Partnered Content

Assalamu’alaikum and greetings!

CCIGE is pleased to invite you to our upcoming Webinar Session via Zoom. Come and join us for an engaging and insightful discussion with Dr. Zouhir Gabsi. The session will be opened and moderated by Assoc. Prof. Dr. Danial Yusof (Director, CCIGE).

 Date: Thursday, April 10, 2025

 Time: 11:30 AM (Kuala Lumpur Time)

 Platform: Zoom

 Join Zoom Meeting:
https://iium.zoom.us/j/99543389366?pwd=mrJI2z6pSqXk3G5I3HAYLprjbkmM6b.1

 Meeting ID: 995 4338 9366

 Passcode: 613359

Looking forward to your participation! 

Please feel free to share this invitation. 

Agriculture has long been the backbone of Southeast Asia, contributing significantly to food security, economic stability, and rural livelihoods. The ASEAN region, rich with diverse agricultural practices and resources, faces common challenges such as climate change, urbanization, market volatility, and policy discrepancies. As countries navigate these complexities, understanding the socio-economic dimensions of agriculture within the ASEAN context becomes crucial for fostering resilience, sustainability, and collective growth.

In light of these challenges, Yayasan Strategik Lestari (YSL) and stratsea are honored to create a platform for dialogue and knowledge exchange to achieve three primary aspirations: to cultivate a society that understands international relations, to identify Malaysia’s role in addressing agricultural socio-economic issues through expert perspectives, and to gather recommendations for further research and policy benchmarking.

The webinar will delve into critical questions such as:

• What are the socio-economic dynamics shaping ASEAN’s agricultural sector?

• How can collaboration among ASEAN countries enhance agricultural productivity and resilience?

• What policy interventions are necessary to address the impacts of climate change and market volatility on the region’s food security?

• How can Southeast Asia harness its agricultural diversity for mutual benefit and sustainable development?

Webinar Details

Date: Friday, 11 April 2025

Time: 09:30 AM (Indonesia/Thailand) / 10:30 AM (Malaysia/Philippines/Singapore)

Speaker Details

Dr. Dona Laily Wahyuning is a prominent scholar in agribusiness management, specializing in agricultural competitiveness, trade dynamics, and rural socioeconomics. As Head of the Agribusiness Management Laboratory at Universitas Pembangunan Nasional Veteran Jawa Timur, her research offers valuable insights into Indonesia’s agricultural landscape and its regional implications.

Among her notable works is the analysis of rice farming competitiveness in Bojonegoro Regency, which explores strategies to enhance productivity and resilience in one of Indonesia’s key rice-producing areas. She has also examined factors influencing rice imports in Indonesia, shedding light on trade policies and food security challenges. Additionally, her study on the competitiveness of Indonesian cloves compared to Tanzania and Madagascar provides critical perspectives on global spice markets and Indonesia’s position within them.

Dr. Dona’s research reflects a deep commitment to strengthening agricultural resilience and market performance, making her a valuable voice in advancing sustainable agricultural development across ASEAN.

Introduction

In the age of mercantilism, economic dominance was not merely about trade—it was enforced through brute military strength.

European empires deployed gunboats to the coasts of nations, coercing them into opening markets, signing lopsided treaties or even submitting to colonial rule.

The Opium Wars of the 19^th century stand as a stark example—when China resisted British trade demands, gunboats rained fire upon its ports, forcing the Middle Kingdom to cede Hong Kong and open its economy on unfavourable terms.

Power was exercised through the barrel of a cannon while nations bent under the weight of superior firepower.

Today, the battlefield has shifted, but the objective remains the same: influence, control and dominance. Gunboats no longer dictate policies; instead, social media does.

The rise of digital platforms has created a new arsenal of influence operations—one where narratives, not naval fleets, determine the direction of entire countries. Algorithms replace admirals and viral trends become the new cannonballs.

Those who can shape public opinion can shape long-lasting policies. No warships needed; no shots fired—yet the effects can be far more enduring. A single viral campaign can sway elections, overturn governments or redefine national identities.

The ASEAN Landscape

In ASEAN, where youth make up a significant portion of the population and digital adoption is at an all-time high, this reality is unfolding at an unprecedented pace.

From likes to legislation, the power once wielded by empires through brute force is now in the hands of millions of young, digitally empowered individuals. What they believe, share and push into the mainstream today will become the policies that shape their nations tomorrow.

ASEAN’s economic rise has been nothing short of remarkable. In 2024, the region contributed 7.2% of the global economy and was responsible for 8.6% of the world’s GDP growth over the past decade.

With a combined GDP projected to reach US$4.25 trillion by 2025, ASEAN is on the verge of surpassing major economies and cementing itself among the world’s top five economic powerhouses.

This growth is not merely a statistic—it is reshaping global supply chains, investment flows and economic alliances.

Unlike the aging economies of Europe, where labour shortages are becoming a structural problem, ASEAN enjoys a demographic advantage. With a median age of just 31, its workforce is young, vibrant and digitally connected.

The contrast with Europe, where the median age is over 40, is stark. While Western nations grapple with declining birth rates and economic stagnation, ASEAN’s youths are driving an unprecedented wave of innovation, entrepreneurship and consumption. This demographic dividend is fuelling the rise of a powerful middle class, which is expected to reach 350 million people by 2030—larger than the entire population of the United States today.

These are all concrete indicators which enable the possibility of a digital revolution which squarely puts power and influence in the hands of the digitally savvy young generation.

Youth’s Digital Revolution

Over the past decade, the digital landscape in the ASEAN region has undergone a significant transformation, marked by substantial increases in internet access, mobile phone usage and social media engagement among young people.

In 2013, the average internet penetration rate in ASEAN was approximately 34%. By 2021, this figure had more than doubled, reaching 73%. This surge reflects the region’s rapid digital adoption and infrastructure development.

A study conducted in 2019 revealed that 97.5% of Thai high school students owned smartphones, while in Indonesia between 2013 and 2018, smartphone ownership among young adults (ages 18-34) surged from 17% to 66%.

To compound on to this trend, the average youths spend close to five hours a day on their smartphones, thus making them the most digitally reliant generation.

The omnipresence of youths on social media has blunt the influence of mainstream media which in nascent democracies are largely controlled by the government or its cronies.

In Malaysia, for over six decades, the Barisan Nasional (BN) coalition maintained political dominance, partly by controlling mainstream media narratives. The BN government either directly controlled the mainstream media through its ownership of news agencies like The Star and Bernama, or indirectly through strict media licensing laws that promote censorship.

Billionaires linked to the government through monopoly-like multibillion dollar concessions also owned other major media houses.

However, in the lead-up to the 14^th general election (GE14), social media platforms emerged as vital arenas for political discourse, especially among the younger demographic, thus breaking the long-held information monopoly.   

A study analysing 187 news pieces from six online news platforms during the 11-day campaign period highlighted that social media was effectively utilised to influence public perception.

Key issues such as the Goods and Services Tax (GST), the 1Malaysia Development Berhad (1MDB) scandal, and the reputations of political candidates were extensively discussed online, contributing to a wave of political dissent and activism.

This online engagement played a crucial role in shifting public sentiment, leading to BN’s unprecedented electoral defeat.

This was particularly evident on the night before voting, whereby the prime minister candidate for the opposition directly communicated to the public via a Facebook-live event, a feat that was viewed by more than 220,000 people and reached 10 million people in less than 24 hours.

This last figure was more than half of the voting population. Comparably, the then sitting prime minister, who enjoyed the full backing of the media establishment, only garnered 15,000 audience while conducting a similar event.

Knowing that the government had a solid grip on the media establishment, the opposition then actively mobilised the youths to showcase the opposition videos to their parents and grandparents via WhatsApp groups, or in-person when they meet to cast their votes. This merged the influence of social media and the youths to successfully break the government-controlled information monopoly, thus leading to a historic election win.

The same trend could be seen in Thailand. The Move Forward Party’s (MFP) rise in Thailand’s 2023 general election is a testament to the power of social media and youth-driven political engagement in disrupting traditional power structures.

Winning 151 seats, the MFP effectively leveraged digital platforms to bypass mainstream media controls and mobilise grassroots support. On election day alone, the party was mentioned over 245,932 times across social media, with post-election engagement reaching 83.4 million interactions, 70% higher than any other party.

This surge in online activism translated into real political momentum, particularly among Thailand’s younger generations. Of the 52.3 million eligible voters, nearly 44% belonged to Gen Z (18-26 years old) and millennials (27-42 years old)—the demographic that overwhelmingly backed the MFP’s progressive policies.

Their engagement contributed to a historic 75.22% voter turnout, one of the highest in Thai electoral history. Through a combination of digital mobilisation, targeted messaging and political activism, the MFP demonstrated how social media can break conventional information monopolies, empowering young voters to reshape national politics despite institutional resistance.

The Dark Side of Social Media

Social media in the hands of the youths can also be a double-edged sword. It can empower the people, but it can also be weaponised to deceive them. Nowhere is this more evident than in the whitewashing of corruption and dictatorship.

In the Philippines, the Marcos family turned social media into a propaganda machine, rewriting history and painting the brutal Marcos dictatorship as a “golden age”. YouTube and Facebook were flooded with revisionist content, downplaying human rights abuses and glorifying an era of plunder and oppression. This relentless online misinformation campaign worked—Marcos Jr. rode the wave of digital deception all the way to the presidency.

