Introduction

China’s maritime coercion directed against the Philippines reached a peak in 2024, with ships and boats from China harassing Philippine civilian vessels between July and September 2024.

Such reports of aggressive and dangerous conduct on China’s side have been increasing at an alarming rate. Since February 2023, the Philippines has accused China of unsafe behavior on at least 12 occasions, often within its exclusive economic zone (EEZ).

To illustrate this, there were two separate “ramming” incidents that had taken place between the ships of the Chinese and Philippine coast guards. One of such incidents caused severe damage to the hull of one of the latter’s vessels in waters near Sabina Atoll, well within the Philippines’ EEZ.

A spokesperson of the Philippine National Maritime Council stated that China’s illegal actions do not contribute to confidence-building measures that are necessary to achieve mutual respect and preserve a rules-based international order.

Despite both sides agreeing in July 2024 to avoid confrontations during resupply missions to Philippine troops at a disputed shoal, recent events have called into question China’s sincerity. A month later, two Chinese planes released flares in the path of a Philippine military aircraft over the Scarborough Shoal, thus contradicting the agreement.

Geopolitical Concerns and Chinese Maritime Aggression

Southeast Asia is beset by a host of maritime security threats, including illegal, unreported and unregulated (IUU) fishing, piracy, sea robbery, illegal trafficking in arms, people, and drugs, as well as environmental crimes.

Institutions responding to these issues have proliferated, both inside and outside the purview of ASEAN. Indeed, the region is considered the “center of intensifying geopolitical competition with multiple potential flashpoints.”

Within Southeast Asia, the Philippines is a major maritime trading hub. Its territorial waters abound with enormous natural resources, beautiful beaches, minerals and hydrocarbon deposits. The protection of merchant, fishing and tourism vessels has thus created the need for constant monitoring of the maritime area. 

Given the tremendous maritime traffic, the Philippine Navy and the Philippine Coast Guard are tasked with dealing with IUU fishing, piracy, armed robbery, the trafficking of drugs and people, as well as the transport of illegal goods by sea.

With such hefty tasks at hand, the intrusion of Chinese vessels has thus added another problem to the mix.

However, it is a mistake to perceive this problem solely from the Philippines’ perspective, as China’s maritime activities can never be extricated from its broader strategic competition with the United States in the Indo-Pacific region.

On the United States’ part, it has political and moral obligations to maintain its position in areas threatened by Chinese incursions, including in the South China Sea, the East China Sea and the Yellow Sea.

Among others, these include: 1) keeping the regional balance of power favorable to the United States and its allies; 2) safeguarding US-led security architecture in the Western Pacific, and; 3) upholding its commitments to Japan and the Philippines.

The United States has undertaken various actions to attain these goals, which comprise activities such as: 1) transferring military personnel, equipment and supplies to bases at sites occupied in the South China Sea, and; 2) upholding the July 2016 tribunal award in the South China Sea arbitration case of the Philippines and China.

The Academic Perspective

It should be noted that China’s maritime strategy is derived from serious academic works on naval study and the alignment of military doctrine with national defense modernization, as written by Lidong Wang in “Theory of National Maritime Interest.”

These studies are done by the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Academy of Military Science and the PLA National Defense University, which focus on the use of armed force, tactics, and military theories.

Many sea power theorists center their assessments on China’s continental power and its rising international status. Interestingly, some, like James Holmes and Toshi Yoshihara, found the commonalities between China’s strategy in the South China Sea and the United States’ in the Caribbean Sea.

These studies offer adequate knowledge regarding China’s increasing naval capability as well as the implications of China as a sea power—China’s intrusion into the Philippines’ waters being one manifestation of such.

Accordingly, a narrative has emerged into how the state should pursue its maritime policies. Such studies suggest the expansion of naval influence, the acquisition of deterrent sea power and the focus on the protection of sea lines of communication, according to Wenmu Zhang in Discussion of China’s Sea Power.

As shown, extensive research has been pursued pertaining to Chinese maritime power development.

In 2009, Chinese academics such as Wu Shicun, Xu Liping, Zhang Jie and Zhong Feiteng promoted their ideas on China’s international roles, diplomatic relations with the United States and China’s prominence in Southeast Asia. Their research centered on raising possible policy approaches to resolve debates and foster collaboration in the region.

Other studies also cover non-dispute-related maritime issues. Scholars of these areas posit that the information environment is strategic to China’s energy and logistic supply. Examples include studies on the “Malacca Dilemma” and the “String of Pearls,” which are associated with China’s energy imports and sea control.

Efforts to Safeguard Territorial Integrity

The Philippines has undertaken steps to safeguard its territorial integrity by emphasizing the importance of international law and through engagement with ASEAN.

While leveraging on international law is important, the Philippines still needs to continuously highlight in international forums about China’s violations of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), especially considering both the Philippines and China are parties to UNCLOS.

For example, the Philippines needs to highlight the outcome of the 2016 South China Sea Arbitration that found China’s claim as incompatible. The arbitration resulted in several key decision points.

Firstly, China’s claims to historic rights and resources have no legal basis. Secondly, none of China’s claimed land features in the Spratly Islands are islands capable of generating a 200-nm EEZ. Thirdly, China violated the Philippines’ sovereign rights on several layers: 1) interfering with the latter’s oil exploration activities; 2) prohibiting its fishing vessels from operating; 3) failing to prevent Chinese fishing vessels from operating and; 4) conducting land reclamation in areas where the Philippines enjoys sovereign rights to explore for and exploit natural resources. Lastly, China violated its marine environmental protection obligations under UNCLOS by causing “severe harm to the coral reef environment” with its land reclamation activities and harvesting of endangered species.

Despite this, China has lodged its non-participation and non-acceptance of this ruling.

The impact of the 2016 arbitral ruling is threefold. First, the arbitration denies the effectivity of China’s maritime security strategy in the South China Sea. Second, it denies China’s historic rights claim. Third, it gives independent states recourse to the merits of UNCLOS in the face of China’s sea power in the South China Sea.

In other words, it has reinforced the Philippines’ contention that the actions of China in the South China Sea are “Illegal, Coercive, Aggressive and Deceptive.”

As a strategy to promote this ruling, President Ferdinand Marcos signed Executive Order 57 on 25 March 2024, to deal with issues that impact the country’s national security, sovereignty, sovereign rights and maritime jurisdiction over its extensive maritime zones. The Philippines continues to present the merits of the 2016 Arbitral Ruling in all public forums and implement exhaustive efforts to maintain its full adherence to the rule of law.

Efforts to Counter Maritime Aggression

The Philippines’ strategic alignment with the United States, Japan and Australia is a clear response to China’s intrusion. Under the auspices of the US Indo-Pacific Strategy, the Philippines can coalesce international support to maintain its position vis-à-vis China’s activities in the South China Sea.

There is strength in number. The leaders of the United States, Japan, India and Australia have collectively declared their concern about the situation in the East and South China Seas,  the “coercive and intimidating maneuvres” by China in the latter.

Even with such support in place, the Philippines must adopt a two-fold strategy to deal with China’s recurring activities within its EEZ.

The first strategy is to allow the United States and other foreign vessels to join the regular resupply mission to the BRP Sierra Madre, a tank-landing vessel under the Philippine Navy. If the Philippines’ resupply vessels are accompanied by foreign vessels, this may deter the Chinese maritime militia from carrying out its ramming techniques. Thus, the resupply missions can be peaceful and may be completed without any incident.

The second strategy is to allow active-duty Filipino Americans in the United States’ armed forces to join the resupply mission on board Philippine vessels.

The Philippines is one of several countries that recognize dual citizenship, with more than 15,000 Filipino Americans actively serving in the United States Navy, some of whom have achieved ranks of leadership at all levels. 

Many Filipino American officers are known as “mustangs,” naval service members who have worked through their career path from the bottom to the top. This is an honor that is difficult to attain and those mustangs are valuable repositories of knowledge as well as experience wherever they go.

The Philippines may put a request to the United States to allow Filipino-American naval officers to participate in regular resupply missions to the BRP Sierra Madre and in the patrolling of territorial waters in the South China Sea. The presence of Filipino Americans inside the Philippine vessels would help boost confidence among the Philippine Coast Guard and the Philippine Navy officers.

Conclusion

Chinese aggression within the Philippines’ EEZ has increased dramatically in the second half of this year. These actions have resulted in increased tensions between the two, thus threatening regional stability. Furthermore, despite a joint China-Philippine arrangement, which focuses on refraining from aggression during resupply missions to BRP Sierra Madre, China has not adhered to its commitments. This has called into question the viability of any diplomatic agreements with China.

The time has come for the Philippines to adopt more creative ways to deter China. The two-pronged strategy of including American vessels and Filipino American naval officers for regular resupply missions may offer a boost to maritime stability.

Filipino officials need to go beyond just diplomatic efforts to address the tensions in the South China Sea. These two creative solutions, which constitute peaceful strategies, may lead to better maritime security and regional stability in the long term.

Introduction

It has been more than two decades since the concept of blue economy was proposed to the world and since then the concept has progressed through its adoption by international organizations, academia, and the private sector.

Previously understood as a solution to sustainable use of sea resources, the blue economy has expanded in scope, now encompassing such dimensions as economic growth, social inclusion and sustainability for all.

Sustainable management of ocean resources is not without its challenges. The implementation of the blue economy faces challenges from various directions, including the climate crisis, habitat degradation, unfair trade and overfishing. According to the World Bank Group, 57% of fish stocks are fully exploited and another 30% are over-exploited, depleted or recovering.

Fish stocks worldwide are affected by illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing (IUU fishing), which is responsible for roughly 11 to 26 million tons of fish catches annually, or US$10-22 billion in unlawful or undocumented revenue.

The Conundrum of IUU Fishing

IUU fishing is a complex dilemma and a major hindrance for nation states to achieving sustainable management of the fisheries ecosystem. IUU fishing involves activities conducted in contradiction to national or international laws.

IUU fishing encompasses such instances as fishing in a country’s waters without permission, fishing in areas beyond one’s national jurisdiction and a range of violations against the rules of Regional Fisheries Management Organization (RFMO). Specifically, IUU fishing also includes various offenses such as fishing in restricted zones, landing in unauthorized ports, possessing false licenses, falsification of catch data, mismanaging fisheries, using prohibited gear, capturing protected species, engaging in illicit activities like human trafficking and drug smuggling, operating stateless vessels or under flags of convenience, employing dangerous, harmful, or banned methods and substances, and subjecting workers to forced labor as well as abusive working conditions.

Thus, the conduct of IUU fishing extends from the concerns of flag, coastal, post and market states. Based on this, we could conclude that a range of actors with competing interests are responsible to tackle IUU fishing.

