

b. Graduated from  SMPN 20 Bandung in 2004;

c. Graduated from STM Taman Siswa in 2007; and

d. Enrolled as undergraduate student in Islamic Education at University of Islam Nusantara (UNINUS), but dropped out in the second semester.

Possible Reasons for the Attack

There are three possible reasons for the attack. First, Agus wanted to seek revenge on the police for killing Yayat Cahdiyat on 27 February 2017. Second, he wanted to demonstrate to the public that IS supporters in Indonesia still exist. Third, he wanted to encourage other IS supporters not to give up and continue to attack enemies of IS.

Way Forward

The suicide attack by Agus highlights the security impact and ongoing problem of recidivism. The Indonesian government needs to take steps to prevent similar attacks in the future. The police also needs to identify former inmates with bomb-making skills and monitor their movements. Significant effort must be taken to prevent them from regrouping with their old networks.

Second, the Indonesian government is strongly encouraged to revise the Anti-Terrorism Law Number 5/2018 to include an article stipulating that perpetrators of terrorist crimes are to be imprisoned until they are rehabilitated. This article should also oblige terrorist inmates and their families to take part in the government’s deradicalization program.

Third, this attack highlights the continued perception of Indonesian security agencies as enemies of religiously motivated violent extremists. Notably, this is one of numerous attacks or attempted attacks on police officers and their premises since 2010. This attack is testament for the need for improved security for police officers and infrastructure. However, such improvements could be hindered by a negative national perception towards them.

Introduction

The 2017 Soufan Center report states that at least 1,000 fighters from Southeast Asia (some references estimate it closer to 1,500) have joined the Islamic State in Syria and Iraq (ISIS) . However, the exact number of Filipino Foreign Terrorist Fighters (FTFs) and their families is uncertain. The only validated information is that of Ellen Jen Barriga and her husband, Mohammad Reza Kiram, who died in Syria as an Islamic State (IS) fighter. With their children, they left the Philippines to join IS in 2015. This highlights how violent extremists have turned to their spouses and extended families as recruits. Thus, policymakers must consider their family dynamics and individual radicalization experiences if their return to the Philippines are accepted.    

The following sections will discuss individual radicalization from several perspectives via a case study of a Filipino family: the father, mother and children. Descriptions of these are from the perspective of the sociocultural, religious and psychological context of being a Filipino Muslim FTF.

The Father and the Husband– Muhammed Reza Lahaman Kiram, a.k.a. “Abdul Rahman Al-Filipini”

Kiram’s Pathway to Extremism: A Devout Filipino Muslim Tausug Millennial

Kiram’s ethnic affiliation is “Tausug,” known as “people of the current” and “fierce people,” which is the prominent tribe in Mindanao scattered in Zamboanga, Basilan, Tawi-Tawi, and Sulu. Though not the direct descendants, his family belongs to the sultanate of Sulu, who are claimants of Sabah. He was raised in Zamboanga City and had a typical upbringing from childhood to young adulthood. He was a millennial who lived comfortably with his businessman father while his mother was a nurse in Saudi Arabia before he became part of IS. Like any millennial, he spent much of his time online, eventually leading to his online IS radicalization. He started by questioning people around him about everything he read, including the unlawful persecution of Palestinians, Syrians, and Muslim Filipinos which made him furious. His primary motivation was to seek justice for all the abuse his fellow Muslims suffered at the hands of the non-Muslims. Highly fueled by IS propaganda, he firmly believed that Islam was under attack and that it was his duty, as a Muslim man, to protect it.

Kiram was an idealistic young man who studied Islamic Jurisprudence in a madrasah (Muslim school). He was also a talented, influential young Muslim who was particularly passionate during religious discussions. Notably, he was a polyglot fluent in Malay, Turkish, Arabic, English, Filipino and Tausug. With such a profile, he became a prized target for recruitment by IS. Initially, Kiram was secretive about his involvement with IS while still in the Philippines. The first sign of Kiram’s radicalization that worried his family was when he started to attend a hardline mosque associated with Tablighi Jamaat, a missionary movement from South Asia suspected of nurturing militants. Despite vehemently denying it, his family’s greatest fear of him pledging allegiance to IS became a reality.

