Introduction

Security threats to Malaysia go beyond sovereignty and territorial integrity issues. Malaysia’s security, as I argued elsewhere, must be conceptualised via the developing countries’ security framework. The dynamism and interplay between internal and external variables are key to the management of security predicament in the country. Like other developing countries, the idea and concept of-nation-state are still problematic. Social and political identity formation face great challenges, while economic activities and sources still rely heavily on commodities. Hence, Malaysia’s security challenges in 2022 and beyond continue to suffer from in-factor (domestic variables) problems such as a fragile state idea, societal structural issues, and competing identity and ideology. Simultaneously, the outside-factors (external variables) due to the changing structure of international landscape, also pose security challenges to the country.

Malaysia’s Existential Threats

Several existential issues remain a challenge to Malaysia’s security. The politics of race and religion are a major concern as Malaysia’s political system is race-based since independence. For decades, the United Malaya National Organisation (UMNO) has drawn commendable Malay support with little challenges. It was only recently that a new party albeit formed with seasoned politicians, Bersatu, attempted to challenge this dominance.

The Parti Islam SeMalaysia (PAS), though claimed to be an Islamic party can be argued to be nationalist. Its support is largely limited to rural Malay-majority areas. As a partner member in the current government, PAS’ political statements and ideology had occasionally raised tensions with other members, potentially influencing their alliance moving into Malaysia’s 15^th General Election. Its support for the Taleban government, for instance, poses challenging diplomatic tasks for the fragile coalition government.

Although UMNO appears to lose its majority at the 14th General Election, recent by-elections and state-elections show that UMNO is making a come-back. Political analysts, however, have been quick to point out that it is too early for UMNO to “celebrate” its return as it was argued that the opposition still commands large support. But the opposition appears to have failed in forming a united front against the Barisan Nasional (BN), which UMNO has been a dominant coalition partner. It was also argued that, in the last by-elections and state elections, UMNO had played the “racial card” of Ketuanan Melayu (Malay dominancy) by creating fear among the Malays of the possibility that Democratic Action Party (DAP) could once again dominate the government like it did during the Pakatan Harapan (PH) administration. (Abdullah, 2022)

In addition to politicians, Malaysia’s nation-building process have also been hampered by ultranationalist-religious movements (like Perkasa and Hindraf) that stoke fear-mongering sentiments to gain grass-root support. It is, thus, not surprising that racial as well as religious conflicts like May 13, 1969, the Memali, Jenalek, and Kampung Medan occur and continue to threaten the country’s stability.

Another major concern to Malaysia’s national security is threats from radical religious movements. For years, religious radicalism was treated as an in-factor, but since the September 11 incidents, Malaysia has jumped into the bandwagon by supporting the US-led campaign on War Against Terrorism (WAT). The current fight against religiously-inspired terrorism, however, could be a blessing in disguise for Malaysia.  

Since independence, the government was confronted with religious radicalism in the form of demands for Malaysia to be established as an Islamic state. At one time, the backbone of these groups came from PAS members. This created serious political confrontation between two major Malay-based political parties – UMNO and PAS. Several leaders from both parties were arrested under the now abolished Internal Security Act (ISA), for their direct and indirect involvement in those radical groups. Through WAT, government policies and approaches against threats from local religious fundamentalism were strengthened.

Unfinished Statehood Building

The fragile notion of statehood also explains various traditional and non-traditional security threats faced by the country. Its state formation, inherited from colonialism, has been challenged by regional actors. The most salient threat is the territorial claim by the Sulu Sultanate, which is supported by the Manila, to control Sabah. The Sulu Sultanate claimed a major victory when the Paris arbitration ordered the Malaysia government to pay more than RM62 billion compensation to the heirs of Sulu Sultanate. The Malaysian government rejected the arbitration arguing that it was a unilateral decision made without Malaysian government representation. This became a moral boost for the sultanate that attempted to wrest control of Sabah by force in 2013. Jamalul Kiram, the self-proclaimed Sulu Sultan, was the figure responsible for the encroachment. Though Manila distanced itself from the incident, it had failed to issue strong condemnation for the act.

Non-traditional security threats i.e. illegal migration, Transitional Organised Crime (TOC) are also not new issues to Malaysia’s security. During the colonial period, Southeast Asia was divided into colonial powers’ sphere of influences through bilateral agreement. The British and Dutch in 1824, for instance, divided the Malay archipelagic area into two territories that is presently known as Malaysia and Indonesia. This agreement split ethnic groups and families into two different states which was difficult to accept as the idea of statehood was never fully comprehended by locals. Instead, they were inclined to identify themselves through their ethnicity rather than by forced political identity. Consequently, illegal transborder movements, as defined by state nowadays, is still an alien concept to them. For states like Malaysia, illegal transborder movements entail other security concern like terrorism, human trafficking, arms smuggling, and illegal fishing. This security concern is more pronounced in the eastern coast of Sabah.

Unfinished border demarcation also explains Malaysia’s predicament in facing with a territorial dispute with regional power – China. The overlapping maritime issue is not only relatively new and involve multiple regional players in Southeast Asia, but has only involved another major power, US. With such complexity and China’s willingness (or lack thereof) to resolve the issue, a stalemate or for the status quo to continue in the short-term. However, with China’s continued rise, claims over the South China Sea will become an increasing threat to Malaysia’s territorial integrity.

Finally, Malaysia’ security also relies on a stable international structure. The country is situated in a conflict-prone region. Conflicts in neighbouring countries would have spill-over effects to the country. During the Vietnam War, Malaysia hosted thousands of refugees. When Indonesia was in turmoil in the post-Soeharto period, Malaysia once again became a safe haven not only for economic migrants but also to radical Islamists. This is similarly seen with the Southern Thai and the Mindanao conflicts. Aside from being forced to accept thousands of refugees, Malaysia has also been accused of supporting separatist groups. These rows inevitably create diplomatic tensions with neighbouring countries and contribute to instability in the region.