The Complexities of Regulating IUU Fishing

Several international efforts have been undertaken to combat IUU fishing.

The most evident international law addressing IUU fishing is the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). This magna carta of the sea treaty encompasses a wide range of state duties and obligations such as the flat state, coastal state, activities in the high seas, governance of migrating fish, as well as the ground stone for the establishment of RFMO.

Under UNCLOS, states also established an implementing agreement namely the UN Fish Stock Agreement  for the management of migratory fish stocks and raising state obligations over resources and registration of vessels.

The United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) also established a Compliance Agreement addressing the management measures for the preservation of marine resources on the high seas and strengthening the responsibilities of flag states. In 1995, FAO introduced a voluntary code of conduct for responsible fisheries, which up to date over 170 members of FAO have voluntarily adopted.

Furthermore, in 2001 FAO also issued an International Plan of Action to prevent, deter and eliminate IIU fishing as a toolbox for states to develop national plans of action to combat the conundrum,. The document also serves as a reference for regional cooperation to assist states in harmonizing their policies.

In fact, since the mid-1990s, numerous efforts have been made on a global, regional and national scale to address IUU fishing. These initiatives encompass voluntary and binding international and regional agreements, enhancements in monitoring, control, and surveillance (MCS) efforts, collaborative intelligence sharing, and the deployment of innovative technologies for the identification and tracking of fishing vessel activities.

Despite these global legal efforts, it is apparently not enough to tackle and eliminate IUU fishing.

According to the 2021 IUU Fishing Index by Global Intiative, the global score across all state responsibilities and types of indicators went down from 2.29 to 2.24 in 2019, representing only a small improvement.

Therefore, IUU fishing persists as a substantial global challenge, exerting detrimental environmental, social and economic consequences which are all inconsistent with the aims of blue economy.

IUU Fishing in Indonesian waters

As an archipelago, Indonesia is faced with multitude of challenges associated with IUU fishing. In the maritime sector, Indonesia is a significant contributor, accounting for approximately 34% of the fish products from the ASEAN region reaching global markets. The economic impact of IUU fishing in Indonesia is anticipated to be as high as USD 3 billion annually.

Issues of IUU fishing have received noteworthy attention by the Indonesian government. In 2014, Indonesian President Joko “Jokowi” Widodo declared an anti-IUU fishing plan, prohibiting illegal fishing in Indonesia and introducing the policy of sinking vessels caught engaging in the activity.

During the same period, the then-Minister of Maritime Affairs and Fisheries implemented additional policies, such as Regulation Number 56/PERMEN-KP/2014 which was designed to halt the exploitation of fish resources by foreign-made fishing vessels with sizes ranging from 150 to 400 gross tons.

In 2015, through Presidential Regulation No.115 of 2015, the government established Task Force 115, tasked to eradicate illegal fishing. The task force operates by maximizing the use of operational personnel and equipment (such as ships, aircraft and other technologies) belonging to the Ministry of Maritime Affairs and Fisheries, the Navy, the Police, the Attorney General’s Office, and other relevant institutions.

Regardless, due to large scale and complexities of IUU fishing, it is still difficult for the government to completely eradicate the conundrum. Combatting the issue has been a priority for Indonesia as it is included in one of the Maritime Defense and Security programs. Furthermore, apart from enhancing MCS system, it has been suggested that local fishing communities are to be involved in cooperating and combatting against IUU fishing.

Tackling IUU Fishing: A Collaborative Effort

Tackling IUU fishing requires a multitude of approaches involving not only states, but also private actors, societies, civil organizations and academia.

On 5 December 2022, the Center for World Trade Studies of Universitas Gadjah Mada, in collaboration with Circular Economy Forum 2023 and WTO Chairs Programme, held the International Workshop on Blue Economy.

Recognizing the importance for Indonesia as an archipelagic state and a member of ASEAN, the implementation of blue economy becomes increasingly compelling. The forum maintained that the application of the blue economy in Indonesia is intended to tackle environmental degradation, particularly in the maritime sector, while also serving as a catalyst for national and global economic development.

One of the panels of the forum specifically discussed the international regulation on fisheries and international economy practice. Several of the speakers addressed on how the WTO Fishery Subsidies Agreement (FSA), which was proposed by the EU and Indonesia, could serve as a basis to pressure states to prevent harmful subsidies being contributed to the conduct of IUU fishing. The FSA will prohibit certain forms of fishery subsidies that contribute to overcapacity and overfishing as well as eliminate subsidies that contribute to IUU fishing.

Furthermore, members are obliged to take special care and exercise due restraint when granting subsidies to vessels not flying their flag and when granting subsidies to fishing or fishing related activities regarding stocks the status of which is unknown.

Such approach, if taken into concrete steps, could become a profound way for states to tackle IUU fishing. However, the agreement would only come into force after two-thirds of the WTO member states register their approval. Despite this, the forum serves as a testament of how academia could contribute towards combatting IUU fishing as a pretext to promoting the blue economy.

Steps Forward

The complexity of IUU fishing is not only rooted in the variety of activities involved, but also the concern of overlapping jurisdictions, prompting some scholars to consider it as an act of transnational organized crime.

Thus, a collaborative effort is required to establish not only legal instruments, but also to enforce these regulations. Such collaborative effort must be coordinated and in line with achieving the goals of the blue economy in sustainably managing ocean resources for the benefit and livelihood of all.

Everyone needs to realize that our ocean resources are limited. If it is not up to us to save them for future generations, then no one else would carry out the task.

Introduction

Recent news about the sinking of Chinese fishing vessel Lu Peng Yuan Yu 028 brought to the fore the hardship faced by Indonesian ship crews.

The vessel, which sank in the Indian Ocean last May, allegedly carried 39 crew members – 17 of which are Indonesians – who went missing.

The Chinese government ordered a search and rescue for the missing mariners, while its Foreign Ministry launched an “emergency mechanism for consular protection” involving embassies and consulates in Australia, Sri Lanka, the Maldives, Indonesia and the Philippines.

Seven bodies of the crews have since been found, though the whereabouts of the Indonesian crews remains uncertain. Some Indonesian politicians have asked the government to coordinate with various parties, including the Chinese government, to investigate whether or not there was a violation of law or elements of negligence and to ensure that the victims’ families get their rights as workers.

This incident, which is the latest of a series of incidents involving Indonesian ship crews in Chinese vessels, should be a wakeup call for Indonesia and China to take this issue more seriously in their relations.

Repetition upon Repetition

Indonesia’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs has successfully conducted two repatriations of crew members during the pandemic.

In November 2020, 157 crew members who were stuck on Chinese ships were repatriated through a handover process in the middle of the North Sulawesi Sea. Two among those were already dead. In December of the same year, the Ministry received six crew members from a Chinese ship in Batam waters, one of which was dead.

The number of dead crew members is certainly a concern, even as the Indonesian Institute for Destructive Fishing Watch (DFW) reported that there is an increasing number of Indonesians being forced to work on Chinese vessels.

Some of these workers were duped into fake agreements or arrangements, initially promised a work opportunity elsewhere but ended up being forced to work on Chinese vessels. These workers also experience poor and degrading treatments, such being forced to work for more than 18 hours a day, subjected to violence and served fish bait and distilled water from the sea as daily consumption. Sick crews often suffer for 30-45 days before succumbing to death, during which period they were also forced to work.

Corpses are thrown into the sea on the pretext of preventing disease transmission, an activity labeled as “sea burial”. In one case, some Indonesian crews attempted to persuade the ship’s captain to have the corpse “stored” in the fridge before a proper burial on land could be conducted. This idea was rejected by the ship’s captain.

Recruiters often try to cover up the fact of the death. For example, in 2019, PT. Karunia Bahari Samudera contacted the family of a dead crew and gave them a letter in Chinese from the captain of the ship and Rp50 million for insurance coverage. Nonetheless, the company asked the family to claim the insurance on the condition that they give approval for the body to be thrown into the sea. PT. Karunia Bahari Samudera also asked family to sign a statement letter not to sue the company, the ship owner and the ship’s captain.

The same thing happened to Ari, who passed away on 31 March 2020. PT. Karunia Bahari Samudera only informed his family of his death on 9 April 2020 and the family gave their approval for a sea burial four days later. However, to make it appear as though the family had given approval, the letter was backdated to March 31.

Although there are many companies supplying crew members to China, only a few carry official permits from the government as placement companies for Indonesian migrant workers. The Indonesian police has investigated and arrested officials from some of these companies.  

In some cases, there is actually a chance to save these crew members if only the Ministry of Foreign Affairs could respond quickly. As a matter of fact, the Ministry often only informs the family after the bodies were thrown into the sea. One example is Riswan who died on board Han Rong 368 on 29 July 2020 with a swollen body covered with freckles and grayish-white discharge from his mouth. The Ministry visited Riswan’s family in Sulawesi only after his body was thrown into the sea and presented four approval letters for sea burials, cremation, autopsy and repatriation of Riswan’s corpse. None was signed by his family.

Moreover, these workers are often paid very little. Some of the crew members did not receive a salary and some had their wages deducted – which means the contractual agreement was violated. There are also crew members who received a meagre salary of US$120 or the equivalent of Rp1.7 million for 13 months of work.

Some workers went missing. For instance, a woman from Tegal wrote an open letter to President Joko “Jokowi” Widodo after her husband, who was suspected to have been forced into labor, disappeared. By that time, her husband had worked for one year as a crew member on the Fu Yuan Yu ship. The last time they communicated, she was told that her husband had experienced inhumane treatment at work and was not allowed to go home.

Later, she received news from a crew member that her husband was transferred to another ship. After that, the trail went cold.

In other cases, crews got stranded in other countries. For example, 13 Indonesians were stuck on Somali waters for about eight months, where one died and another disappeared.

Another case involved to a crew member who worked on Luqing Yuan Yu 623. He died on board and his body was found in Somali waters. This death was allegedly due to the torture he received while working on the ship. This incident occurred in the last week of January 2020, but the news only arrived at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in May, about four months later.

The Indonesian government had tried to evacuate them but had not been successful because their location was difficult to reach.

Problems compound as their passports are confiscated by the ship captain and the Chinese fishing boat company that refused to return them to Indonesia, prompting some crews to jump off the ship. For instance, two Indonesian crew members on board the Lu Qian Yuan Yu 901 chose to throw themselves into the sea and escape the working condition.

Ways Forward

Over the years, the Indonesian government has asked the Chinese government to investigate these cases and hold shipping companies responsible. Minister of Foreign Affairs Retno Marsudi once said the cases experienced by Indonesian crew members “will be followed up strictly through a parallel legal process by both the PRC authorities and the Indonesian authorities.”

Indonesia has also summoned China to ask for clarification regarding vessels allegedly mistreating Indonesian crews, with some resulting in death.