Kiram’s Full Radicalization as a Politico-Religious Extremist

Kiram eventually became a senior IS member who recruited and instructed others, Filipino and FTFs. Specifically, Kiram was suspected of conducting a 2012 bus bombing in Zamboanga City and IS-linked Ansar Khalifa group recruits in 2014. Beyond recruitment and instructing, he was the first and only verified Filipino citizen who beheaded a Caucasian in an ISIS video released in June 2016. In the video, he called for IS supporters who cannot travel for “Jihad” (Muslim Holy war against non-Muslims) to the Syrian Arab Republic to travel to the Philippines instead. He told them to “unite and join under the command of the Emir of the soldiers of the caliphate in the Philippines, Abdallah al-Filipino [a reference to Isnilon Hapilon]. Kiram also stated, “my brothers, do not hesitate to blow up their towns. Kill the disbelievers wherever you find them and do not have mercy on them”.

Collectively, these demonstrated how deep Kiram was into IS propaganda. In other words, Kiram firmly believed in the delusion that he was a mujahideen (Muslim Holy Warrior) committing terror in the name of God through a “Martyrdom Operation,”. They used the word “jihad” (Muslim Holy War) in all IS narratives to attract and appeal to Muslims worldwide to join them in their so-called war against non-Muslims.

As of August 23, 2018, pursuant to paragraphs 2 and 4 of resolution 2368 (2017), Kiram was found guilty of his association with IS or Al-Qaeda for “participating in the financing, planning, facilitating, preparing, or perpetrating of acts or activities by, in conjunction with, under the name of, on behalf of, or in support of,” “recruiting for” and “other acts or activities indicating an association with” Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), listed as Al-Qaeda in Iraq (QDe.115) as per United Nations Security Council. Simultaneously, the US declared Kiram a “Specially Designated Global Terrorist” (SDGT).

Kiram’s Impact as a Radical Husband & Father

The prevailing family dynamics in Filipino Muslim families are patriarchal, meaning the father holds the most authority in the household. As such, Kiram played a large part in shaping his wife’s and his children’s personalities, behaviors, and beliefs toward violent extremism. With such a pivotal role, his wife, Jen Barriga, voluntarily swore allegiance to ISIS and flew to Syria with him to conduct a martyrdom operation. Additionally, their children, who were minors then, became exposed to violent extremism, particularly during their time in Syria. Such exposure during their formative years would likely have lasting impacts on their lives.

As with Kiram’s case, the Philippine government must engage not only male violent extremists but also their families to prevent and counter violent extremism. Only through this can the Philippine government potentially break the chain of family radicalization.

Narrative Warfare: “One Man’s Terrorist is Another Person’s Freedom Fighter.”

It is interesting to note that Kiram is an excellent example of the cliché, “one man’s terrorist is another person’s freedom fighter.” Even though Kiram was officially labeled by the US as a Special Designated Terrorist, as the head of the family, he was able to condition the minds of his wife and children successfully. Through Classical Conditioning, he repeatedly told his family members that death from conducting an IS operation was not only “honorable” but the best type of death for a Muslim. Consequently, in the eyes of his wife and children, he died as a “Mujahideen,” which was his goal from the start. Besides his family, Kiram’s death as an IS fighter was also celebrated by other members, elevating his family’s status. Such elevation in status became sources of motivations for violent extremism: 1) Pride due to elevated status, 2) Vengeance sought by his wife and children, and 3) Financial rewards awarded by IS for Kiram’s death. These bombardments of positive reinforcements are a form of terrorist Operant Conditioning that aims to reiterate the violent extremist narrative to motivate the remaining family members to follow in Kiram’s footsteps. This continuous supply of potential suicide attackers was vital in sustaining IS martyrdom operations as they were their deadliest weapon.

The Wife and the Mother – Jen Ellen Barriga

Barriga’s Pathway to Extremism: Her Marriage to a Violent Extremist

In the case of Barriga, she came from a conservative Christian family named after the archangel who defends the Christian faith against demonic forces. Her radicalization began when she grew close to Kiram. Infatuated with Kiram, she converted to Islam and eventually married him. Following the hadith of Prophet Muhammad (SAW),that “obeying the husband is the key to paradise” Barriga became submissive to Kiram. As with other cases, such compliance could lead the wives of violent extremists to follow them in joining violent extremist groups.

Barriga’s Vulnerability as a Convert

Religious conversion by itself should not raise red flags, but conversion with other underlying factors indicates a greater risk for radicalization. These underlying factors served as the drivers of radicalization, in which conversion gives individuals a reason to manifest their radical tendencies. As a convert, there were four reasons why Barriga was particularly vulnerable to IS radicalization:

1) She had no one else to consult and no independent guide to her new faith except her husband.

2) Despite her voluntarily swearing allegiance to IS, this may have stemmed from her husband.

3) As a convert and wife to a violent extremist, she may have overcompensated to be seen as a “good Muslim” and a “good wife.” This included her blind compliance with her husband.