Conclusion Current security challenges in Malaysia are sandwiched between fragile socio-political structure and the fluid nature of international system. Yet, the domestic sources of threat are still the main security challenges. The inability to address the domestic sources of threat coupled with an uncertain international order could drag the country into larger conflict in the future if not manage properly.

Introduction

While struggling to contain COVID-19 infections, Indonesia like many in the world is facing a “second pandemic.” As a consequence of the pandemic, many Indonesians are suffering from various forms of psychological issues such as anxiety, depression and trauma. Confounding this is the implementation of social distancing measures, a response to the virus’ quick transmission, that impacts access to health services. It is, thus, important to evaluate the impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic on mental health services in Indonesia and measures to address this issue.

Limited Mental Health Services in Indonesia even Prior to COVID-19

Indonesia possesses 9,831 community health centres, locally known as Puskesmas, spread across 34 provinces. Of which, 92.4% administer mental health programmes. This indicates the Indonesian government’s reliance on them to provide mental health services to the community. Though some form of assistance are rendered to them by the Ministry of Health such as service guidelines and Mental Health and Psychological Support (MHPSS) during the pandemic, it is uncertain how many of these programmes are still running and how effective they are to reach the community. Unfortunately, there is also a lack of in-depth research that evaluates the sustainability of these mental health programmes, especially in areas that are remote and with limited resources.

Key to ensuring the sustainability of such programmes in these community health centres is the availability of resources, namely financial and health personnel. When conducting research in Lombok after it encountered a disaster in 2019, the author found that mental health programmes were not administered in several community health centres because of limited funds. To confound matters, available funds were also redirected to other programmes as mental health was not deemed to be an urgent issue. This was despite the discovery that around 60% of the elderly had developed PTSD; none were treated.

At the national level, the budget for mental health is also insignificant. However, from this meagre sum, 90% of it is allocated for psychiatric hospitals. Additionally, the human resources for mental healthcare are still far from ideal. For every 100,000 citizens, Indonesia only has 0.31 psychiatrists, 0.17 clinical psychologists, and 2.52 trained mental health nurses. Similarly, these numbers are insufficient to serve more than 260 million Indonesians. Furthermore, these specialists are not evenly distributed; most are largely concentrated in Java. With such limited resources, mental health programmes may only be present in name at these community health centres as they lack impactful activities.

With the onset of COVID-19, Indonesia was reported to have experienced a disruption in its mental health services. Globally, disruptions occurred due to reasons including 1) outpatients could not come for their appointments, 2) social restrictions, and 3) a decrease in the number of inpatients due to the cancellation of elective services. Although the types of services that were disrupted and the scale of disruption were not specified, any disruptions could further burden Indonesia’s already fragile mental healthcare system, potentially leading to its breakdown. As an example, the author discovered a psychiatric hospital in a major city in Indonesia was forced to discharge their inpatients earlier due to disruptions. Unfortunately, such disruptions can lead to a knock-on effect of overwhelming Indonesia’s primary healthcare due to a surge in patients. If the primary healthcare was to fail, patients can be left untreated, thus widening the mental health treatment gap in the community.

Tele-psychiatry: An Ideal Replacement of Conventional Mental Health Services Model

Despite the grim mental healthcare situation in Indonesia, there were several innovative strategies to respond to the people’s mental health needs during the pandemic.  First, the Indonesian government launched a psychological service programme called Sejiwa, abbreviated from Sehat Jiwa (literally Mentally Healthy) at the end of April 2020, in collaboration with the Indonesian Psychological Association (HIMPSI). This service entails providing psychological assistance via the telephone, thus improving accessibility. A month into its launch, this programme has received nearly 15,000 calls from all over Indonesia, or an average of about 500 callers per day. Some local governments have also provided online-based mental health services. For example in Jakarta through a programme called Mental Health Friend (Sahabat Jiwa) and in West Java with Online Mental Health Consultation (KJOL).

Second, many mental health practitioners have themselves taken the initiative to provide their services via online communication platforms such as WhatsApp, Zoom, and Meets. These individual initiatives help overcome the absence of such services that are supposed to be integrated into healthcare facilities. The community also benefits from the presence of various psychological consulting applications, for example: Getbetter.Id, Riliv, Kalm, Klee and Kariib. These proliferation of online-based service innovations can further reduce the gap in mental health services.

Demonstrating the potential of such innovations, tele- medicine as well as mental and psychosocial helplines were the two most widely used strategies to manage psychiatric issues during the COVID-19 pandemic. Tele-medicine (or tele-psychiatry specifically for mental health) and the helplines were used in about 70% and 67.7% of respondent countries, respectively. This approach is beneficial for the continued provision of healthcare services in this pandemic, considering the highly-contagious nature of the virus. The conventional mental health services model which emphasizes three factors (i.e. providing face-to-face consultations between therapists and patients, conducting consultations in a healthcare faculty, and is provided by specialists) is, thus, becoming less relevant. Continued emphasis on these three factors will only widen the service gap.

Innovations such as tele-psychiatry that were developed in the midst of the COVID-19 pandemic were found to possess  three characteristics: 1) offering spatial flexibility, 2) entailing health and social aspects, and 3) leveraging on technology. Therefore, it can be argued that this pandemic is a catalyst for the development of tele-psychiatry in Indonesia. In just one year, many have switched from conventional services to adopting this innovation; a feat difficult to achieve under normal conditions.

Towards Sustainability and Scaling up of Tele-psychiatry

However, it should be noted that this innovation is only at its infancy because of the current pandemic. Also known as imposed service innovation, such innovations are not triggered due to the strength or development of services, otherwise known as extant service innovation. Unfortunately, such innovations can end abruptly if the compelling circumstances no longer exists and / or if there is no further effort for development. Moreover, many tele-psychiatric services are currently provided as a private initiative with minimal facilities. Even though such services are beneficial, they will encounter issues in sustainability and scaling up.

Sustainability and scaling up are important due to two reasons. First, regardless of the pandemic, tele-psychiatry is considered a strategy that has the potential to reduce inequalities in mental health services. It is important to highlight that while developing countries such as Indonesia require such innovations, many have yet to implement it on a large-scale. Second, sustainability would be dependent on factors such as relevance of the innovation. Tele-psychiatry’s relevance can be ensured by using the behaviour of current users during the pandemic as a reference to envision the future market. Such massive developments would thus require political will from the government and support by its stakeholders.