However, in response, the Chinese government claimed to be paying special attention and was carrying out an investigation into Chinese fishing companies that employed Indonesian crew members. Time will tell if serious actions will be carried out following such investigations.

Therefore, the issue needs to be addressed in the interactions between Indonesia and China. Laws relating to the protection of crew members working on foreign ships already exist, but these need to be enforced properly by the government. In addition, the government should also look into illegal agency companies that actively recruit young people with the promise of money, only to end up enslaving them.

Indonesian authorities need to coordinate with China’s law enforcement to investigate both Indonesian and Chinese companies that employ crew members from Indonesia.

It is also crucial to coordinate over data collection on crews’ placement on Chinese vessels as a safeguard against potential problems down the lane, such as the cases presented above.

Indonesia also needs to ensure that the rights of the deceased crew members are properly channeled to their heirs and family members. They also need assistance and protection so as to not be manipulated by irresponsible agents.

Moreover, Indonesian law enforcement officials need to investigate a number of recruitment agencies who delivered the bodies of dead crew members because they are partly responsible for these human tolls. Lastly, attention is also needed on the existence of several pending issues, including returning stranded Indonesian crews, upholding their labor rights, improving workplace conditions and fostering law enforcement through mutual legal assistance.

Introduction

On the campaign trail during the Philippines’ 2016 election cycle, President Rodrigo Duterte declared in a press conference, “I will ask the Navy to bring me to the nearest point in [the] South China Sea that is tolerable to them and I will ride a jet ski. I will carry a flag and when I reach [the] Spratlys, I will erect the Filipino flag. I will tell [China], suntukan o barilan (fistfight or gunfight)?”

Running on a platform of ridding the country of drugs and crime, Duterte also vowed to solve these perennial problems within six months of his holding office. When the United States and other western countries criticized his war on drugs, he called President Barack Obama a “son of a whore” for raising human rights concerns with him.

This strongman stance, however, obscures powerful undercurrents. Underneath all the bravado is a deep-seated insecurity exacerbated by massive online information campaigns, thereby resulting in a widespread defeatist attitude. Below, we examine the expression of this despondence in the Duterte administration’s pivot to China policy and neutrality in the Ukraine crisis. We also trace the origins of this stance to Filipino identity and culture, as well as the country’s longstanding alliance with the United States. Finally, we consider the ramifications of the 2022 elections that relied on an intricate information machinery and installed the former dictator’s son, Ferdinand Marcos, Jr., as president and Duterte’s daughter Sara as vice president.

Manifestations of Defeatism

Duterte’s jet ski pronouncement masks an underlying and persistent insecurity towards China. Acknowledging China’s more superior military, Duterte argued that he did not want to aggravate China because doing so could unnecessarily cost Filipino lives. As discussed below, this was the logic behind his pivot to China policy and the administration’s stance in the Ukraine crisis.

In many ways, the Philippines’ pivot to China is unsurprising as there had always been a tension and a frustration borne of a violent colonial history and America’s “democratizing mission” to the Philippines. Thus, the decision to not renew the American military bases in Clark and Subic in the early 1990s rode on anti-US rhetoric. Likewise, the move was seen as an assertion of Filipino independence. It was this history that set the stage for Duterte, who made it clear very early during his term that he was separating from the United States and reinvigorating relations with China.

In one of his State of the Nation Addresses, he said, “I have nothing against America…but if you put bases here [again], you will double the spectacle of a most destructive thing just like Manila during the Second World War – during the retaking of this city…. [So if we put American bases] at this time, this will ensure [that] if war breaks out, because there would be atomic arsenals brought in, this will ensure the extinction of the Filipino race.”

Rhetoric like this betrays an affinity towards – and even an appeasement of – China. A similar rhetoric is echoed by others in his administration. For example, a provincial governor objected to live-fire exercises between the Philippines and the United States under the aegis of the 2022 Balikatan exercises because “we don’t want to anger China”.

The clearest expression of defeatism, however, is in regard to the South China Sea disputes, this despite the Permanent Court of Arbitration’s award in 2016 unanimously in favor of the Philippines. China claims that the award is immaterial because it never agreed to the arbitration proceedings in the first place. This notwithstanding, the award is a victory for the Philippines.

Furthermore, while enforcement is constrained by international law and the military mismatch between China and the Philippines, there are ways and means that a country like the latter can use to leverage its position. The President, however, doubled down on setting the award aside and justified China’s incursion in the West Philippine Sea by arguing that the Philippines is caught in the crosshairs of a brewing US-China conflict.

He said, “China [is] building structures and military bases, I must admit it. But is it intended for us? You must be joking. It’s not intended for us…. It’s really intended against those who the Chinese think would destroy them, and that is America. Wala tayong kasali diyan. (We’re not a party to that fight.) Then why would I go there…bring my Navy, my soldiers, my police, and everything only to be slaughtered? I will not commit the lives of the Filipinos only to die unnecessarily. I will not go into a battle which I can never win.”

Here we see a different rhetoric than the bold, flag-planting, gunfight-or-fistfight claims of the Duterte campaign; rather we see a fatalist (and isolationist) view.

A parallel rhetoric is as follows: “…unless we are prepared to go to war, I would suggest that we better just call off and treat this, I said, with diplomatic endeavors. China is claiming it. We are claiming it. China has the arms, we do not have it. So, it is simple as that. They are in possession of the property…. So what can we do? We have to go to war and I cannot afford it. Maybe some other president can, but I cannot. Inutil ako diyan, sabihin ko sa inyo. (I’m useless when it comes to that, I’m telling you.) And I’m willing to admit it. Talagang inutil ako diyan. Wala akong magawa. (I’m really useless. I cannot do anything.)”

Considering the administration’s resigned attitude regarding the South China Sea, it is no wonder it announced its neutrality in the Ukraine crisis. Saying that “it’s not our battle to fight”, Duterte’s inclination was to avoid any position to ensure that the country would not be dragged into a war.

Even though the Philippines voted to support the United Nations General Assembly resolution that condemned the invasion, Duterte’s neutrality makes sense, considering his plans early in his administration of acquiring weapons from Russia, including aircraft and submarines. However, when the United States advised the Philippines against purchasing Russian submarines, Duterte responded, “You sold us six helicopters. One or two or three crashed already…. Is that the way you treat an ally and you want us to stay with you for all times? Who are you to warn us?”

The US$249 million deal for Mi-17 helicopters went through in November 2021 with an initial payment made in January 2022. It is against this context that the Philippines opted for a neutral policy, a move that earned the praise of Russia’s ambassador to the Philippines.

The Philippines’ defeatist stance is the price to pay for a tit-for-tat strategy. After all, a reinvigorated bilateral relationship with China translated to support for Duterte’s war on drugs despite mounting criticisms from not only the United States, but also the European Union and the International Criminal Court that found evidence of crimes against humanity being perpetrated in the country.

Aside from this, closer ties with China meant support for Duterte’s flagship Build, Build, Build program, to which China offered US$24 billion in investment pledges in 2016. However, the return on investment is lacking as Duterte ended his term in 2022.

China also benefited from the exchange. For one, the 2016 arbitration award has been downplayed and any talk about the South China Sea was marginalized during the Philippines’ chairmanship in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) in 2017. Furthermore, maritime incidents involving the Chinese militia and Filipino fisherfolk were understated, and the patrols and presence of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) and the Philippine Coast Guard (PCG) were constrained. As long as the Philippines’ position remains the same, China can be assured of enjoying these benefits indefinitely.

This defeatism, however, did not begin only with the Duterte administration in 2016. It is worth noting an entrenched and internalized Filipino value. Generally speaking, Filipinos are generous of spirit and hospitable to a fault. A function of this is the desire to not want to offend anyone. The default, therefore, is to be non-confrontational. Hence, caving into China’s assertive moves in the South China Sea and appeasing the rising power in exchange for support in the war on drugs and in infrastructure projects – while not necessarily morally correct – become logical.

Another factor that can explain defeatism is the security guarantee provided by the United States through: 1) the 1951 Mutual Defense Treaty (MDT); 2) the subsequent arrangements, including the 1998 Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA), which details the range of movement for US military personnel in the Philippines and the conduct of joint military exercises that eventually led to the annual Balikatan exercises, and; 3) the 2014 Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement (EDCA), which allows the United States to rotate troops in the Philippines and to build facilities – and therefore granting access to American planes and ships – on Philippine bases. In short, the existence of this triad of agreements makes the need for permanent American military bases in the Philippines unnecessary. This was a good compromise, given the strong anti-US sentiment that prompted the closure of the Clark and Subic bases in 1992.

While joint military activities and defense cooperation remain robust regardless of who sits in power, institutionalized cooperation ironically engendered complacency on the part of the Philippines. Arguably, institutionalized cooperation fostered deep professional linkages between the two countries, and it was these connections that allowed the endurance and resilience of the alliance. Seeing the alliance as the default security guarantor placed the Philippines in a comfortable position that transformed into complacency.

This complacency, however, cannot vanquish insecurities, especially in regard to the extent to which the United States would invoke the alliance in the face of persistent Chinese gray zone operations in the South China Sea. In this regard, calls to review the MDT were especially strong under the Duterte administration due to perceived asymmetries within the alliance. In fact, Duterte vacillated between abrogating the VFA, to suspending the abrogation and finally to cancelling the abrogation altogether. Observers argue, however, that revising the MDT simply to further obligate the United States to aid the Philippines will be counterproductive in the long term.

Implications of Defeatism

The swirling threads of defeatism in the Philippines became fertile ground for information operations that propelled the restoration of the Marcos family into power. Ferdinand Marcos, Sr. ruled the country from 1965 to 1986 in what is known and documented as one of the most violent periods in Philippine history. Now that the 2022 elections have wrapped up, the dictator’s son, Ferdinand Jr., is the President.

To many, Marcos’ win is not a surprise, given his consistently wide lead in pre-election surveys. To others, this made little sense because Marcos was equally consistent in being absent during presidential debates and has numerous issues involving his candidacy, educational background, and estate tax liability.

What is clear is the vast information ecosystem on which the Marcos campaign relied on and utilized for years prior to the 2022 elections. Marcos benefited from coordinated amplification online – particularly of stories that depict the martial law years under Marcos Sr. as the “glory days” or the “golden age” of the country – through an extensive network of pages and groups on social media platforms like YouTube, Facebook, Twitter, and TikTok. Besides historical revisionism, the information ecosystem exaggerated the Marcos family’s success and vilified the opposition.

The new battlefield is truly in the cybersphere. This becomes even more concerning because knowledge production and narratives in social media inevitably shape foreign policy and international relations. The South China Sea disputes are a good example. As the Philippines proceeds with the modernization program of its armed forces, there must be a corresponding transition in strategic thinking from defense to deterrence. Currently, the National Defense Strategy is still built on the concept of “minimum credible defense” as a response to hostile acts.

