Introduction

Despite the COVID-19 pandemic, the spread of violent extremist ideology has increased. Because of social restrictions, there has been a shift in tactics used by violent extremists to spread their ideologies and conduct their activities. For instance, violent extremist organizations are now more reliant on technology and social media to spread their ideologies. Also, the pandemic has altered the domestic threat landscape and provided a platform for people of various ideologies to openly advance agendas and propagate justifications for radical and nationalistic misinformation, fake news, and conspiracy theories. The potential rise in online terrorist content and a broader acceptance of it, ostensibly due to the significant number of lives affected by the pandemic, increases the chances of radicalization. Unfortunately, Malaysia is not spared from this threat.

Trends of Radicalization during COVID-19

The internet is a double-edged sword. While increasing access to knowledge, it also promotes radicalization and indoctrination through digital media. Its low cost, dynamic, globally-connected, and decentralized networks facilitate online radicalization. Additionally, the emergence of technology has created pathways for diverse ideologies to take root. Social media, for example, serves as a tool for jihadi recruitment. From personal interviews with local law enforcement agencies, Malaysia is experiencing similar trends.

Since 2019, violent extremist groups have exploited the prevailing pandemic to advance their cause. Violent extremists are riding on the rising public anger due to the pandemic towards governments. By leveraging on this public anger while providing “solutions”, violent extremist groups intend to increase opportunities to overthrow governments while increasing public support for themselves. Not only does the pandemic aid violent extremist groups in their attempts to destabilize national security, but it is also an opportune time for groups such as Al Qaeda and the Islamic State (IS) to rebuild after years of counterterrorism efforts against them.

Additionally, violent extremist groups have adapted their narratives around the pandemic. There is a growing sentiment that radicalized individuals are contagious and can spread the “disease” through interactions like the coronavirus. Unfortunately, this breeds mistrust towards specific communities, establishing the fertile ground for recruitment by violent extremist groups. Such groups would exploit the mistrust and mutual grievances to garner support from potential recruits while reinforcing their members’ worldviews.

This phenomenon is also experienced in Muslim-majority Malaysia particularly in certain Malay communities. These communities generally propagate the belief that COVID-19 is “God’s punishment” for those who do not share their ideologies. They also propagate anti-vaccine propaganda.

Malaysia is currently facing threats from several violent extremist groups, including Al Qaeda, Jemaah Islamiyah (JI), the Abu Sayyaf Group, and IS. Additionally, Malaysia’s political instability has exposed the country to the possibility of politically-driven radicalization, in addition to religious-based extremism. Noteworthily, politically-driven radicalization has yet to culminate to terrorism in Malaysia. From personal interviews, the authors found that in Malaysia, such radicalization is connected with a range of issues, including politics, religion, race and gender relations, and the government’s failure to manage the pandemic effectively.

The abrupt change of government in Malaysia has also created several uncertainties, affecting the drafting and implementation of P/CVE policies by government agencies such as the police and intelligence. The change of government has led to a change in priorities and agenda within the new government. The new government has shifted their focus from hard policing to soft policing and has called for the participation of civil society to join the government in being first responders of radicalization and terrorist attacks. Malaysia is also concerned about JI leader Abu Bakar Bashir in Indonesia as his release might reactivate JI networks in Malaysia. Currently, the JI network in Malaysia has shifted its allegiance to IS-linked groups in Southeast Asia and have decentralized cells operating in both online and offline domains.

The nexus between violent extremism developments in Indonesia and Malaysia is evident. In the latest Indonesian church bombing in March 2021, Malaysian sympathizers have supported calls for more powerful bombs to be used for future attacks in their social media accounts which includes both Malaysian and Indonesian followers. As Indonesian extremists target the police and non-Muslims, there is a possibility that the Malaysian followers may adopt such notions, potentially leading to the police and non-Muslims being targeted in Malaysia.

Furthermore, prior to COVID-19, there was an increasing trend of violent extremism in East Malaysia due to the increasing support for such groups in Sabah and the southern Philippines. These groups have established Tawau and Sandakan in Sabah as new transit points for their entry into Southern Philippines and Myanmar. Users of these transit points include both Malaysians and foreigners of diverse nationalities including those from distant conflict zones. The list of those arrested includes Bangladesh, Indonesia, Iraq, Myanmar, the Philippines, Turkey, Yemen and Xinjiang.   It is likely that these transit points will be utilized again once travel restrictions are lifted. In addressing this growing threat from its citizens and foreigners, the Malaysian government has ratified the international treaties on terrorism from the United Nations Security Council Standing Committee on Terrorism.

The Malaysian government has supported other international efforts to combat violent extremism. This includes supporting ASEAN’s collaboration with Canada and Russia to combat International Terrorism and the establishment of the ASIA-Europe meeting (ASEM), Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation Counter-Terrorism Taskforce and Commonwealth Committee on Terrorism (CCT).  Malaysia has also supported regional efforts, including the ASEAN Political and Security Blueprint (2015-2025), The 2017 Manila Declaration, and the ASEAN Plan of Action to Prevent and Counter the Rise of Radicalization and Violent Extremism (ASEAN PoA PCRVE). One notable international initiative that Malaysia developed was the 2015 Langkawi Declaration on the Global Movement of Moderates. This declaration outlines measures to promote moderation and curb extremism globally. Malaysia’s support for these initiatives stems from its long history of grievances concerning the political, economic, racial, ethnic, and religious and ease of spreading hate-related ideologies.

Malaysian Legal Landscape and Threat of Terrorism

To combat violent extremism in Malaysia, the government passed the Prevention of Terrorism Act (POTA) and the Special Measures Against Terrorism in Foreign Countries Act (SMATA) in 2015. These legislations adhere closely to UNSC 2178.  Previously, in 2012, the Internal Security Act of 1960 (ISA), widely used for violent extremism offences, was replaced by the Security Offences (Special Measures) Act (SOSMA) 2012. The difference between SOSMA and POTA is that the former is a procedural law while the latter is a detention law.

SOSMA, in lieu of the Criminal Procedure Code (CPC), governs the procedures for arrest, temporary detention, investigation, and trial of an individual in cases involving offences against the state, terrorism, organized crime, and human trafficking. In other words, SOSMA is explicitly used for violent extremism cases, while CPC is used for general offences. Notably, in 2007, Chapter VIA was added to the Penal Code to address security concerns related to violent extremism and espionage.