4) As a Muslim convert, she experienced marginalization from her family and friends as soon as she started wearing the hijab.

Considering all of these, it is understandable why Barriga involved herself heavily in IS to establish a new social status with her adoptive community. Equally important to note is that her experiences are similar to many female Muslim converts who ended up in IS.

Barriga’s Initial Participation in Violent Extremism

According to the Philippine National Police, Barriga, who had an accounting degree, was allegedly channeling IS funds to local militants and aiding in a failed bombing attempt in the southern Philippine city of Davao. Barriga’s Christian name helped her set up bank accounts and avoid suspicion. She was also recruiting other Balik Islam (converts), who was just as vulnerable to radicalization as her.

Radical Journey as a Terrorist Couple:

In 2012, Kiram and Barriga were arrested in connection with a foiled bombing plot. Together with an Indonesian man, they allegedly targeted a night market in Davao, Philippines. The Indonesian was shot and killed by the police, but due to insufficient evidence, Kiram and Barriga were released. Three years later, the couple was recruited by IS.

Possible Implications of the Death of her IS husband.

It is important to remember that Barriga is a widow of a “Mujahideen.” Being radicalized into violent extremism, she believes that her terrorist husband is now in paradise, which might encourage her to do the same. Additionally, by following in her husband’s footsteps, she could increase her reputation and potentially receive other incentives from IS. A recent example is when militants’ widows conducted twin suicide bombings in Jolo town on August 24, 2020, which killed at least 15 people, including military soldiers, and wounded more than 70 others. One of the suicide bombers named Nanah, a resident of Basilan, was the wife of the first confirmed Filipino suicide bomber, Norman Lasuca. She had also previously carried out an attack against the 1st Brigade Combat Team in Sulu in June 2019, leaving seven people dead and 12 others wounded. While the other bomber, Inda Nay, was the widow of militant Abu Talha, who was killed following an encounter with the First Scout Ranger Battalion in November 2019. Thus, the possibility that Barriga might do the same remains a legitimate threat to national security if she was allowed to return to the Philippines.

The Vulnerability of Filipino Muslim Children to Terrorist Parents

Radicalization in children often occurs within families involved in terrorism. Here, the role of mothers in such families is crucial as they are responsible for educating their children. Following the hadith of Prophet Muhammad (SAW),“paradise lies under the mother’s feet“ mothers are very respected and thus enable them to influence their children significantly. Therefore, mothers may expose children to undemocratic and discriminatory beliefs, leading them to violent extremism. This role is apparent in violent extremists such as the Maute brothers, who were responsible for the Marawi Siege in 2017. The matriarch, Farhana, maintained a private militia that included her seven sons.

Furthermore, being respectful to parents demonstrates gratitude to Allah (SWT). This belief may confound any deradicalization attempts made on children of violent extremist families. Children could fear that any deviation from their parent’s beliefs is disrespectful. They may also view deradicalization attempts as attacks on their families, leading them to be guarded and unreceptive.

Their community’s close social ties (family, kin, friends) further complicates this scenario. An example of this was Indonesian FTF Rezky Rullie, aka Cici, a foiled suicide bomber captured in Jolo on October 10, 2020. Rezky was a daughter of an Indonesian couple responsible for the deadly 2019 Jolo Cathedral bombing. Furthermore, her younger sister, rescued in 2021, was married to an Abu Sayyaf member.  

Conclusion

Without the involvement of wives and children in violent extremism, addressing this issue becomes less complex. This is particularly when male members of such organizations yearn for martyrdom. With the involvement of wives and children, it readies future generations of violent extremists. Therefore, governments, including the Philippines, must not only continue but increase efforts to break the chain of radicalization in families. Additionally, as every family is unique, comprehensive data must be collected, including the sociocultural factors of each family. Understanding them aids in a more accurate assessment of their levels of radicalization and the development of rehabilitation and reintegration programs particular to their needs.

Introduction

At the end of April 2022, the Madago Raya operation task force fatally shot Askar alias Pak Guru who was a member of East Indonesia Mujahideen (MIT) in a shootout in Parigi Moutoung Regency, Central Sulawesi. His death brought the number of MIT members down to two men. Pivotal to this was the joint operation between the Indonesian National Police (Polri) and the Indonesian National Armed Forces (TNI). However, TNI was not immediately involved in the operation initially codenamed “Camar Maleo” in January 2015. TNI only became involved upon Polri’s request for assistance in September 2015. By then, the operation was re-coded as “Camar Maleo III”. Assistance was requested as Polri encountered difficulties in conducting the mission due to the difficult terrain, exacerbated with its personnel lacking skills in jungle warfare. More adapt to such terrain and warfare, TNI’s involvement was expected to improve the success of the operation.

