Introduction

Despite the COVID-19 pandemic, the spread of violent extremist ideology has increased. Because of social restrictions, there has been a shift in tactics used by violent extremists to spread their ideologies and conduct their activities. For instance, violent extremist organizations are now more reliant on technology and social media to spread their ideologies. Also, the pandemic has altered the domestic threat landscape and provided a platform for people of various ideologies to openly advance agendas and propagate justifications for radical and nationalistic misinformation, fake news, and conspiracy theories. The potential rise in online terrorist content and a broader acceptance of it, ostensibly due to the significant number of lives affected by the pandemic, increases the chances of radicalization. Unfortunately, Malaysia is not spared from this threat.

Trends of Radicalization during COVID-19

The internet is a double-edged sword. While increasing access to knowledge, it also promotes radicalization and indoctrination through digital media. Its low cost, dynamic, globally-connected, and decentralized networks facilitate online radicalization. Additionally, the emergence of technology has created pathways for diverse ideologies to take root. Social media, for example, serves as a tool for jihadi recruitment. From personal interviews with local law enforcement agencies, Malaysia is experiencing similar trends.

Since 2019, violent extremist groups have exploited the prevailing pandemic to advance their cause. Violent extremists are riding on the rising public anger due to the pandemic towards governments. By leveraging on this public anger while providing “solutions”, violent extremist groups intend to increase opportunities to overthrow governments while increasing public support for themselves. Not only does the pandemic aid violent extremist groups in their attempts to destabilize national security, but it is also an opportune time for groups such as Al Qaeda and the Islamic State (IS) to rebuild after years of counterterrorism efforts against them.

Additionally, violent extremist groups have adapted their narratives around the pandemic. There is a growing sentiment that radicalized individuals are contagious and can spread the “disease” through interactions like the coronavirus. Unfortunately, this breeds mistrust towards specific communities, establishing the fertile ground for recruitment by violent extremist groups. Such groups would exploit the mistrust and mutual grievances to garner support from potential recruits while reinforcing their members’ worldviews.

This phenomenon is also experienced in Muslim-majority Malaysia particularly in certain Malay communities. These communities generally propagate the belief that COVID-19 is “God’s punishment” for those who do not share their ideologies. They also propagate anti-vaccine propaganda.

Malaysia is currently facing threats from several violent extremist groups, including Al Qaeda, Jemaah Islamiyah (JI), the Abu Sayyaf Group, and IS. Additionally, Malaysia’s political instability has exposed the country to the possibility of politically-driven radicalization, in addition to religious-based extremism. Noteworthily, politically-driven radicalization has yet to culminate to terrorism in Malaysia. From personal interviews, the authors found that in Malaysia, such radicalization is connected with a range of issues, including politics, religion, race and gender relations, and the government’s failure to manage the pandemic effectively.

The abrupt change of government in Malaysia has also created several uncertainties, affecting the drafting and implementation of P/CVE policies by government agencies such as the police and intelligence. The change of government has led to a change in priorities and agenda within the new government. The new government has shifted their focus from hard policing to soft policing and has called for the participation of civil society to join the government in being first responders of radicalization and terrorist attacks. Malaysia is also concerned about JI leader Abu Bakar Bashir in Indonesia as his release might reactivate JI networks in Malaysia. Currently, the JI network in Malaysia has shifted its allegiance to IS-linked groups in Southeast Asia and have decentralized cells operating in both online and offline domains.

The nexus between violent extremism developments in Indonesia and Malaysia is evident. In the latest Indonesian church bombing in March 2021, Malaysian sympathizers have supported calls for more powerful bombs to be used for future attacks in their social media accounts which includes both Malaysian and Indonesian followers. As Indonesian extremists target the police and non-Muslims, there is a possibility that the Malaysian followers may adopt such notions, potentially leading to the police and non-Muslims being targeted in Malaysia.