Despite these general laws in addressing terrorism, upholding the rule of law remains challenging particularly during COVID-19. Violent extremists have sought to profit from disturbances caused by COVID-19 by riding the wavetops of divisiveness and hate speech, magnified by the pandemic. The threat has become even more challenging to contain, as low-cost, low-tech attacks against soft targets by so-called lone wolves have become increasingly prevalent. Since 2020, only seven have been arrested for violent extremism offences. However, only four people were charged, with the rest released due to lack of evidence. According to the authors’ interviews with law enforcement officials, the pandemic was initially seen as a blessing in disguise as violent extremists in Malaysia were seemingly more concerned about sustaining their daily lives than conducting attacks. However, as aforementioned, the pandemic awards terrorist groups here time to rebuild, readying them for attacks. Any attacks conducted in the short-term will be particularly detrimental for Malaysia as the country is reeling from 1) high COVID-19 infection rates, 2) political instability, and 3) economic downturn due to the pandemic.

Additionally, the travel and social restrictions seemingly have an added effect of reducing the number of attacks in Malaysia. Coincidentally, the number of violent extremism-related arrests have also reduced during this period. However, the actual threat of violent extremism should not be measured by the number of arrests or a rule-based approach. Instead, an indicator should be based on monitoring social media platforms and social messaging platforms commonly used by violent extremist groups such as Facebook, Telegram and WhatsApp. Based on personal interviews with Normah Ishak, Malaysia’s first female counterterrorism chief, the Malaysian Special Branch will continue this policy of active monitoring under her leadership to maintain peace and security in the country.

The Malaysian law enforcement authorities (LEAs) have also adopted a soft approach in mitigating this threat. This was implemented in 2016 by Datuk Ayob Khan Mydin Pitchay, Normah Ishak’s predecessor. The Religious Rehabilitation Program that was subsequently developed is based on reeducation and rehabilitation of those found guilty of violent extremism. Reeducation is aimed at correcting political and religious misconceptions while rehabilitation entails comprehensive monitoring of these individuals following their release. Additionally, upon their release, these individuals will be assisted in their reintegration into society. From personal interviews with the authors, LEA officials shared their belief that as with general crime offenders, convicted violent extremists should be given a second chance at life. A soft approach would better serve to convince these offenders to give up their pursuit of violence.

Facilitating this second chance highlights the need to involve other stakeholders such as religious, educational, cultural, and youth leaders. Additionally, to enhance detection of violent extremism, these stakeholders should be given appropriate training to pick up any red flags within their localities. This stems from the importance of community and society-based monitoring.

Nationally, the Ministry of Home Affairs’ pending national action plan is crucial in aiding and guiding the approach taken by relevant LEAs. Taking a soft approach is clearly in tandem with the growing danger of lone-wolf attacks, which are more challenging to detect. By involving the community, early intervention is possible as they would be the first to identify any indications of would-be violent extremists.

Introduction

On November 27, 2020 the Indonesian anti-terror police unit Detachment 88 dismantled a pro-Islamic State extremist group, called Mujahidin Pohuwato, and arrested eight of its members. As reflected in its name, the group is based in Pohuwato, Gorontalo province, on Sulawesi Island. They were initially a non-violent Islamic revivalist group, Tablighi Jamaat, who were radicalized through social media such as Facebook, Telegram and WhatsApp groups. The group planned to attack various hard targets such as the Mananggu sub-district military headquarters and police stations in Pohuwato and Marisa. They also planned to rob members of the Pohuwato local parliament and an Indonesian Chinese store owner. This article explains the group’s interest in targeting the military and proposes solutions to prevent future casualties of TNI personnel.

TNI Targeted on Numerous Occasions

Islamic extremists target Indonesian military headquarters for two reasons. First, they perceive military personnel as anshar thaghut (helpers of tyrants), who prevent them from establishing an Islamic state based on their interpretation of Islamic law. Regardless how military personnel present themselves as pious Muslims, they will continue to be deemed as unbelievers by extremists and, thus, worthy to be attacked. Second, they intend to seize TNI’s weapons in light of limited alternative sources. This means that military presence in an area does not always deter extremists. Instead, extremists could be attracted to its weapons cache.

Mujahidin Pohuwanto’s plan to attack a military installation was not the first terror plot on the TNI. Previously, in April 2011, a member of Ashabul Kahfi group, Muhammad Syarif, killed a military personnel in Cirebon, West Java whom he considered as an anshar thaghut. In April 2020 another pro-IS group, Muhajirin Anshar Tauhid, also planned to attack the district military headquarters in Bima, West Nusa Tenggara to seize their weapons.

We should not underestimate extremists’ interest in attacking military headquarters because despite their lack of capabilities, they remain committed to executing their attack plan. A research by PAKAR, an Indonesian-based NGO that studies terrorism, discovered that not only had Mujahidin Pohuwanto members surveyed the Mananggu sub-district military headquarters, but one of its members, Fijal Kadue, was also set to conduct the attack in late 2018. Equipped with a bow, two arrows and a knife, he left his home and went to the military headquarters. As the headquarters was seemingly vacant, he decided to delay his attack while waiting at the house of a fellow member. However, upon seeing the member’s sister covered only with a towel, he became aroused. Consequently, he decided to cancel his attack altogether because of his impure thoughts.

Lax Security in Koramil

There are 332 district military headquarters (known as Kodim) and an estimated 7,252 sub-district military headquarters (known as Koramil) across Indonesia. Although extremists target both district and sub-district headquarters, Kodim seems to be a harder target than Koramil. This is due to Kodim housing large numbers of personnel and enforcing strict security. A Kodim usually has a gated entrance/check point manned by one or two personnel equipped with a rifle. Such security points can stop extremists from entering the headquarters. Conversely, Koramil contains a small number of personnel (around 7-10) and has a lax security. Its unguarded entrance has no check point making it easy for extremists to penetrate its compound. For this reason, it is not surprising that Koramil are more targeted by extremists than Kodim.

Need for Heightened Monitoring and Coordination by Military Intelligence

The cases of Mujahidin Pohuwato and Muhajirin Anshar Tauhid emphasize the urgency for military intelligence to intensify their efforts to monitor extremist groups, particularly online. This is evident when members of both groups, initially non-violent with moderate interpretation of Islam, became radicalized by pro-IS recruiters through social media. Thus, the military cyber unit needs to aggressively detect extremist online radicalisation activities, identify and conduct surveillance on individuals keen on pursuing terrorism. Upon collecting strong evidence of potential attacks, it is imperative for the unit to work with the intelligence officers in Kodim and Koramil for further investigations. For quicker mitigation of threat, military intelligence officers need to coordinate their work with Detachment 88 who could be investigating the same plotters and are authorized to conduct arrests.