The prerequisites of deterrence, that is, actions that need to be taken even prior to the emergence of hostilities, are still largely missing in Philippine discussions. One reason for this is that since the Cold War and especially during Marcos Sr.’s time, the Philippine military has been tasked to handle internal security operations, especially counter-insurgency operations. The assumption was that external security could be handled by the alliance with the United States. In this sense, the Philippines engaged in a classic buck-passing move insofar as its external security was concerned. Not only did this cement the complacency on the part of the Philippines, but this also made transitioning from defense to deterrence more difficult, especially since the move will require calculations involving gray zone operations, such as China’s maritime militia in the South China Sea and Chinese counter-narratives about the contested waters.

Another aspect of the South China Sea that can be imperiled by online narratives is the need to decouple the disputes from Chinese development assistance. The entrenchment of the issue solely in the political and security realm implies that the choice for the Philippines is to either confront China militarily or to befriend it in the hopes that it could be persuaded from further incursions in the West Philippine Sea. Online narratives depict the choice as strictly binary, but there are alternatives that the Philippines can pursue.

First, the disputes can be framed as a food security issue. The South China Sea contains 190 trillion cubic feet of natural gas and 11 billion barrels of oil. It also contains rich fishing grounds of up to 27 percent of the Philippines’ commercial fisheries production. China’s unabated construction of artificial islands compounded the pressures of overfishing, clam extraction, dredging for the construction of artificial reefs and other features, and hydrofracking. Thus, fisher folks’ inability to access fishing grounds translates into higher market prices and uncertainty in regular provisions for their families and communities.

Second, the South China Sea can be reframed as an environmental issue. The waters contain diverse ecosystems ranging from 3,000 species of fish and 600 species of coral reef, mangrove and seagrass, as well as turtles and seabirds that depend on the islands therein. The destruction of the marine environment as a result of the construction of artificial islands disrupts the natural processes of the ecosystems. Furthermore, it robs coastal communities the opportunity to sustainably rely on and replenish the natural marine resources.

Attention likewise needs to shift to the critical role of the blue economy, which is crucial to maritime safety and security. A vibrant blue economy hinges on sustainable coastal tourism, improved port infrastructure, and managed and regulated fishing. Coastal welfare is an important part of this equation because economic insecurity onshore usually translates to illicit maritime activities. Hence, improved maritime governance in fisheries, to begin with, can prevent coastal populations from turning to criminal networks and activities such as piracy incidents, armed robbery at sea, human smuggling, trafficking, slavery, and illicit trade of drugs and wildlife, among others. Likewise, better maritime governance can prevent people from having to resort to illegal means to exploit maritime resources.

Conclusion

Defeatism in the Philippines has been expressed primarily through the Duterte administration’s pivot to China policy. The same thread is reprised in the South China Sea and more recently in the Ukraine crisis. The stance is, to a certain extent, rooted in the Filipino values of deference and generosity, but another explanation can be the resulting complacency arising from the security guarantees by the country’s sole treaty alliance with the United States.

Defeatism thus seems to be entrenched, and this became fertile ground for the massive information campaign that propelled Marcos to win the 2022 election cycle. As the Philippines embarks on a new administration, there is all the more reason to carefully examine the extent to which vast information ecosystems can impact foreign policy.

If left unchecked, the complications for the Philippines can be catastrophic as this leads to intensified democratic erosion and further divisions in society. Likewise, this can diminish even more the clout and centrality on which ASEAN – the region’s premier grouping – depends, especially if China continues its assertive moves in the South China Sea and the negotiations on the Code of Conduct remain stalled. The global impact is not so much rooted on defeatism per se, but on what defeatism engenders. The Philippines in this instance is the proverbial laboratory in terms of the power of an online machinery to warp history, determine elections and chart the future.

Acknowledgements

The author is grateful for the invaluable research assistance of Peggy-Jean Allin and Jihyun Kang. This essay was produced with the support of a grant from the Office of Naval Research (ONR N00014-21-1-2121). Any opinions, findings, and conclusions or recommendations expressed here are those of the author’s and do not necessarily reflect the views of the funding organization.

Tensions in the South China Sea Series: A Five-Part Series (Part 5)

Introduction

Highlighting the 2016 Arbitral Award in his United Nations General Assembly speech, President Rodrigo Roa Duterte emphasized its importance amidst the challenge posed by Chinese maritime militia in Philippine territorial waters. The first five months of 2021 has been a delicate period for Philippine-China bilateral relations with respect to the South China Sea issue. The Philippines has been filing protests almost daily since March 15, 2021 when 220 Chinese vessels started swarming around Julian Felipe (Whitsun) Reef. Philippine Defense Secretary Delfin Lorenzana had demanded that China recall these vessels while dispatching a naval task force to patrol the area. Emphasizing Philippine’s diplomatic efforts to resolve this issue, Department of Foreign Affairs Undersecretary Elizabeth Buensuceso met Chinese Ambassador Huang Xilian the following month to repeat the Philippine’s demand.

The Philippines has already filed around 100 diplomatic protests against China’s various incursions in the West Philippine Sea despite the Duterte administration’s vaunted “pivot to China” foreign policy. Ivy Banzon-Abalos, executive director of the Department of Foreign Affairs’ (DFA) office for strategic communications, stated that the country has filed 99 protest notes as of May 28, 2021. The DFA then filed the 100th diplomatic protest against the “incessant deployment, prolonged presence, and illegal activities” of Chinese vessels particularly off Pag-asa (Thitu) Island. The DFA asserted that the “Pag-asa Islands is an integral part of the Philippines over which it has sovereignty and jurisdiction.”

The Philippines has also stepped up its patrols in the South China Sea. From March 1 to May 25, 13 law enforcement or military vessels from the Philippines patrolled waters around the contested Spratly Islands and Scarborough Shoal at least 57 times.

The Philippines has also received international support in this issue. The US State Department released a statement that the “US stands by its ally, the Philippines.” Similarly, Canada, Japan and Australia also affirmed their support for the Philippines during this stand-off.

Notwithstanding the international support, this article primarily focuses on Philippine’s reactions to China vis-à-vis in the South China Sea and a short-term outlook for the Philippines and its regional neighbours.

Strengthening Posture via New Naval Bases and an Amphibious Military Force

Philippine’s strategic posture is guided by its National Marine Policy. This entails maintaining a proactive maritime administration ensuring effective implementation and enforcement of all laws, regulations and recommendations. Through this policy and in addition to diplomatic measures, two bills are pertinent to Philippine’s response to the South China Sea issue. The first is the introduction of House Bill No. 9420, the Philippine Navy Forward Operating Bases Act, authored by Representative Johnny Pimentel. This Bill proposes 12 new naval bases; four naval bases positioned in Luzon’s western seaboard and three in the eastern coast to guard the West Philippine Sea and the Philippine Rise. These naval outposts will serve as future staging and resupply sites for the Navy’s warships and battle craft to address future incursions.

The second Bill facilitates the reinforcement of Philippine’s maritime security efforts via the presence of an amphibious force. Senate Bill 1731, authored by Senator Sonny Angara, provides the Philippine Marine Corps (PMC) with its own charter. Consequently, the PMC will become the fourth service branch of the country’s armed forces that is equal and mutually independent as the three existing branches of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP): the Philippine Army, the Philippine Air Force and the Philippine Navy (PN). The presence of the PMC is vital considering the country’s archipelagic makeup which requires a comprehensive yet rapidly deployable amphibious military force that is primarily mandated to conduct seaborne and on-shore tactical operations to protect the country’s territories, communities, and inhabitant. This is evident in the PMC’s capabilities to provide ground combat, combat support, combat service support, aviation component, and other units necessary for the pursuit of its mandate.

To increase capability in countering and interdicting the potential coastal threats in territorial waters, the PMC recently adopted the Archipelagic Coastal Defense (ACD) Concept. This ACD adopts a strategy of anti-access and area denial (A2/AD) for its joint operations with other units. The ACD underscores that the composition of coastal defense is not limited to missiles, rockets, and guns, but is also defined by having capable and ready maneuver forces, support systems, maritime forces, and sustainment capabilities. The concept emphasizes the simultaneous development and integration of these capabilities that will determine the strategic and operational success of the ACD Concept. The creation of a Coastal Defense Regiment (CDR), a unit that is designed to protect the country’s shores, ships, and amphibious task forces against an invading enemy and to improve support of naval operations, will be developed within the PMC. The PMC will also procure shore-based anti-ship missile system (SBASMS), shore-based air defense system (SBADS), Man Portable Air Defense System (MANPADS), Multi-launched Rocket System (MLRS), and the deployment of howitzers.

Further Strengthening of Naval Assets: Fleet, Bases and Equipment

To strengthen maritime security, the PN developed the Strategic Sail 2020 Plan which states that the PN will “adopt a dynamic and responsive naval organization.” This entails the PN fleet being classified into six categories: Ready Force, Patrol Force, Service Force, Assault Craft Force, Naval Air Group, and Naval Special Warfare Group. These categories empower the PN in being dynamic and responsive by ensuring a continuous and cost-effective capability that facilitates the overall mission planning. Moreover, the fleet plan also builds upon the specialization of each force and it enhance their respective competencies in each operational run. The PN continuously upgrades the seven regional force commands based throughout the Philippines. This includes acquiring more ships and submarines, and developing new naval stations. It also means establishing advanced radar facilities for better monitoring.

As a way to enhance coastal defense capabilities in the South China Sea, the Philippines has implemented a full-scale modernization of the Navy. The PN has commissioned two guided-missile frigates for better technical capabilities and stronger firepower in order to deter incursions of foreign vessels in the South China Sea. Philippine Secretary of Defense Delfin Lorenzana said that the completion of the frigate acquisition project “marks the advent of our future fleet towards having a modernized and multi-capable Philippine Navy.” Moving forward, the PN procurement plan from 2022 to 2025, centers on the acquisition of four more frigates, 12 corvettes, 18 offshore patrol vessels, 40 fast-attack interdiction craft and 42 smaller multipurpose attack craft.