Within months of its involvement, TNI slain Santoso, the leader of MIT. Despite its initial success, the operation protracted for seven years with two members still on the run. Many hoped for the Madago Raya operation to end soon. Locals have voiced their concerns about the never-ending operation because it has disrupted their daily lives. Upon assessing the current situation in Poso, TNI Commander-in-Chief Gen. Andika Perkasa believes that the situation in Poso is now more stable. Thus, he hopes that the police would call for the termination of the operation. Gen. Andika added that TNI has gradually began to withdraw its forces from Poso since March 2022.

This operation piqued debates on the involvement of the military in counterterrorism. Engaging TNI in counterterrorism is a sensitive issue in Indonesia due to its repressive nature during the New Order. This article will not only discuss the common concerns about involving the military, but also identifies other factors which should be addressed.

The Debates on TNI’s Involvement in Counterterrorism

The relatively successful, though protracted, operation should bring us to discussions on enhancing the effectiveness of the military for future operations. Although TNI is well-known for its capabilities in jungle warfare, its personnel were still impeded by Poso’s difficult terrain. However, discussions on military effectiveness are often downplayed particularly due to various socio-political issues. Instead, the bulk of the attention is on limiting the military’s role in counterterrorism because of fears that granting a greater involvement for the military would lead to extensive human rights violations and the return of the military to its internal security role.

Under the mandate of the revised law on terrorism, Law No. 15/2018, the Indonesian government is supposed to issue a Presidential Regulation (Perpres) on the Rules of Engagement (RoE) of the military in counterterrorism operations. This Perpres should have been issued a year after the ratification of the revised law. Yet, it has been four years since the ratification and there are currently no updates on when the Perpres would be issued. Unfortunately, the Perpres issue would only become news headlines following any related incidents. For instance, in March 2022, House Commission I member Maj. Gen. (Rtd) T.B. Hasanuddin called for the government to expedite the issuance of the Perpres on TNI in counterterrorism following the death of eight civilians in Papua who were killed by an armed criminal group (KKB) in Papua. He asserted that the military should be deployed in operations against KKB and the Perpres would serve as a legal protection for the military in carrying out its duties. He even used a strong rhetoric that KKB has violated human rights due to their brutalities. Ironically, human rights violations have always been the main concern of involving the military in counterterrorism operations. By highlighting the brutal acts of KKB against innocent civilians, it serves to neutralize any concerns about the military’s human right abuses. Additionally, it shifts the discourse to the urgent need to deploy the military against KKB threats.

In recent years, the Indonesian government has released a draft of the Perpres several times. This enabled the public to assess the draft and provide feedbacks. Civil society organisations in Indonesia opposed the draft due to the clauses that they believe will allow TNI to be involved in all stages of counterterrorism measures, including preventive, enforcement, and rehabilitation programmes. They asserted that it would only exacerbate the overlapping responsibilities already shared by key stakeholders such as Polri, National Intelligence Agency (BIN), and National Counterterrorism Agency (BNPT).

Intense opposition to the draft is ostensibly due to the men behind the draft itself. According to a 2020 investigation, the Coordinating Ministry of Politics, Legal, and Human Rights assigned the Ministry of Defence to craft the draft of the Perpres. The Ministry also involved other relevant stakeholders from the military to provide suggestions, such as the TNI Headquarter, TNI’s Strategic Intelligence Agency (BAIS), TNI’s Legal Office, and representatives from the special forces. Due to the military dominance, the draft represents the institutional belief and interests of TNI. Despite attempts to accommodate public opinions, there is little impact to the draft as drafters are dominated by the military officers. It was also found that TNI lobbied house members to support the draft.

Pondering Beyond the Established Debates

Ironically, the prolonged debates also created a “gray area” for TNI in conducting its activities. The existing regulations are truly vague which emphasizes an urgent need for a Perpres that can draw clear boundaries. Regardless of the on-going criticism, TNI has carried out various counterterrorism efforts, including counter-radicalisation and deradicalisation programmes. The territorial command structures, which enables TNI to have its own representatives at each regional level down to the village level, regularly carry out Management Territorial (Pembinaan Teritorial or Binter) to improve the living conditions of the people and encourage them to support and protect the national ideology of Pancasila. In Poso, they conducted various activities to “win the hearts and minds” of locals and distance them from the influence of MIT members. These activities included renovating houses, providing health care services, and holding seminars on the dangers of radicalism and terrorism. TNI will not be changing its policy of using Binter to counter terrorism especially when it has always been an intrinsic part of TNI’s mandate since its establishment.