Three Measures to Prevent Future Attacks on TNI

To prevent future attacks on Kodim and Koramil, it is crucial for TNI to implement the following measures. First, TNI facilities can be further secured by building fences around its Kodim and Koramil compounds while ensuring manned check points are installed at all entrances. Minimally, these fixtures will hinder attacks, giving Kodim and Koramil personnel added reactionary time.

Second, TNI needs to empower its village supervisory non-commissioned officers (Babinsa) to suss out suspected extremists in villages under their supervision and report them to the Koramil commander, who will then report to the Kodim commander. With the information supplied by the Babinsa, the Koramil commander will be better able to determine if the suspected extremists pose a serious security threat to the Koramil. If the threats are legitimate, the Koramil commander can ready his men for potential attacks while working with Detachment 88 to apprehend them prior to their attacks.

Third, TNI needs to monitor ideological infiltration by extremists into its personnel as according to the former defence minister, Ret. Gen. Ryamizard Ryacudu, around 3% of TNI members were exposed to extremism. Unfortunately, there have been several of such infiltrations. In the most recent case, the Mujahidin Pohuwato group had infiltrated the Koramil in Mananggu. One of its members, Miman, befriended and elicited a Koramil personnel to share information on the headquarters’ weapons depot. The information was crucial in assisting the group plan its attack on the Koramil while seizing military weapons. Other prominent examples include the cases of the late Yuli Harsono, Daeng Koro and Lesmana Ibrahim. These men were not only recruited by extremists, but participated in attacks on military installations and the public. The former Second Private Yuli Harsono did not only steal ammunitions from a military ammunition  depot in Bandung, West Java in 2001-2003 but he also killed two police officer in Central Java in 2010. The former special forces member Daeng Koro helped the late Santoso, the leader of Mujahidin of Eastern Indonesia (MIT), a pro-IS terrorist group based in Poso, Central Sulawesi develop MIT. He was responsible for a series of attacks in the province. The former naval intelligence officer, Lesmana Ibrahim, provided refuge for a perpetrator of the Jakarta Petra Church bombing in 2001.

To address such infiltration, TNI needs to screen its personnel’s contacts to reduce any possible interactions with extremists keen on involving them in unsanctioned missions. TNI also needs to ban its personnel from attending extremist religious gatherings and their access to online extremist propaganda. Additionally, extremist preachers should be banned from preaching at the mosques in military compounds.

A Four-Part Series on Extremism and Online Recruitment – Part 4: Mothers and the Internet

Introduction

On Sunday, 28 March 2021, a bomb was detonated in front of the Sacred Heart of Jesus Cathedral in Makassar, South Sulawesi. A newlywed couple, Lukman and Yogi, added themselves to the long lists of suicide bombers in the country. Since the era of Jama’ah Islamiyah, families in Indonesia have been encouraged to participate in terrorism.  Previously,  marriage alliances among jihadists was one of the primary institutions to protect the sustainability of the terrorist organisation and its networks, including the production of next generation mujaheddins. In such circumstances, women simply played the role of child bearing and rearing.

However, women are increasingly playing greater roles in terrorism, demonstrating gender equality between men and women. Additionally, women continue to make significant non-military contributions such as propagandists, recruiters, facilitators, enablers, and as wives and mothers. To confound matters, technological advancement can contribute to the radicalization of children. Children are, thus, caught in between their mother’s influence and that from the internet.

The Increasing Roles of Mothers as a Source of Influence

Mothers have been suggested to employ ‘a robust and methodical indoctrination infrastructure’ to envision their children to strive for the establishment of a caliphate.  Here, mothers play two critical roles.

First, mothers strongly embrace the transmission of ideology to their children. Indirectly, through their commitment to such ideology or organization, mothers and fathers can influence the behaviours of their children who would constantly imitate their parents. This demonstrates   why families are a primary avenue for developing individuals’ social and psychological attributes.

Second, mothers not only represent role models for their children to imitate, but mothers also can effectively persuade their children to comply with the religious responsibility of taking part in jihad. Interviews with the children whose families were involved in the series of suicide bombing in Surabaya in 2018 found that they became attracted to violent ideology through their parents. Notably, their mothers force-fed the children to watch videos depicting the violence that occurred in countries such as Syria, Iraq, and France. As these children were intentionally home-schooled, their mothers indoctrinated them with their ideologies while encouraging them to seek martyrdom. Unfortunately, as evident from these bombings, children are deemed by terrorist organizations in Indonesia to be effective tools for conducting terrorist operations.

Three Significant Ways Terrorists Use the Internet

The increasing roles of mothers and the growing involvement of children in terrorism benefit from technological advancement such as the internet and social media. In general, the internet has been significantly used by terrorist groups in three ways.

First, the internet enables active indoctrination by parents through online platforms that enable access to extremist videos and contents. As seen in the Surabaya bombings, mothers could extensively utilise the visual method of learning through videos for teaching radical values to their home-schooled children. They teach their children to watch such videos routinely and quote the contents as references for their children’s life norm lessons.

Second, terrorist groups extensively use the internet to recruit children and to build the children’s capabilities. There has been an increasing trend of using digital platforms as a breeding ground for developing radical interpretations and augmenting extremism. Such online platforms facilitate the young generation to learn and interact extensively with peers. An example is the case of Ivan Ahmadi Hasugian (Ivan) who attacked a priest in a church in Medan with an axe in early 2016 after his plan to carry out suicide bombing failed. He later shared that he learned the tactic from the internet as  he aimed to mimic the church attacker in Northern France that occurred one month before his attack.

Third, terrorist groups have also exploited the internet to support their technical streams such as fund-raising and weapon procurements. In terms of online fund-raising, terrorists gather money in two ways. First, the groups conduct online fund-raising activities on social media or encrypted chat forums by inviting their communities to donate funds and support to the families of convicted and deceased terrorists through charity groups. Second,  the internet can aid terrorist groups by facilitating international financial transactions through cryptocurrencies and internet-based payment services, or even executing unlawful cyberspace activities, such as hacking and carding, in order to gain large profits for them. In the case of the Surabaya bombing attacks, the terrorist families procured weapons and chemical substances to be used for crafting improvised bombs. They also planned the attacks through online e-commerce platforms to hinder detection from authorities.