In Malaysia, Najib Razak, convicted for his role in the 1MDB scandal, used social media to rebuild his image. His “Bossku” persona on Facebook and Instagram transformed him from a disgraced leader into a man of the people. He posted selfies. He cracked jokes. He played the victim. Suddenly, he was not a kleptocrat anymore—he was a hero to many.

This is the terrifying power of social media. It does not just shape the present—it rewrites the past.

In the digital age, the erasure and rewriting of history through social media not only deceives the present but also imperils the integrity of future generations’ understanding of truth.

The youth of today are unshackled from the past. They do not carry the weight of old political battles or the emotional baggage of previous generations. History, to them, is not lived experience—it is content they consume online.

Just like how Marcos Jr. benefitted from a rewritten past, we see the same phenomenon in Malaysia with Anwar Ibrahim’s Reformasi movement. In 1998, Reformasi was a fiery rebellion against Mahathir Mohamad’s rule, marked by street protests, mass arrests and cries for justice.

For those who lived through it, Anwar was either a hero or a threat—there was no in-between. But for today’s youth, 1998 is not a memory, it is a hashtag. They see Reformasi not through the lens of those who fought for it, but through the narratives being shaped today.

The same Anwar who was once the face of resistance is now the prime minister, navigating compromises and coalitions. For the youth, the past is not set in stone—it is fluid, shaped by what trends, what gets shared and what is most convincing in the digital age.

Indonesia, ASEAN’s most populous democracy, is no different. President Prabowo Subianto’s transformation is nothing short of a political masterclass in digital rebranding. Once a controversial military figure, even banned from entering the United States, he is now Indonesia’s president—winning outright in the first round with 58.6% of the vote.

How? Social media magic. His campaign deployed the gemoy strategy, turning him from a feared general into an adorable, meme-worthy grandfather figure. Viral videos showed him dancing with his cat Bobby, AI-generated animations softened his image and TikTok flooded with content making him look fun, lovable, and approachable.

This was not just a campaign—it was a full-blown digital personality makeover. And it worked. Youth voters, who once saw him as a relic of the past, now saw him as their gemoy leader. In today’s politics, perception is reality—and social media decides both.

Final Reflections

The latest ISEAS survey in six Southeast Asian countries showed that young undergraduates rarely engage in political discussions online, with more than 50% of youths in five out of the six countries surveyed never or rarely discuss political or social issues online.

However, it fails to capture the nuances of youth activism.

Just because they do not actively post about politics does not mean they are apolitical or politically ignorant. More often than not, these youths are “lurkers” online—consuming hours of political content without actively posting. In fact, they are often more politically informed than older generations (the boomers), thanks to their constant exposure to digital information and reliance on social media as their primary news source.

This phenomenon becomes most evident during elections, when young people, once labelled as “politically disinterested”, suddenly mobilise in massive numbers to vote—often becoming the decisive force in political outcomes.

A local poll conducted just one month before Malaysia’s GE14 showed that more than 50% of youths were disinterested in politics. Yet, in less than 30 days, over 80% of young voters turned up to vote. Not only that, they also actively convinced their parents and grandparents to vote in their favour—triggering the greatest political upset in Malaysia’s electoral history.

All of these show that social media has become the new battleground for power. It can spark revolutions, rewrite history, elevate the fallen and bring down the mighty. It has given the youth of ASEAN a voice louder than ever before—a voice that can shape policies, influence elections and redefine national narratives.

But with great power comes great risk. The same platforms that expose corruption can also whitewash it. The same digital tools that empower democracy can also manipulate it.

The future of ASEAN will not be decided in old halls of power alone, but in the ever-evolving digital arenas where perception is reality and those who control the narrative control the future. The question is no longer whether social media matters—it is who masters it first.

Introduction

China’s maritime coercion directed against the Philippines reached a peak in 2024, with ships and boats from China harassing Philippine civilian vessels between July and September 2024.

Such reports of aggressive and dangerous conduct on China’s side have been increasing at an alarming rate. Since February 2023, the Philippines has accused China of unsafe behavior on at least 12 occasions, often within its exclusive economic zone (EEZ).

To illustrate this, there were two separate “ramming” incidents that had taken place between the ships of the Chinese and Philippine coast guards. One of such incidents caused severe damage to the hull of one of the latter’s vessels in waters near Sabina Atoll, well within the Philippines’ EEZ.

A spokesperson of the Philippine National Maritime Council stated that China’s illegal actions do not contribute to confidence-building measures that are necessary to achieve mutual respect and preserve a rules-based international order.

Despite both sides agreeing in July 2024 to avoid confrontations during resupply missions to Philippine troops at a disputed shoal, recent events have called into question China’s sincerity. A month later, two Chinese planes released flares in the path of a Philippine military aircraft over the Scarborough Shoal, thus contradicting the agreement.

Geopolitical Concerns and Chinese Maritime Aggression

Southeast Asia is beset by a host of maritime security threats, including illegal, unreported and unregulated (IUU) fishing, piracy, sea robbery, illegal trafficking in arms, people, and drugs, as well as environmental crimes.

Institutions responding to these issues have proliferated, both inside and outside the purview of ASEAN. Indeed, the region is considered the “center of intensifying geopolitical competition with multiple potential flashpoints.”

Within Southeast Asia, the Philippines is a major maritime trading hub. Its territorial waters abound with enormous natural resources, beautiful beaches, minerals and hydrocarbon deposits. The protection of merchant, fishing and tourism vessels has thus created the need for constant monitoring of the maritime area. 

Given the tremendous maritime traffic, the Philippine Navy and the Philippine Coast Guard are tasked with dealing with IUU fishing, piracy, armed robbery, the trafficking of drugs and people, as well as the transport of illegal goods by sea.

With such hefty tasks at hand, the intrusion of Chinese vessels has thus added another problem to the mix.

However, it is a mistake to perceive this problem solely from the Philippines’ perspective, as China’s maritime activities can never be extricated from its broader strategic competition with the United States in the Indo-Pacific region.

On the United States’ part, it has political and moral obligations to maintain its position in areas threatened by Chinese incursions, including in the South China Sea, the East China Sea and the Yellow Sea.

Among others, these include: 1) keeping the regional balance of power favorable to the United States and its allies; 2) safeguarding US-led security architecture in the Western Pacific, and; 3) upholding its commitments to Japan and the Philippines.

The United States has undertaken various actions to attain these goals, which comprise activities such as: 1) transferring military personnel, equipment and supplies to bases at sites occupied in the South China Sea, and; 2) upholding the July 2016 tribunal award in the South China Sea arbitration case of the Philippines and China.

The Academic Perspective

It should be noted that China’s maritime strategy is derived from serious academic works on naval study and the alignment of military doctrine with national defense modernization, as written by Lidong Wang in “Theory of National Maritime Interest.”

These studies are done by the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Academy of Military Science and the PLA National Defense University, which focus on the use of armed force, tactics, and military theories.

Many sea power theorists center their assessments on China’s continental power and its rising international status. Interestingly, some, like James Holmes and Toshi Yoshihara, found the commonalities between China’s strategy in the South China Sea and the United States’ in the Caribbean Sea.

These studies offer adequate knowledge regarding China’s increasing naval capability as well as the implications of China as a sea power—China’s intrusion into the Philippines’ waters being one manifestation of such.

Accordingly, a narrative has emerged into how the state should pursue its maritime policies. Such studies suggest the expansion of naval influence, the acquisition of deterrent sea power and the focus on the protection of sea lines of communication, according to Wenmu Zhang in Discussion of China’s Sea Power.

As shown, extensive research has been pursued pertaining to Chinese maritime power development.

In 2009, Chinese academics such as Wu Shicun, Xu Liping, Zhang Jie and Zhong Feiteng promoted their ideas on China’s international roles, diplomatic relations with the United States and China’s prominence in Southeast Asia. Their research centered on raising possible policy approaches to resolve debates and foster collaboration in the region.

Other studies also cover non-dispute-related maritime issues. Scholars of these areas posit that the information environment is strategic to China’s energy and logistic supply. Examples include studies on the “Malacca Dilemma” and the “String of Pearls,” which are associated with China’s energy imports and sea control.

Efforts to Safeguard Territorial Integrity

The Philippines has undertaken steps to safeguard its territorial integrity by emphasizing the importance of international law and through engagement with ASEAN.

While leveraging on international law is important, the Philippines still needs to continuously highlight in international forums about China’s violations of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), especially considering both the Philippines and China are parties to UNCLOS.

For example, the Philippines needs to highlight the outcome of the 2016 South China Sea Arbitration that found China’s claim as incompatible. The arbitration resulted in several key decision points.

Firstly, China’s claims to historic rights and resources have no legal basis. Secondly, none of China’s claimed land features in the Spratly Islands are islands capable of generating a 200-nm EEZ. Thirdly, China violated the Philippines’ sovereign rights on several layers: 1) interfering with the latter’s oil exploration activities; 2) prohibiting its fishing vessels from operating; 3) failing to prevent Chinese fishing vessels from operating and; 4) conducting land reclamation in areas where the Philippines enjoys sovereign rights to explore for and exploit natural resources. Lastly, China violated its marine environmental protection obligations under UNCLOS by causing “severe harm to the coral reef environment” with its land reclamation activities and harvesting of endangered species.