Noteworthily, tele-psychiatry is not a strategy that can be applied in all situations, considering the socio-demographics of Indonesia. However, it is an effective stopgap measure to reduce the gap in mental health services that have been disrupted due to the pandemic. Moreover, with the limitations of mental health specialists, tele-psychiatry can be used to reduce spatial and temporal needs of service delivery. What the provincial governments of Jakarta and West Java are implementing should be adopted by other regions, although ideally this service should be meted out in every district / city while working closely with the community health centres to reach the community at the grassroots. Investment in this field will greatly impact everyone as they can access mental health services wherever they are, even after the pandemic.

Introduction

President Joko Widodo’s (Jokowi) recent announcement of Indonesia’s vaccination plan sparked several contradictory effects. Economically, Indonesian Rupiah (IDR) strengthen by 0.07% or IDR 14.080/US$ after the plan was announced. Prior to the announcement, IDR weakened by 0.32% or IDR 14.135/US$. Stock spending also increased by 2%.

Conversely, the announcement triggered Indonesians to neglect COVID-19 safety protocols such as physical distancing, washing hands, and wearing face masks. Shortly after the announcement, only 9% of the 512 regencies and municipalities complied with the face mask-wearing rule, and barely 4% adhered to the physical distancing rule. Ominously after the announcement, Indonesia continued to set new daily records of COVID-19 infections. This suggests the early impacts of these safety breaches.

These should serve as a warning for GoI that their vaccination plan may not encourage its citizens to maintain their health, through these safety protocols, despite eliciting a positive effect on Indonesia’s economy. Additionally, it is pertinent for GoI to remember that the main objective of the COVID-19 vaccine is not only for short-medium term outcomes, namely reducing infection rates and strengthening the economy. It is also for medium-long term outcomes where the government, its citizens, and the private sector develop a system to prevent future pandemics while ensuring that issues faced during this pandemic are better handled in the future.

COVID-19: Problems of Health and Environment

There are two problems with COVID-19. First concerns health. COVID-19 infected individuals could either be asymptomatic or symptomatic with symptoms such as pneumonia, dry cough, and high fever. Early research suggests that asymptomatic individuals were 42% less likely to transmit the virus than symptomatic individuals. However, in highly populated cities of developing countries such as Jakarta, Indonesia, these asymptomatic individuals assist in accelerating infections. This is especially so when testing in most countries are targeted at those with symptoms. This means that not only would these asymptomatic individuals perpetuate the pandemic, people infected by these individuals may become symptomatic and are at risk of succumbing to the virus.

Second, the initial discovery that COVID-19 was due to the human consumption of bats indicates an environmental issue. Although this finding is still debatable, some have expanded on this by suggesting the origins of COVID-19 to be from a wet market that sold livestock and wild animals such as bats in close proximity to each other. The virus proceeded to undergo mutations and eventually infected humans.

These two problems are, however, not new nor are unique to COVID-19. Countries including Indonesia have experienced these issues prior to this pandemic.

In addition to COVID-19, Indonesia continues to experience several health concerns. Of these health concerns such as respiratory diseases, Indonesians are still at risk from dying of diseases that are either preventable or manageable. Attributing to this is the lack of care for personal health, unknowingly due to the lack of education or intentional such as continuing unhealthy habits. Though the severity of these health concerns has been overshadowed by COVID-19, these problems still exist with some not having a vaccine solution.

Indonesia also continues to struggle with environmental problems which can develop into health issues. For example, Indonesia has the highest levels of polluted air quality with 90% caused by motor-vehicle emissions and by forest fires linked to palm-oil plantation developments. Exposing 32 million Indonesian children to such environmental problems have led to a decrease in intelligence quotient (IQ) by 2 points. Additionally, practices of selling wild animals can also be found in Indonesia.

Unfortunately, Indonesia have yet to develop efficient policies to address these issues. For example, Indonesia only have broad health measures targeted at the community level. Such broad measures also lack any instrumentations and details of how such policy works, especially how government and society relate to each other. While GoI allocates 5% of state spending for these community health measures, the society still faces issues with maintaining their health and the environment. These problems highlight how chronic these problems are, particularly when correlation studies as well as comprehensive policies managing both simultaneously are absent. Furthermore, these demonstrate why vaccines are not holistic and sustainable solutions and why Indonesia should further develop health and environment management systems post-COVID-19.

Sustainable Policy: Beyond Vaccines

Herd immunity can develop without vaccines. From history, the Spanish Flu pandemic was eventually mitigated due to the development of herd immunity when most became immune to the virus. The reliance on non-pharmaceutical interventions demonstrate why herd immunity is not solely dependent on medicine, vaccine, or any chemical intervention. Pharmaceutical interventions simply expedite herd immunity. Therefore, herd immunity can be achieved by allowing the human body to build a natural resilience against the pathogen. To achieve this communal protection, it is thus crucial for people to maintain their health such as through good personal hygiene and their environment, reducing the opportunities for pathogens to mutate. Noteworthily, the Spanish Flu also saw the initial use of using face masks as used currently to stem infections.

By understanding that vaccines are not the ultimate solution, the next steps should be for Indonesia to develop policies to manage future pandemics sustainably. These policies should be comprehensively discussed by government, private and societal necessities, as evident in governance where service, profit, and democratic values are integrated.

Sustainable Policy, an upgraded version of Sustainable Development, provides a way forward. Sustainable Policy centres on the principle that sustainability is not only achievable via people, planet, and profit approaches. It is also achieved by ensuring the future viability of our planet and all its diverse communities by education and advocacy. Furthermore, Sustainable Policy is also the belief that the creation of a sustainable society is via protecting and enhancing social, environmental and economic impacts that are important as Indonesia develops. These principles and beliefs of Sustainable Policy should drive policies in Indonesia, especially after this pandemic. Such policies can, thus, assist Indonesia to fully utilize its resources. From past instances, Indonesia has yet to do so. One recent example is how Indonesia has amassed one of the highest number of infections and deaths from COVID-19 in the world despite possessing a tropical climate. A tropical climate should have impeded the spread of COVID-19 as compared to colder climates.