The Perpres is also urgently needed to provide legal protection for the newly minted unit, Special Operations Command (Koopsus). TNI reinvigorated the Special Operations Command (Koopsus) in 2019 in which 80% of Koopsus’ duty was claimed to be on intelligence and surveillance. On paper, Koopsus is not an official intelligence agency, hence there would be limitations on how it conducts missions. Interestingly, one of the early deployments of Koopsus was an evacuation of Indonesians from Wuhan, China. This deployment was not a counterterrorism operation per se. Nevertheless, Koopsus’ capabilities were necessary in the operation as a pre-emptive measure against unwanted terrorist attacks during the evacuation process. Without a clear and legitimate regulation, similar deployments in the future might be subjected to criticism as public will assume that the deployment is beyond the scope of the unit’s duties.

We cannot deny the fact that increasing TNI’s involvement in counterterrorism will allow the military to gain more state resources and justify the existence of its territorial command structures which has always been the target of military reformers. These issues are relevant and should be addressed accordingly. However, it has been more than four years since the revised law on terrorism was ratified and the debates remain stagnant. There are also other areas of debates that should have been explored to understand what should be done to improve the military’s capabilities and maximise their contributions to the country’s counterterrorism efforts.

There is also a concern that discussions on military effectiveness might be exploited by the military to gain more material benefits for the institution. However, enhancing military effectiveness is not only about increasing military budget and acquiring advance equipment. It is also to ensure that the military can adapt to the changing threats and environment, receive adequate training and education, and develop appropriate doctrines. Koopsus, for instance, comprises of personnel from the military’s special forces of each service, but it would take time for the personnel to adjust themselves with the unit’s joint doctrine. Training and experiences would be valuable for the unit to improve its capabilities.

Notably, discussions on military effectiveness tend to be minimal among public. Further, there are limited academics or activists who have the knowledge and technical expertise that could enhance the military effectiveness. The military would, thus, be better suited and should be given a degree of autonomy to technical issues. Nevertheless, the involvement of civilians who have such knowledge is also important to create a good mechanism for checks and balances. By doing so, the debates will not only revolve around socio-political issues but also ensuring that the country has a capable and functioning military.

Lastly, there is a valid fear that involving the military would only exacerbate the perennial problem of overlapping responsibilities among relevant stakeholders. However, overlapping responsibilities cannot be solely blamed on the military. It has always been an acute problem among governmental and non-governmental agencies. The government should ensure the implementation of Perpres No. 7/2021 on the National Action Plan on Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism (P/CVE). One of the clauses stipulates the creation of an integrated database on P/CVE efforts. This would supplement the upcoming Perpres on TNI’s Rules of Engagement (RoE) in counterterrorism.

Conclusion

Deploying the military is not the ultimate solution to eradicate terrorism in Indonesia. However, TNI’s role is inevitable when threats escalate beyond the capabilities of Polri. Current debates on TNI’s involvement in counterterrorism often sidestep discussions on the effectiveness of TNI in such operations. Instead, debates largely centre on limiting its role for fear of human rights abuses by TNI. What is crucial for Indonesia’s counterterrorism efforts is firstly for the issuance of PerPres on RoE to be expedited. The much-needed PerPres will not only enforce boundaries on the military but also provide legal protection to TNI when carrying out its duties. Secondly, debates on military effectiveness should be intensified with the involvement of capable civilian authorities. Such discussions should go beyond increasing military budget and acquiring advance equipment. Through such discussions, TNI would be capable of mitigating future threats to Indonesia including terrorism. Lastly, there must be stronger efforts to deconflict overlapping responsibilities in counterterrorism. This would include the implementation of regulations facilitating the creation of an integrated database on P/CVE.

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Negotiated with the Amir to Avoid Taking up Arms

Soon after, in January 2017, I had the opportunity to continue my journey to a transit city which was deemed to be a safe route into Raqqah. I spent around three weeks in this transit city in a modest house used by muhajir (immigrants) for shelter. Here, some will be sent directly into combat under the banner of IS while the rest will be taken to Raqqah. Rather than taking up arms, I negotiated with the amir (leader) of the group via an Egyptian muhajir (immigrant) assisting to translate what I shared from English to Arabic.

I learnt that those who would be taken to Raqqah was because their wives had earlier arrived in Raqqah via a different route. I pleaded for leniency as many of my family and relatives were already residing in Raqqah.

Alhamdulillah, I was allowed to meet my family and relatives in Raqqah; avoiding the mandatory participation in armed conflict by unmarried muhajir (immigrants).