Despite this, China has lodged its non-participation and non-acceptance of this ruling.

The impact of the 2016 arbitral ruling is threefold. First, the arbitration denies the effectivity of China’s maritime security strategy in the South China Sea. Second, it denies China’s historic rights claim. Third, it gives independent states recourse to the merits of UNCLOS in the face of China’s sea power in the South China Sea.

In other words, it has reinforced the Philippines’ contention that the actions of China in the South China Sea are “Illegal, Coercive, Aggressive and Deceptive.”

As a strategy to promote this ruling, President Ferdinand Marcos signed Executive Order 57 on 25 March 2024, to deal with issues that impact the country’s national security, sovereignty, sovereign rights and maritime jurisdiction over its extensive maritime zones. The Philippines continues to present the merits of the 2016 Arbitral Ruling in all public forums and implement exhaustive efforts to maintain its full adherence to the rule of law.

Efforts to Counter Maritime Aggression

The Philippines’ strategic alignment with the United States, Japan and Australia is a clear response to China’s intrusion. Under the auspices of the US Indo-Pacific Strategy, the Philippines can coalesce international support to maintain its position vis-à-vis China’s activities in the South China Sea.

There is strength in number. The leaders of the United States, Japan, India and Australia have collectively declared their concern about the situation in the East and South China Seas,  the “coercive and intimidating maneuvres” by China in the latter.

Even with such support in place, the Philippines must adopt a two-fold strategy to deal with China’s recurring activities within its EEZ.

The first strategy is to allow the United States and other foreign vessels to join the regular resupply mission to the BRP Sierra Madre, a tank-landing vessel under the Philippine Navy. If the Philippines’ resupply vessels are accompanied by foreign vessels, this may deter the Chinese maritime militia from carrying out its ramming techniques. Thus, the resupply missions can be peaceful and may be completed without any incident.

The second strategy is to allow active-duty Filipino Americans in the United States’ armed forces to join the resupply mission on board Philippine vessels.

The Philippines is one of several countries that recognize dual citizenship, with more than 15,000 Filipino Americans actively serving in the United States Navy, some of whom have achieved ranks of leadership at all levels. 

Many Filipino American officers are known as “mustangs,” naval service members who have worked through their career path from the bottom to the top. This is an honor that is difficult to attain and those mustangs are valuable repositories of knowledge as well as experience wherever they go.

The Philippines may put a request to the United States to allow Filipino-American naval officers to participate in regular resupply missions to the BRP Sierra Madre and in the patrolling of territorial waters in the South China Sea. The presence of Filipino Americans inside the Philippine vessels would help boost confidence among the Philippine Coast Guard and the Philippine Navy officers.

Conclusion

Chinese aggression within the Philippines’ EEZ has increased dramatically in the second half of this year. These actions have resulted in increased tensions between the two, thus threatening regional stability. Furthermore, despite a joint China-Philippine arrangement, which focuses on refraining from aggression during resupply missions to BRP Sierra Madre, China has not adhered to its commitments. This has called into question the viability of any diplomatic agreements with China.

The time has come for the Philippines to adopt more creative ways to deter China. The two-pronged strategy of including American vessels and Filipino American naval officers for regular resupply missions may offer a boost to maritime stability.

Filipino officials need to go beyond just diplomatic efforts to address the tensions in the South China Sea. These two creative solutions, which constitute peaceful strategies, may lead to better maritime security and regional stability in the long term.

Part of an ongoing article series on the impact of the Middle East conflict on Southeast Asia.

The Context Today

The ongoing Israeli war on Gaza has reached a critical juncture. Despite efforts by negotiators towards an immediate ceasefire and for humanitarian aid to be delivered, the talks have borne frustrating results.

In brief, the future of Israel-Palestine relations remains uncertain, as does the stability of the Middle East region at large.

The inability of the UN and other intergovernmental institutions to effect change in the geopolitical situation not only worsens the humanitarian crisis but also renders the legitimacy and capability of global regimes questionable.

The failure of the UN to protect Palestinian civilians exposes the ugly reality that even trusted global institutions and legal regimes can do nothing when the interests of global power are at stake.

The position of powerful Western countries in support of Israel and the opposing policy of non-Western powers like China and Russia have made it difficult for the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) to function effectively. The polarized responses of powerful countries on the issue, in the UNSC and beyond, have further deepened human rights violations in Gaza.

Regional insecurity has become more profound. Middle Eastern countries have been careful in calculating their moves vis-à-vis the crisis to preserve relative regional peace and security.

Still, certain geopolitical dilemmas and nuances begin to manifest themselves. For one, the conflict has also expanded to Lebanon and potentially Iran at the time of writing.

The inability of the UNSC to mediate may force other countries, both inside and outside the region, to directly or indirectly engage in the conflict.

For decades, the region has been mired in conflict as a result of long-standing colonial legacies and sustained external intervention pitting Middle Eastern countries against each other.

The Western deterritorialization project affecting geographic and socio-cultural domains in Arab and non-Arab Middle East has created multiple sovereignties and given way to sustained rivalries among state and non-state actors in the region.

The creation of Israel in 1948, for example, was received unfavorably by the Palestinians and several Arab countries. The series of Arab-Israeli wars and Arab-Palestinian conflicts, hence, have become the main determinant of past, present and possibly future peace discussions.

The polarizing policies of Western countries favoring Israel questions the West’s long-standing claim of championing humanitarianism. Scholars, politicians, students and the grassroots begin to ask if these countries still hold moral and ethical ascendancy, at least in the context of the Israeli war on Gaza.

Meanwhile, Al Jazeera’s uncensored coverage of the war presents the graphic reality of violations of human rights and international conventions, such as protecting public spaces like schools and hospitals during wartime.

The protests not only question the inhuman treatment of Palestinian civilians but also the motivations behind continued investment in Israel; they put pressure on many companies, universities and governments to reconsider their support as well as complicity in Israel’s atrocities. The diversity of Southeast Asian responses to the humanitarian crisis in Gaza can also be exploited by existing fundamentalist organizations in the region.

Nonetheless, some take the pro-Israeli position, arguing that Israel has the “right to exist” while condemning Hamas’ attacks on Israel as acts of “terrorism”.

Divergence in Southeast Asia

Southeast Asian states have diverging positions on the issue. Muslim countries like Malaysia, Indonesia and Brunei condemn Israeli forces for killing Palestinian civilians and question the effectiveness of international law and rule-based order.

The Malaysian Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim decried the Israeli war on Gaza, banning Israeli ships from docking on Malaysian ports. Meanwhile, Indonesia has pledged to continue its support for the Palestinian people by advancing the two-state solution.

Both Malaysia and Indonesia have even included the future of the Palestinian people in their foreign policy agenda.

Similarly, Singapore consistently supports the two-state solution and the primacy of international law. Considering its sizeable Muslim population, Singapore takes the “principled decision” of being a “friend to all and enemy to none”. Essentially, it aims to maintain relations with Israel while balancing its national interests and humanitarianism.

The Philippines takes a different approach altogether, continuing its official policy to support Israel but condemning the “terrorist” attacks of Hamas on Israeli citizens. The Philippines sees Israel as an allied country, second only to the United States. This may have created an awkward yet inevitable contrast between the Philippines’ stance and others in Southeast Asia, particularly the Muslim-majority nations.

Thailand and Singapore’s muted condemnation of Israel is calculated, as each has its own strategic and economic interests both with Israel and the United States.

Geopolitical uncertainties would force countries in Southeast Asia to re-evaluate their policies and approaches toward the region. It is important to note that these countries are also acting based on their national interests and domestic concerns.

Given the global strategic relevance of the Middle East in terms of history, energy supply, trade routes and migration, a prolonged war can cause further damages to global trade as well as foreign relations, while also weakening the prospects for humanitarian protection.

Historical Connection and Alliance with the United States

The position of the Philippine government and the support of the Filipino people to Israel are not without basis.

Officially, the Philippines voted for the partition of Palestine and the eventual creation of the State of Israel under UNGA Resolution 181 in 1947. In fact, the Philippines was the only Asian country that supported the creation of Israel.

Even earlier, in 1934, the government of former president Manuel Quezon welcomed the Jews who fled Europe amid Nazi persecution. With US High Commissioner McNutt and the Frieder brothers, the Philippines implemented an “open door” policy and authorized the issuance of 1,300 entry visas to Jewish refugees.

From the strategic point of view, the Philippines has always followed the United States as a big brother: its “blind support for Israel” is rooted in the unquestionable American-Israeli alliance.

In addition, a strategic partnership between the Philippines and Israel was inked in 2022 when both signed the Investment Promotion and Protection Agreement (IPPA), which covered areas such as water management, agriculture, cybersecurity, defense industry, smart transportation, manufacturing and diamond industry development, among others.

From the religious point of view, the predominantly Catholic Filipino people believe that Israel is the “promised land” and the place where Jesus was born. Indeed, around 40% of Filipinos mirror the government’s position on the war, while more than half are neutral.