Social Media as an Enabler to Strengthen Social Friendships among Youths

Social media is also important for terrorist groups. Terrorists have exploited online communication to impart values, norms, and customs among followers, members and potential recruits. Creating an online space for open conversations strengthens the groups bond through dialogues such as those concerning infidels, personal issues, recruitment, propaganda, and religious discussions.

Furthermore, terrorist groups leverage the use of social media by using encrypted communication applications with typically leaderless forums to complement face-to-face communication. The use of such chat groups benefits them in three ways. First, terrorists utilize private conversations among selected members to steer them towards extremism. Second, virtual interactions on particular applications, like Telegram and WhatsApp, facilitate greater outreach to wider audiences, including diaspora communities, migrant workers, sympathizers, and supporters. Third, younger terrorists prefer such forms of communication because the online community with 24-hour access enables them to build emotional bonds among friends, thus convincing themselves that they are not alone in striving for their jihad goals. Justification of their beliefs is essential to their self-esteem, increasing their likelihood of conducting their attacks.

Previous research on social media usage among Indonesian jihadists shows the increasing use of social media since the inception of the Islamic State (IS) in 2014. Initially, Facebook Fan Pages were created to support IS. Examples of Facebook pages were Para Pendukung Khilafah, We Are All Islamic State, Khabar Dunia Islam which promoted violence and supported international networks, including expanding groups based in Indonesia. Support was subsequently moved to encrypted media to communicate among members, including Telegram and WhatsApp after such Facebook pages were shut down. These platforms are not only more secure, but they could accommodate as many as 200 members.

Generally, encrypted communication platforms hugely benefit jihadist groups in several ways, from religious conversations and private news sharing to the opportunity of promoting online businesses and even to recruit individuals who were prepared to join IS in Syria. These were evident from the following incidents. Previously, there was an Indonesian telegram group named “Wa Aiddu” called for those who wanted to devote themselves to Syria. Ika Puspitasari, a female terrorist convicted in 2017, used Telegram and WhatsApp to be involved in religious study groups which reinforced her extremist views while she engaged with other jihadists. In September 2014, she pledged her allegiance to IS through Telegram. She subsequently graduated from simply joining these virtual groups to initiating other groups in Telegram and WhatsApp to organize fund-raising to finance attacks including bomb-making.  Similarly, Rizky Kurniawan, a local IS follower, was exposed to extremist ideologies after joining a WhatsApp group called MENITI TAUHID in 2017. The group taught him to understand and adopt ideas about false democracy, jihad and IS. Another terrorist, Agus Melasi led several telegram groups like “Penyaringan” to recruit followers and “Istiqomah Jihad”, a private chat group to discuss a plan of crafting a TATP bomb, arrows, and hand-crafted weapon.

Conclusion

Understanding and anticipating the next evolution of online violent extremism is essential in developing future strategic counter-terrorism policies. Drawing lessons from the aforementioned incidents, policymakers and practitioners should also focus on identifying mitigation strategies against the flourishing use of sophisticated technology and social media which terrorist groups abuse to facilitate their indoctrination tactics. This is predominantly utilised by women in the family to involve children in terrorism.

The vast growth of modern technology benefits terrorist groups as a communication and learning launchpad to reinvigorate radical values, norms and customs inside the family unit. It is necessary to complement existing counter-terrorism strategies by monitoring the education pathways of youths both offline and online. Online accounts used for disseminating teachings through videos, private forums, and audios strongly influence the children to engage. Unfortunately, this cannot be eliminated through counter-narratives and censorship techniques. The government should enforce additional efforts targeted at parents in order to strengthen family values that promote moderate religious ethics and customs. This is essential in response to the evolving global trends and threats of violent extremism that recently highlight the tactics of lone-actor attacks inspired by their terrorist ‘idols.’

Furthermore, robust counter-terrorism policies addressing the abuses of modern technology and social media are also required. Despite the extensive benefits of the internet, there is an urgent call to develop effective mitigation strategies through strategic collaborations among domestic agencies and international counterparts. It is also important to create an intervention strategy corroborated with the private sector. For instance, imposing restrictions and policies for e-commerce business in knowing their customers and filtering the limit of purchasing weapons and chemical substances that can be assembled into bombs or used as hazardous materials.

Part 1: Linguistic Appeal of Propaganda

Part 2: Quest for Significance

Part 3: Online Recruitment of Filipino Youths

A Four-Part Series on Extremism and Online Recruitment – Part 3: Online Recruitment of Filipino Youths

Introduction

The Islamic State (IS) significantly benefits from the internet: its online contents can be simultaneously accessed anytime, anywhere, across multiple devices. Within Southeast Asia, the Islamic State-East Asia (IS-EA, a regional chapter of IS) maximizes the utilization of the internet, specifically via social media, to disseminate their politicoreligious propaganda and to recruit. Compared to the internet, traditional media was more expensive, had limited outreach, and impeded youth recruitment globally. Due to their prowess, IS-EA is even feared in its use of social media. Unfortunately, Filipino youths are not spared from IS-EA’s influence.

Telegram Still Prevalent for Online Recruitment of Filipino Youths and Terrorism Financing

Currently, Telegram continues to play a role in bolstering support and encouraging more attacks in new areas, including sub-Saharan Africa and the Indo-Pacific region. This is evident from the prevalence of pro-IS chat groups in Telegram and its use to recruit and coordinate attacks globally as observed from the November 2015 Paris attacks and 2016 Brussels bombings. Pro-IS chat groups such as the Furqan network facilitates rapid transmission of key messages including the 2019 interview of Abu Bakr al Baghdadi to their followers. Additionally, the authors had recently shared information on potential terrorist plots communicated via Telegram to authorities in countries such as the US and the Philippines. In the Philippines, suicide bombing tactics by female terrorists and guides on Improvised Explosive Devices assembly are commonly disseminated to IS-EA followers through Telegram.

Similarly, Telegram is also instrumental in IS-EA’s recruitment and terrorism financing efforts in the Philippines. To recruit Filipino youths, IS-EA has called for youths to establish a state based on their warped interpretation of Islam which would not only make the country more insular but adversarial to almost all other countries. Exploiting their financial vulnerabilities, these youths were also promised financial gains for their participation. Additionally, chat groups such as the “Expansion of the Caliphate in East Asia‟, “Sharq Asia‟ and “East Asia Wilayah‟ were created to attract foreign recruits to travel to the Philippines.