An example of how Sustainable Policy can help Indonesia better mitigate future pandemics is via food management. To improve the health of its citizens, Indonesia can implement a more rigorous food hygiene policy. Learning from the UK government, Indonesia should require merchants to pass a hygiene test before being allowed to sell their food products. With better hygiene awareness, it could ensure higher food safety, thus help prevent a future COVID-19-like pandemic. However, Indonesia will require time to implement such policies due to the need for proper infrastructure and manpower training.

Nevertheless, such policies must also be complemented with an equally rigorous environmental policy. This ensures that the cleanliness of venues selling and distributing food are regulated. This is imperative because despite possessing a food safety regulation, 36.55% of distribution facilities in Indonesia did not meet food safety requirements.  Furthermore, only 46 traditional markets in Indonesia possess a certificate of cleanliness. This is far from the target of 15,657 markets.

Collectively, these highlight the need for Sustainable Policy to be discussed by numerous stakeholders such as the government, private sector, and society, both within institutional and non-institutional contexts. Institutional context entails Sustainable Policy to be embedded within the general processes of policymaking while non-institutional context refers to the integrity of those responsible for implementing and upholding Sustainable Policy. Both contexts are essential to be discussed with regards to matters such as state budget. Within the institutional context, institutions must first ensure that state budget is allocated towards health, environmental and social interests. Subsequently, those responsible must ensure that state funds allocated for Sustainable Policy are free from corruption. This reinforces the need for the involvement of GoI, private sector and society to ensure that Sustainable Policy is implemented efficiently.

In this tripartite alliance, the society is essential in tying policies formulated by the government with the financial contributions from the private sector. With a well-functioning tripartite alliance, Sustainable Policy that is implemented will not only be able to response better to similar health threats in the future, but will also instil healthier and more environmentally-friendly lifestyles in future generations.

Introduction

Surging to 678,125 COVID-19 cases prompted two immediate measures from President Joko Widodo (Jokowi). Such numbers have led to relieving the Health Minister of his appointment and an eventual U-turn to ensure that the COVID-19 vaccine is free for all Indonesians. However, it is pertinent to understand how Indonesia possesses the highest number of COVID-19 infections (and still climbing) in Southeast Asia. This commentary highlights four factors that would have prevented Indonesia’s ascend in COVID-19 cases, if had been addressed.

Missteps since the Beginning

Despite numerous countries including those in Southeast Asia reporting cases of COVID-19 in January 2020, Indonesia not only maintained status quo but also denied the presence of the virus in the country. Such stance led Indonesia to continue its detection and prevention phase. Despite referring to Presidential Instruction Number 4 of 2019 (Capacity Enhancement in Preventing, Detecting, and Responding to Outbreaks of Disease, Global Pandemic and Nuclear, Biological and Chemical Emergencies) and the 2005 International Health Regulation, no preventive measures were implemented by the government.

While countries closed their borders, Indonesia incentivized domestic and international tourists via provision of travel discounts from 1 March 2020 for the continued travel within and into the country. Complementing this was the proposed disbursement of IDR 72 billion (~USD5.1 million) to international influencers to promote tourism to Indonesia. It was evident that Indonesia was concerned with aiding the recovery of its tourism sector impacted by COVID-19. Shortly after, Indonesia reported its first COVID-19 infection.

Instead of implementing an immediate country-wide quarantine as others have done upon a COVID-19 case, the government seemed torn between prioritizing health and economy. The basis of such uncertainty was because Indonesia was believed to be vulnerable to an economic crisis if a country-wide quarantine was implemented. After a month-long deliberation and basing on inputs from local governments, Indonesia eventually implemented large-scale social restrictions (PSBB).

Unfortunately, the time taken enabled COVID-19 infections to spike. Its capital, Jakarta, for example, implemented PSBB on 10 April 2020 when there were 3,412 cases in Indonesia. Of these cases, 1,719 were from Jakarta.

In addition to the lack of coordination to implement PSBB in all regions, PSBB was also inconsistently implemented. From April to December 2020, Jakarta continuously oscillated between implementing PSBB and partial PSBB. Such back-and-forth indicated that the debate to prioritized health and economy was yet to be resolved. To confound matters, the PSBB implemented in Jakarta was not strictly enforced. For instance, travelling in and out of Jakarta continued despite being prohibited. These collective missteps consequently encouraged many to disregard health protocols, further contributing to the increasing daily COVID-19 infection rates.

Disinformation by the Government

In its attempt to allay its citizens, the Indonesian government became a source of disinformation. Numerous appointment holders within Jokowi’s inner ring frequently released statements downplaying the true extent of the situation. Not only was the severity of COVID-19 joked about, the former Health Minister accused the media of fear-mongering. Noteworthily, the herbal necklace that was claimed to prevent COVID-19 infections without scientific evidence was also heavily endorsed by numerous Indonesian artistes.

Such actions suggest that the government was focused on instilling a pseudo sense of security for its people. This was ostensibly to prevent any negative sentiments by investors to avert an economic crisis. It also highlighted the Indonesian government’s growing control over information on social media platforms via the engagement of buzzers.

Moreover, upon the announcement of its first COVID-19 case, the government had not then established a centralized information centre with accountable data. Instead, the media had to rely on their own efforts to gather and process data to provide timely and relevant updates. Currently, Indonesia’s Ministry of Health only has established a website on COVID-19 albeit still lacking in information.

The lack of accurate information and the belittling of the situation by the government, thus, contributed to many in the community to downplay the severity of COVID-19 and to have no qualms disregarding health protocols.