Implications for the Philippines

The Philippines has always been vulnerable to geopolitical and security tensions in the Middle East. This has been the reality for the Philippines since the 1970s and it will continue until the country can fully exercise an independent foreign policy. This vulnerability arises from the country’s inability to direct its interests beyond its territories.

Furthermore, the country depends on the international labor market. 10% of its population is working and residing abroad. The majority of Filipino migrant workers are in the Middle East and their exposure to the regional conflict is undeniable.

The National Economic Development Authority’s claim that the war has “hardly any impact” on the Philippine economy is shortsighted. This is because of the country’s dependence on two critical elements of its relationship with the Middle East: oil and overseas Filipino workers (OFWs).  

These elements are vital to Philippine economic growth and development, yet their relevance is challenged by compounding regional events beyond the Philippine government’s control. Hence, for the Philippines, a peaceful Middle East is good for business, as it allows the smooth flow of oil as well as Filipino workers to the region and foreign remittances to the Philippine economy.

The Philippines’ position on the conflict is influenced by several considerations, the most important of which are history and the Philippine-American alliance, along with economic reasons and the safety of OFWs.

OFWs and Remittance

The conflict threatens the lives and safety of OFWs in the region. Recent data from the Philippine Statistics Authority shows that in 2023, the breakdown of OFW destinations is as follows: Asia (77.4%), North and South America (9.8%), Europe (8.4%), Australia (3.0%), and Africa (1.3%). Saudi Arabia was the leading destination for OFWs, accounting for 20% of the total, followed by the UAE at 13.6%.

Around 30,000 OFWs, mostly caregivers, are living and working in Israel. In 2023, their cash remittances to the Philippines reached ₱109.14 million, slightly lower than that in 2021 and 2022, which totaled ₱119.86 million and ₱110.63 million, respectively.

This is minimal compared with records from Saudi Arabia, the third largest source of overall remittances, from which OFW transfers amounted to US$307.981 million, or 5.6% of the total.

Saudi Arabia is followed by the UAE, which recorded remittances amounting to US$206.29 million, or 3.8%.

In comparison, available data shows that there are only a hundred plus Filipinos in Gaza, mainly married to Palestinian nationals. There is no available data so far on remittances coming from Filipinos in Gaza.

Great Concerns for the Philippines

Beyond the scope of OFWs, the Philippines are also facing other challenges emanating from the conflict. These include: 1) political and energy instability; 2) emergence of anti-Israeli sentiments; 3) conflict exploitation by domestic and regional terrorist organizations, and; 4) potential influx of Palestinian refugees.

As the conflict extended to Lebanon, Yemen and potentially Iran, there is a great deal of anxiety for a potential regional war. This could have global economic and security implications. It may impact the delivery of crude oil to the global market and lead to energy price volatility due either to shortage or market speculation.

Given the Philippines’ massive dependency on Middle Eastern oil, its volatility could affect the price movements of basic commodities and services domestically.

Another potential challenge for the Philippines and the rest of Southeast Asia is the rise of pro-Palestinian sentiment. All around the world, many students of big and small universities take part in public protests to demand the cessation of the Israel-Hamas war.

For instance, students at Columbia University in New York demanded the university’s divestiture from Israel over the “genocide” committed by the Israeli Defense Forces. Despite the government’s policy, modest protests could still be observed in several parts of the Philippines, although not as intense and disruptive as in other countries like the United States.

Finally, as the war continues, more Palestinian refugees may reach the Philippines, although so far only Filipinos married to Palestinians in Gaza have sought refuge in the archipelago since the beginning of the war. The presence of refugees in the country may add to the economic, legal and socio-cultural pressures that burden the host government.

Conclusion

The ongoing Israeli war on Gaza exposed the inability of governments and institutions to take action in favor of an immediate ceasefire. Existing international conventions and legal regimes supposedly for the preservation of humanity are powerless. With the polarizing attitudes of the UNSC permanent members and other powers, the UN has so far not been able to make an impactful decision to stop the war.

The Philippines’s strong support for Israel is based primarily on historical precedence and its national interests. Materially, the country’s strategic economic and political partnerships with Israel and the United States defined much of the country’s policy rhetoric. However, the country also stands to lose if the conflict in the Middle East expands to the whole region.

Introduction

President Ferdinand “Bongbong” Marcos Jr. of the Philippines plays a crucial role in the intricate geopolitical dynamics of Southeast Asia.

The administration’s strategic realignment towards strengthening ties with the United States represents a notable change in regional politics, especially in light of the escalating rivalry between the United States and China.

The reconfiguration is driven by the wider involvement of the United States in the area, as demonstrated by initiatives like the AUKUS security agreement involving Australia, the United Kingdom and the United States.

Although the Philippines is not directly participating in AUKUS, the agreement highlights the potential advantages that Manila could gain from military and strategic collaboration, particularly considering its ongoing maritime conflicts with Beijing.

The bolstered US military presence in the area, backed by agreements such as AUKUS, acts as a deterrent to China’s aggressive territorial assertions, particularly in the South China Sea. The sea in question serves as a focal point in the diplomatic relations between the Philippines and China, thus making the support of the United States vital to Manila’s strategy of deterrence.

Marcos Jr. aims to utilize the advantageous position of the Philippines to optimize its diplomatic and security advantages, by aligning more closely with US interests in order to strengthen its regional position.

Not So Easy

Nevertheless, the possibility of Donald Trump returning to the presidency in the United States brings about a sense of uncertainty regarding the changing security condition.

During Trump’s previous term, there were notable changes towards isolationism, evident in his decision to withdraw from international agreements and his skepticism towards long-established alliances.

An exemplary instance was his choice to withdraw from the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), a decision that was widely perceived as a withdrawal from the United States’ involvement in shaping regional economic frameworks and countering China’s increasing influence in the Asia-Pacific region.

Moreover, Trump’s lack of clear commitment to NATO and his confrontational requests for member nations to augment their defense expenditures demonstrated a more general unwillingness to participate in collaborative endeavors. The President’s decision to withdraw from the Paris Climate Agreement has further strengthened this pattern, indicating a potential scaling back of US participation in international obligations, which may be reinstated if he assumes office again.

The potential consequences of a Trump presidency have significant implications for the Philippines. Trump’s policies of isolationism may result in a decrease in the United States’ defense obligations, including those pertaining to the South China Sea.

This region holds significant importance for the Philippines, not only because of its ongoing territorial conflicts with China but also as a crucial passageway for global commerce.

If there is any uncertainty in the support provided by the United States, Marcos Jr. may need to adjust his foreign policy. This could involve seeking new alliances or enhancing the country’s military capabilities within its own borders to make up for the perceived withdrawal of US support.

If Trump’s isolationist approaches are reinstated, Marcos Jr.’s foreign policy strategy, which currently depends heavily on US support, could be at risk. The Philippines could be vulnerable if the United States reduces or withdraws its military presence, particularly in light of its recent assertive position against China.

This revelation may be interpreted within the country as a setback to Marcos Jr.’s plan to strengthen the Philippines’ global reputation and improve its security, which could potentially result in political instability domestically.

Internally, the political dynamics within the Philippines are highly responsive to changes in foreign policy. Marcos Jr.’s predecessor, Rodrigo Duterte, had developed stronger relations with China, moving away from the traditionally pro-US foreign policy path of the Philippines.

Duterte’s adoption of a pro-China policy was a strategic move aimed at expanding the Philippines’ diplomatic ties and decreasing its dependence on the United States.

If Marcos Jr.’s strategy, which is aligned with the United States, is unsuccessful in obtaining the expected support due to changes in US policy under a potential Trump administration, it may result in a revival of pro-China sentiment within the country, potentially led by Duterte or his political allies.

This has the potential to stimulate opposition movements and shape public opinion, resulting in a substantial transformation of the political environment. These changes have the potential to undermine Marcos Jr.’s legislative agenda and impact the electoral prospects of both him and his political allies.

Therefore, it is emphasized that there is a requirement for a well-rounded and adaptable foreign policy that can respond to changes in the global landscape while protecting the interests of the nation.

It Is All about Hedging

For Marcos Jr., effectively managing the delicate balance of international alliances, regional tensions and domestic political pressures is of utmost importance. Ineffectively handling these aspects could potentially lead to the Philippines becoming isolated on the global stage and undermine trust and confidence within the country, which would have negative consequences for the overall stability and effectiveness of the administration.

Aligning with the United States and taking a more assertive position on China signify substantial shifts from the previous administration’s approach. Trump’s return could disrupt this strategic positioning, making Marcos Jr. susceptible to domestic scrutiny and political obstacles.

The relationship between the Philippines’ foreign policy and its domestic political landscape is a constantly changing and flexible process, shaped by worldwide political patterns, regional security issues and internal political considerations. Essentially, Marcos Jr.’s foreign policy maneuver is a risky strategy with both positive and negative consequences.

Although there are advantages to aligning with the United States, relying too heavily on this partnership – considering the unpredictable nature of US politics – could result in significant challenges both domestically and internationally.

To successfully navigate this intricate terrain, it is essential to employ a sophisticated and flexible foreign policy strategy that can effectively protect the interests of the Philippines, irrespective of any changes in its relationships with major global powers.

The ASEAN Conundrum

In addition to the domestic and bilateral challenges discussed, an alignment with the United States places the Philippines in a precarious position within ASEAN.