During the Marawi Siege, Telegram was also instrumental in channeling funds to support IS-EA efforts while displaying the close rapport between similar-minded terrorists from Indonesia and Malaysia. Via Telegram, a member of terrorist group Jamaah Ansharud Daulah (JAD) based in Indonesia was tasked to collect funds from individuals he did not know in various cities in Indonesia from January to March 2017. Notably, this request came from a former Malaysian lecturer participating in the siege. Such interstate coordination will likely continue due to their challenging nature to uncover. Among others, uncovering them is dependent on close coordination between authorities from various countries.

Skillfully Tying Physical and Online Efforts for Recruitment

Addressing youth recruitment by IS-EA requires simultaneous efforts on both the physical and virtual worlds. This is because of IS-EA skillfully tapping on both avenues to recruit youths. IS-EA online youth recruitment started as early as 2016 on platforms such as Facebook. Such platforms had proven successful as they have been previously used by the group for fundraising efforts. Additionally, to increase its outreach, the local dialects of Maranao, Yakan and Tausug were frequently used on these platforms. To further target Filipino youths, recruiters have also targeted them on online gaming platforms. This entailed building from being part of the same team or alliance in online games to becoming friends offline, before inviting potential recruits to their terrorist cell.

Simultaneously in the physical world, IS-EA notably recruits children using non-coercive means by gradually exposing them to the group’s ideology, worldview and apocalyptic vision. The organization convenes public events aimed at raising awareness of the group, attracting children by offering them toys, candy or ice cream just for showing up. Additionally, IS-EA child soldiers and youth recruits from economically disadvantaged families in the Philippines to provide timely surveillance information, accompanied by photos and videos, in exchange for receiving not only either cash incentives or crystal methamphetamine (locally called “shabu”), but also to get something as basic as regular top-ups or reloads for their prepaid mobile phones. This not only allows these recruits to continue playing addictive online games, but also being “groomed” by recruiters via in-game chat functions.

Such close nexus was demonstrated during the Marawi Siege. The IS-EA fighters used social media to announce the start of the Marawi Siege. For example, the first news that militants had taken to the streets of the Islamic City of Marawi on May 23, 2017, came from Facebook. Pictures of masked men carrying assault rifles and waving the black flag of the Islamic State were swirling across social media well before Philippine and international news channels picked up the story. By the time the military and the media had begun to respond, Marawi’s residents were already streaming out of the city by the tens of thousands to seek refuge from the violence. In the months leading up to the siege, there had already been speculation that extremist groups were trying to use social media to reach and recruit Muslims across Mindanao.

The online recruitment of Muslim youths for the siege accompanied offline efforts. The authors uncovered that a heavy volume of cash was needed to sustain the IS-EA fighters during the Marawi Siege, as families demanded hefty payments in exchange for support. Moreover, like their foreign counterparts, the Maute terrorists were focused on expanding their area of control, taking hold of natural resources and commercial centres, producing and distributing illegal drugs, and the stockpiling of weapons and ammunition. Military sources pointed out that each of the Maute-supporting family received PhP50,000 (~USD1,030.00). Separately, individual youth fighters recruited from these families received PhP30,000 upon joining IS-EA and those who made it to the main battle area received Php70,000. Additionally, there were more than 2,000 child soldiers who were training in secluded areas around Marawi City with at least USD 6million paid in cash to the desperate Maranao and Filipino parents.

Online Radicalization of Filipino Youths

After the Marawi Siege, IS-EA factions relied on the traditional revenue sources they employed prior to pledging allegiance to IS, including remittances and criminal activities such as kidnap for ransom and extortion. According to law enforcement officials, this steady stream of income supports the online radicalization of Filipino youths. Based on a 2018 study, it was found that 1) online networks replicated offline communities and 2) extremist messaging in the Philippines is highly localized, and connects with local grievances that spring from the municipal or provincial level. To replicate offline communities digitally, most recruiters use networks such as Facebook to target individuals they already have a connection with.

Government Intervention to Disrupt Online Recruitment

The Philippine Government intends to disrupt online youth recruitment by terrorist organizations through tapping bilateral partnerships with its closest defense ally, the United States. However, efforts to disrupt online youth recruitment by relying on one defense ally alone may prove insufficient in the long-run. One example of such bilateral efforts is several countering violent extremism–themed programmes in Mindanao conducted by Equal Access International (EAI). EAI trained local civil society members in Mindanao to design and implement locally based countering violent extremism (CVE) campaigns. Additionally, through EAI’s two tech camps, the designated local fellows were given funding to carry out their peace promotion projects. Another example is the Philippine military efforts to disrupt online youth recruitment which is funded by Countering Violent Extremism efforts of the Operation Pacific Eagle–Philippines (OPE-P), an overseas contingency operation. The OPE-P is a counterterrorism campaign conducted by U.S. Indo-Pacific Command, in coordination with other U.S. Government agencies, to support the Philippine government and its military forces in their efforts to counter IS-EA and other priority violent extremist organizations in the Philippines.

Policy Recommendations

Community partnerships are a crucial component of effective disruption of online youth recruitment. At the core of this critical disruption is to empower mothers who are the first to identify changes in the behavior of their own sons and daughters who are constantly exposed to the internet and may also be active users of various online games which can be exploited by extremist recruiters. Community leaders need to actively work with parents and teachers to help spot and disrupt the online youth recruitment of radical groups as early as possible.

Online gamers also need more tools and better access to in-app mechanisms to instantly report and notify game creators about extremist content or “grooming” towards radicalization done via in-game chat functions. P/CVE experts need to be more pro-active in partnering with online gaming communities to enable gamers to challenge the statements that extremists have shared on various online gaming platforms. Policymakers may also push for the creation of an opensource software that will enable all online games to automatically identify and remove extremist content from their gaming platforms.

Law enforcement agencies should work to empower local communities with appropriate information and instruments they need to build their own capacity to disrupt, challenge and counter youth recruitment of radical and extremist groups, in both the real world and the virtual world. A whole-of-society approach can be applied to enable law enforcement officials to work directly with communities to exchange information and best practices in thwarting online recruitment by extremist groups that prey on the vulnerable and highly malleable minds of children and youths.

Effective criminal justice responses to threats presented by the use of the internet by terrorists require governments to develop clear national policies and laws dealing with, inter alia: (a) the criminalization of unlawful acts carried out by terrorists over the Internet or related services; (b) the provision of investigative powers for law enforcement agencies engaged in terrorism-related investigations; (c) the regulation of Internet-related services (e.g. ISPs) and content control; (d) the facilitation of international cooperation; (e) the development of specialized judicial or evidential procedures; and (f) the maintenance of international human rights standards.