In a bid to further increase intelligence gathering in the South China Sea, the Philippines plans to acquire French submarines in the near future. Moreover, in order to be able to improve the country’s coastal defense capabilities, the PN is building a naval station in Palawan and upgrading the Subic Bay Naval Base. Furthermore, as a way to enhance interoperability in joint military exercises with other Asian navies in the South China Sea, the PN participates in the annual holding of Staff-Staff talks with the Vietnamese Navy. The sixth iteration of Staff-to-Staff Talks (STST), regarded also as one of the confidence building measures, was held between the Philippine Navy and the Vietnam People’s Navy (VPN) at VPN headquarters in Hai Phong city on November 26, 2019. In a bid to facilitate the identification and detection of hostile targets, better radar systems were installed. Additionally, the PN expanded the National Coast Watch Center (NCWC) by installing various radar outposts around the base to allow the military to monitor events in the South China Sea in real time. The NCWC is also better equipped with the deployment of local radar systems such as the Synthetic Aperture Radar and Automatic Identification System for Innovative Terrestrial Monitoring and Maritime Surveillance (SAR with AIS) Project. The SAR with AIS Project focuses on terrestrial monitoring and maritime surveillance on high priority areas through simultaneous radar image and automatic identification system (AIS) data acquisition through the NovaSAR-1 satellite developed by Surrey Satellite Technology, Ltd. More importantly, with better monitoring, the NCWC can better unite the efforts of the PN with the Philippine Coast Guard and the Philippine National Police Maritime Group.

Balikatan 2021 Exercise: Show of Strength, Strengthening Ties with US

As part of its bilateral engagements, the AFP and US Military conducted the 36th Balikatan Exercise from April 12-23, 2021. This was a large-scale exercise with 736 AFP and 225 US Army personnel. The Balikatan Exercise not only demonstrated both countries’ shared commitment to peace and stability and the adaptability of US and Philippine forces, but also a step towards seeking new ways to strengthen security cooperation between two traditional allies.

Philippine Support for a Free and Open Indo-Pacific

While building its military capabilities, the Philippine Government also fully supports a free and open Indo-Pacific. In his speech at the Nikkei Forum, President Rodrigo Duterte called for countries in Asia to act responsibly and within a system of norms, commitments and obligations. This includes the peaceful resolution of disputes in line with international law.

In a recent development, the Philippines has retained the Visiting Forces Agreement(VFA) via President Duterte’s retraction of the VFA termination letter sent in 2020. Through the VFA, the US government will continue to render humanitarian and military assistance to the Philippines through regular deployment of US military personnel. This agreement also allows US aircrafts and vessels to enter the Philippines based on implementing agreements. Their presence can further aid freedom of navigation operations in the South China Sea.

The Philippines remains a staunch ally of the US in the Indo-Pacific. It supports the Freedom of Navigation operations which is regularly conducted by the US. The Philippines and Japan affirmed their commitment to upholding freedom of navigation in the South China Sea at the first meeting of Japanese defense minister Nobuo Kishi and Secretary Delfin Lorenzana last October 23, 2020. They issued a joint statement “calling on concerned parties to desist from any action and activity that contravenes the Asean-China Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea as these generate tension, mistrust and uncertainty, and threatens regional peace and stability.”

Bleak Short-Term Outlook for ASEAN and South China Sea

Like the developments in Myanmar, the policy of non-interference will prevail among ASEAN countries on issues affecting the South China Sea. Brunei, the current ASEAN Chairman, continues to adopt this policy. Unfortunately, ASEAN, as a collective body, has been incapacitated by this principle of “non-interference.” This is evident from the silence and inaction of ASEAN and China on Myanmar which has encouraged the Myanmar military to terrorize its own people.

The bleak short-term outlook for the ASEAN and South China Sea is characterized by the “principle of non-interference” and the Chinese insistence on bilateral discussions with ASEAN members on the South China Sea. Additionally, each member country has developed their own preferred way of dealing with China, particularly on specific issues that are of great importance to them. However, their ways generally centre on the crucial aspect of not antagonizing China.

Strong Philippine-China bilateral relations persist despite the tension caused by Chinese maritime militia at the Whitsun Reef. During the pandemic, China has donated 1 million Sinovac-made Coronavac to the Philippines and made available an additional 1 million doses. Chinese investments in the “Build, Build, Build” program of the Duterte Administration remain committed.

Another bleak development is that the South China Sea has largely been overtaken by the Covid-19 crisis and the need for a coordinated regional response to the pandemic. Correspondingly, all negotiations on the South China Sea are put on hold in deference to the Covid-19 Delta variant that is afflicting the citizens of the ASEAN. The primordial focus of the ASEAN-China Forum is on Covid19 regional cooperation. The Mission of China to the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), the Foreign Policy Community of Indonesia (FPCI), supported by the Permanent Mission of the Philippines as country coordinator for ASEAN-China Dialogue Relations, organized the Jakarta Virtual Forum on 29 May 2020 which brought together experts to discuss areas where regional cooperation on COVID-19 need to be strengthened.

In its conduct of foreign policy, the Philippines remains committed to peaceful means as set out in the 1982 Manila Declaration on Peaceful Settlement of International Disputes. The Preamble of the Manila Declaration highlights the obligation of all States to settle their international disputes by peaceful means. Unfortunately, China is never keen on using international platforms to discuss South China Sea issues. But China’s successive diplomatic notes to the Philippines has emphasized the paramount importance of bilateral meetings with respect to all negotiations on the South China Sea.  It is expected that future discussions on claims on the South China Sea will remain within the ambit of bilateral relations between China and any one of the ASEAN states.

Part 1: South China Sea: The Need for Strong and Persistent Policies

Part 2: Indonesia and Maritime Rules-Based Order in the South China Sea

Part 3: Changing Realities for Malaysia in the South China Sea Dispute

Part 4: Malaysia’s Diplomacy in the South China Sea: Between the Devil and the Deep Blue Sea

Tensions in the South China Sea Series: A Five-Part Series (Part 4)

Introduction

The South China Sea has emerged as an area where political, economic and strategic rivalry are played out, affecting regional stability and security. The so-called South China Sea dispute centres on the overlapping claims involving China, Taiwan, Philippines, Malaysia, Vietnam and Brunei. At the ‘epicentre’ of this dispute is China, which has made claims over a large part of the South China Sea as indicated in its 9-dash line map, and has been contested by other claimants as it encroached their maritime claims and interests.  China’s assertiveness and military activities in the disputed area of the South China Sea further aggravated the situation and has led to a rethinking about Beijing’s rhetoric of its peaceful rise.  Its actions are also viewed with great concern by other extra-regional powers as they too have a big stake in the region making the eventuality of major power rivalry inevitable.  For Malaysia, this is more than just worrisome. In the past, it has shown a more conciliatory attitude towards Chinese assertiveness, in contrast to the policies exhibited by other claimants such as Vietnam and the Philippines. But can this continue in view of more emboldened Chinese actions in the South China Sea that threatened Malaysia’s national security?  What are the considerations that it must weigh to preserve its security and territorial integrity in the face of threats arising out of the dispute and China’s unpredictable behaviour in the South China Sea?

The South China Dispute: Part of China’s Awakening?

The South China Sea lies at the nexus of Southeast Asia and Northeast Asia, at the meeting of point of global sea routes offering the shortest route between the Indian and the Pacific Oceans. It is important not only to regional countries for SLOC and commerce, but also for major powers such as US and Japan. The US, despite not being a claimant state is very much concerned with the dispute and has taken a strong stand against what is seen as China’s assertiveness in projecting its claims. The rise of China economically, accompanied by the inevitable political impact on the region, is both welcomed and a cause of concern.  It has been touted for a long time that when China wakes up, the world should pay attention to it. China has, in fact, awaken and making its way confidently across the globe, worrying many powers that have the same ambition and capabilities. But is the South China Sea dispute part of China’s awakening and reinforcing the notion that as a power rises, it will inevitably expand?

For Southeast Asian nations, the South China Sea is important to their economic well-being and security. Considered the “Mediterranean Sea” of Southeast Asia, coastal nations grew and developed economically, culturally and politically around it. China’s massive claims on the sea therefore has huge implications for these countries. Vietnam, for example, is a claimant state whose only strategic gateway to the oceans is the South China Sea, thus leaving it at economic and strategic disadvantage if its maritime access to the East Sea (as the Vietnamese call it) is hindered or left to the mercy of another power. The Philippines is another country that has vigorously opposed China’s aggressive behaviour in the South China Sea. Although the Philippines has access to the Pacific Ocean besides the South China Sea, it is geographically too exposed and thus vulnerable to China’s activities in the area. The US and other countries that are frequent users of the South China Sea have highlighted the importance of freedom of navigation as guaranteed under UNCLOS. China, however, disagreed with the interpretation that this would allow states to enjoy unqualified freedom of navigation and overflight within an EEZ, hence reacted forcefully to USNS Impeccable activities within its EEZ. Thus, the implications of dispute in the South China Sea are not confined to claimant states, but having wider impact.

But the most important question in the minds of many in Southeast Asia is: what has emboldened China in pursuing its claim with such assertiveness? So far, ASEAN has not produced a united common position vis-à-vis Chinese claims and position on the dispute. But its members have agreed that it must be resolved in a peaceful manner.  ASEAN states involved in the dispute have, however, indicated their disinterest in bilateral negotiations with China.

Malaysia’s Attitude: Softer, but Sometimes Stern

One of the criticisms levied against Malaysia in its attitude on the South China Sea dispute is that it has been “quiet”, “too soft” or even “too accommodating” vis-a –vis China on the issue.  What can one infer from Malaysia’s so –called “low profile” attitude and response to the South China Sea dispute? The South China Sea is important for Malaysia from economic, social, strategic and security aspects. It may not be in a “choke” situation as Vietnam in the matter, because Malaysia has access to the Indian Ocean via its control of the Strait of Malacca. But socio-culturally and strategically the South China Sea matters to Malaysia. It separates the two landmasses of the Peninsula Malaysia and the territories of Sabah and Sarawak, with strategic implications for defence and security of these three core areas.

The South China Sea is not only economically important for Malaysia as a maritime nation, but it is also as important from the perspective of national security. The three core areas that must be defended and secured are the Malay Peninsula, Sabah and Sarawak.  Sabah in view of its geographical location is especially vulnerable to many threats from the seas around it. To strengthen the defence and security of the two territories, Malaysia made concerted efforts towards modernizing its navy and strengthening its defence forces in the area.  The submarine base in Kota Kinabalu, Sabah is a symbol of Malaysia’s will to protect its maritime territorial integrity. Still, in the event of aggression from another country with stronger capabilities, there is no guarantee that it can be met effectively. An increase in tensions in South China Sea will put additional burden on Malaysia’s effort to beef up its defence and security in Sabah and Sarawak which are exposed and vulnerable to the fall-out from the dispute.  As Malaysia’s national security is not just protection from external threats, such additional pressure will necessarily divert attention towards efforts at consolidating and maintaining internal peace and security.