Lack of Capability and Accuracy of COVID-19 Tests

In numerous WHO’s weekly reports, Indonesia was recommended to increase its COVID-19 testing capability. At one point, its rate of testing was observed to be only 25 tested for every 1 million individuals. This disparity in testing is still observed today. On 22 December 2020, there were 69,343 suspected COVID-19 cases in Indonesia. However, only 48,806 specimens were tested while specimens were only collected from 30,768 individuals. Therefore, it is rather certain that Indonesia was underreporting its COVID-19 cases. Unfortunately, this would also mean that its 678,125 reported cases may not be an accurate representation of reality.

To confound matters, the level of accuracy of Indonesia’s COVID-19 tests is also questionable. A case in point would be 13 Indonesians were found positive for COVID-19 upon landing in Saudi Arabia in November 2020. These travellers had been certified COVID-19 negative prior their disembarkation. Several incidents were also reported in Taiwan on October and December 2020.

Regrettably, 202 out of 510 laboratories did not report their results on 21 December 2020. This discovery came as medical facilities and manpower continued being overwhelmed in managing COVID-19 cases. This was evident from the limited availability of negative pressure isolation wards, isolation wards without negative pressure, negative pressure ICU rooms equipped with ventilators, negative pressure ICU rooms without ventilators, non-negative pressure ICU rooms equipped with ventilators, and non-negative pressure ICU rooms without ventilators.

The misdirected and inconsistent policies, limited testing capability, inaccurate test results, overwhelmed healthcare sector contributed to Indonesia’s deterioration. When compared with Philippines, which is similar in population size, Indonesia has not only surpassed the latter’s cases, but also has five times more COVID-19 deaths and active cases.

Sole Reliance on COVID-19 Vaccine

As early as September 2020, Indonesia began touting the availability of COVID-19 vaccines by November 2020. Such reliance on vaccines and without other mitigative measures suggest that the government is solely dependent on vaccines as a silver bullet. By early December 2020, only 3 million Sinovac vaccines which has an unknown efficacy rate arrived in Indonesia. Moreover, Indonesia has yet to secure procurements of other vaccines with known efficacy such as Pfizer BioNTech (95% efficacy), AstraZeneca (62-90% efficacy) and Moderna (95% efficacy) unlike its neighbouring countries. Additionally, despite targeting the immunization of 70% of its population to elicit herd immunity, Indonesia still has yet to receive sufficient vaccines to do so.

Despite its reliance on vaccines, the Indonesian government again had to deliberate on the administration of its vaccines. At one point, there were two forms of administration, namely those from the government that were offered free of charge and those that were available to paying customers. Enabling vaccines to be purchased was met with criticisms from various quarters. A chief criticism was the worry of unequal distribution of vaccines to all strata of the community. Eventually, President Jokowi announced that vaccines will not only be free for all Indonesians but would be the first to be vaccinated in a bid to allay fears pertaining to the vaccine’s safety.

It is also still unclear how these vaccines can be effectively rolled out in Indonesia which has a large population and land size. Breaking away from other countries’ vaccination plan, Indonesia has decided to prioritize frontline staff and workers between the ages of 18 to 59 over the elderly. Only time will tell if such a gamble will go in Indonesia’s favour.

Introduction

In mid-November 2020, word of a possible revival of Malaysia’s Anti-fake News Act floated during parliament sittings. Justifying these discussions were the unhindered, wide-spread dissemination of voluminous content deemed as ‘fake news’ as authorities were preoccupied with COVID-19 measures. As of October 11, 270 investigation papers were opened with 388 denials and clarifications made with 35 charged in court. While such info-demic could be responded with existing Malaysian laws and other government campaigns, an examination of Malaysia’s information environment is worth exploring, particularly in the search to refine or innovate approaches to address ‘fake news’ for the present and immediate future.

Responding Without Anti-fake News Act in Malaysia

Seen as part and parcel of communication, such forms of information disorder can be found in Malaysia’s information environment prior to the birth of Twitter, Facebook and YouTube. An example would be the conflicting accounts for the root causes of the 1974 Baling demonstrations where students and farmers protested the decline in the price of rubber and rising poverty levels. Mal-information, the deliberate distribution of truthful information with the intention of inflicting harm on an individual or country, too is no stranger to the Malaysian information environment. High-profile exposes involving the personal lives of politicians aim to smear character or distract from existing issues. Most prominent of which is the former deputy Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim’s sodomy trials in 1998.

Even without the repealed Anti-fake News act, the Malaysian authorities could respond to such incidents with existing laws and institutions. Section 233 of the Communications and Multimedia Act 1998 (CMA 1998) punishes those who produces or transmits content or misuses an application service with the intention of annoying, abusing, threatening or harassing another person. The Baling Demonstrations, among other factors, resulted in the Printing Presses and Publications Act 1984 to improve response to virulent misinformation that could result in violence. Moreover, mal-information could be addressed by the Sedition Act 1948, if it was in the interest of the government. The Penal Code too addresses defamation with imprisonment of up to two years.

However, the question on the efficacy of existing laws to address information disorder is relevant, particularly given the nuances of content today. While thresholds of existing laws would vary from the CMA 1998’s intent to ‘annoy, abuse, threaten or harass’ to ‘the incitement of violence’, usage of misinformation, disinformation or mal-information are intended to produce strategic outcomes. In the case of misinformation for instance, where the disseminator believes the information to be true, participation for its transmission may be accidental and would require education and awareness as panaceas as opposed to stringent laws. Fact-checking, from institutions to culture should be cultivated.

In addition, false amplification of messages can target intangible outcomes such as the political congruence of society or social cohesion for political gains. Thus, in a system where divisive political communication may seem a part of the norm, additional laws would be considered unnecessary whether it is to have high quality of fact-checking, to ensure greater transparency in systems or to address content intended to segregate.

But herein lies three problems. The first is trust in institutions, particularly those providing the clarifications and running the fact-checking schemes. And noteworthily, how ‘fake news’ is defined. The second is the idiosyncrasies in Malaysia’s information environment which encourages the manipulation of public sentiment. The third problem is the need to hold open conversations on political communication, organized public manipulation and harm on nation building.