Historically, the grouping has pursued a strategy of hedging—balancing relationships between major powers to avoid overt partiality and to maintain regional stability and autonomy. This strategy has allowed ASEAN Member States (AMS) to leverage relationships with both the United States and China, gaining benefits from each without becoming overly reliant on either.

However, putting all eggs on the US basket risks straining the Philippines’ relations with ASEAN. This shift could be perceived by other AMS as a departure from ASEAN’s traditional collective stance of neutrality and non-confrontation.

Such a perception might lead to diplomatic friction, as other AMS may be concerned about the implications of the Philippines’ US alignment for their own security and regional dynamics.

Moreover, ASEAN’s cautious approach to China contrasts sharply with the more confrontational stance that the Philippines is adopting under Marcos Jr. This divergence could isolate the Philippines within ASEAN and potentially reducing its influence in regional forums. In an organization that operates by consensus, the lack of alignment with the broader group could diminish the Philippines’ ability to shape regional policies and initiatives.

This potential isolation within ASEAN could compound the vulnerabilities Marcos Jr. faces due to potential shifts in the United States’ policy. If the superpower were to retract its military and strategic commitments in the region, the Philippines would find itself doubly disadvantaged—lacking both the robust backing of the United States and the supportive buffer traditionally provided by ASEAN.

Such a scenario could necessitate a recalibration of Marcos Jr.’s foreign policy to realign more closely with ASEAN’s principles of hedging and neutrality, or to seek strengthened bilateral relationships within the group.

Conclusion

Therefore, while Marcos Jr.’s alignment with the United States offers potential security benefits, it also introduces complexities into the Philippines’ regional relationships, particularly with ASEAN.

Balancing these relationships will require a nuanced approach to diplomacy that respects ASEAN’s collective ethos while safeguarding the Philippines’ national interests. Navigating this delicate balance is essential to ensure that the Philippines remains a proactive and respected member of the regional community, capable of influencing outcomes and advancing its national agenda in a rapidly evolving geopolitical landscape.

Introduction

The election of President Bongbong Marcos Jr. as the 17^th and current President of the Philippines is welcomed by a larger percentage of Filipino electorates. Voters hoped the president could transform the country’s pandemic-wrecked economy into a thriving one.

The president’s series of foreign travels in 2022 indicate his resolve to strengthen the country’s relations with the international community and attract foreign investors. However, the Philippines might find its options limited as today’s global power competition – signified by the US-China competition – may easily derail the Philippines’ interest should the Marcos Jr. administration fail to play the balancing game.

Instead, the Philippines should cast its sight beyond the usual suspects. The Philippine should take advantage of Middle East and North African (MENA) countries in terms of sourcing foreign capital investment, energy supply and external market for its exported products. Given that foreign policy orientation of the Philippines in the previous decades vis-à-vis the MENA region was concerned more on Overseas Filipino Workers (OFWs), the Marcos Jr. administration should start tapping MENA as the source of investments and market for Filipino products.

The recent creation of the Department of Overseas Workers should not only signal the rationalization of commitments and services to OFWs, but also an opportunity to expand the Philippines’ economy into other sectors. Fortunately, the MENA region offers ample opportunities to further these agendas.

MENA’s Relevance to the Philippines

Since the 1970s, the MENA region has constantly been the source of crude oil supplies to the Philippines as well as the market for Filipino workers. The Philippines first opened its diplomatic doors with the regimes in MENA during the time of former President Marcos Sr., after which the Philippines started sending its workers to the region.

It can be surmised that the newly installed president should also be familiar of this historical milestone in the country’s foreign relations. Therefore, Marcos Jr. should consider making the MENA region an important component of his foreign policy priority in the next six years.

A question remains: did Marcos Jr. inherit his father’s diplomatic skills and tact? This is a question that only time itself would answer.

Diversifying Priorities

Recent geopolitical flux in the Asia-Pacific region requires the Marcos Jr. administration to be selectively strategic in exercising foreign policy options. This could mean that while the Philippines dances with both rival giant economies, it has to profoundly diversify foreign policy options in the name of national interests and gain more opportunities for the Philippines outside the ambit of global power competition.

MENA is perhaps one of the regions in the globe that for decades have been underrated in the Philippines’ foreign policy priorities. Although it is true that the Philippines has sent millions of OFWs to as well as imported much of its fossil fuel from the region, there are certainly many more opportunities to explore.

Given that the country’s foreign relations in the past decades were very much centered on Cold War geopolitics, its ability to explore other opportunities was thus limited. Because of this, the country was unable to access more capital investment from as well as export its products to MENA region.

The Philippine government and its officials should begin thinking beyond the Cold War mentality and embrace new options available in MENA. Embracing such options can provide the Philippines not only with ample opportunities to reassert its true identity and purpose, but also a momentum to adopt new innovative approaches in conducting foreign relations.

Fortunately, some recent developments could provide a window for the Philippines to explore these new opportunities with MENA.

Internally, the Philippines has just succeeded in passing into law the creation of the Department of Migrant Workers, a department which has long been awaited by many OFWs to cater to their needs and issues. Before this, the OFWs were the primary responsibility of the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA), in collaboration with other labor agencies of the government. The Department of Migrant Workers may take away some of the responsibilities on this matter off the Department of Foreign Affairs, therefore giving the latter more space to focus on diplomacy and improve relations with other countries.

The Department of Migrant Workers will now have a full working capacity in addressing OFWs concerns and issues. Although it needs to work on its structure as well as its budget in the coming months or so, it is seen by many as an alternative department that could seriously cater to the interests of Filipino overseas workers.

Externally, the MENA region has seen better prospect for cooperation between Israel and Arab countries.

The signing of the Abraham’s Accord may be seen by many Muslim countries to be a half-cooked initiative for peace and would probably fail in the coming years due to its limited partnerships. Some, however, see it as a good opportunity to kickstart the cooperation between Israeli and Arab partners that for many decades has been tainted by the Israeli-Palestinian issue.

The normalization of Israel-Arab ties may lead to false claim on creating peace in the region, but it can somewhat contribute for better work opportunities for Filipinos in service industries to increase opportunities to employment as well travel and effective facilitation of commercial goods.

The normalization of relationship between Israel and the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Sudan, Morocco, Egypt as well as Jordan may possibly increase the prospects for peace and cooperation between the former antagonists. This could be a strategic boon to the Philippines, giving the country an opportunity to better expand its relations with both sides with little attention to the geopolitical issues that have defined these relationships in the past years.

The Philippine recognizes that the expansion of the Abraham’s Accord to Saudi Arabia, Turkey and other regional countries could be an important component for creating a better prospect for peace and cooperation. However, the steps that have already been taken provide the Philippines an optimistic signal to explore deeper commercial and labor cooperation with Israel and Arab countries.

Way Ahead

The idea of an independent foreign policy, that former President Duterte espoused during his term, should continue and be the bedrock of Marcos Jr.’s foreign policy strategy vis-à-vis the MENA region. In addition, the Philippines should exercise asymmetrical balancing to give itself a chance to explore and expand cooperation beyond the traditional oil and foreign workers portfolios when it comes to dealing with MENA. 

Given that an estimated number of two million Filipinos are working and living in the MENA region currently, it is a vital interest of the Philippines to prioritize their welfare.

Furthermore, the Marcos Jr. administration needs to come up with a strategic plan of action on how the Philippines can take advantage of the MENA market as well as attract their capital investment.

Aside from India and China, four other countries in the Southeast Asia, namely Malaysia, Brunei, Singapore, and Indonesia, have seen a considerable rise of Arab investment since 2012, while the Philippines has largely been ignored. This is despite some opportunities that are available. For example, MENA countries can invest in several economic areas in the Philippines such as in agro-industry, mining, halal products, renewable energy and agroforestry, innovation, as well as information technology, among others.

In addition, tourism industry is a strategic area that the Philippine can promote to MENA countries. Records shows that MENA tourist frequently travels to Southeast Asian countries such as to Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia and the Philippines. Given that the Philippines is a predominantly Catholic country, it has to prepare its facilities to attract more Muslim tourists from the Middle East region. In addition, it has to increase tourist accreditation as well as improve the country’s halal industry.

Saudi Arabia leads the MENA region in terms of the number of tourist arrival in the Philippines, both pre- and post-pandemic. For example, in 2019 it ranked number one among the Philippines’ source markets in the Middle East, with 43,748 visitors. Since the Philippines reopened, Saudi Arabia has contributed as many as 9,424 arrivals.

Given this, the Marcos Jr. administration should double its effort in attracting MENA tourists and include tourism as a strategic industry to generate revenues and create jobs for local people.

Finally, the government should continuously consult and partner with academic and research institutions, business sectors as well as non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in order to come up with an effective strategic plan of action that will help promote the interests of the Philippines in the MENA region.

Some steps have been taken, such as the signing of the Philippine-United Arab Emirates (UAE) investment promotion and protection agreement. The agreement is expected to generate around 7.1 billion worth of investment and 2,500 jobs for Filipinos. More positive measures such as this are needed, however.