Malaysia is a maritime nation; both the Strait of Malacca and the South China Sea are important for its international trade.  For hundreds of years, the coastal states of Malaysia facing the South China were involved in maritime trade, maritime social and cultural life. They interacted with other nations in the region via the South China Sea. All these are deeply embedded in the consciousness of Malaysians, they have expressed it through poetry, songs and folk stories. With the recent acknowledgment of Malaysia as a maritime nation, more efforts are being done to collate and expose their connections to the South China Sea. The need for a peaceful environment in the South China Sea is vital for Malaysia’s national security and economy as a maritime nation, a necessity that is now being undermined by China’s growing boldness in its actions to secure its claims in the area.

Delicate Balance of Interests

Malaysia’s low –profile attitude vis-a- vis China in the dispute is a delicate balance to keep its good relations with China, at the same time to avoid being seen as too compliant with China on the issue. Could it be a sort of face-saving device, a well-known but unspoken trait of Malay traditional diplomacy and behaviour? This, however, should not be seen as a being weak, but rather an act of being reasonable in the face of a perilous uncertainty.  China, despite its “peaceful rise” claim, is still an unpredictable big power in the region, and smaller states remain cautious of an outcome of displeasing China. Unlike Vietnam, Malaysia does not have the geopolitical leverage that can be factored into consideration of China’s core interest which will deter China from taking actions that would disadvantage Malaysia. The Philippines may have the advantage of a certainty of reliance on American support to ward off Chinese threats. The same cannot be said of Malaysia. One of the aims of its non-aligned foreign policy has always been to keep the region free from external powers’ intervention.  Malaysia remains solidary with other ASEAN claimant states in opposing Chinese assertive policy in the dispute, but at the same time it does not want to stir up the dragon. However, it is equally important that China does not misconstrue this as being weak or subservient to a big power.  It is obvious that ASEAN claimants in the dispute want to avoid dealing with China on a bilateral basis, and Malaysia remains in solidarity with them in this matter. ASEAN has also made efforts to provide frameworks in which the parties involved in the dispute may resolve it peacefully.

The recent intrusion of Chinese aircrafts into Malaysian areas of South China Sea has again awaken a latent mistrust of China. Malaysia has demanded explanations from China to which China responded as a ‘regular exercise’, a response many in Malaysia thought implausible. Could this intrusion be an indication of boldness on the part of China as a result of Malaysia’s reticence in showing a more vocal opposition to Chinese activities in the South China Sea? Chinese behaviour seems to corroborate the view that it will bulldoze its way to achieve its ambition in the South China Sea regardless of what other countries have to say. Naturally, the intrusion reinforced public mistrust of China’s aims in the region, but whether or not that will change Malaysia’s policy towards China in the dispute is another matter. Malaysia has to stand on its own two feet and has to consider which is the less costly measure to deal with China’s assertiveness in the area.  Responding ‘softly’ may be a gentlemanly behaviour, but such a gentleman position, would require a certain amount of confidence in oneself. Is a small, peace-loving country with constraints in its capabilities, in the face of a big power’s blatant disregard for good neighbourhood policy condemned to accept such behaviour?  Malaysia, as stated by its foreign minister, is not subservient to a bigger power even if its policy in the South China Sea dispute is “mild” in comparison to the more vocal response of other ASEAN claimants.

For a small country with limited capabilities, it has little option but to navigate cautiously in these turbulent waters. But what does that entail? It cannot stray too far from the paths taken by other ASEAN claimants and must be seen in solidarity with them. Much as it would have desired to be more forceful in response to China’s assertive attitude, Malaysia could not do so in view of the uncertainty of the outcome. It is hoped that China sees Malaysia’s diplomacy in the South China Sea, specifically with regards to the overlapping claims as an opportunity towards creating a more conducive environment for peaceful negotiation and solution to the problem, therefore acts accordingly.  It may also be surmised that when Vietnam and Philippines voiced out their displeasure at China’s “might is right” attitude, they are also voicing Malaysia’s concern at such attitude.

In conclusion, the South China Sea remains a core issue in Malaysia’s national security and therefore needs careful handling. Its ‘low-profile’ response to the South China Sea dispute is not an indication of ‘reverence’ to big brother behaviour, but rather a way to manage its vulnerability as a small country vis-à-vis a big, assertive and unpredictable power with a global ambition. At the same time, it does not preclude Malaysia’s ability and willingness to remind the big dragon that in international diplomacy, superiority of firepower alone does not guarantee respect and legitimacy.

Part 1: South China Sea: The Need for Strong and Persistent Policies

Part 2: Indonesia and Maritime Rules-Based Order in the South China Sea

Part 3: Changing Realities for Malaysia in the South China Sea Dispute

Part 5: A Matter of Firm Resolve: The Philippine’s Strategic Posture in the South China Sea

Tensions in the South China Sea Series: A Five-Part Series (Part 3)

Introduction

Malaysia’s public statements and positions on the South China Sea dispute has seen the country come under longstanding scrutiny, speculation and at times, “parachute analysis”. With a few exceptions, Malaysia has kept much of its apprehension on China’s actions and policies in the South China Sea confined to closed door meetings.

While this is appreciated by Beijing and allows both countries some strategic space to manage the dispute, Malaysia’s hedging approach has led to perceptions of Malaysia as a country that is “quiet” on the dispute, and one that acquiesces to the changing status quo imposed by the former. Leading policymakers have also often highlighted their concern on the role of external powers that accentuate tensions in the South China Sea, reinforcing this impression.

This article explores the developing challenges faced by Malaysia in the South China Sea and the tough but practical choices faced by its policymakers in the foreseeable future.

Developing Challenges Faced by Malaysia in the South China Sea

Despite Malaysia’s preference for low-key diplomacy in managing its disputes in the South China Sea, the past decade has seen a significant escalation in the challenges it faces, which both influences and hamstrings its South China Sea policy.

The first and most severe challenge is the operational capacity and reach of China, down to the furthest southern reaches of its claims in the South China Sea, intruding into Malaysia’s Economic Exclusive Zone. Vessels from the Chinese Navy, Coast Guard and its maritime militia are now a regular feature at James Shoal, located just 80 kilometres from the coast of the state of Sarawak, and at the Luconia Shoals, a further 20 kilometres from James Shoal. The latter is often referred to by some Chinese publications and statements as the “southernmost” territory of China.

This near-constant presence has changed realities significantly for Malaysian policymakers and security personnel who are stationed in these areas. Reports of Malaysian fisherman of the coast of Sarawak being harassed by Chinese vessels are not unheard off while further incidents of aggressive manoeuvring and even ramming by the maritime militia often go unreported. The current policy is for Malaysia to shadow but not interfere with such deployments and patrols when they are detected. A constant worry amongst Malaysian policymakers is responding to grey zone tactics in the South China Sea, especially China’s use of maritime militia. Recent developments at Whitsun Reef might be an indication of what lies in the future for other claimants, including Malaysia.

Second, China’s reclaimed features in the South China Sea, which have been extensively built up and militarised, are likely to further confound matters. The operating distance between Hainan and the coasts of Sabah and Sarawak are figuratively halved, allowing for Chinese vessels to dock, resupply, and thus rotate for much longer in the contested waters. This adds tremendous stress on the small and already-stretched capacity of Malaysian vessels sent to monitor these intrusions. The possibility of regularised air-patrols from the reclaimed features is a game-changer that cannot be ruled out.

Third, the longstanding lack of adequate assets that Malaysia can deploy in the South China Sea, and the resources needed to acquire and maintain them, have progressively deteriorated, despite widespread acknowledgement of the problem. Malaysia now faces a crippling delay of naval assets and further reduction of an already-reduced purchase of maritime patrol aircraft. Malaysia is in fact, increasingly dependent on direct and indirect aid provided by friendly countries – the United States for drones and radar, Japan for long-distance coast guard vessels.

High tempo patrol operations in the northern Malacca Strait and Sulu Sea against irregular migrants and criminals have seen the relocation of navy and coast guard assets, causing a shortfall of assets elsewhere, including in the South China Sea, and a high strain on the capacity and operational budget of these maritime agencies.

Fourth, China’s reactions in April 2020 to the efforts of Malaysian state-owned hydrocarbon company Petronas to explore for prospective resources in blocks contested by both China and Vietnam has added another complication to Malaysia’s South China Sea considerations. The harassment of the Petronas-contracted West Capella drillship by multiple Chinese vessels marks the first time that China has reportedly interfered with Malaysian offshore hydrocarbon activities. This is significant as the exploration and extraction of oil and gas are among the primary strategic and economic interests of Malaysia in the South China Sea. However, it is also worth noting that the fluctuating price of hydrocarbons and its corresponding significance to Malaysia’s coffers could also influence Malaysian policy options in the South China Sea.

Fifth, there is heightening fear amongst Malaysian policymakers that the South China Sea dispute is increasingly being subsumed within the wider wedge of strategic rivalry between China and the United States. Malaysia’s apprehension against internationalising the dispute is anchored on the long held assumption that one major power often attracts another. This then leaves smaller claimant states like Malaysia at a significant disadvantage when it comes to the narrative and developments of the disputes.

Thus, it is unsurprising that freedom-of-navigation-operations, mainly carried out by the US and more recently other external parties, worry Malaysian policymakers. Additionally, such operations often draw both public and private criticisms that such actions only give Beijing further reasons to militarise the reclaimed features and enhance their presence in the disputed waters. It is the claimant and littoral states, not external powers, which suffer from the fallout. Such views are predominant amongst policymakers albeit not unanimous.

Sixth, Malaysia’s non-contagious nature, with the South China Sea separating East and West Malaysia, adds a unique burden to policymakers. The most direct sea-air corridor have to go through international and Indonesian waters and airspace. This sea-air gap represents a critical challenge to the defence and territorial integrity of Malaysia. Beijing’s assertive rhetoric and actions have increasingly pushed Jakarta to drastically securitise the air and sea domains around the Natuna Islands, which in-turn impacts Malaysian use of the airspace. This is despite an existing air-corridor agreement between the two governments.

Matters are further complicated by the increasing influence of East Malaysian politics in a fractured national political landscape. No West Malaysia-based party can form a federal government without support from the East. And currently, there is wide frustration by East Malaysians toward the former on a variety of issues. A secure and peaceful air and sea route between East and West Malaysia therefore is a core strategic, security, economic and political concern for policymakers. The dominance of the South China Sea by any single major power – especially one that has claims over Malaysia’s maritime zones in the area – represents an existential threat to Malaysia.

Seventh, the strong, comprehensive, bilateral relationship between Putrajaya and Beijing, has only improved and deepened since the onset of the Covid-19 global pandemic. China remains Malaysia’s largest trading partner and has been so for 12 consecutive years. Despite the wider economic slowdown, trade with China expanded by 4.2% to MYR 329.77 billion in 2020, accounting for 18.6% of total trade that year. In a year where face-to-face largely came to a halt, there was a slew of high profile, reciprocal meetings between key officials from Putrajaya and Beijing. China is an important consideration in Malaysia’s pandemic management approach, its vaccination drive, and a post-pandemiceconomic recovery. At a time when the Malaysian economy has seen its largest contraction since the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis, the chances of Malaysia risking any economic costs imposed by Beijing, as China has done with other countries that have displeased it, is next to nil.