Three Challenges of Existing Laws and Institutions

Malaysia holds a few fact-checking organisations which are either government-run, media-affiliated or interest-based. Prior to COVID-19, the most prominent would be Sebenarnya.my (launched in 2017) and Medical Mythbusters Malaysia (launched in 2016). The modus operandi of such organisations generally involves verifying information directly from official sources. For instance, fraudulent claims about a certain fast-moving consumer goods was not halal, Sebenarnya.my would address such claims with official documentations as proof. Unfortunately, such modus operandi cannot adequately clarify or debunk all claims. This is because such modus operandi relies on the trustworthiness of official sources. Sources whose trust is perceived as compromised challenges the verification process, consequently leading to he-said-she-said situations. Such trust issues dig deeper into systemic problems and the chosen belief-systems of the audience. For instance, if the reputation of the body issuing halal certificates is compromised – truthfully or otherwise – any debunk or clarification made by a fact-checking body would not be effective.

Furthermore, Malaysia has a broad definition of ‘fake news’, even under the repealed Anti-fake News act. In this act, fake news is referred to “any news, information data and reports, which is or are wholly or partly false” with disproportionately high punishments for creators, disseminators and publishers of such content. Confounding this issue is the unfair practice of penalizing the dissemination of false information without discriminating its motivations.

For instance, content analysis of government-attached fact-checking outfit, Sebenarnya.my, during the COVID-19 health crisis (data stops in June 2020) revealed a majority of ‘fake news’ is related to authority’s actions. The categorization, made by Harris Zainul inferred that a majority of motivations behind the claims are to “troll or provoke with no discernible political motive”. An example is the highest viewed fact-check in the data set, a debunk of a voice note stating that Malaysia’s National Security Council will declare an emergency. Motivations for the dissemination of such information could stem from sentiments of concerns or panic rather than a deliberate intention to mislead. To complicate matters, the claims of those charged in court during this period were not revealed to the public. Thus, the exact premises for items regarded as ‘fake news’ was not transparent to the general public.

Secondly, there are idiosyncrasies of Malaysia’s information environment which could create susceptibility to info-demic. An environment unfolding since the 1970s, the terrain consists of the media, government agencies, private sector and civil society to an audience divided linguistically, culturally and politically. With the introduction of Web 2.0, sources of information that are no longer only government-affiliated individuals and bodies. In other words, the Internet has lowered barriers of access to information and barriers to discourse. This enabled greater representation of minority voices through new media, quicker feedback it offered political parties and individuals,  traditional media being more open to non-establishment views due to competition with new media, and an increase in accountability as politicians are forced to interact with individuals online.

Yet, the interactive environment would not change a population that is divided in vernacular, cultural or political media consumption. Despite proffered democratic values offered by Web2.0, the public sphere can still be rife with manipulation, particularly due to Malaysia’s contested political space. Both sides of the political divide would deploy half-truths and disinformation tactics to discredit each other, which could detract conversations from policies and issues. The success of such tactics would be dependent on their effectiveness of building echo chambers that aim to segregate and divide. It is also not helpful that with the anonymity of the Web, the distinction between representing the views of the masses and misrepresenting the views of a few as that of the masses is blurred.

Such misrepresentations are evident from the presence of bots utilised by Malaysian actors and permanent cyber troopers in Malaysia’s digital spaces. An open secret, Malaysia’s cyber troopers consist of paid support as well as loyal amplifiers who could be paid in kind,  engaged by numerous political parties. The saturation of cyber troopers was deemed important when in 2017 Datuk Seri Ahmad Zahid Hamidi, who was then the Deputy Prime Minister, depicted that 93.4% of cyber-troopers were pro-opposition with the remaining 6.6% supporting the Barisan Nasional government. The decision to saturate the Internet with such forms of support appear similar to the acquisition or increased affiliation of media houses in the 1970-1980s.

There are aspects of the process that can be organic, for instance harnessing the energy of supporters to build favourable environments online and offline. However, suggestions to amplify messages by utilizing social media and employing micro-targeting methods may segment the online population further. This could utilize narratives inclusive of fanning racial rhetoric, encourage cyber-bullying of alternative-voices and the creation of fake accounts to falsely bolster a message. The role of such actors in public opinion would eventually feed to traditional and new media sources, which could impact direction of nation-building and policies. Therefore, in addition to verification and fact-checking, conversations on civil interaction, the development of societal preference for issue-based policy conversations and digital attempts to pierce echo chambers need to be held to advance democratic maturity.

It would be easy to think that addressing info-demicis only concerned with truth and truth-seeking. However, the end goal is the development of matured discourses on issues. As complex information environments complicate truth formation, safeguarding society from inauthentic representation, particularly those with socio-political consequences would have to be acted upon. Legislative action and any reprisal of the Anti-fake News Act – or future legislation – would have to consider these as the nation battles COVID-19 and info-demic.

Introduction

Up till 2024, the regulation policies for tobacco control is unlikely to experience significant progress. This is despite tobacco consumption being a major risk factor for non-communicable diseases (NCDs). Reasons include strong resistance and protest from the majority of parliamentary factions and the tobacco industry. This issue is further confounded as political attention and national resources are prioritized for the management of the coronavirus pandemic and its direct health, economy and social impacts. Theoretically, tobacco regulation policies and the prevention of diseases caused by cigarette consumption are clear, easy to apply and will have a major impact on improving public health in the long term.

Lethality of Tobacco-associated Non-communicable Diseases

NCDs are the leading cause of death and disabilities worldwide. In 2018, the World Health Organization (WHO) recorded an annual 41 million deaths globally due to NCDs. This constitutes an estimated 70% of the total deaths worldwide. The top three lethal NCDs were cardiovascular diseases (17.9 million), cancer (9 million), and respiratory diseases (3.9 million). Causes of these top three killers include the consumption of highly toxic products such as cigarettes. Additionally, tobacco products are mass produced, thus, not only increasing access to these harmful products but also increasing society’s exposure to its toxins.