Part 1: Linguistic Appeal of Propaganda

Part 2: Quest for Significance

Part 4: Mothers and the Internet

A Four-Part Series on Extremism and Online Recruitment – Part 2: Quest for Significance

Introduction

“Cyber void is so full of amazing emptiness that makes us feel fulfilled.” – Munia Khan

Social psychologist Roy Baumeister hypothesized that the desire for interpersonal attachments is a fundamental motivation for humans. This need is deeply ingrained that when our social environments reject us, it will unfavourably affect our adjustment and threaten both our physical health and psychological well-being. In this digital era, one can easily access online communities that not only cater to his/her preferences but also imbibe a sense of being a part of something bigger than oneself.

Unfortunately, there are a few but quite influential online communities which provide the need to belong for their members at the cost of harmful consequences for the intergroup relations in the society. Similar with social change movements such as environmental protection groups, their discontents are directed toward the current societal condition. However, rather than perpetuating democratic values, imbuing their members with hatred and violent narratives toward their perceived enemies are often their approach.

Previously, the presence of online communities suggests an increased attention to political movements particularly among youth. Aligned with this, social media is massively used by extremist groups as a propaganda medium. For instance, ever since Islamic State utilized Twitter in 2012 as their propaganda machine, the public have become more aware of the presence of online extremism. Teenagers and young adults are particularly vulnerable as they are the primary target of recruitment by those extremist groups. But why are these young people vulnerable? What factor attracts these youths to commit to these violent communities? Here, we argue that the quest for significance – or the meaning seeking psychological motivation – is the primary driver for youth extremism.

Why Extremist Communities are Attractive for Young People: Lessons from the Psychology of Violent Extremism

Narratives perpetuating the existence of injustice toward a particular group are ever present in the violent extremist groups. To extremist groups, the current society is not ideal, unfair, and may threaten the existence of their group. Take white supremacist online communities, for example. They believe that hatred and discrimination toward immigrants are necessary to defend the sophisticated Western civilization. In order to avoid its collapse, it is necessary to protect the purity of the Caucasian ethnicity and culture. Similar narratives can be seen in the Salafi-jihadist communities which often emphasize the purity of their religious teachings while propagating against the degradation of the society caused by the Western civilization.

While such political and ideological narratives are useful in characterizing the agenda of each community, it is not sufficient to motivate individuals – particularly youth – to commit atrocities such as violence. Our research demonstrated that Indonesian ideological narrators in extremist groups are less influential compared to operational leaders. While the first primarily focuses on ideological or religious persuasion, the latter may combine religious narratives with the followers’ psychological needs. For example, these operational leaders promising a hero status to members, fulfilling their revenge that they may be seeking, and rewarding their dedication. Religious teachings may be used to justify such needs.

Catering to the followers’ psychological needs is important, simply because it is more attractive. People can sacrifice themselves to a great extent (i.e. martyrdom) for their community where they belong as these groups provide them with a sense of meaning. Therefore, it was posited that personal significance attainment is a primary driver of extremism.

According to the quest for significance theory, the condition of personal insignificance such as perceived alienation by the society, exclusion, loneliness, meaninglessness, and deprivation of psychological needs is agonising and thus a person seeks to overcome such condition by searching for significance. This is relevant to youth recruitment by extremist groups, particularly those who perceived themselves as outcasts, experiencing hollowness in their lives, or simply feeling lonely.  By joining extremist groups, youths are offered solace in times of insignificance and a sense of something to fight for.

An ongoing research conducted by one of the authors found that Indonesian college students’ attitude toward extremism may be linked to their need for personal significance and identity-seeking motivation. In other words, personal significance is important in shaping youths’ attitude toward extremism. These youths were more favourable to extremism when they were encountering personal insignificance. Interestingly, many of these college students came from economically comfortable families. This suggests that condition of insignificance may occur independent of one’s economic status.

Moreover, in a phenomenon called pop-jihadism, youths were persuaded by online extremist propaganda because it was edgy and exciting. They imagined that being a terrorist equated to being a superhero like Iron Man, the Hulk, or Batman. Religious narratives were less important here as the pursuit of excitement became the primary driver. Excitement seeking has been noted as a potential factor for youth radicalization. As an extension to the quest for significance theory, studies have demonstrated that excitement seeking was present in individuals who were willing to commit self-sacrifice and are more supportive of political violence. In this perspective, meaning-seeking motivation stimulates a person to find excitement in political violence.

Extremist propaganda resonates with the diaspora community and youths in particular by facilitating them to negotiate their identities via the internet. Their propaganda is aimed at promulgating their ideological narratives and mobilizing diverse youth groups. Additionally, by developing an online community, it could provide a platform for sharing and reinforcing these narratives. Through such communities, youths may feel that they have contributed to an important social change.

What can We Do?

In the past two decades, many programmes have been proposed and enacted to help youths disengage from the militant extremist groups. Some of these programmes attempted to change their belief systems or ideology. Others focused on providing monetary support. Unfortunately, both may be limited in its effectiveness. Attempts to change one’s ideology may instead elicit resistance. For instance, in response to deradicalization attempts by the Indonesian government, the terrorist detainees considered such attempts as a means to corrupt their cherished beliefs. Monetary support may be useful to motivate youths to disengage from extremist groups, but may have limited viability as a long-term solution. There is also a high risk of recidivism since the ideology still persists in their minds.

To increase the effectiveness, psychological interventions should be amalgamated into such programmes. After all, the primary drivers for youths are psychological. In other words, addressing the narratives (ideology) and networks (engagement with extremist groups) alone in counter-radicalization attempts may not be enough.

Supporting this is positive indications from incorporating psychological interventions in deradicalization programmes. Indonesia, with more than 200 terrorist detainees spread across the country, is beginning to see positive outcomes from doing so. Among others, one key psychological element that is address is the quest for significance.

According to our empirical findings with Indonesian youth terrorist prisoners as participants, support for violent extremism was lower when they derived significance from alternate sources , away from their extremist communities. Often, those who remain committed to the violent extremist groups possessed only a single identity – that is, their extremist group. By awakening their personal significance through other identities, those youth are exposed to alternative means of compensating their personal insignificance.

Familial ties, romantic ties, or pursuit of social status are potential alternative sources of significance. This approach, however, should be individualized because valuable sources of significance may differ from person to person. For instance, a person who values achievement may see their economic status as a more valued source of significance compared to a person who value kinship. On the contrary, those who value familial ties may pursue happiness for their families rather than personal achievements.