Lack of Options– Difficult, Practical Decisions Ahead

The challenges listed above indicates that the changing status quo in the South China Sea has seen Malaysia’s strategic wiggle room narrow, and its options correspondingly shrink. Coupled with perceived fear of high costs that can be imposed by China, the calculation by Malaysian policymakers seems to be centred on responses that will not give an excuse to escalate. This is especially in the South China Sea where it enjoys an escalation dominance that neither Malaysia nor any other Southeast Asian claimant state can match.

Most policymakers in Malaysia believe this is a practical, if cautious approach. This cautious-practicality does not negate Malaysia’s continued forthrightness in its own quiet way on its claims and concerns in the South China Sea, even against China. Malaysia’s partial submission in December 2019 on an extended continental shelf triggered what became known as The Battle of the Diplomatic Notes, with up to 25 diplomatic notes exchanged by 10 states. A Malaysian note verbale that followed China’s response to Malaysia’s initial submission, rejected in no uncertain terms, both China’s claims of historic rights and its ubiquitous nine-dash line. Despite harassment by Chinese vessels, the West Capella drillship only proceeded to leave the contested waters after it finished the exploration it was contracted for.

There are dissenting views on whether Malaysia’s caution has led to policymakers excessively limiting themselves on the options it could consider. While quiet diplomacy succeeded in preserving most of Malaysia’s core interests in the South China Sea thus far, the rapidly changing circumstances indicate that this might not be sustainable. In the long term, the question is whether Malaysia will reassess this approach and consider more public responses, including increased practical cooperation with other stakeholders in the South China Sea, should it come under further pressure by China.

One of the other outcomes of Malaysia’s quiet diplomacy with China and aversion to ‘internationalising’ the dispute is that the country has been construed a supporter China in the South China Sea, an outright inaccurate view. Malaysia should be cognisant that there are multiple narratives being crafted on the dispute and the stance of its stakeholders. If it doesn’t make its position clear, it allows others to muddy the waters, to its cost.

Part 1: South China Sea: The Need for Strong and Persistent Policies

Part 2: Indonesia and Maritime Rules-Based Order in the South China Sea

Part 4: Malaysia’s Diplomacy in the South China Sea: Between the Devil and the Deep Blue Sea

Part 5: A Matter of Firm Resolve: The Philippine’s Strategic Posture in the South China Sea

Tensions in the South China Sea Series: A Five-Part Series (Part 2)

Introduction

Maritime disputes and strategic competition in the South China Sea have long been a critical strategic challenge for successive Indonesian governments. The country, however, has so far been able to maintain its diplomatic position as a “non-claimant state”, allowing Indonesia, whose foreign policy has long been guided by “free and active” and “non-aligned” principles, to keep a healthy distance from the conflict and present itself as an “honest broker.”

However, this year, Indonesia seems to be deviating from its long-held foreign policy. In March, during atwo-plus-two dialogue, Indonesia and Japan agreed to deepen their security cooperation amidst the increasingly volatile situation in the East and the South China Sea. Indonesian defence minister Prabowo Subianto and his Japanese counterpart voiced their opposition to China’s unilateral actions in regional waters that could escalate tensions and change the status quo. The two ministers then signed an agreement that would allow Indonesia to procure defence equipment from Japan and announce the plan to conduct a joint exercise in the South China Sea.

In the following month, British foreign secretary Dominic Raab visited Jakarta. In a joint conference with Indonesian foreign minister Retno Marsudi, Raab reiterated his government’s plan to deploy a carrier strike group to the South China Sea as part of Britain’s “Indo-Pacific tilt.” The carrier strike group will be led by the new aircraft carrier HMS Queen Elizabeth, giving the plan substantial political weight. Indonesia welcomes the plan.

These recent diplomatic manoeuvers, therefore, provoke several questions. What is behind Indonesia’s latest attempt to secure closer relations with extra-regional powers? Has Indonesia finally got on board the balancing coalition against China? How do Indonesian policymakers perceive the threats in the South China Sea? What is really at stake for Indonesia?

What is at stake for Indonesia

Indonesia’s threat perception in the South China Sea stems from several factors, ranging from the immediate concern of repeated incursions into its maritime areas to the broader, long-term interest in preserving the status-quo rules-based order.

The immediate concern is China’s challenge to Indonesia’s control of its maritime jurisdiction and resources. While it agrees there is no territorial dispute with Indonesia, China insists that areas that fall within Indonesia’s EEZ north of the Natuna Islands form part of its historical fishing ground, thereby leading to overlapping claims on maritime rights and interests. They would also overlap with the EEZ and continental shelf derived from the Spratly Islands should China declare straight baselines around them.

Since at least the late 2000s, when China started to press its claims in the South China Sea more assertively, Natuna has seen repeated standoffs between China’s maritime militias and coast guards and Indonesia’s maritime security forces. Moreover, Indonesia’s lack of maritime patrol capability and chaotic maritime security governance makes it an easy target for China’s grey zone strategies that seek to gradually alter the status quo through coercive measures deliberately designed to remain below the threshold of conventional conflict by using nonmilitary tools.

At the end of 2019, for instance, only a couple of weeks after President Joko Widodo’s second administration was sworn in, China tested Indonesia’s resolve by sending dozens of fishing boats, accompanied by China Coast Guard (CCG) vessels, into Natuna. Due to the limited capability of its own coast guard (BAKAMLA), Indonesia had to rely on its Navy to expel the Chinese vessels, thus risking itself to give in to China’s grey zone playbook by escalating the situation. Realising the disadvantage, Indonesia beefed up its deterrence in Natuna and reinvigorated the plan to reform its maritime security governance. In the most recent incident in September 2020, BAKAMLA, not the Navy, took the lead in driving away a CCG vessel found patrolling in Natuna.

While direct security threats from China and the possible spillover from great powers conflict  have increasingly found their way into Indonesia’s defence calculus, in a broader sense, Indonesia’s interest in the South China Sea is to preserve the status quo order. This status quo consists of many layers, the most important of which is the recognition and adherence to international norms, especially UNCLOS, in governing the conduct of states at sea and determining maritime entitlements.

The importance of UNCLOS for Indonesia cannot be overstated. After all, it is the international adherence to the law of the sea that constitutes the basis for Indonesia’s territorial integrity as an archipelagic state, along with its rights and obligations. Moreover, UNCLOS allows Indonesia to draw straight archipelagic baselines joining its outermost islands and claim complete sovereignty over the internal and archipelagic waters. Therefore, a challenge to UNCLOS means a challenge to the very notion of Indonesia’s territorial integrity.

In recent years, this status quo has been undermined by China’s self-centric reinterpretation of UNCLOS. With the grounds for the “nine-dash line” have been practically removed by the 2016 arbitral tribunal award -despite China’s rejection-, Beijing is shifting its approach. Several official statements suggest China’s intention to treat the Spratly Islands as a single archipelago and declare straight baselines and rights over the extended maritime zones around the features it claims. If so, Indonesia will vehemently reject such a move as UNCLOS only grants rights to draw archipelagic baselines for states constituted “wholly by one or more archipelagos” like Indonesia.

Defending UNCLOS

Indonesia’s recent move to engage external powers should be placed within this context of addressing its South China Sea challenges. For Indonesia, it serves at least three purposes.

First, an increased presence of external powers would hopefully put a brake on China’s assertiveness in the region. It would ease the burden for Indonesia to take on China on its own. Recent attempts to accelerate its defence modernisation notwithstanding, it will take some time before Indonesia can pose a meaningful challenge to China’s aggression in the South China Sea beyond its own maritime jurisdiction. There is also the question as to whether Indonesia is willing to do so. Engaging friendly states to whom it can pass the buck of containing China’s assertiveness, therefore, is a pragmatic option for Indonesia for the moment. With the great powers continued competition to balance against each other, Indonesia itself can maintain the distance and reap benefits from all sides.

Second, closer cooperation with diversified partners would benefit Indonesia in terms of its defence modernisation. Access to Japanese-made defence equipment and technology, for instance, would benefit Indonesia in its ongoing efforts to strengthen its maritime patrol capability and reform its maritime security governance. Indeed, Indonesia is the latest Southeast Asian country, after Malaysia, the Philippines, and Vietnam, that has benefitted from Japan’s expanding portfolio in the region. For example, in May, Japan handed a second offshore patrol boat to the Indonesia after the first in February 2020. Moreover, having diversified suppliers of weapon systems would also keep Indonesia from overreliance on any particular state.

Third, and most importantly, closer ties with UK and Japan would provide much-needed reinforcement for the status quo rules-based order in the South China Sea in the face of China’s revisionist challenges. Indeed, Indonesia’s interest aligns with those of the UK and Japan’s. In his remarks after the meeting in Jakarta, Dominic Raab called Indonesia and Britain two “maritime powers with strong maritime interests … in making sure that the rules-based system, the tenets of which reflected in the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea are upheld.”

Earlier, both UK and Japan also joined a list of countries that participated in the battle of diplomatic notes against China that ensued since 2019. In its note verbale, submitted jointly with France and Germany in September, UK emphasised that the provisions for treating archipelagos or marine features as a whole entity and drawing straight archipelagic baselines apply only to archipelagic states. Thus, anticipating China’s move to declare baselines around the features it claims in the South China Sea as implied in its earlier statements.

Japan concurred with the UK in its note submitted in January 2021. It rejected China’s position that the drawing of territorial baselines on islands and reefs in the South China Sea is in line with UNCLOS and general international law. “There is no room for a State Party to justify the application of baselines that do not satisfy the conditions stipulated under UNCLOS,” Japan said. Both UK and Japan also underlined their interest to uphold freedom of navigation and overflight and rights of innocent passage in the South China Sea.

Indonesia’s emphasis on maintaining rules-based order is also reflected in its approach towards the alliance politics in the region. A survey released by the Australian Strategic Policy Institute in 2018, for instance, revealed that Indonesia, while sceptical about the Quad, of which Japan is a member, hopes that it plays  a role in enforcing rules-based order in the region, including the Arbitral Tribuna’s ruling and freedom of navigation.

What to expect

What lies ahead for Indonesia, China, and the maritime rules-based order in the South China Sea? If recent events are taken as an indication, we would likely see more countries consolidating their support behind UNCLOS and firmly rejecting China’s interpretation of its provisions. We would also likely see Indonesia play a more active role in building the so-called coalition of “UNCLOS defenders“. Already, Indonesia has renewed its interest to lead the early conclusion of the South China Sea code of conduct, presumably to ensure that the eventual provisions would not contradict UNCLOS. To what extent this would actually affect China’s behaviour remains to be seen. However, at the very least, China would no longer have a free pass to rewrite the international laws in its favour.