Unfortunately, Indonesia is not only one of the biggest producers of tobacco but also one of the biggest consumers in the world. Enabling this is the favourable environment in Indonesia that enables the tobacco industry to flourish. Collectively, these highlight the need for two simultaneous courses of action. Lacking one course of action would compromise efforts to mitigate NCDs. The first course of action would be targeted at the individual level with the promotion of a healthy lifestyle while avoiding the consumption of toxic products. The second is the need for structural changes through stricter tobacco control policies.

Without strong political will from President Joko Widodo, it is almost certain for the status quo to remain. This seems to be the reality as he completes his final tenure as President in 2024. And without stricter tobacco control policies, Indonesians susceptibility to sickness and poverty would increase. In addition to NCDs,  tobacco consumption increases the risk and severity of communicable diseases such as influenza, tuberculosis, and nosocomial infections. Numerous studies have also shown that the majority of tobacco users in developing countries are the poor. Upon their addiction to tobacco products, a larger percentage of their income would likely be used on these products instead of basic essential items. This consequently increases their risk of falling ill and thus, worsening their financial standing.

Two factors that affect political will are the social norms of tobacco consumption and the delayed expression of symptoms. Unlike infectious diseases such as COVID-19 where their symptoms are immediate, ailments from NCDs usually require several decades to develop. Additionally, tobacco consumption, particularly smoking of kreteks (clove-flavoured cigarettes), is deeply entrenched in Indonesia.

To reverse the increasing number of deaths due to tobacco consumption, WHO has approved and encouraged countries to ratify the Framework Convention on Tobacco Control (FCTC) since 2003. FCTC entails a strong and comprehensive legal framework to control tobacco consumption. Currently, this convention has been ratified by 182 countries consisting of more than 90% of the world’s population. However, Indonesia is the only Asian country that has yet to do so but not without trying. In 2004, plans to ratify the convention by the Indonesian government failed and there have been no attempts ever since. Instead, in 2016, Joko Widodo stated that one reason for Indonesia to continue the status quo is to safeguard “national interest” on the basis of protecting tobacco growers and those employed in the tobacco industry. Similarly, the tobacco industry, association and its supporters in Indonesia have constantly lobbied Joko Widodo against the ratification on the pretext that the industry contributes a large amount of taxes to the government while ensuring the livelihoods of many Indonesians.

Due to this stance, Indonesia’s Health Ministry faces a losing battle against tobacco consumption. This is despite Indonesia’s Health Ministry reporting 230,000 tobacco-related deaths annually. The ministry has also uncovered a rising prevalence of teenage smokers, aged 10 – 18. Teenage smokers rose to 9.1% in 2018 from 7.2% in 2013. Ironically, the Indonesian government had targeted the prevalence of teenage smokers to be capped at 5.4% in 2019 despite their stance on tobacco consumption. This is indicative of the government’s failure to control cigarette consumption while highlighting the tobacco industry’s success at targeting teenagers. Targeting teenagers is a significant achievement by the industry as teenage smokers will become their long-serving patrons, replacing older smokers.

Economically, Indonesia’s Health Ministry has shown massive losses of nearly IDR 600 trillion (USD 40 billion) to the macro economy due to tobacco consumption. This amount is four times the amount of cigarette taxes received by the government in the same year. Losses are tabulated from the total number of productive years lost, inpatient and outpatient costs. Unfortunately, the amount of losses is envisaged to increase annually as these costs increase. A more grave concern is that the majority of smokers (60%) comes from low-income families.

These statistics, however, do not hinder 65 million Indonesians from continued tobacco consumption. Tobacco industries in Indonesia are relatively unimpeded in advertising, promoting and distributing their products. This population will continue to increase as children and teenagers are targeted by the tobacco industry as their new generation of consumers. Indicative of this is WHO’s estimation that the population of tobacco consumers in Indonesia to rise to 96 million by 2025. It is, thus, a monumental challenge for Indonesia to drop from its third ranking of countries with the highest number of smokers in the world without stricter tobacco control policies.

Restricting Outreach and Price Control: Easier Said Than Done

Outreach and price control are two effective policies to regulate tobacco consumption that are much needed and still lacking in Indonesia. Restricting outreach entails the total banning of its advertisements, promotions, and sponsorships in mass media and outdoor media. Meanwhile, price control entails increasing prices of tobacco products by setting minimum prices and increasing taxes on tobacco products.

Current outreach restrictions are still suboptimal. Tobacco product commercials continue to be broadcasted on television albeit restricted to airtimes of 09.30pm to 05.00am daily. Similarly, advertisements on print media are still allowed with certain restrictions such as no full-page advertisements. The Indonesian government, at the urging of the health ministry, must be recognized for its attempt at curbing online outreach. A total of 114 websites were shut down in 2019 for violations prohibiting the publication of tobacco product images in their advertisements. However, such regulations can be bypassed simply by removing such images. Additionally, there have yet to be regulations on advertisements on social media platforms. Another regulation that is lacking is the restriction on internet sales.

The affordable prices and taxes on tobacco products do not impede their purchase by the poor and children. Despite a revision in cigarette prices this year, one can still obtain a pack of 12 at IDR 12,300 (USD0.84). It must be noted that one of the lowest regional minimum wage (UMR) in Indonesia is around IDR 1.7 million. Setting a minimum price of IDR 50,000 could motivate consumers to stop their habit. It is also concerning that the sales of loose cigarettes are still permitted in Indonesia. According to a 2018 survey, the market price per stick of loose cigarette is approximately IDR 1,000 – IDR 2,000. Its cheap prices and lack of enforcement on age restrictions enable their purchase by children. Additionally, tobacco industries have yet to incur the maximum amount of tax that can be legally enforced on their products, set at 57% of the retail price. Currently, the highest tax bracket is capped at 43%. This was only after an increase this year as there was no revision of tax for tobacco products in 2019.

Should the stance of the next government administration on tobacco control policies change, ratification of the FCTC could still be a tall order. Nevertheless, continued lobbying could lead to tougher restrictions and increasing public awareness on the dangers of tobacco consumption. Such incremental toughening and increased awareness could one day culminate to Indonesia ratifying the FCTC.