Other than providing alternative sources of significance, this strategy also works to improve the social identity complexity. Youths can be made to understand that their affiliation is not only with a single community (extremist community) but actually encompasses multiple ingroups – each may or may not overlap with each other. Such understanding can be followed by the acceptance of diversity in society. This is evident from previous works that demonstrated social identity complexity may improve intergroup relationship and tolerance toward outgroups.

With regards to the need for excitement that is prevalent in youths, it may be important to alter the pursuit of significance – from violence to a non-violent pursuit that may provide an equal sense of excitement. Unfortunately, peaceful or normative quest for significance (e.g. prosocial or humanitarian goals) may not be perceived as equally exciting by those who seek such sensations. Ostensibly, the issue is with the framing of such pursuits that do not invoke a sense of excitement in youths. Instead of framing prosocial goals merely as something good or useful, perhaps these goals can be framed as ae quest to defeat the enemies of humanity in general. In other words, enabling them to perceive themselves as heroes in a noble quest.

Since appealing to the youths’ psychological needs were the primary means of recruitment by extremist groups, it is pertinent to consider psychological factors – such as quest for significance and social identity complexity in helping these youths get out of violent extremism. By doing so, youths are encouraged to adopt alternative sources of meaning and identity, and thus significance. Here, it is important to emphasize that it is insufficient to convince youths to leave their groups by countering their ideological narratives alone.

Part 1: Linguistic Appeal of Propaganda

Part 3: Online Recruitment of Filipino Youths

Part 4: Mothers and the Internet

A Four-Part Series on Extremism and Online Recruitment – Part 1: Linguistic Appeal of Propaganda

Introduction

Formation of groups such as Daesh (also known as the Islamic State, IS) signifies the rise of violent extremism; a global security concern. Southeast Asia is not spared by this militant organization’s brutality and violent ideology. Like in Indonesia and Philippines,

These categories significantly impact the minority Muslim populations living in the West. Daesh exploits the higher likelihood that these individuals may feel marginalized as a minority living in a Western society. On the social level, Daesh has accused and condemned these Muslims for siding the enemy (i.e. the Western political leaders). By supporting the enemy, these Muslims have betrayed the Ummah as these countries have killed Muslims under Daesh’s territory. Through such framing, Daesh attempts to provoke the sense of “otherness” to Muslim viewers who have yet joined their cause and stoking a sense of guilt through their associations with the enemy.

Daesh has also emphasized the potential marginalization Muslims have faced due to their race and religion vis-à-vis personal category. They have repeatedly exaggerated the West’s hostility on Muslims, amplifying the narrative of discrimination to Muslims.  One example centres on the idea of religious oppression, that Muslims in the West cannot freely practise Islam. And due to their religion, these Muslims are incited to believe that they are forced to live in deplorable conditions and in loneliness. This was evident in Daesh’s propaganda provoking the idea that Muslims, specifically in France, have been segregated by their non-Muslim counterparts and forced to live in “despicable” and “humiliating” living conditions.

They have also focused on the disparate, unfair treatment of Muslims in the workplace. Unfortunately, such discriminatory labour market practices is a reason for individuals to travel overseas to join terrorist groups in Syria, such as Daesh and Jabhat Fateh Al-Sham. By creating such tensions, Daesh proposes a political / religious reason for these individuals. They claim to offer the “truth” and a “better life” for these disenfranchised. By joining Daesh, they will also have the opportunity to live a “pure life” and obtain “true freedom”, away from the discriminatory acts they encounter in their home countries.

Recruitment from Muslim-majority Malaysia Mainly for Political/Religious Reasons

Unlike their counterparts in the West, Malay Muslims (the predominant community) in Malaysia have been motivated mainly for political/religious reasons.  Interviews with current violent extremist detainees revealed that the main reason for recruitment into Daesh was due to sympathizing with Muslims in conflict zones. They, thus, bought into the narrative of performing jihad by way of fighting for affected Muslims against foreign coalition attacks and the Assad government. To facilitate a more reachable goal, those who cannot migrate have been encouraged to “terrorize” the non-Muslims in their homeland. This was evident when Malaysia encountered its first terrorist attack in 2016 that targeted a nightclub in Rawang, Selangor.

By iterating their members being killed in conflict, Daesh position themselves as victims of war, further justifying any means of “terrorizing the enemy” a justified cause as a way of responding to the attacks against them. By framing these acts as “just’ and “obligatory”, individuals have been presented with the risk of committing a sin or worse, becoming an apostate. To enhance their victimization narrative, there is also evidence of children and women being positioned as predominant victims of war. Descriptions and images of such vulnerable actors can be seen as an appeal to emotion, encouraging the target audiences to uphold justice for these helpless subjects. The inclusion of these two groups of people is not new; for instance, in political discourses, they are often the subjects of vulnerability. There has also been evidence of manipulation of images to amplify the aggressiveness of the enemies. An example is recontextualizing an image of nuclear missiles being tested to demonstrate the destructive nature of the enemies, further reinforcing their enemies’ ‘war-mongering’ characteristic.

Conclusion and Policy Recommendation

Research on extremist propaganda tended to focus on their disseminated contents (i.e. what were they disseminating?). However, it is also important to analyze these contents linguistically to understand how these contents create meaning and construct reality for their intended audiences. This would provide insights into answering why there is continued support for such brutal organizations with the potential of effectively addressing their propaganda.

More attention should be given to potentially impactful words or phrases (i.e. how these terms would resonate with the target audiences); examples include the words kufr and murtad. It is, thus, important to address how these terms were misused and misinterpreted. This prevents readers from being manipulated to taking up their cause. The current, general tactic of preventing such manipulations superficially mention that such organizations misuse holy texts for their cause. It is crucial to go beyond and provide holistic political, historical and social contexts to demystify their ideologies and to address the existing misconceptions surrounding Islam as a result of their actions. However, this requires herculean effort as extremist propaganda is disseminated via numerous means such as 1) online (e.g. social media platforms), 2) face-to-face (e.g. religious classes), and 3) physical write-ups (e.g.  books and comics). Additionally, these countermeasures must cater for each target group (e.g. youths).

Additionally, the demographic differences in Muslim-majority and Muslim-minority highlight how differently personal, social, and political/religious reasons drive recruitment. Therefore, states must consider how these three categories of reasons are key drivers for their citizens’ recruitment into terrorist organizations.