Organizational restructuring helps as well. The newly formalized Department of Migrant Workers will give 100% of its attention in addressing OFWs concerns, thus enabling the Departments of Foreign Affairs, Trade and Industry, Tourism, as well as Science and Technology to pursue these matters above. On a final note, the Philippines-Middle East relations need to move beyond the traditional areas of cooperation and start consider a more strategic, elevated and mutually beneficial partnerships where both sides can gain. The time to do that is now.

Introduction

The 2017 Soufan Center report states that at least 1,000 fighters from Southeast Asia (some references estimate it closer to 1,500) have joined the Islamic State in Syria and Iraq (ISIS) . However, the exact number of Filipino Foreign Terrorist Fighters (FTFs) and their families is uncertain. The only validated information is that of Ellen Jen Barriga and her husband, Mohammad Reza Kiram, who died in Syria as an Islamic State (IS) fighter. With their children, they left the Philippines to join IS in 2015. This highlights how violent extremists have turned to their spouses and extended families as recruits. Thus, policymakers must consider their family dynamics and individual radicalization experiences if their return to the Philippines are accepted.    

The following sections will discuss individual radicalization from several perspectives via a case study of a Filipino family: the father, mother and children. Descriptions of these are from the perspective of the sociocultural, religious and psychological context of being a Filipino Muslim FTF.

The Father and the Husband– Muhammed Reza Lahaman Kiram, a.k.a. “Abdul Rahman Al-Filipini”

Kiram’s Pathway to Extremism: A Devout Filipino Muslim Tausug Millennial

Kiram’s ethnic affiliation is “Tausug,” known as “people of the current” and “fierce people,” which is the prominent tribe in Mindanao scattered in Zamboanga, Basilan, Tawi-Tawi, and Sulu. Though not the direct descendants, his family belongs to the sultanate of Sulu, who are claimants of Sabah. He was raised in Zamboanga City and had a typical upbringing from childhood to young adulthood. He was a millennial who lived comfortably with his businessman father while his mother was a nurse in Saudi Arabia before he became part of IS. Like any millennial, he spent much of his time online, eventually leading to his online IS radicalization. He started by questioning people around him about everything he read, including the unlawful persecution of Palestinians, Syrians, and Muslim Filipinos which made him furious. His primary motivation was to seek justice for all the abuse his fellow Muslims suffered at the hands of the non-Muslims. Highly fueled by IS propaganda, he firmly believed that Islam was under attack and that it was his duty, as a Muslim man, to protect it.

Kiram was an idealistic young man who studied Islamic Jurisprudence in a madrasah (Muslim school). He was also a talented, influential young Muslim who was particularly passionate during religious discussions. Notably, he was a polyglot fluent in Malay, Turkish, Arabic, English, Filipino and Tausug. With such a profile, he became a prized target for recruitment by IS. Initially, Kiram was secretive about his involvement with IS while still in the Philippines. The first sign of Kiram’s radicalization that worried his family was when he started to attend a hardline mosque associated with Tablighi Jamaat, a missionary movement from South Asia suspected of nurturing militants. Despite vehemently denying it, his family’s greatest fear of him pledging allegiance to IS became a reality.

Kiram’s Full Radicalization as a Politico-Religious Extremist

Kiram eventually became a senior IS member who recruited and instructed others, Filipino and FTFs. Specifically, Kiram was suspected of conducting a 2012 bus bombing in Zamboanga City and IS-linked Ansar Khalifa group recruits in 2014. Beyond recruitment and instructing, he was the first and only verified Filipino citizen who beheaded a Caucasian in an ISIS video released in June 2016. In the video, he called for IS supporters who cannot travel for “Jihad” (Muslim Holy war against non-Muslims) to the Syrian Arab Republic to travel to the Philippines instead. He told them to “unite and join under the command of the Emir of the soldiers of the caliphate in the Philippines, Abdallah al-Filipino [a reference to Isnilon Hapilon]. Kiram also stated, “my brothers, do not hesitate to blow up their towns. Kill the disbelievers wherever you find them and do not have mercy on them”.

Collectively, these demonstrated how deep Kiram was into IS propaganda. In other words, Kiram firmly believed in the delusion that he was a mujahideen (Muslim Holy Warrior) committing terror in the name of God through a “Martyrdom Operation,”. They used the word “jihad” (Muslim Holy War) in all IS narratives to attract and appeal to Muslims worldwide to join them in their so-called war against non-Muslims.

As of August 23, 2018, pursuant to paragraphs 2 and 4 of resolution 2368 (2017), Kiram was found guilty of his association with IS or Al-Qaeda for “participating in the financing, planning, facilitating, preparing, or perpetrating of acts or activities by, in conjunction with, under the name of, on behalf of, or in support of,” “recruiting for” and “other acts or activities indicating an association with” Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), listed as Al-Qaeda in Iraq (QDe.115) as per United Nations Security Council. Simultaneously, the US declared Kiram a “Specially Designated Global Terrorist” (SDGT).

Kiram’s Impact as a Radical Husband & Father

The prevailing family dynamics in Filipino Muslim families are patriarchal, meaning the father holds the most authority in the household. As such, Kiram played a large part in shaping his wife’s and his children’s personalities, behaviors, and beliefs toward violent extremism. With such a pivotal role, his wife, Jen Barriga, voluntarily swore allegiance to ISIS and flew to Syria with him to conduct a martyrdom operation. Additionally, their children, who were minors then, became exposed to violent extremism, particularly during their time in Syria. Such exposure during their formative years would likely have lasting impacts on their lives.

As with Kiram’s case, the Philippine government must engage not only male violent extremists but also their families to prevent and counter violent extremism. Only through this can the Philippine government potentially break the chain of family radicalization.

Narrative Warfare: “One Man’s Terrorist is Another Person’s Freedom Fighter.”

It is interesting to note that Kiram is an excellent example of the cliché, “one man’s terrorist is another person’s freedom fighter.” Even though Kiram was officially labeled by the US as a Special Designated Terrorist, as the head of the family, he was able to condition the minds of his wife and children successfully. Through Classical Conditioning, he repeatedly told his family members that death from conducting an IS operation was not only “honorable” but the best type of death for a Muslim. Consequently, in the eyes of his wife and children, he died as a “Mujahideen,” which was his goal from the start. Besides his family, Kiram’s death as an IS fighter was also celebrated by other members, elevating his family’s status. Such elevation in status became sources of motivations for violent extremism: 1) Pride due to elevated status, 2) Vengeance sought by his wife and children, and 3) Financial rewards awarded by IS for Kiram’s death. These bombardments of positive reinforcements are a form of terrorist Operant Conditioning that aims to reiterate the violent extremist narrative to motivate the remaining family members to follow in Kiram’s footsteps. This continuous supply of potential suicide attackers was vital in sustaining IS martyrdom operations as they were their deadliest weapon.

The Wife and the Mother – Jen Ellen Barriga

Barriga’s Pathway to Extremism: Her Marriage to a Violent Extremist

In the case of Barriga, she came from a conservative Christian family named after the archangel who defends the Christian faith against demonic forces. Her radicalization began when she grew close to Kiram. Infatuated with Kiram, she converted to Islam and eventually married him. Following the hadith of Prophet Muhammad (SAW),that “obeying the husband is the key to paradise” Barriga became submissive to Kiram. As with other cases, such compliance could lead the wives of violent extremists to follow them in joining violent extremist groups.

Barriga’s Vulnerability as a Convert

Religious conversion by itself should not raise red flags, but conversion with other underlying factors indicates a greater risk for radicalization. These underlying factors served as the drivers of radicalization, in which conversion gives individuals a reason to manifest their radical tendencies. As a convert, there were four reasons why Barriga was particularly vulnerable to IS radicalization:

1) She had no one else to consult and no independent guide to her new faith except her husband.

2) Despite her voluntarily swearing allegiance to IS, this may have stemmed from her husband.

3) As a convert and wife to a violent extremist, she may have overcompensated to be seen as a “good Muslim” and a “good wife.” This included her blind compliance with her husband.

4) As a Muslim convert, she experienced marginalization from her family and friends as soon as she started wearing the hijab.

Considering all of these, it is understandable why Barriga involved herself heavily in IS to establish a new social status with her adoptive community. Equally important to note is that her experiences are similar to many female Muslim converts who ended up in IS.

Barriga’s Initial Participation in Violent Extremism

According to the Philippine National Police, Barriga, who had an accounting degree, was allegedly channeling IS funds to local militants and aiding in a failed bombing attempt in the southern Philippine city of Davao. Barriga’s Christian name helped her set up bank accounts and avoid suspicion. She was also recruiting other Balik Islam (converts), who was just as vulnerable to radicalization as her.

Radical Journey as a Terrorist Couple:

In 2012, Kiram and Barriga were arrested in connection with a foiled bombing plot. Together with an Indonesian man, they allegedly targeted a night market in Davao, Philippines. The Indonesian was shot and killed by the police, but due to insufficient evidence, Kiram and Barriga were released. Three years later, the couple was recruited by IS.

Possible Implications of the Death of her IS husband.