Heading to Raqqah

As the third week at the transit city ended, we started our journey to Raqqah in a medium-sized van to a place that was more deserted. We then moved to a large single cabin pickup akin to a Chevrolet Silverado. Despite its large size, we had to pile on top of each other so as that everyone could board the vehicle. The uncomfortable situation became worse when we had to contend with hours of travel in high winds and low temperature. Occasionally during the trip, we were instructed to disembark the vehicle and to walk for quite a distance. This was a tactic to avoid detection from the enemies and to avoid driving over the many landmines laid in the ground.  Eventually, we boarded cars that were waiting for us at the border of IS territory. At that point, though fatigued and concerned, I continued reciting all the prayers that I have memorized as I was bestowed safety throughout the journey.

The Reality in IS Territory

The closer our car got to IS territory, the more doubts I started to have which I kept to myself. Images of the glitter of the capital at night and the organized city of Raqqah that I have seen in IS propaganda were unproven. Instead, the city was dark, gloomy, and devastated as though the city had been a battlefield for the longest time.

Eventually, our car arrived at the immigration office known as Maktab Hijrah. There, the personal details of muhajir (immigrants) are recorded, however, such processing are just for formalities. This is because we were simply asked our names, age and our country of origin.

As I briefly rested at the office, I saw that there was an employee with an Indonesian name. I immediately requested with staff that were present to meet with this Indonesian employee as I wanted to ask about my family. Having noted my request, we were led to a safehouse to rest. The next day, I was invited to meet with the Indonesian employee at Maktab Hijrah.

Upon meeting, our conversation was brief and straight to the point. I only managed to ask the following questions: 1) Do you know my family? 2) How are they? 3) Where are they residing? That was it. He answered that he knew about my family’s whereabouts and wished to take me to their residence. I was informed that such meetings were prohibited but as I have not seen them for more than a year, I was given two days to catch up with them on the condition that I participated in militant training after those two days.

Soon after accepting this term, I eventually met with my family. This reunion is arguably the most memorable in my life. Overwhelmed with many emotions, I bawled upon seeing them in person. They too were extremely shocked by my unexpected arrival. While catching up, they began asking me numerous questions: how I travelled to Syria, what I did in the five months in Syria, and do I know how to return to Indonesia?

Planning to Go Home Despite Just Arriving in Raqqah

After enduring a challenging journey, I was shocked to learn that my family was trying to find ways to return to Indonesia for the past year or so. They had sought information from civilians in Raqqah, contacting relatives in Indonesia, and seeking assistance from the Indonesia Embassy in Damascus. Their efforts were, however, unsuccessful.

I was unprepared to learn of their intentions to return to Indonesia which reflected their 180 degrees change in worldview that I saw a year and half ago. Why was there a change? The answer was simply because they were convinced that they were completely deceived by IS propaganda. All the sweet promises and talks about “living in heaven on earth” were fictitious. Instead, they saw IS’ cruelty, injustice, brutality that are contrary to Islam. Examples include health facilities being accessible only to those who have joined IS and how non-Arabs such as Southeast Asians were prioritized in hospitals.

Additionally, infringements such as inappropriate dressing and attitude that were not in accordance with IS orders are met with reprimand and even prison sentences. Often my sister would visit IS offices to submit appeal letters citing the Qur’an and Hadiths for IS to change its rules but her letters were unheeded. Notably, my sister and mother have been arrested by the Syar’I police as their dressings were deemed inappropriate even though they were wearing clothes that were issued to them upon their arrival. Fortunately, they were released when my sister berated them for not fulfilling IS promises, instead my sister was demanded to pay SYP 10,000 to buy new clothes that they deemed to be more Syar’i. Such trivial matters should have never been an issue in the first place.

Her letters, though unheeded, did not go unnoticed. My family was once visited by female officers of the Syar’i police to “chat” with my sister. They issued her an ultimatum to not continue arguing and delivering her letters to IS offices. Should she continue, she will be executed. That was the point when my family felt they have been misled and deceived.

After learning reasons for their change, I revealed that I was to participate in militant training after two days of our reunion. Unsurprisingly, my mother and sister immediately forbade my participation. We began thinking of ways to get those who would pick me up for training to release me from such training. I eventually resorted to eating a large onion to raise my body temperature. On the day I was supposed to be picked up for training, my sister informed them that I was sick and that my mother did not permit me to get involved in armed conflict.