Furthermore, prior to COVID-19, there was an increasing trend of violent extremism in East Malaysia due to the increasing support for such groups in Sabah and the southern Philippines. These groups have established Tawau and Sandakan in Sabah as new transit points for their entry into Southern Philippines and Myanmar. Users of these transit points include both Malaysians and foreigners of diverse nationalities including those from distant conflict zones. The list of those arrested includes Bangladesh, Indonesia, Iraq, Myanmar, the Philippines, Turkey, Yemen and Xinjiang.   It is likely that these transit points will be utilized again once travel restrictions are lifted. In addressing this growing threat from its citizens and foreigners, the Malaysian government has ratified the international treaties on terrorism from the United Nations Security Council Standing Committee on Terrorism.

The Malaysian government has supported other international efforts to combat violent extremism. This includes supporting ASEAN’s collaboration with Canada and Russia to combat International Terrorism and the establishment of the ASIA-Europe meeting (ASEM), Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation Counter-Terrorism Taskforce and Commonwealth Committee on Terrorism (CCT).  Malaysia has also supported regional efforts, including the ASEAN Political and Security Blueprint (2015-2025), The 2017 Manila Declaration, and the ASEAN Plan of Action to Prevent and Counter the Rise of Radicalization and Violent Extremism (ASEAN PoA PCRVE). One notable international initiative that Malaysia developed was the 2015 Langkawi Declaration on the Global Movement of Moderates. This declaration outlines measures to promote moderation and curb extremism globally. Malaysia’s support for these initiatives stems from its long history of grievances concerning the political, economic, racial, ethnic, and religious and ease of spreading hate-related ideologies.

Malaysian Legal Landscape and Threat of Terrorism

To combat violent extremism in Malaysia, the government passed the Prevention of Terrorism Act (POTA) and the Special Measures Against Terrorism in Foreign Countries Act (SMATA) in 2015. These legislations adhere closely to UNSC 2178.  Previously, in 2012, the Internal Security Act of 1960 (ISA), widely used for violent extremism offences, was replaced by the Security Offences (Special Measures) Act (SOSMA) 2012. The difference between SOSMA and POTA is that the former is a procedural law while the latter is a detention law.

SOSMA, in lieu of the Criminal Procedure Code (CPC), governs the procedures for arrest, temporary detention, investigation, and trial of an individual in cases involving offences against the state, terrorism, organized crime, and human trafficking. In other words, SOSMA is explicitly used for violent extremism cases, while CPC is used for general offences. Notably, in 2007, Chapter VIA was added to the Penal Code to address security concerns related to violent extremism and espionage.

Despite these general laws in addressing terrorism, upholding the rule of law remains challenging particularly during COVID-19. Violent extremists have sought to profit from disturbances caused by COVID-19 by riding the wavetops of divisiveness and hate speech, magnified by the pandemic. The threat has become even more challenging to contain, as low-cost, low-tech attacks against soft targets by so-called lone wolves have become increasingly prevalent. Since 2020, only seven have been arrested for violent extremism offences. However, only four people were charged, with the rest released due to lack of evidence. According to the authors’ interviews with law enforcement officials, the pandemic was initially seen as a blessing in disguise as violent extremists in Malaysia were seemingly more concerned about sustaining their daily lives than conducting attacks. However, as aforementioned, the pandemic awards terrorist groups here time to rebuild, readying them for attacks. Any attacks conducted in the short-term will be particularly detrimental for Malaysia as the country is reeling from 1) high COVID-19 infection rates, 2) political instability, and 3) economic downturn due to the pandemic.

Additionally, the travel and social restrictions seemingly have an added effect of reducing the number of attacks in Malaysia. Coincidentally, the number of violent extremism-related arrests have also reduced during this period. However, the actual threat of violent extremism should not be measured by the number of arrests or a rule-based approach. Instead, an indicator should be based on monitoring social media platforms and social messaging platforms commonly used by violent extremist groups such as Facebook, Telegram and WhatsApp. Based on personal interviews with Normah Ishak, Malaysia’s first female counterterrorism chief, the Malaysian Special Branch will continue this policy of active monitoring under her leadership to maintain peace and security in the country.

The Malaysian law enforcement authorities (LEAs) have also adopted a soft approach in mitigating this threat. This was implemented in 2016 by Datuk Ayob Khan Mydin Pitchay, Normah Ishak’s predecessor. The Religious Rehabilitation Program that was subsequently developed is based on reeducation and rehabilitation of those found guilty of violent extremism. Reeducation is aimed at correcting political and religious misconceptions while rehabilitation entails comprehensive monitoring of these individuals following their release. Additionally, upon their release, these individuals will be assisted in their reintegration into society. From personal interviews with the authors, LEA officials shared their belief that as with general crime offenders, convicted violent extremists should be given a second chance at life. A soft approach would better serve to convince these offenders to give up their pursuit of violence.