Introduction

The importance of maintaining food security was re-emphasized with the onset of COVID-19. The pandemic has also emphasized the need for countries to invest in new technologies as they strive towards self-sufficiency i.e. reducing their reliance on trade. Previously, the impetus of such technologies was to ensure that the increase in global food demand, a consequence of rising population, will always be met. These technologies, known as agritech, also offer attractive and viable solutions particularly for countries facing limited available land. The following sections provide a brief description of agritech and its attractiveness as a target for attack.

What is Agritech?

Agritech is one of two part of the billion-dollar agrifood industry. This part refers to technologies that targets agriculture producers such as farmers. Unlike traditional agriculture methods, investors are more receptive to these new technologies due to their capability to ensure consistent production and quality. In other words, reducing the risk while increasing the potential Return on Investment (ROI). This is possible as key to agritech is its precise control of almost every factor that impacts the success of the harvest. Employed are sensors that assist in regulating the environment. Benefits include optimizing the use of resources such as fertilizers, preventing resource wastage thus decreasing overheads, decreasing the potential for such media to get leaked into the environment, maintaining an ideal growth environment for the products, and negating the need for succession planting. This potentially means all types of plants and animals can be cultivated anytime throughout the year.

Additionally, agritech will reduce the need for heavy equipment such as tractors as production facilities become more compact from the optimized use of space and reliance on automation. More important for investors is how agritech encourages research to not only better understand the needs of their products but for genetic manipulation for increased resilience and quality of their products. Such research can, thus, create other numerous revenue-generating sub-industries focusing on husbandry, nutrition, health, and breeding. Therefore, adopting agritech will ensure a shift in the recruitment of higher educated and trained personnel.

Currently, the four technologies that are present in Southeast Asia (SEA) are vertical farming, aquaculture, aquaponics, and cultured meat (also known as in vitro or lab-grown meat). Vertical farming is an innovation that leverages on two existing systems: hydroponics and aeroponics. Utilizing either one of these systems, plants are grown in stacks without the reliance of soil and in growth media. This, thus, improves food safety by eliminating soil-based contamination. Additionally, vertical farming improves space usage as it can be built in the form of tall towers or underground.

Aquaculture is the farming of seafood products such as fish and crustaceans. Previously, such farms are built outdoors and are dependent on the quality of existing water source. There is now a push for such farms to be built indoors i.e. overland for greater control. Aquaponics is simply a hybridized closed loop system that includes a hydroponic system and an aquaculture system. Its principle lies in using wastewater generated from the aquaculture system as growth media for the hydroponic system. Water from the hydroponic system is then treated and re-entered into the aquaculture system. Like its name, cultured meats are meats that are grown using cells in bioprocessing facilities. Although aimed at preventing animal cruelty, this technology still requires some animals to be reared and harvested for their cells. As it is still in its infancy, research is still ongoing to not only reduce the production costs but to expand the variety of meats produced in vitro.

Agritech Facilities as Attractive Targets of Attack

Unfortunately, the characteristics that make agritech appealing also makes it attractive targets of attack. Due to its compact processes, an attack on such facilities would result in higher damage and losses than traditional facilities. Additionally, any damage or disruption inflicted on their centralized control network would lead to similar outcomes. Those leveraging on closed loop systems are also vulnerable as an introduction of contaminants in any part of the system can lead to total system failure. Contributing to its attractiveness as targets could be its limited security features and the psychological impact of an attack on such facilities; food being a basic need. Currently, guidelines and gold standards to securitizing these facilities may be limited and may even be overlooked.

Three Groups of Potential Perpetrators

The first group of potential perpetrators are terrorists. Included in this group are religiously motivated terrorists and ecoterrorists. Religiously motivated terrorists, responsible for most contemporary terrorist attacks, have been argued to display organizational learning. They would therefore not only search for new tactics but also targets. Additionally, the ambiguity of whether lab grown meat are religiously permissible may legitimize them as targets. Aquaculture, aquaponics, and lab-grown meats may come under the crosshair of ecoterrorists as they act to advance animal rights. Though lab-grown meats involved a reduced number of live animals, it may be deemed unacceptable as it promotes the continued consumption of meat and the abuse of livestock. It certainly is a disservice to agritech as it requires electricity to power its operations. Unfortunately, in SEA, coal-powered generators are still a major source of electricity. This provides an additional point of contention for ecoterrorists.

The second group of potential perpetrators are those who are disenfranchised by these technologies. This group of individuals are likely those who have lost their employment when traditional farms adopt these technologies. It could also include small-scale producers who lose their livelihoods to agritech facilities. These individuals may carry out attacks uncoordinated and on their own, through anti-technology movements, or get recruited into terrorist groups. Anti-technology movements have been known to exist since the 1800s, most notable is the Luddites.

The third group of potential perpetrators are opportunists. These are individuals or groups who could demand a ransom from agritech facilities on the threat of disrupting their production. Their tactics would likely come in the form of online attacks to the facilities’ essential IT infrastructure. Non-functioning sensors, for example, will be disastrous for such facilities.

Likely Modus Operandi & Implications

Implicit from the list of potential perpetrators, two forms of modus operandi are envisaged. The first centres on perpetrators physically forcing entry into these facilities. Upon their successful entry, they could sabotage production by either inflicting structural damage to essential infrastructure or contaminating essential resources such as growth media. In such a scenario, the perpetrators potential weapons of choice include guns, explosives, and poisons. It is unlikely that perpetrators would resort to using chemical and biological agents in such attacks as introduction of large amounts of easily obtainable contaminants such as dishwashing liquid is enough to disrupt production.

Additionally, in such a scenario, it is thus important to maintain sufficient security to prevent any unlawful entry into these premises, particularly in essential areas such as control rooms. Personnel and vehicle checks at entry points are also essential. These checks are to screen for weapons and explosives. It is also ideal to create a stand-off distance to minimize damage to the main buildings. This would mean creating as much free space between the entry point and the main buildings.

The second likely modus operandi is the online penetration into the facilities IT infrastructure. In addition to constantly ensuring the facility’s cybersecurity, it may be ideal to also consider decentralizing their systems. A decentralized system allows the creation of redundancy and is more tolerant to faults.