Not believing of my sickness, the IS members took me to the hospital. My sister advised me to pretend that I was in pain when the doctor examined me. Thankfully, the doctor rudimentarily assessed me without any medical devices including a stethoscope. I was next given medicine and an injection after replying that I had was experiencing diarrhoea, vomiting and weakness when I was not. In fact, I became seriously sick after being injected with an unspecified drug. This further solidified my account of being sick. This ploy bought me a few weeks of rest. However, I was informed that I will be picked up once I am well. True to their word, one IS member returned. This time, my family instructed me to stay hidden in my room as they tried to persuade the IS member. The IS member eventually became annoyed and felt toyed with. He stated that every man who was old enough is obligated to join the conflict without exceptions. Thankfully, his anger was limited to verbal reprimands without any physical violence.

After his departure, I was instructed by my family to stay home for the time being to avoid being instructed to join the conflict. Weeks turned to months. During this period, my sister and several other female relatives continued to look for information on escaping Raqqah.

Via God’s intervention, help came to us in the form of a civilian in June 2017. The civilian suggested that we should surrender ourselves to the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) which were gradually reaching Raqqah. We heeded his suggestion but it was not easily implemented.

Money, possessions and even our lives were at stake. We had to survive barrages of bullets whizzing past our heads we exited IS territory. We also had to overcome miscommunications between those smuggling us out and the SDF. Eventually, it took three tries before we were successful.

The men in our group were subsequently interrogated for approximately two months in Kobane by both US intelligence and SDF officers. For the women and children, they had to field numerous interview sessions from many international journalists. Following these interviews, the Indonesian government facilitated our return to Indonesia. On the first weekend of August 2017, we were on our way home, grateful for the assistance rendered by the government.

Four years have past since our return. I have been active in activities organized by both government and NGO to advocate peace and tolerance in Indonesia. This is my commitment to make up for the mistakes we have committed.

Closing Remarks

I want to highlight several things that need to be understood from the damaged and chaotic system of IS’ governance which are contrary to Islamic and societal norms. First pertains to the voting process in the general elections as contrary to Islamic law. If IS was to study history properly, they would not have forbidden democracy. During the time of Umar bin Khattab RA, several individuals were gathered to seek the best candidate to replace the caliph Umar RA. Additionally, every house in the city of Medina was asked on their opinion. Eventually, a unanimous decision was made to appoint Uthman bin Affan RA as the next caliph. Such a system is certainly similar to democracies implemented today albeit with a slight modification, namely voting is conducted in specified areas rather than relying on visiting every household.

Second is about the coercion to participate in armed conflicts and the intolerance to other faiths which are often met with brutality. This is against what is stated in Al-Baqarah (2) verse 256 which states that, “There is no compulsion in religion.” This means that each individual is free to decide on their own religious understanding and beliefs.

Third, advising one another of religious obligations should be done gently without violence. This is reflected in Surah Taha (20) verses 43-44 where Allah instructed Prophet Moses (Musa) and Prophet Aaron (Harun) to gently talk with the Pharoah even though the Pharoah was one who greatly transgressed. This is contradictory to the treatment meted by IS on its opponents. Cruel treatments await those who do not heed IS “advice.” This is, of course, done to spread terror within the society.

Part 1: Interview with Febri Ramdani

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Introduction

Hello everyone, my name is Febri and I am of mixed heritage, Madura and Minangkabau. My father was formerly employed in a State-owned Enterprise (SOE, BUMN), more specifically a government-owned bank in Jakarta prior to his retirement in 2016/2017. My mother had worked for almost 20 years in a government ministry before her resignation / early retirement due to several reasons. One of which is the rampant occurrences of corruption, collusion, and nepotism (KKN) in her office.

Through the years, my parent’s marriage became rocky, eventually culminating in their separation in 2005. Upon their separation, my elder sister and I not only chose to live with our mother but also decided to cut ties with our father.

Mental Pressure from Home-schooling

Amidst this personal turmoil begins my journey to the Middle East. Upon graduating from high school (SMP), my mother advised me to an alternative, less popular route for pre-tertiary education (SMA), namely home-schooling. This was because my parents were concerned that I would get involved in delinquencies by associating with peers particularly in Jakarta. Though initially hesitant, I reluctantly agreed to my parent’s appeal.

One of the “privileges” of home-schooling is that I completed my studies in just one year. The focus of each subject was only on what was deemed essential and geared towards preparation for the final examinations. This privilege, however, did not make me happy. Instead, I was depressed. Apart from not being able to appreciate the knowledge obtained in that one year, I was robbed of the three years of socializing with peers if I had enrolled in a school.