Part 1: South China Sea: The Need for Strong and Persistent Policies

Part 3: Changing Realities for Malaysia in the South China Sea Dispute

Part 4: Malaysia’s Diplomacy in the South China Sea: Between the Devil and the Deep Blue Sea

Part 5: A Matter of Firm Resolve: The Philippine’s Strategic Posture in the South China Sea

Tensions in the South China Sea Series: A Five-Part Series (Part 1)

Introduction

The South China Sea (SCS) issue is presently one of the hottest flashpoints of the territorial and jurisdictional disputes in this twenty-first century. The area is claimed by China, Taiwan, Vietnam, Malaysia, the Philippines and Brunei. The claims centre mainly on the maritime features in the Spartly and Paracel Islands.

There have been numerous incidents between the claimants in the SCS since the mid of 1970s, including the 1974 Paracel Islands Incidents, the 1988 Johnson Reef incidents, the 1995 Mischief incidents, the 2012 Scarborough Shoal incidents, and the 2014 HSY Oil Rig incident. There were also stand-offs between China and Vietnam in the Vanguard Bank, as well as with Malaysia between the Haiyang Dizhi 8 and MV West Capelle. However, the most obvious action by China that might shaking the stability of the region is China’s reclamation in the SCS.

Another issue is China’s illegal claiming of territories based on historical background. Chinese officials point to maritime documents dating back to dynastic times as support for their claim. Termed the Nine-Dash Lines, these territories were considered to be traditionally China’s fishing grounds.

China Previously Restrained, Accommodating

However, China’s attitude in the region was not always hostile. There was a time when China’s behaviour in the region was described as relatively restrained and accommodating. This attitude was observed between the period after the 1995 Mischief incident to the years of 2007 – 2009, and it contributed to the signing of the Declaration on the Conduct of the Parties in the South China Sea (DOC) in November 2002. China also signed the Treaty of Amenity and Cooperation of ASEAN (TAC) in 2003. These two documents restrained not only China but also other claimant states in making any provocative moves. Moreover, China’s willingness to join the COC negotiations was also China’s assurance towards ASEAN. In short, the SCS experienced a conducive period from the mid of 1990s to 2007 – 2009.

The situation changed due to the stand-off between China and the Philippines in Scarborough Shoal in 2012. This leads to the Philippines seeking legal action at the United Nations Convention of Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA) Tribunal in 2013.

The External Power – The United States and its ally.

Additionally, the presence of the United States (the US) in the region also plays an important if not an essential role in the SCS. The US presence in the region, according to former US Secretary of State, Hillary Clinton, was merely for maintaining freedom of navigation in the SCS. This principle was announced in the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) meeting in Hanoi 2010.

In order to implement this position, the US launched the Freedom of Navigation Operations or FONOPs in the region. These FONOPs are means to enforce UNCLOS by reinforcing freedom of navigation through practice, using ships to sail through all areas of the sea permitted under UNCLOS, including those areas that state(s) have attempted to close off from free navigation. For sure, US FONOPs in the SCS have attracted greater international attention and Chinese anger.

In addition to the US FONOPs, two Indian navy warships and a Vietnamese navy frigate, recently held exercises that started at a port in Vietnam. The exercise is part of the ongoing deployment of Indian Navy ships in the SCS. Also, a Royal Canadian Navy warship joined Australian, Japanese and U.S. naval vessels for a coordinated exercise in January this year. Moreover, ships from Australia, India, Japan and the United States conducted their annual Malabar exercises near Guam recently. All in all, warships from eight countries have passed through or near the SCS since the beginning of this year. Interestingly, those eight countries do not have actual maritime claims to the region. Therefore, this is simply a statement that the US and its allies would like to convey to China.

China’s Reaction

Despite these developments, in the last 30 years, there was no open war between the navies in the region, as what happened in 1974 and 1988. However, the situation is still regarded as a low-level conflict (or low-level contingency). This may change with the recent situations in the SCS.

For China, activities by the US and its allies are regarded as a foreign interference to a regional issue between ASEAN and China vis-à-vis the SCS. China believes that these actions are beyond the principles of freedom of navigation. For China, it is an act of provocation.

With these foreign navy operations in the area, China fears the dispute is becoming more internationalized. Therefore, China might lose its strategy to discuss sovereignty disputes bilaterally with other Asian states. As we know, China prefers to discuss the issue one-on-one rather than through multilateral mechanism.

To balance the situation, the People’s Liberation Army Navy ships are expected to travel the SCS more often as well as to step up the frequency of its navy exercises. In fact, China already held its naval exercises since January to September 2021. Unsurprisingly, China will react with something comparable to what the US and its allies are doing in the region which might change the situation. China would also bolster its diplomatic protests against the non-Asian naval exercises.

Other Claimants

Brunei, Malaysia, the Philippines, Taiwan and Vietnam lay claims in the SCS. Mostly they value the sea for its fisheries, undersea fossil fuel reserves and marine shipping lanes. In fact, all are militarily weaker than China. Out of those countries, Vietnam and the Philippines have spoken out against China’s ship movement and land reclamation at disputed islets.

Without any clear domestic policy on how to “handle” China, these claimant states, for the time being, benefit from the presence of the US and its allies in the region. The Southeast Asian maritime claimants now have some leverage and “protection” from the US, India, Australia, the British and others. They also have the “power” not to engage China bilaterally. This is the reason, for example, why Vietnam might now feel emboldened to step up its drilling for undersea oil and gas exploration. The US actions are certainly offsetting China’s dominance in the region and also counterbalancing or even attacking China’s hegemonic desire in the SCS.

The Non-Claimant: Indonesia

Even though Indonesia is directly bordering the SCS (Indonesia named the sea north of Natuna Island as North Natuna Sea), however, Indonesia has no maritime features claim to the territory. Also, Indonesia persistently rejects China’s claim of the Nine-Dash Line, and secured Indonesia’s Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) as defined by UNCLOS 1982, in which China is a signatory to. This position was reinforced by the decision made by the PCA of 12 July 2016 that there are no maritime features that has the right of EEZ and Continental Shelf. In short, there is no overlapping claim between Indonesia and China, therefore, there is no territorial claim issue to be negotiated between the two countries.

In addition, since 1993 to 2020, Indonesia has continuously objected China’s Nine-Dash Lines map by emphasizing that the map clearly lacks international legal basis and is against UNCLOS. Through persistent objections, Indonesia would like to prevent such claim to become an embryonic and systemic claim, that Indonesia is ultimately not bounded to.

Indonesia’s interest in the SCS remains the same, namely, to maintain peace and security in the SCS. As an honest broker to the conflict, Indonesia would like to create an enabling environment to engage dialogue for peaceful dispute resolution in the SCS based on international law – especially UNCLOS. With its Free and Active Foreign Policy, Indonesia calls on all parties to exercise restraint, refrain from escalatory activities and secure Southeast Asia from military activities that could threaten peace and stability.

Conclusion

The Hague PCA Tribunal 2016 and the presence of the US and its allies in the SCS bestow a positive advantage to Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia, Brunei Darussalam, Taiwan and even, to Indonesia. But the questions remain: for how long? How long will the US and its allies be in the region? What happened if the US and its allies change their policies on the SCS? What will happen if China withdraws from UNCLOS? What will the claimants’ states do if China declares its Air Defence Identification Zone (ADIZ) in the SCS?

Unlike Indonesia, the other claimants need to define its own strong policy on the SCS and on how to “deal” with the People’s Republic of China, with and without the back-up of other states. Without a clear, strong policy, there is no doubt that those claimants will always be the objects of disputes.

These ASEAN Claimant states, together with Indonesia, need also to push China to adhere to the Declaration of Conduct (DOC) 2002 in order to establish mutual trust as well as commitment to the freedom of navigation and overflight principles. Though the Code of Conduct of the SCS (CoC) is not aimed to settle the territorial disputes, CoC is important in managing the conduct of the states in the region. Thus, ASEAN and China need to quickly finish the formulation of COC.

Additionally, Indonesia also needs to develop its national policy on Natuna Islands, its EEZ and surrounding. The national policy should include, among others, policy on economy activities development, military and non-military law enforcement, the enforcement of maritime sovereign rights in Indonesia’s continental shelf and EEZ, maritime domain awareness policy, as well as developing an effective and strong defence and sovereignty diplomacy. The policy must also send a strong message that Natuna Islands, North Natuna Sea and its EEZ belong to Indonesia.

The view expressed is his own.

Part 2: Indonesia and Maritime Rules-Based Order in the South China Sea

Part 3: Changing Realities for Malaysia in the South China Sea Dispute

Part 4: Malaysia’s Diplomacy in the South China Sea: Between the Devil and the Deep Blue Sea

Part 5: A Matter of Firm Resolve: The Philippine’s Strategic Posture in the South China Sea

While many of us are still grappling with the COVID-19 and its derivative challenges, I warmly welcome the five articles touching upon a very critical issue that has been overshadowed, for at least the last two years, namely the South China Sea. I sincerely hope that the other readers share the same sense as of mine.

These articles provide meaningful insights from Indonesia, Malaysia and Philippine over the most recent developments related to the South China Sea saga. The South China Sea is predominantly perceived as a legal issue for the very foundation of the nine dashed line claimed by China contradicts with the provisions of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). Each of the note verbales submitted by the member States of UNCLOS to the Secretary General of the United Nations, which contains a comprehensive legal analysis of why China’s nine dashed line claim is inadmissible, reflects the desire of the international community to uphold the constitution of the ocean and maintain the longstanding order in place. Unfortunately, as everyone sees it, the reality has not changed so much despite of multiple formal rejections.

As a result, States in the Southeast Asia particularly must continue their effort and simultaneously develop layers of strategic plan to anticipate various possibilities that may emerge in the nearest future from China’s assertiveness. This series capture this interesting point. It provides us with wide-range perspectives, from the international relation point of view to the defense and strategic one.

A careful reading upon these four writings gives us understanding of how important the South China Sea for Indonesia, Malaysia and Philippine and what is at stake at this period of uncertainty; What are the possible outcomes from the three countries’ outreach expansion to the Japan, United Kingdom, and United States of America; How the government carefully navigates the country in the middle of competing super powers; and What are the internal improvements currently in progress and ought to be made in Indonesia, Malaysia and Philippine respectively. Additionally, the authors include their analysis upon the multilateral cooperation such as the QUAD and the ASEAN that may have a substantive role in relaxing the tension peacefully.

I enjoyed reading these writings and I believe that you will as well.