It is important to remember that Barriga is a widow of a “Mujahideen.” Being radicalized into violent extremism, she believes that her terrorist husband is now in paradise, which might encourage her to do the same. Additionally, by following in her husband’s footsteps, she could increase her reputation and potentially receive other incentives from IS. A recent example is when militants’ widows conducted twin suicide bombings in Jolo town on August 24, 2020, which killed at least 15 people, including military soldiers, and wounded more than 70 others. One of the suicide bombers named Nanah, a resident of Basilan, was the wife of the first confirmed Filipino suicide bomber, Norman Lasuca. She had also previously carried out an attack against the 1st Brigade Combat Team in Sulu in June 2019, leaving seven people dead and 12 others wounded. While the other bomber, Inda Nay, was the widow of militant Abu Talha, who was killed following an encounter with the First Scout Ranger Battalion in November 2019. Thus, the possibility that Barriga might do the same remains a legitimate threat to national security if she was allowed to return to the Philippines.

The Vulnerability of Filipino Muslim Children to Terrorist Parents

Radicalization in children often occurs within families involved in terrorism. Here, the role of mothers in such families is crucial as they are responsible for educating their children. Following the hadith of Prophet Muhammad (SAW),“paradise lies under the mother’s feet“ mothers are very respected and thus enable them to influence their children significantly. Therefore, mothers may expose children to undemocratic and discriminatory beliefs, leading them to violent extremism. This role is apparent in violent extremists such as the Maute brothers, who were responsible for the Marawi Siege in 2017. The matriarch, Farhana, maintained a private militia that included her seven sons.

Furthermore, being respectful to parents demonstrates gratitude to Allah (SWT). This belief may confound any deradicalization attempts made on children of violent extremist families. Children could fear that any deviation from their parent’s beliefs is disrespectful. They may also view deradicalization attempts as attacks on their families, leading them to be guarded and unreceptive.

Their community’s close social ties (family, kin, friends) further complicates this scenario. An example of this was Indonesian FTF Rezky Rullie, aka Cici, a foiled suicide bomber captured in Jolo on October 10, 2020. Rezky was a daughter of an Indonesian couple responsible for the deadly 2019 Jolo Cathedral bombing. Furthermore, her younger sister, rescued in 2021, was married to an Abu Sayyaf member.  

Conclusion

Without the involvement of wives and children in violent extremism, addressing this issue becomes less complex. This is particularly when male members of such organizations yearn for martyrdom. With the involvement of wives and children, it readies future generations of violent extremists. Therefore, governments, including the Philippines, must not only continue but increase efforts to break the chain of radicalization in families. Additionally, as every family is unique, comprehensive data must be collected, including the sociocultural factors of each family. Understanding them aids in a more accurate assessment of their levels of radicalization and the development of rehabilitation and reintegration programs particular to their needs.

Introduction

The Philippines has allowed cryptocurrencies to be used as legal tender. Approximately less than 2% of all known transactions in the Philippines are conducted using cryptocurrency but this does not account for transactions conducted in the informal economy. The easy conversion of cryptocurrency to fiat currency could easily be done through the Automated Teller Machines (ATMs) of the Union Bank of Philippines and other registered remittance and transfer companies.

Since the Philippines closely follows US financial regulations, the US White House Executive Order on Digital Assets released on March 2022 is essential to understand the future trajectory of Philippine cryptocurrency policies. The Executive Order stipulated that, “Digital assets may pose significant illicit finance risks, including money laundering, cybercrime and ransomware, narcotics and human trafficking, and terrorism and proliferation financing.” It further emphasized six key priorities: consumer and investor protection; financial stability; illicit finance; U.S. leadership in the global financial system and economic competitiveness; financial inclusion; and responsible innovation. Dr. Alondra Nelson, the Director of the Office of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP) gives an optimistic tone to the potentials of the use of digital assets for the benefit of society. She cites three key takeaways on US cryptocurrency policy: 1) focus on the potential of digital assets in helping the unbanked population, 2) the risk of predation by the crypto industry on vulnerable populations, and 3) the environmental challenge posed by certain digital assets that require high levels of computing power. 

Overview of Cryptocurrency Companies in the Philippines

Cryptocurrency exchanges have been growing in the Philippines. In addition to the 11 operators registered by the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP), there are 37 crypto exchange operators licensed by the Cagayan Economic Zone Authority (CEZA). (See Table 1: BSP-Approved Cryptocurrency Exchanges). These operators are registered under the Remittance and Transfer Companies with Money Changing or Foreign Exchange Dealing and Offshore Virtual Currency Exchange (OVCE) Service. The CEZA has issued two types of licenses: 24 companies received the Offshore Virtual Currency Exchange (OVCE) Principal License and 13 companies received the OVCE Regular license. The former licensees are allowed to conduct offshore financial technology and cryptocurrency exchange activities while the latter license only permit licensees to conduct offshore crypto exchange activities.

In the Philippines, cryptocurrency has a strong customer uptake. According to BSP Governor Benjamin Diokno, the volume of transactions involving virtual assets grew 362% year on year to nearly 20 million in June 2021. These transactions were worth P105.93 billion in June, up 71% over the same period. This pattern can be sustained due to increasing interest by the Philippine art and media sector to pay for art works using Non-Fungible Tokens (NFTs). A non-fungible token (NFT) is a unique digital code stored on a blockchain, a form of distributed or digital ledger. Non-fungible tokens represent rights to the particular asset. The term “non-fungible” distinguishes NFTs from other digital assets that are fungible or interchangeable, such as bitcoin.

Table 1: BSP-Approved Cryptocurrency Exchanges

The NFTs provide an ability to authenticate virtually anything where there is a need to establish authenticity and ownership. Their popularity has centered on the art and collectibles world. Based on a survey to gauge the Filipino youth perspective on cryptocurrencies, there were three key observations: 1) The number of consumers who are highly aware of the presence of cryptocurrency is still much to be desired; 2) Cryptocurrency is positively viewed as a potential medium of exchange but there is still much skepticism for it to be positively accepted to function as an investment vehicle primarily due to its volatility, and 3) The  attitude towards cryptocurrency and level of awareness significantly influence an individual’s willingness to adopt cryptocurrency.

Several companies have even offered cryptocurrency games. Axie Infinity which is created by Skymavis allows players to earn NFTs and cryptocurrencies by breeding, battling and trading digital pets called Axies. These online games allow creation of money or other rewards and players can exchange real money for game currencies, also known as digital or virtual currencies. Notably, such games have gained attention as they presented Filipinos with an opportunity to earn during the pandemic. There are semblance of safeguards in place to protect players. For example, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) issued an advisory against Pogi Breeds, a company that claims to use people’s money in buying and breeding Axies and in playing Axie Infinity in 2021.

The strong optimism in crypto trading also led the Union Bank of the Philippines (UBP) to launch a trading platform. UBP bank officials estimated that an average Filipino investor will likely hold 3% to 5% of their personal assets in digital assets like Bitcoin in the next five years assuming markets are “stable,” up from around 1% to 2% now.

The Panorama of Government Regulations

The primordial hurdle for regulators is to balance innovation with the integrity of financial markets and customer protection. The existing regulations carefully nurture innovation, while also guiding it to be responsible. In the Philippines, there are two government regulatory agencies focusing on the cryptocurrency industry: 1) BSP or Central Bank and 2) SEC. BSP adopted a regulatory approach to cryptocurrency through the issuance of Circular No. 944 dated February 7, 2017. This circular requires businesses in the exchange of cryptocurrencies for fiat money in the Philippines to register with the BSP as remittance and transfer companies.

BSP also issued Circular No. 1105, series of 2020, or the Guidelines for the Establishment of Digital Banks. This circular recognized digital banking institutions that can operate and deploy their banking products and services via fully digital platforms. Additionally, the circular stated that only banks granted a license to operate as digital banks may claim and represent themselves as a digital bank. In addition to the minimum capital requirement of PHP1 billion for digital banks, a digital bank license application goes through these stages: (1) the application for approval to establish a new bank; (2) the application for the issuance of a certificate of authority (COA) to register with the Philippine Securities and Exchange Commission; and (3) the application for the issuance of the COA to operate as a digital bank. Prior to the issuance of circular No. 1105, digital banking in the Philippines was deployed by traditional BSP-licensed banks through electronic banking services and operations, as regulated under BSP’s Manual of Regulations for Banks (MORB). Under MORB, banks that plan to offer or enhance existing electronic banking services must submit an application to BSP, describing the services to offer or enhance, and how it fits in the bank’s overall strategy. The application must be accompanied by a certification signed by its president that the bank has complied with BSP’s minimum pre-conditions.

BSP circular No. 649, series of 2009 defined electronic money as a monetary value represented by a claim on its issuer, that is: (1) electronically stored in an instrument or device; (2) issued against receipt of funds of an amount not lesser in value than the monetary value issued; (3) accepted as a means of payment by persons or entities other than the issuer; (4) withdrawable in cash or cash equivalent; and (5) issued pursuant to other guidelines of BSP circular No. 649. Further, BSP stipulated that Electronic Money Issuers (EMIs) can be in the form of EMI banks, non-bank financial institutions, or non-bank institutions registered as a money transfer agent. The electronic money which is issued by banks shall not be considered as deposits as they can only be redeemed at face value, which shall not earn interest, rewards and other similar incentives. BSP has issued a draft amendment to the EMI Regulations for public comment, which allows banks to offer electronic money services subject to BSP’s approval under an electronic payment and financial services (EPFS) Type A license, and compliance with prudential criteria provided under MORB. The draft provided classifications between a large versus small-scale EMI bank. Large-scale EMI banks must have a 12-month average value of aggregated inflow and outflow transactions equal to or greater than PHP25 billion (USD478 million). Otherwise, it shall be classified as a small-scale EMI bank. In terms of capitalization, the large-scale EMI banks require at least PHP200 million; the small-scale EMI bank requires at least PHP100 million.