Facilitating this second chance highlights the need to involve other stakeholders such as religious, educational, cultural, and youth leaders. Additionally, to enhance detection of violent extremism, these stakeholders should be given appropriate training to pick up any red flags within their localities. This stems from the importance of community and society-based monitoring.

Nationally, the Ministry of Home Affairs’ pending national action plan is crucial in aiding and guiding the approach taken by relevant LEAs. Taking a soft approach is clearly in tandem with the growing danger of lone-wolf attacks, which are more challenging to detect. By involving the community, early intervention is possible as they would be the first to identify any indications of would-be violent extremists.

Introduction

Terrorism has become a perennial problem for many nations, including Indonesia, country with the largest Muslim population in the world. It has been plagued by the threat of violent extremism, both offline and online. The perpetrators of terrorism are now not only in groups, but also individuals known as “lone wolf”. In 2020, anti-terror squad detachment-88 have arrested at least 228 terrorism-related suspects.  Unfortunately, the varying motivations and triggers such as economic and political factors have added to the complexity of mitigating this threat. Due to the complexity of this issue, the Indonesian government recently issued a Presidential Regulation (Perpres) Number 7 of 2021 concerning the National Action Plan to Prevent and Mitigate Violent Extremism that Leads to Terrorism, known as the RAN PE, which delegates the eradication of violent radicalism not only to the government, but also to civil society.

The Controversies

However, the emergence of the Perpres is not without controversy. This new regulation enables community policing , a move that rights activists have cautioned could lead to wrongful arrests and division among the public, sparking numerous questions. What is the definition of “radical” stated in the Perpres? Who are the targets of this new law?  What are the limitations or criteria to ascertain a person or action as a violent extremist or an act of violent extremism?

The chairman of Advocacy Division of the Indonesian Legal Aid Institute Foundation (YLBHI), Muhammad Isnur argued that the spectrum related to terrorism issues is very wide; there is nonviolent extremism, violent extremism that does not lead to terrorism, and violent extremism that leads to terrorism. According to him, there is no clarity regarding the definition of “radical” and criteria as to who this rule is targeting, making it open for interpretation. It is feared that this could lead to divisions in the community due to feelings of suspicion and a tendency to find fault or “witch hunts”.

Rights group Setara Institute deputy director Bonar Tigor Naipospos also expressed his concerns that the lack of public knowledge about definitions would lead to discrimination or elimination of certain groups, not to mention the potentially high numbers of criminalization when coupled with the Electronic Information and Transactions (ITE) Law.  This law itself has long been criticized for its ambiguity –so known as ‘catchall articles’– and is often misused by certain parties to ensnare opponents.

In the Perpres, violent extremism that leads to terrorism is described as a belief and or actions that use violent means or threats of extreme violence with the aim of supporting or committing acts of terrorism. Here, terrorism is also defined as an act that uses violence or threats of violence that create an atmosphere of terror or widespread fear, which can cause mass casualties, or cause damage or destruction to vital strategic objects, the environment, public facilities, or international facilities with ideological, political, or security disturbance motives.

Based on this description, the author argues that the key words for this Perpres are “violence” and “terrorism”. The radical thoughts and actions referred to in this regulation must contain elements of violence, more specifically, intended for terrorism. Because of this, the title of this regulation is detailed and long so as to anticipate multiple interpretations and misunderstandings of ordinary people even when they hear it for the first time.

The intended target of this regulation is also quite clear if one, for example, is well-versed with terrorism incidents and can easily categorize perpetrators as terrorists.  But beyond that, the challenge remains at identifying and categorizing an individual as an extremist with the potential to carry out acts of terror. Therefore, the government must establish clear boundaries and criteria in the Perpres.