Part 2: Quest for Significance

Part 3: Online Recruitment of Filipino Youths

Part 4: Mothers and the Internet

Abstract

Indonesian children face an increased risk of online radicalization during COVID-19. This commentary discusses the challenges to prevent such radicalization while proposing how the involvements of social influencers may be a step forward.

Introduction

The involvement of children in terrorism is no longer a foreign concept. However, the COVID-19 pandemic has brought unique challenges vis-à-vis the potential for their online radicalization. Throughout the pandemic, many including educational institutions have heavily relied on technology to maintain a sense of normalcy. Extra care and vigilance are required particularly for children as they no longer benefit from the amount and type of supervision that comes with conventional classes.

This is due to three factors: 1) Children are susceptible to radicalization as they are highly impressionable; 2) Children are strategic tools for terrorist groups as they go against social norms and, thus, become more newsworthy; and 3) early intervention at their formative years maximizes the chances of successful rehabilitation.

Alarmingly, COVID-19 could worsen this issue as Indonesian children were already at risk of being exposed to extremist contents online prior to the pandemic. And this risk substantially increases when the child’s parent(s) become involved in terrorism. Based on personal interviews of such families in Jakarta prior to the pandemic, parents admitted exposing their children to violent propaganda videos online to cultivate their children’s yearning for “jihad.” Moreover, these videos become effective visual evidence to reinforce the ideologies espoused by their parents.

Challenges of Online Radicalization of Children in Indonesia during COVID-19

The pandemic presents several new challenges to the radicalization of children. The first is that children may spend more time with their families as part of lockdown measures. This becomes problematic for families whose parents subscribe to violent ideologies. The intensity of passing down their ideologies to their children will substantially increase. Unfortunately, such means of radicalization is difficult as it could compromise personal privacy. It is noteworthy that such radicalization have led to physical actions in Indonesia where entire families including their underaged children were involved in suicide bombings.

Secondly, parents may become distant from their families including their children as they reel from increased stress during this pandemic. In June 2020, 6.4 million Indonesians have lost their jobs due to the impact of the pandemic. This is concerning as children will be left unattended for extended periods. Additionally, as physical interactions among peers are limited, children become heavily reliant on the internet. Prolonged, unsupervised internet usage may expose the child to adult contents including emotionally-charged terrorist recruitment videos and extremist discussion forums.

Not surprisingly, extremists have started to exploit popular online communication platforms such as Zoom and Google Meet. These encrypted platforms allow them to customize their discussions to their needs; either discussions that are open for all or restricted to the invited few. Such platforms may thus become a surrogate parent for children seeking attention and care during this troubled time.

Third, efforts to prevent online radicalization may get compromised as the Indonesian government are focused on mitigating the spread of COVID-19. Such shift in attention has enabled intolerant or radical group to ramp up their anti-government influence. In August 2020, the Indonesian Ministry of Communication and Information Technology uncovered 1,928 online hoaxes related to COVID-19. These hoaxes range from perpetuating the conspiracy that COVID-19 is a hoax to highlighting the government’s failure to effectively respond to the pandemic.

Such hoaxes become attractive fodder for the disillusioned seeking an outlet for their current predicament. Not only has COVID-19 increased unemployment rate, but also resulted in restrictions on entry of places of worships; removing a source of solace for many. Children will face a tougher time than adults as they try to make sense of this new normal. Unfortunately, disillusioned parents may either propagate hatred for the government to their children or leave them to make sense of their bleak situation on their own. Both are unfavourable for children as the former encourages societal disengagement while the latter presents a cognitive opening for radicalization. Societal disengagement has also been found to be a factor for radicalization to occur.

Preventing Radicalization during COVID-19 is More Important than Before

The restrictions on direct social interactions and the heavy reliance on the internet during COVID-19 makes it more challenging to prevent online radicalization of children. Children are now at a higher risk of self-radicalization. We may, thus, encounter a repeat with that experienced with the radicalization of Indonesian women. As with women, Indonesian authorities may face difficulties in monitoring children who are self-radicalized and are not part of terrorist groups that are monitored. It is also worth emphasizing that in this digital era, wars are no longer fought solely on land but also in cyberspace. As seen with the recent radicalization of Indonesian domestic helpers working overseas, terror groups continue to employ the internet to wage their war of influence.

Aiding these movements are the vast number of internet users. In May 2020, 62.6% of the Indonesians were reported as internet users. Regardless that this figure is an estimate on a particular point in time, it presents three potential issues: 1) This population would likely include children who are now more reliant on the internet; 2) Although most Indonesians can access the internet, bestowing them with Internet safety principles is still a work-in-progress; and 3) The Indonesian authorities would have to invest in large resources to uncover and monitor online activities of extremist groups. This is, however, not impossible considering how the Indonesian National Police mandated the launch of “cyber patrols” and “counter-narratives” on social media in response to rising tensions against the newly enacted Omnibus Law. Additionally, official government procurement documents revealed a total spending of IDR 90 billion (US$ 6 million) to “influencers” or “key opinion leaders” in the last three years.

Such tactics should similarly be employed to counter extremist propaganda as they imbibe the contemporary principles behind the spread of digital information. Not only does it acknowledge a shift in the balance of influence from broadcasters to individuals, “co-opting” social influencers increases the chances of spreading influence to the many diverse online social clusters. Additionally, such influencers would possess the necessary skills and knowledge to create and package relevant information that is appealing to the masses. These are particularly important when previous counternarrative strategies may lack these characteristics. Therefore, getting social influencers on board will complement current strategies of reducing the digital space extremist groups can operate in.

Such preventive strategies are now more important in Indonesia for two additional reasons. Despite this pandemic, Indonesia is set on conducting regional elections. In such states of political flux, mitigating misinformation will be confounded by smear campaigns that will be rife as politicians attempt to gain an advantage over their competitors. There is, thus, a higher risk of children being exposed to misinformation via their parents. Secondly, deradicalization of individuals including children is extremely challenging. Such programmes are time-consuming, costly and is not guaranteed. It is not uncommon to find former terrorist in Indonesia who have yet to recognize Indonesia as a state even after their release from prison. Moreover, during COVID-19, deradicalization programmes in Indonesian prisons are affected as authorities attempt to prevent its spread amongst inmates.

Collectively, they emphasize the need for political will to ensure that new and relevant counternarrative strategies are adopted by the Indonesian government. They also emphasize how it is now timely to include media-savvy individuals with vast outreach in such efforts.