Another important regulation is BSP circular No. 1033, series of 2019, which states that the Electronic Payment and Financial Services (EPFS) license generally applies across all BSP-supervised financial institutions seeking to provide electronic payment and financial services. The EPFS is an inherent part of EMI and digital banking where the requirements are embedded within EMI and digital bank application processes.

Additionally, under SEC’s Rules on Digital Asset Exchange, Section 8 establishes the Mandatory provisions in Digital Asset Exchange Operational Framework. Further, SEC issued Memorandum Circular No. 19, Series of 2019 to require financing and lending companies to register their online lending platforms. Pertaining compliance, SEC also released a Warning Advisory on 14 unregistered companies which had been soliciting funds from the public in 2018.

Areas of Concern

The cryptocurrency industry while replete with opportunities, also carries with it significant risks. The industry has to establish technological solutions to operationalize new compliance standards and establish appropriate Know Your Customer (KYC), due diligence and reporting procedures. The Wire Transfer Rule, also called the ‘Travel Rule’, requires states to take precautions to ensure that Virtual Asset Service Providers (VASPs) monitor and share customer data among themselves and with the relevant government authorities.

A second area of concern is the cybersecurity risk. There is a need for a coherent approach to the regulation and oversight of cryptocurrencies in terms of cybersecurity. The different levels of cybersecurity adoption by cryptocurrency companies need to be evaluated by government regulators to ensure if the cybersecurity in place is secure and safe in terms of personal data privacy protection. The increases in security breaches and digital surveillance highlight the need for improved privacy and security. For instance, an electronic system operator should respect the privacy of personal data and treat it as confidential. There is a need for BSP and SEC to appoint third party organizations to ensure that data privacy follows Republic Act 10173, known as the Data Privacy Act. This is a law that seeks to protect all forms of information, be it private, personal, or sensitive.

A third area of concern is the lack of an enabling law governing government oversight of this industry in terms of sanctions and remedy. The industry is growing at a phenomenal rate but there are no specific provisions for redress on the part of the customers. Moreover, since the industry is still evolving, there may be regulatory “grey areas” or possible misinterpretations of risk, regulation or compliance on the part of well-meaning government regulators. Additionally, for any disputes on cryptocurrency transactions, there are no clear guidelines on which specific government agency the consumers can file their cryptocurrency-related complaints. SEC has a penalty clause covering Digital Asset Exchanges in Section 82 which is classified as Prohibited Acts. Despite this penalty clause, there is a need for SEC to closely collaborate with Law Enforcement Agencies (LEAs) in order to arrest and prosecute the violators of these penalty provisions.

A fourth area of concern is consumer protection. The Republic Act 7394, otherwise known as the Consumer Act of the Philippines of 1991 is the legal basis for consumer protection in the country. The law embodies the state policy on the protection of consumers and establishes standards of conduct for business and industry in the country. However, this law was passed before the inception of the cryptocurrency industry. Therefore, there is a need to amend this law in order to include consumer protection in the financial technology and cryptocurrency industries. Consumer protection providers should incorporate transparency, impartial treatment, trustworthiness, privacy and safety of customer data and information, and simple treatment of complaints and customer disagreement resolution into their operations, along with fast and inexpensive charges. Currently, BSP regularly publishes information about registered cryptocurrency companies and Digital Asset Exchange companies and it encourages customers to only deal with them. BSP also publishes warnings including those on bitcoins.

The fifth area of concern focuses on inheritance issues. It is unclear how this asset can be passed on to one’s heirs. Another serious area of concern is the use of cryptocurrency for terrorism funding.

Two Lacunas

While the conversion of cryptocurrency to fiat money is regulated by BSP, authorities may find it difficult to pinpoint individuals involved in the transaction as PhilSys – the Filipino Identification System – has not reached 100% registration for all Filipino citizens. Moreover, the SIM Registration Law was vetoed by President Rodrigo Duterte last month due to serious freedom of expression concerns.  Several senators inserted in the draft bill at the last minute requiring the mandatory registration of all social media accounts of each citizen. Additionally, the continued proliferation of prepaid mobile SIM numbers makes it difficult for law enforcement officials to closely monitor transactions including cryptocurrency transactions. Collectively, these two lacunas provide terrorists with enough room to exploit cryptocurrencies for terrorism financing purposes. The Philippines is on the Financial Action Task Force (FATF’s) grey list due to “strategic deficiencies” in its money laundering and terrorism financing system. A terrorist-linked money laundering operation involving cryptocurrencies generated funds, which were then allegedly used to finance the activities of terror networks operating in the conflict-ridden Mindanao region in the southern Philippines.

In the context of the socio-political environment, several concerns were highlighted. Since privacy and anonymity is guaranteed by the cryptocurrency, it may be useful for illicit purposes by transnational organized crime groups. Terrorists and criminals are highly resourceful and will find ways to commit crimes. Major thefts have occurred (the bitcoin-exchanges of Mt. Gox35,), illicit transactions have occurred (the bitcoin-marketplace of Silk Road38 where people can buy and sell narcotics and other illicit items), fraudulent practices by specialized computer hardware manufacturer (the manufacturer Butterfly Labs39) have occurred. However, it is not clear at all that these crimes would not have occurred if there were no cryptocurrencies.

Another serious concern is that cryptocurrencies make arbitration and adjudication of disputes between transacting parties difficult, if not nearly impossible. Where should one go and to whom should one complain? There is a need to carry out an extensive education for law enforcement and prosecution officials on cryptocurrency trading and investments. In fact, there is a need for a dedicated Philippine National Police unit focusing on crime-related cryptocurrency transactions.

International Coordination

An ASEAN Cryptocurrency policy has yet to be crafted. Due to the lack of standardization of cryptocurrency regulations, the acceptance of cryptocurrency as legal tender varies greatly in Southeast Asia. Cambodia has integrated blockchain into their public goods system. Singapore hosts successful cryptocurrency start-ups while Malaysia has a thriving cryptocurrency sector. In Indonesia, the government is applying tax on digital transactions starting May 2022 including cryptocurrency. However, in Muslim-majority Indonesia, there are factions against cryptocurrencies. The National Ulema Council, or MUI, has deemed cryptocurrency as haram, or not permissible, as it has elements of uncertainty, wagering and harm. MUI asserts that if cryptocurrency as a commodity or digital asset can abide by Shariah tenets and can show a clear benefit, only then can it be traded.

Challenges remain in terms of inter-country law enforcement cooperation and enforcement actions. The standardization of cryptocurrency policies within Southeast Asia and the process of enhancing the understanding of law enforcement officials about the workings of this industry need to be improved. Due to cryptocurrency’s fast-moving and innovative technology, products and solutions, law enforcement officials need to acquire new skill sets to keep pace with the knowledge requirements for risk and compliance functions.

The Philippine regulatory authorities aim to achieve the broader goals of fostering financial inclusion, promoting competition and delivering better outcomes for society. These goals are also pertinent to the cryptocurrency industry. Nevertheless, trust is needed to maintain the societal conventions regarding the use of money. The regulatory authorities need to provide, an open, neutral, trusted and stable platform. The level of regulatory oversight and investor transparency at these venues has not matched similar platforms for corporate bonds or equity securities. Additionally, there is a need for a clear disclosure requirement to cryptocurrency companies in order to warn customers of the risk of loss.

Conclusion

It is in the interest of Philippine regulatory authorities to allow the cryptocurrency sector to continue its phenomenal growth in the absence of a 100% uptake on the National ID and the SIM card law regulating SIM card use for personal mobile phones. Without the full enforcement of these important strategic policies, targeting strict regulations for the cryptocurrency sector will simply lead to unintended policy consequences: interfering in seamless payments and lending systems; hampering income revenues from cryptocurrency investments and trading; and, crippling the thriving Philippine art and music sectors which have benefited from different NFTs.

Cognizant of the risks of AML and CFT, it is also essential to increase the expertise and technical capabilities available to Philippine regulatory authorities so that AML/CFT is reduced or completely eliminated. The regulatory authorities can work on the development of Public-Private Partnerships in cryptocurrency transactions. The Philippine government can also implement the upgrading of prosecutorial and law enforcement expertise and capacity with the purview of enforcing regulations in the medium-term. Government regulators must also pay attention to the monitoring of new cryptocurrency players and the testing of emerging industry procedures to faithfully comply with FATF rules. Finally, regulatory authorities, LEAs and cryptocurrency companies should consult each other and develop typologies and indicators for terrorist financing methodologies and potential asset storage operations in the field of crypto transactions.

In the final session of our 3-part webinar series on Tuesday, four expert panelists will share their insights on the propagation of violent extremist propaganda and fund raising tactics in Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, and Singapore. Do join us on 18 April 2022. 1400hrs – 1600hrs (Indonesia) 1500hrs – 1700hrs (Malaysia, Singapore, Philippines)