The Presidential Regulation, initiated by the National Counterterrorism Agency (BNPT), consists of 12 articles which explain the coordination and functions of state institutions and local governments in mitigating violent extremism.  It also contains an appendix containing 125 action plans involving more than 20 ministries and agencies, as well as civil society. As part of the plans, BNPT and national police will shortly conduct outreach and training -known as ‘community policing’- for Indonesians including youth leaders, religious leaders, mass media, lecturers and influencers.

The action plan also aims to deal with the triggers for violent extremism, which consists of two factors, namely conducive environments and structural contexts, and the radicalization process.  Conducive environments and structural contexts consist of economic inequality, marginalization and discrimination, poor governance, human rights violations and weak law enforcement, prolonged conflicts, and radicalization within prisons. Whereas the radicalization process entails several factors, including the individual’s background and motivation, victimization, collective disappointment, as well as distortion of certain understandings (rooted in beliefs, political ideology, ethnicity and cultural differences, and social networks).

The potential for misuse of this regulation as a ‘catchall articles’ and a means for ‘witch hunts’ cannot be underestimated. We have recently seen how the hardline group Islamic Defenders Front (FPI) was linked with the Islamic State (IS) terrorist organization, thus strengthening reasons for its dissolution. Two old videos resurfaced when the Coordinating Minister for Political, Legal and Security Affairs Mahfud MD announced the disbandment of FPI. One video pertains to Rizieq Shihab’s lecture calling for support for IS while the other shows FPI members supporting IS’ mass pledge in Makassar in January 2015. Although not related to the latest Perpres, how FPI is linked with IS seems like a deliberate attempt to find fault.  This is despite FPI in 2014, since the emergence of IS, issuing a declaration rejecting the terrorist organization. Also, why were these old videos brought up again, in lieu of new evidence, when the government was about to dissolve FPI?

A Means for the Government and People to Collaborate

However, some parties view this Perpres favourably. In personal interviews with the author, BNPT spokesman Brig. Gen. Pol Eddy Hartono shared that community involvement is important for early detection of violent extremist groups and acts of terrorism in respective neighbourhoods, which in turn can help the government mitigate these threats. Eddy, who is also Director of Law Enforcement at BNPT, revealed several specific characteristics of such individuals or groups, based on many prior cases, including a closed attitude and not interacting with the community, perceive that their beliefs and actions are in accordance to the one and only truth, and not agreeing with the state ideology known as Pancasila.

These characteristics aligned with the author’s observations of Islamic State (IS) supporters’ activities on social media (Instagram, Facebook) and a WhatsApp group over recent years. These observations include allowing and supporting violent jihad, orienting towards violent radical clerics such as Aman Abdurrahman and Abu Bakar Ba’asyir, rejecting the concept of democracy and Pancasila, and hostility towards the government and security forces.

Eddy added that BNPT will later enhance the Community Policing programme, known as Polmas, an existing programme based on the Regulation of the Head of the National Police Number 3 of 2015. A collaborative programme between the police and the community, it aims to detect and identify security problems in the neighbourhood and to find their solutions.

Similarly, National Police Inspector Gen. Argo Yuwono stated that all parties need to “think positively” about the signing of the Perpres intended for national security and progress. Under this new regulation, the public can also monitor the performance of the government, including the police, in implementing this regulation because the results of their evaluation and achievements will be publicly available. This is emphasized in Article 7 paragraph (3) which requires the publishing of all reports on the achievement of implementation and results of evaluation as a form of public accountability.

The religious freedom watchdog Wahid Foundation sees the establishment of the RAN PE as a step forward in mitigating violent radicalism.  Its director Yenny Wahid, in a personal interview with the author, highlighted that the factors and triggers of violent extremism are not singular that it is almost impossible to overcome them with only a security approach (hard approach). There needs to be a soft approach such as humanitarian, religious and educational approaches, in which civil society can play a large role. Therefore, there needs to be rules that facilitate this synergy between the government and community actors. This is where RAN PE comes into play. Moreover, the community is the one who knows best about the things that happen in the neighbourhood where they live.

Yenny, however, warned that the framework for implementing the Perpres must be prepared as clearly as possible and promulgated widely to all stakeholders to avoid misunderstandings. The principle of transparency and accountability which is emphasized in Article 7 paragraph (3) is an important element in this regulation so that the public can participate in monitoring and evaluating its implementation.