Towards the end of our home-schooling was when my sister and I begin studying the holy Qur’an at home. Unfortunately, we were unequipped to adequately understand the Qur’an, making us susceptible to be misguided. Prior to studying the Qur’an, my heart was not at ease. I felt constrained as I was unable to socialize freely, spending most of the day cooped up at home. I began feeling inadequate as a person as I cannot study “normally” like peers of my age. I was also not very religious at that time which adds to my lack of enthusiasm to studying about Islam. This mental pressure lasted for about four years which strained my relationship with my sister.

Loneliness from Family’s Sudden Departure to Syria

2014 was a particularly eventful year for me. First, throughout 2014, my sister and I avoided all communications with each other even though we lived in the same house due to our strained relationship. In that year, my family’s financial standing declined drastically as one of our family businesses collapsed. This collapse was due to a failed project as a business partner was arrested for being involved in corruption. Our family’s situation became more complicated when we learnt that several of our family members were unwell. One of whom was my sister who suffered from a rare disease, namely bone tuberculosis. At that time, the national insurance and social security schemes (BPJS) which would have helped with treatment was still relatively unknown by many including my family.

Coincidentally in 2014, a terrorist organization called the Islamic State (IS) declared that it had established a caliphate in parts of Syria and Iraq. The extensive coverage on this group by international media included the truth, hoaxes and those in-between. My family began taking into IS’ propaganda that divulge the “beautiful” life they could live if they resided in a country that “properly” enforces Islamic law. They bought into IS’ administration of health facilities, work, education, and the peace of life that was like the time of Prophet Muhammad. My family was too taken in by the propaganda that their grave mistake was not looking for other sources of information.

It was akin to those blinded by love; not caring about other’s views. Unfortunately, such blindness is usually temporary, and things fall apart upon their marriage where all the advises others have warned about get exposed. That is also when regret sets in.

In their “love blindness”, my family gathered all their resources and departed for Syria without inviting me, let alone informing me. They were so smitten with IS that they stopped listening to secular media as they deemed them to only spread lies about the group. At that time, my conflict with my family made me to strongly reject their perspective of IS. Despite this, their departure, especially in such a large group, shocked me as I did not think they would actually leave Indonesia.

Their departure led me to leave home and lived alone in a room in a cheap boarding house near Universitas Indonesia. I sold whatever I could find at home to survive for about a year. Surviving that one year took a toll on my health. I lost a lot of weight and became more depressed as I was succumbed by my inner thoughts. As a result, I was often sick.

Yearning to Reunite with Family in Raqqah

Despite the many days of complete emptiness, I did not have any intention to visit my father or his extended family who were still in Indonesia. Instead, I began developing ill feelings towards those who worked or supported the government. It was very clear to me that those caught in the rampant acts of corruption do not get fair and proper punishments. As my father and his family generally worked in government or government-owned organizations, I perceived that their incomes were from ill-gotten gains. I feel that this was the turning point for my indoctrination.

I started referring to IS propaganda online which I believe was an attempt to find solace. I convinced myself that the propaganda was true through advises from my family prior to their departure. These advises that were deeply ingrained in me included the secular media were simply vilifying IS for their own self-interests. In addition to being convinced that I was being “blinded” by secular media, I was also drawn by the many promises by IS, namely: 1) opportunity to continue my education, 2) job prospects, 3) no obligation to participate in armed conflict, and 4) being able to live akin to the times of Prophet Muhammad (PBUH).

As personally experienced, I believe that ideological factors are not the sole determinant that makes an individual want to join a terrorist organization. For myself, I felt that IS propaganda played a small part in my decision to head to Syria.

Eventually in September 2016, I departed for Syria to be with my family. The biggest push for me was that I missed my mother. And before my last meeting with her in Indonesia, I felt that I had not done a lot of things that was asked of me by my mother.

With the help of a relative, my preparations to Syria went smoothly including passport and document applications. So was the direct flight from Jakarta to Istanbul, Turkey.

At Istanbul began my long journey to Syria. I was first detained for a month by another extremist group, Jabhat al-Nusra. I next had to wait for a further five months to receive information about Idlib and Hama. Eventually, I was reconnected with my mother and several of my family members and relatives in Raqqah.

I spent the five months in Idlib and Hama under increasingly chaotic circumstances. Bombings and missile strikes grew increasingly frequent. I remained relatively safe until one day in December 2016 when a missile came within a kilometre of my residence in Idlib. I remembered the strong vibrations that I felt from the impact. The smoke, fire and destruction accompanied the ensuing panic. We were eventually helped by personnel of the White Helmets (Syria Civil Defence).

Part 2: Interview with Febri Ramdani